Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Category: Mergers & Acquisitions

Why is Intel Buying McAfee?

Intel’s $7.68B announced acquisition of McAfee raised more that a few eyebrows, both in the marketplace and on Wall Street. Does it make sense? It’s hard to say at this point. So much depends upon execution, as well as potential synergies seen by Intel’s management which may not be obvious to outsiders.

 The price is almost 4X McAfee’s most recent annual revenue. That’s very, very pricey in almost everyone’s view. I’ve read a number of columns by others which analyze this deal from various viewpoints.

 Let’s look at several potential rationales for this deal:

 Diversification into software and services

Intel can’t grow in PC semiconductors forever, and is very dependent on the semi business, which can be quite cyclical. Theoretically, attempting to grow by increasing software and services as a percentage of the business makes a lot of sense. But Intel hasn’t been very successful in the past in this very endeavor, which I’ll discuss more below.

 Technology synergies

Intel’s management has provided justification for this deal by talking about embedding security into its chips, as well as valuing highly McAfee’s embryonic security efforts in mobile devices and the cloud. I think these all have strategic merit–but are they worth anywhere near $7.68B?

 Cost synergies

While overlapping functions can lead to cost savings in many acquisitions, there are probably not a lot of costs to be taken out in this one. McAfee is a big company, in a different business than Intel’s core business. Sure, there may be some common functions like HR and finance that can be combined to some extent, but I don’t see cost savings to a material degree here.

 Use of cash flow

Intel generates a LOT of cash. They are one of the most successful tech companies of all times, and their PC processor business is nearly a monopoly, with terrific margins. So the cash is available, and it doesn’t make much sense to have it sitting in the bank earning 1%. THAT will kill your return on assets metric! It needs to be reinvested, or retuned to the shareholders…

 Growth

On the surface, buying a big software company could be a good growth strategy for Intel. Assuming as there is a good return on investment, then why not? It’s going to be hard for Intel to grow much farther in processors. About the only area big enough to make a big difference in their processor business is in mobile. This is a very competitive arena which they’ve failed miserably in to date.

 So that’s some of the reasons you might use to do a deal like this–but is that reality?

 The real reason deals like this happen

CASH: The biggest reason that this type of deal happens is because it can. In this particular case, tech companies like Intel want to be seen as growth companies. It seems to kill tech companies to pay their cash flow out in dividends. But once your company gets to a certain size, it’s hard to be a growth company. A lot of bad acquisitions happen in the process of trying to continue growth status past a reasonable point. But is this the best return on assets, or use of cash flow, for the stockholders?

 Why there is a good chance this acquisition won’t succeed

PRICE: Intel paid dearly for a very established security software player. They paid for the McAfee brand–but will they keep investing in it in the long run? History says that this business will eventually morph into “McAfee by Intel” and they “Intel Security Software”, if the business stays with Intel in the long run. Built into the price was also a large number of retail customers, a dealer and distribution network — but does Intel really want these things? If not, why pay for all of them?

 TECHNOLOGY: Listening to Intel, this seems to be a technology play–but McAfee is universally not considered to have the best technology in the space. They win to a great extent on brand and sheer market presence at this point–like many large companies. Since the price paid was very high–why not buy a smaller player with much better technology to integrate with silicon–for much less?

 CULTURAL FIT: Semiconductors and software are very different businesses. I’ve spent a lot of time in both. I have always said that the “Common Business Sense” that a management team falls back on when stressed, is a real problem when they are making decisions in an unfamiliar business. It doesn’t seem like brain surgery to manage a software business with a semi background, but there are subtle differences that tend to have massive consequences. Intel has bought a number of software businesses in the past–how many of them can you name? There is a reason for this, they tend to disappear in the large semiconductor bureaucracy and eventually wither away.

 Typical M&A ISSUES: Key McAfee personnel will have a tendency to “cash out” and leave after the acquisition. This is a normal issue in M&A, and when the acquirer is in a different space, this can be a particular problem. Possibly the fact that McAfee is already a large public company may reduce this issue. But if the real assets of a software company (the people) walk out the door, there isn’t much left for your $7.68B.

 In summary, I view this as a very questionable move by Intel. Intel has some very smart folks in management. Maybe they have some great strategic and tactical plans in mind, but if so, they’re keeping it all to themselves. For the stated reasons of embedding security in chips, mobile security and the cloud, they could have bought 2-3 innovative security software companies with bleeding edge technology–for a fraction of the price they’ll pay for McAfee. If this acquisition is to pay off, Intel will need to figure out how to leverage the McAfee brand, consumer franchise and distribution channels. I just don’t see this happening in the long run–I hope for Intel shareholders sake I’m wrong. Acquisitions are an area with room for a variety of opinions–what do you think?

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Is HP acquiring Palm a good idea?

To answer the question posed in the title, it definitely is if you’re Palm!

A long time player and sometime innovator in the mobile device marketplace, Palm was rapidly losing steam, market share and relevancy in the hyper-competitive Smartphone market. The company had staked its future on its new WebOS software platform and the recently release Pre SmartPhone.

 After a long period of decline due to an aging product line built on an obsolete software platform, the Palm Pre and its WebOS software was introduced to critical acclaim by industry reviewers and pundits. Had these introductions come a few years ago, they might have indeed turned around Palm’s fortunes.

 But competition in the SmartPhone marketplace has heated up to a white-hot level. After a promising early start, sales momentum of the new Pre products stalled, and this “last-stand” product introduction proved to be too little, too late. At nearly the first sign of Pre sales weakness top Palm executives began bailing out, while Telco partners quit promoting the product heavily, and it was also being dropped from the assortment of major retailers such as Radio Shack. The end was clearing in sight for this handheld industry pioneer.

In swoops HP to save what little shareholder equity was left. HP is on a roll, and in conjunction with their upward momentum they seem to be intent on acquiring everything available for sale, as well as competing in nearly every category of the technology business. This particular acquisition appears to me to be particularly high risk/high reward. It raises several key questions:

 Did HP pay too much?

Probably. The price HP is paying for Palm is about $1.2M, while most knowledgeable industry observers had placed the value below $500M. This is hard to understand for the casual observer, but you must remember that a company is worth what the highest bidder is willing to pay. Except for those on the inside of the deal-making, no one knows what the sizes of the competitive bids were. So it’s a bit pointless to speculate whether they paid more than they needed to. The better question is what is the intrinsic VALUE of Palm to a company like HP?

 A case can be made in this situation for bidding at a price that will prevent the transaction from dragging out. Software loses value quickly–especially in a fast-moving market like SmartPhones, and this is largely a software acquisition. Another big key to the valuation question is whether or not HP is able to hold together and retain the Palm team, especially the key developers. In most cases, buying a software business (which is the key asset of Palm) without the team is nearly worthless.

 Can HP compete in the SmartPhone business, and should they?

This is a huge question in my mind. Hewlett Packard is definitely becoming the 10,000 lb gorilla in the tech business. But even the biggest giants reach a limitation on resources, most importantly senior management bandwidth and market segment knowledge. IBM at one time looked much like HP today, competing actively in nearly every important technology market. Eventually IBM lost traction and did a painful restructuring focusing on services. Microsoft is huge and still dominant in software, but they’ve been far from successful everywhere they’ve invested. There are many examples in the tech business of competing in too many competitive markets at once. The often-used analogy (which still rings true) is to Hitler opening up a two front war by invading Russia. The old joke goes that had he been more focused, we might all be speaking German today. I am very skeptical of Hewlett Packard being able to win in all of the major markets they appear to be serious about at the moment.

 Can putting two losers together ever create a winner?

Not usually. I can’t think of a single high profile successful instance of this, although I’m sure it’s happened before. It usually doesn’t work in such a highly competitive market as SmartPhones, however. Palm was around 5% market share and fading fast.  HP is very successful overall, but its iPaq SmartPhone has less than .1% market share–I’ll bet most of you are shocked to hear that HP was even in the SmartPhone market prior to this deal! When there is a reason that both companies are unsuccessful, it’s very difficult to change the equation simply by combining. Mergers often create more problems then they solve, regardless of how good they look on paper.

 Having said all this, there is some synergy here. There is a belief is that one reason the Pre wasn’t gaining much traction was Palm’s precarious financial position. No one wants to carry around a phone that could soon become an orphan. The HP acquisition should help immensely on that front. Hewlett Packard certainly has the financial might, industry muscle and influence to improve the position of a well regarded platform like the Palm Pre and WebOS platform.

 Will HP be patient and persistent enough to win in SmartPhones?

To me this is the biggest question. If you asked me 10 years ago I would have said no. As a former HP employee, at one time this wouldn’t have been the type of market that I would expect Hewlett Packard to have success. But since them I’ve seen the company persevere for decades as an also ran in the low margin, down and dirty PC business, and finally push Dell out of the top spot. There was a time when Dell (and a few others) used to laugh at HP in the PC market–but that ended a while ago.

 I’m convinced that this ever more powerful version of HP can succeed in SmartPhones if they so choose. But as discussed above, even in a giant company like this, can they win so many tough fights across so many difficult market segments? That is a different question entirely–and something may have to give. They might not be able to win on all fronts.

 Bottom line

The bottom line for me is that HP can probably muscle their way into the SmartPhone market if they want to bad enough. But can they do it while they also compete with Cisco in networking, IBM in services, and Dell in PCs–just to name a few? Even for a successful industry giant like Hewlett Packard is today, I believe in the concept of “biting off more than you can chew”. That is the real risk. One thing I think for sure is that this won’t play out quickly. Only time will tell whether HP ultimately has the market knowledge, patience, tenacity and will to win in this hit-driven and brutally competitive market. What’s your take on this high profile acquisition? Post a comment to rev up a discussion.

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Oracle is buying Sun?

Breaking News…. Oracle buys Sun!? What’s wrong with this picture?

What’s surprising is that a very large software company is buying a very large hardware company. You often see a hardware company buying a software company, but I can’t really think of a deal that’s gone the other way around. Certainly not at this level. My practice at PJM Consulting serves all kinds of technology companies–but a focus is on software. Although every situation is different, my typical advice is for software companies to stay away from hardware, if at all possible.

This news is very interesting on several levels:

Involvement of two high profile, strong personalities in the technology business
I’m talking about Larry Ellison and Scott McNealy. Of course, MCNealy no longer actively runs Sun, but he is still Chairman and a power to be dealt with. He was allegedly the force behind the killing of the potential deal with IBM. Apparently Larry and Scott are old buddies, so maybe there won’t be a problem. But these are two very strong-minded, controversial and sometimes outrageous leaders. Even though they are long time friends, they have never before played together so closely in the same sandbox. It wouldn’t be shocking to see a few disagreements, and some public drama as a result.

Combining the Largest Revenue Database Product with the Largest in Unit Market Share
This aspect of the deal will not get as much attention as some of the others. But Oracle is the 500 lb Gorilla at the top end of the market, and the open source MYSQL is the most popular database choice at the low end, particularly in website development. This aspect likely won’t demand anti-trust scrutiny because they don’t really compete directly. But potential marketplace competition from MYSQL going up market, and Oracle bringing out lower cost solutions, is eliminated by this deal.

Software Company buying a Hardware Company
As I stated above, this is highly unusual, especially for companies of this size. Most established software companies have very high margins, and wouldn’t want to “pollute” their earnings with the lower margin, often commoditized hardware revenue. I can’t think of another comparable deal, looking back even into the distant past. The business models are pretty different. In hardware companies manufacturing efficiency and inventory control are major factors in business success; in most software businesses these are inconsequential factors to success. Hardware businesses tend to be more capital-intensive, while software businesses are very R&D; intensive. I could go on, but suffice it to say that the management of these businesses includes different functional skill sets. Why is Ellison interested in Sun? Just for the Java and the Solaris OS software, or is he really going to continue with the hardware business as well? Even though in some ways, Sun was a bargain at the price of just under $6B net. But if he’s just interested in the software pieces of Sun, the price looks pretty steep–Sun’s direct revenue from Java and Solaris is a pretty minimal portion of its total revenue. Ellison had a flirtation with hardware years ago with the Network Computer concept–could he really still be itching to become a fully integrated systems company?

What will Oracle Do With Sun’s Software?
To me, this is by far the most intriguing question raised by the deal. Solaris is a nice OS, and has a good installed base. But it’s never really had the same impact in the market since open source Linux came around. Java is pervasive in the computing arena, and in embedded systems as well. It has a huge impact on the Internet. It’s literally everywhere. But after trying to charge big money for Java in the early days, Sun decided to give it away. I was intimately involved in the embedded Java market in those early days. Sun initially looked like they had created a technology that could allow them to challenge Microsoft for computing dominance. I believe Microsoft was very worried at the time. But to say that Sun fumbled the ball would be way too kind. Frankly, their effort to commercialize Java was like something out of the Keystone Cops. I could detail their myriad missteps. To summarize, the biggest problem was that they were a hardware company attempting to commercialize a software product, which usually doesn’t work very well. Sun appeared not to have a clue as to what they were doing. Finally, they quit trying to directly make money at Java; they put it into open source and basically decided to give away the technology to anyone who wanted to use it. It looked to me like a way to spite Microsoft, more than anything.

What Happens to Java?
So where does that leave Oracle once they close the deal and own Java? What is their plan to leverage Java in the marketplace? Will they start trying to charge for it somehow? I think this is doubtful; there’s probably no going back on that decision at this point. I’m sure that Mr. Ellison and his team have something in mind–but I can’t imagine what it is. They’ve been very savvy at making some acquisitions that haven’t looked all that complementary, that have worked out well. So I wouldn’t bet against them. But I can help wonder if they haven’t stretched a bit too far in their minds to find synergy in this one. It reminds me a bit of Ebay’s very expensive purchase of Skype, which is now being unraveled because it just didn’t create any synergy. We shall see what happens–it should be interesting to watch this unfold.

SUMMARY
The prospective Sun-Oracle deal is one of the more interesting we’ve seen for a while. There shouldn’t be any major anti-trust issues with this deal, and it doesn’t appear that a higher bidder is likely to emerge. Watching the organizational integration (and possible divestment), as well as the interaction of the outsized personalities, should be entertaining at the very least. But most of all look for what Ellison does with Java–that’s where the real intrigue lays. Post a comment to give me your view of this deal.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Strategies for a Technology Market Slowdown

Is the world economy slowing down? What are the implications for technology companies?

Recently, technology stocks (along with the stock market in general) have tanked. There is a credit crunch that shows no signs of abating, and inflation is rearing its ugly head, with the continual climb in the prices of oil and other natural resources–commodities which touch every aspect of the world economy. Is the economy headed for a severe downturn–taking technology businesses down the drain with it?

I hardly think so, but we have had a very long running economic expansion, that eventually will reverse by the universal law of “what goes up, must come down”. Economies are cyclical by nature, so a downturn has to happen eventually. And tech stocks are usually affected more severely than average in an economic downturn, which affects technology industry investment and ultimately tech growth rates.

So what should you do if you’re the CEO of a software or hardware tech business?

Be Prudent, But Don’t Panic
Now’s certainly not the time to stick you head in the sand, and hope the economy doesn’t get any worse. It almost certainly will; but more importantly, how will it affect your company? That’s what you need to ponder. Is your product a “must have” or a “very nice to have”? Obviously the “nice-to-haves” will have a tougher time in a declining economy, and should plan accordingly. So take the time to analyze you situation, and make a forecast for your own business, based up the unique circumstances of your market and company. Remember, hope is not a strategy.

Look For Opportunities to Outflank Weaker Competitors
For strong players, declining economies can be a great time to pick up market share from weaker competitors. If you have the resources and can do it safely, now might be the time to run a promotion, or selectively increase your marketing. It’s counter-intuitive to most managers’ instincts. But weakening the competition during a downturn can lead to stronger growth when things turn back upward.

Slow Near-Term Expense Growth, But Don’t Compromise Long-Term Initiatives
In most cases, companies will want to carefully monitor, and possibly cut back on their spending. You want to make sure that you don’t put your company in jeopardy, by have expenses out of sync with flat or declining revenues. But try your best to keep intact the initiatives that are critical to long-term growth. You must continue to think long-term as well as short term, assuming you don’t get in a situation where your survival is at stake. Cut back on advertising and office space if you’re seeing a slowdown–but make sure you don’t cut the product development project which will lead to growth 18 months hence. These can be tough decisions, but they really separate the long-term successful CEOs from the flash-in-the-pans. Almost anyone can manage when times are good.

Limit The Growth Of Your Staff
While prudent spending can be wise during a downturn, aggressively increasing the size of you staff usually isn’t. There are always exceptions, of course, but adding too much staff can really bloat your fixed cost structure, in a manner that limits your management flexibility. Unfortunately, many companies are often most aggressively adding staff at the end of a growth cycle–just in time for the downturn. If this leads to layoffs, it can have a devastating effect on your company’s morale.

Although layoffs are sometimes necessary, they are always painful and hurtful to the company culture–unless the company culture is already of the “Attila the Hun”, cutthroat variety. The founders of one of my former employers, Bill Hewlett and David Packard, ran HP for many years with a rule of thumb that limited staff increases to 25% of revenue growth. This helped them avoid the natural inclination to hire someone new every time a new task was identified. I believe was an important factor in many years of smooth growth–without layoffs. This particular metric might not be right for your company, but something similar could prove to be a useful damper on excessive hiring.

Make Sure That You Have Money For A Rainy Day
While it’s no time to panic, it IS time to make sure that you have the financial resources necessary to comfortably cruise through a downturn. VCs and Private Equity firms have been flush with cash; if you are close to a deal to bring in outside investment capital–don’t wait–so it now. Availability of funds and terms will only get worse, as the stock market heads down and the credit crunch continues. Also, make sure that you have available the largest line of credit possible with your bank. It may cost you an extra few thousand dollars a year, but its excellent insurance, if you are surprised on the downside. If you’re in startup mode and financing yourself on credit cards and home equity lines–maximize your future access to these as well! Whatever your sources of funds, make sure now that you’re financially well prepared for whatever the future holds.

Be Poised For The Next Upturn, Whenever It Happens
I mentioned earlier that you should try your best to keep long-term initiatives alive. In that same vein, your thought processes should CONSTANTLY be focused on the next upturn, in all of your decision-making. Again, this assumes that your survival isn’t in question. For example, while massive hiring isn’t usually wise during a downturn, you want to always be open to unique opportunities that may not come along often. Say there is a talented executive available, only because of the downturn. If you can safely afford him or her, snap them up now, before a competitor grabs them. Downturns often present opportunities to improve your business when the next growth cycle occurs. But you need to be “looking ahead” and making good decisions now, to take full advantage of the upturn when it finally does.

Summary
Once again, now is not the time to panic. But it is an important time to plan. Anyone that can predict what will happen with an economy should go to the nearest casino–no need to waste your time with a software or technology company! So I suggest that it might be wise to do a “best-most likely–worst” 2 year forecast now, and try to plan as best you can for the two extreme cases. Post a comment and let me know your thoughts on how the economy and the tech industry will fare in the coming months.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Is It Time to Sell Your Hardware or Software Company?

This is the point that most, if not all, technology entrepreneurs aspire to reach. They dream of selling their company and laying on a beach somewhere, a colorful drink with the requisite umbrella, cooling in their hand.

There are a few of you out there that would never sell your company (it’s your identity, after all), preferring to work forever lest you slow down and quickly deteriorate. But that’s another story; we’ll save your psychoanalysis for another day…

Some of you that want to sell your company have the most grandiose plan of all in mind: An initial public offering (IPO) through a brand name investment banker, bringing not only unimaginable riches, but fame along with that fortune. But that rarely happens–we’ll also table that discussion for another column…

So let’s get back to the great majority of you out there, who set out to some day cash in all of your hard work, by selling your company directly to another company. How do you know when the time is right?

WHAT MAKES PEOPLE WANT TO SELL

There are many triggers that set off serious reflection about whether or not to pursue a sale of a software or tech company. Let’s examine a few of the more common:

1) A potential acquirer approaches the company with an offer
2) A strategic partnership grows closer, and it seems to make sense to grow closer still
3) Business is bad, and the principals begin to worry about losing everything
4) Negative cash flow is starving the business, forcing a sale to ward off bankruptcy
5) The owners need cash for another reason; be it investing in another business, or personal reasons
6) The owner/operators are burnt out, and no longer enjoy the business
7) Business has been robust, and the owners astutely consider whether now is the time to maximize their return, and minimize their risk by selling now
8) It becomes clear that there is a viable business, but is better suited/more valuable within a larger company
9) It’s time for the owners to retire (it seems that very few high tech entrepreneurs make it that far!)

These are the most common reasons that come to mind–it is certainly not a complete list. Although we are talking about companies, the decision to sell ultimately comes down to a personal decision by one or a few individuals. So the reasons that these decisions happen are as varied as the population overall.

Given this list of common rationale for considering a sale, what are the RIGHT and WRONG reasons to consider a sale–if you want to maximize your return within your particular circumstances?

WRONG REASONS TO SELL

On an impulse–you’ve been running your business, not even think about selling your company. An offer comes along, and you get caught up in it–without having planned for it. Or things have been going poorly, and you are at an emotional low. Acting in these circumstances is similar to married, divorced or starting a new business–don’t do it without thinking it through, or planning it properly.
Fear–don’t sell just because you are scared; that’s probably the best way to leave money on the table. There are ups and downs to every technology business. In my experience, things usually aren’t as bad as they look at a specific “down” point in time–or as good as it looks at an “up” time. It’s important to look at the prospects of a business over a period of time, considering both how things have gone and the forward-looking forecast.
Sales are in decline–this is the worst time to sell. If you do this, all leverage goes to the buyer. Of course, panic sets in, as you see your valuation melting away, and human instinct is to “get what you can” before it degrades further. But first consider the situation–is it reasonable that you can turn it around and reignite growth? Is the decline all specific to your business, or is it a cyclical market, or a bad economy overall–which might turn around in some reasonable time period? Sometimes selling under these circumstances is the right thing to do, and is unavoidable. But with proper planning, you may be able to sell your company BEFORE this happens, or turn it around first.

RIGHT REASONS TO SELL

You believe you’ve reached the peak of valuation–this seems obvious, but it is difficult to do. Finding the right time to sell is tricky; you don’t want to exit too early and leave money on the table. So the inclination, given that tech businesses are value as a multiple of revenue or EEBITDA, is to hold on until growth stalls. But if you wait until you built up your sales so much that little “natural” growth” is left in your product/market cycle, the business may not look as attractive going forward, for potential buyers. Most strategic buyers, at least, would like to see growth prospects in a potential acquisition. So it might be best to “leave a little growth on the table”; it might lead to a higher multiple from the buyer.
You haven’t been enjoying running the business for a very long time–I believe strongly this is a time to get out. If you have someone else whom you feel comfortable leaving in charge, that’s fine. But otherwise, either you’ll run it in to the ground from burnout, or you’ll walk away and let someone else destroy it, because you just don’t care anymore. Passion is important in our business; when it’s gone, it’s usually a good time to sell.
A fundamental shift in the market or your business–This could mean many things: you have lost a number of key people, the economics of your market changes, or a major investment will be required to keep the company on a growth path. The specifics here could be quite varied; the common thread is that with the change in fundamentals, there are real clouds on the horizon. This lead you to a thoughtful belief that continuing to operate the business as a standalone entity isn’t optimal.

SUMMARY

An exit, or sale of your company, is a very important “life changing event” for the owners, founders and managers of a software or hardware company. I’ve seen sales come together very quickly, and completely unplanned. I view unplanned company sales as the business equivalent to a quicky divorce that comes out of an emotional event, without careful consideration, or an objective study of the alternatives and consequences. It is a once in a lifetime event for many, and should be given the careful consideration that those types of events deserve. That’s my view–post a comment with your own Exit tales or opinions.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Strategic Acquisitions for Software and Technology Companies

Acquiring new products or whole companies is a popular activity for many growth and market-share oriented companies. Is it a good idea?

Well, as I often say–it depends. I get involved in company or product acquisitions quite often in my consulting practice. There is nothing inherently good or bad about acquisitions in the technology business. However, there is nothing inherently bad about opening a restaurant, either. Nonetheless, a very high percentage of restaurants (I’ve seen figures as high as 90%) fail within 5 years. The failure rate for acquisitions may not be quite as high as for restaurant startups, but technology acquisitions are also judged to be failures at shockingly high rates. Caution should rule when approaching either of these very popular activities. As I’m fond of saying about success or failure in any complex business activity–the devil’s in the details.

Common Motivations for Acquisition Activity

Let’s examine the common reasons that acquisitions are considered in the first place:

1) It’s exhilarating and “sexy” to buy another company
2) Growth for growth’s sake (often pushed by investors)
3) The belief that buying a competitor is the ultimate “victory”
4) A consolidating market (often commoditizing) where there is only room for a few large players
5) Diversification
6) A great strategic fit where 1+1 truly equals 3

As you might have guessed, reasons 1-3 above aren’t great justifications for such a risky activity. Number 4 can be a good justification, but often this is given as the rationale, when the actual market case doesn’t truly support it. Number 5 can be a good or bad rationale, depending upon whether the business case really calls for diversification–or if focus would make more sense. Number 6 is by far the best reason to acquire a company, particularly if you aren’t an industry giant, pitted in a death match with another titan of your marketplace.

So let’s say you’ve actually thought it through, and have used sound analysis and judgment in deciding to pursue an acquisition. Congratulations for passing the first test–but there are still myriad things that can trip you up, on the way to acquisition success:

Great Ways to Fail

First acquisition done “on your own”–I strongly urge all first time acquirers, whether of the product or company variety, to seek assistance. Acquiring a company and even a product is very complex, with a lot of places to trip up. Retaining an experienced hand that has seen and gone through the mistakes before, can prevent you from the most expensive education of your life.
Bad cultural fit–In the excitement of an acquisition or a merger, people have a tendency to not look past the surface. It’s much like dating an attractive potential mate, and proposing based upon infatuation, without establishing whether there is common ground in the way you live your lives. This is the business equivalent of marriage, folks. Compatibility in business philosophies and practices is crucial–and often overlooked, until after the fact, when everything is unraveling.
Poor organizational integration– Even with an excellent evaluation of potential partners, a great many mergers fail based on the execution of integrating the organizations. That’s because it is HARD. You are generally merging two organizations with disparate operating styles, as well as overlapping functions and people. Fear, uncertainty and doubt of the individuals involved can by ITSELF scuttle a potentially great fit. This area is often quoted as the reason most acquisitions fail.
Poor product integration–This is the reason a lot of acquisitions in software and high tech should be called off early in the process. It is often very difficult to rationalize how you are going to support two different code bases or technologies, aimed at the same market. The plan usually call for integrating them over time, but that often proves to be very difficult from a technical perspective. This is a real red flag when buying a direct competitor. Yet the price of the merger in high tech often assumes that the products can be integrated acceptably, without losing customers from either of the existing products. Unfortunately this is usually a very tall order
Paying too much–Price plays a big role in software and technology acquisitions. Due to high growth rates and the perceived need to move quickly in fast-growing, competitive technology markets, acquisitions are often priced in multiples of revenue. This is in contrast to the more conservative multiples of EBITDA in other less dynamic industries. Often the target isn’t even profitable yet, but still commands a high price-to-revenue multiple, due to the “hot” nature of the market space, and perceived value of the acquired technology. This high price puts a severe strain on downstream execution of the merger to be “perfect”, as discussed above.

So with all of the landmines out there in the acquisition arena, along with the high failure rate, is it simply nuts to consider acquisitions? Doesn’t it make sense to just stay away from them? NOT NECESSARILY.

Sound Approaches to Pursuing Mergers

Buying innovation–This often happens when companies reach a certain size; they simply lose their ability to innovate. Rather than innovate internally, they do so by acquiring small companies with market-changing technologies, which may not have the resources to fully exploit in the marketplace on their own. Even though multiples here tend to be high, risk is somewhat mitigated relative to internal Research and Development that might not “pan out”, and the size of the acquisition is often very modest, relative to the resources of the acquirer. This is an example of a true 1+1=3 strategic fit. This strategy has been used with great success by Cisco, Microsoft, and many other large companies with successful acquisition programs.
Buying companies or products that truly fill a hole in your offering–While some companies tend to overuse this as justification, acquisition of a reasonably priced company or product at just the right time, can mean the difference between continued growth or inevitable stagnation.
Buying undervalued assets–This is harder to do in high tech than in other industries; high tech companies have a habit of overvaluing their businesses and technologies. But an executive team with a key eye for a bargain can often pick up a diamond in the rough, for example a division that has suffered because it isn’t a good fit with the parent company’s core business
Truly appropriate diversification–Sometime you run out of steam in your current market, and the amount of cash flow generated by your current business dictates that an investment in another growth area may be prudent. The key here is to pick a market segment adjacent to the existing business, or at least a business that the management team can easily adjust too. However, management teams often are over-confident and deceive themselves, and end up investing in an area where they really don’t belong.

I could go on and talk more about acquisitions for a very long time. But instead of putting you all to sleep, let’s begin a dialogue on this topic. Inform us of your own Merger and Acquisition stories, best practices, and cautionary tales.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Will Web 2.0 Lead to a New Bubble?

So there’s a new “next big thing” happening in the high tech world–that’s feels very, very familiar. In fact, it seems a lot like “déjà vu all over again”, to quote one of my all time favorite philosophers–Yogi Berra. I’m talking about the Web 2.0 phenomenon. The question I present is–what’s the difference between Web 2.0 and 1.0? Although there are obvious differences technologically, and there are a few wildly successful companies following a Web 2.0 style model–my reply is “not a lot” is different.

SOCIAL NETWORKING IS THE BATTLEFIELD

The recent buyout of YouTube by Google for roughly $1.6 billion dollars is what finally set me off to write this article. You see, this is EXACTLY the type of transaction that was representative of the bubble years. An overnight success, with a lot of eyeballs (ok, TONS of eyeballs!) and essentially NO revenue turns it’s twenty-something founders into near billionaires, just months after starting the company. Ok, it was 2 years, but you get the point.

Now we haven’t seen a transaction quite like this in a long time, but they seem to be picking up steam. MySpace was snatched up similarly by Fox for about a half a billion, also with almost no revenue at the time. Facebook also looks like it will be sold soon, to one of the new or older media companies, for a big chunk of change.

What’s happening is the Internet market leaders such as Yahoo, Google, Amazon, Microsoft/MSN, and older media companies trying to keep up, like Fox and Time-Warner–are fighting to get and retain the lead in all the important mass market Internet categories. The hottest one at the moment is referred to as “Social Networking”. The idea is that in Web 2.0, the user is much more of a producer of content in addition to being a consumer of it, so that the idea of online users as passive consumers of content is now passé. This new wave is hitting big with sites that are getting huge growth in traffic, like YouTube and MySpace, which enable their users to produce and publish their own content. But how much money’s really in it?

All the big players are afraid of missing this wave, and like most big companies with respect to societal shifts–have missed the boat completely, or have fallen behind their more innovative startup competitors. And yes, I now categorize Google as one of those less innovative, bigger companies. As much as they’ve tried to avoid that fate, they’ve grown very big quickly–and haven’t had a home-grown hit for a while in “Internet time”.

EYEBALLS FIRST, PROFIT LATER

What strikes me as so familiar about all this is that social networking from Web 2.0 looks A LOT like the “Communities” phenomena of Web 1.0. Both represent an attempt to “get the eyeballs first” and “we’ll figure out how to monetize them later”. Both are based upon the idea of getting people together on a user-driven site, as opposed to selling a specific product or service. And both are driven by a business model where the main source of revenue is expected to be online advertising.

Now I happen to believe that YouTube and MySpace will end up being able to monetize those eyeballs. But does that mean that everyone will?

Some of you might say that the difference is that online advertising has been legitimatized by Google’s unbelievable success with contextual PPC adverting, with their search engine Ads and Adsense network. That success is irrefutable. But does that mean it will go on forever, and that the public will tolerate text ads (or something even MORE invasive) littering nearly every square inch of unused webspace? Personally, I don’t think so. There is definitely a place for online advertising, and I expect it to continue to grow robustly for the foreseeable future. But everyone seems to forget that online banner advertising was also highly successful at the beginning of Web 1.0–until the public got tired of it, and tuned it out. Advertising revenue online dropped like a rock, and many companies were destroyed in the process.

Google has done a great job of improving on the online advertising model so that Advertisers became successful, allowing Google to ride on that success by taking a nice cut of the take. But even today, it’s getting more difficult all the time to make PPC campaigns pay off. The days of easy direct conversions to sales are gone in most markets, and using PPC as a lead generation tool–while still good business for many–is far less compelling. Will the PPC market leaders continue to grow fast for a while longer? I’m sure. Will it flatten out at some point in the medium term? I’m sure of that also. Will most of those companies that are raising huge amounts of venture capital, with online Ad-centric business models, find the same level of success? I’ll bet you everything in my bank account against this. In fact, I think that there is room for surprisingly few additional big players who DEPEND upon online advertising for their success.

PUBLIC MARKET EXCESSES

The other aspect that seems to distinguishes the Web 2.0 wave from Web 1.0 history is the lack of overheating of IPOs. In fact, the IPO market for Tech companies overall still hasn’t really recovered from the Web 1.0 bubble. In addition to the burn marks that remain on Wall Street’s hands with respect to Tech companies, SARBOX has also made going public less attractive to all growth companies. Exit strategies are more often based upon a sale than an IPO these days. But two things here: just because it hasn’t happened yet–doesn’t mean these IPO excesses won’t reappear later in the cycle. I believe we are still early in this one. Secondly, I wouldn’t preclude some type of financial bubble, even without public IPOs of nearly no-revenue companies like in 2000. Anytime hype over-inflates the value of assets, the downstream consequences can be severe. If bidding wars by the established companies get too out of hand, it could still end up having a real negative impact on the stock market and the high tech business environment, down the road.

HISTORY HAS A WAY OF REPEATING ITSELF

My final thought on this topic is that in the High Tech world, there is almost always more money chasing the “next big thing” than can receive an adequate return. This inevitably leads to many excesses, including a level of hype that can only lead to disappointment, for those who get in late or with marginal business plans. The result is a boom-bust cycle that we see re-enact itself over and over again. My thesis is that “eyeballs first, figure out how to monetize later” has always been, and always will be a flawed approach, for all but the fortunate few. If you’re buying into Web 2.0 in a big way, Caveat Emptor–Let the Buyer Beware. A history lesson can sometimes be the most prolific forecaster of all.

Will there be a Web 2.0 bubble, much like the original dotcom bubble? It’s too early to tell. But as I’ve outlined above there are some hints in the news that a repeat might not be that far-fetched.

That’s my take on Web 2.0–what’s yours?

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Flattening of the Growth Curve

In every company’s history there comes a time (or two or three or four times!) when your momentum slows, and the sales curve begins to flatten. This can be one of the most trying and frustrating times for software and technology companies. It’s certainly not as difficult as the startup phase, when “crib death” is an ever present fear. And a no growth, flat revenue scenario is much preferable to declining sales combined with negative profitability that follows, which leads to a “death spiral” if no effective action is taken.

I do find this situation is often more confusing to company management than either the start up or death spiral scenarios. This is because it often occurs just after a period of fast growth and prosperity, where it seems that the company can do no wrong. As a result, senior managers are often in denial about what is happening—whereas in the startup or death spiral situations, the situation is much more obvious, usually motivating folks to take fast, decisive action.

Search for the Culprits, Blame for the Innocent

With flattening growth, it’s easy to blame things that may not be the true cause. I often here excuses and tactics such as the following:

“The marketing department just needs to put out better promotions. Fire the VP Marketing and bring in someone who will get the job done”.

“The sales force isn’t selling hard enough, they just need to close more deals. Get the VP Sales off the golf course and tell him to kick some butt, or he’ll be the next to go”.

“The channel is useless; they’re taking 30% but they aren’t pushing the products—take more deals direct”.

“We just need to charge more for our products; we’re leaving money on the table”.

“Cut the price to stimulate demand.”

“The UK distributor is fat, dumb and happy—sign two more of his competitors to motivate him and maximize sales in that country.”

Now some of these reasons may even be accurate, and some of the proposed tactics could be possibly be useful. But I have found, quite often, that things of this nature aren’t the fundamental issue, and beating up the sales force, cutting or raising prices, or messing with your channel balance may exacerbate the situation and make things worse—not better.

The Real Problem

Sometimes the answer is as simple as “All good things must come to an end.”

Growth cycles don’t last for ever, as much as every software & technology company CEO, VP marketing and VP Sales wishes it would. There is almost a natural cycle that occurs with revenue that often coincides with the life cycle of your products. Also, the economy changes, competition heats up, novel marketing programs age and are copied—which reduces their effectiveness, market segments get saturated, and customer budgets are retargeted to the “next new thing.” Stuff happens—always. The only real question is when.

So what’s a befuddled and perplexed tech company CEO to do?

Finding a Solution

Well, the first thing I recommend is to really spend some time getting to the bottom of things. Instead of shot-gunning blame that may be misplaced, or impetuously blowing up established pillars of the business—conduct a real, objective analysis of the nature of the slowdown. I don’t suggest paralysis by analysis by any means, but do take the time to gather some data, so that your actions will be based on more than knee-jerk reactions.

Past that, it’s hard to generalize on a course of action, because the proper action will depend upon what you find in your analysis. But for the sake of discussion, let’s say that while there are a few factors that you find which could be leading to slower growth, no there isn’t a “silver bullet” reason that can be “fixed” to get the revenue curve again pointed up and to the right. Below are some general ways that I’ve found may enable you to “restart growth”. I might add that many of them are most effective if you begin them prior to actual revenue flattening:

Try marketing programs you haven’t used before
Usually when you get in a period of high growth, there is a workhorse program or two that has worked well for you, and there is a tendency to “keep doing what works”. Unfortunately, even the best conceived marketing programs eventually run out of steam. One of the keys to having consistently good outbound marketing, is too be constantly testing new ideas, placing small bets, and fine-tuning them if there is enough success to continue. As I’ve said many times before, product marketing is part art, and part science—with the art portion unfortunately upfront. You need to do a little trial and error to find a good program, and then the science kicks in, using data you’ve gathered to optimize it. But the key is to be constantly testing new ideas, in good times and bad. If you wait until your growth has already slowed, you may scramble for quite a while, trying to find an answer.

Have an internal “growth” brainstorming session
Ideally you are doing this before you fall into a revenue rut. But regardless, do bring together people in your organization, to bring out the ideas they may have to give the top line a kick start. Do hold these sessions in an open, non-threatening and non-political environment. It’s important that people are able to speak freely, and not be ridiculed, if they come up with an idea that’s “too far out of the box”. That is often where strategic breakthroughs are made. And don’t just limit these sessions to executive managers. Remember, the people at the bottom of the org chart are often the ones closest to the business, and are sometimes able to more easily spot a big opportunity that the company could capitalize on.

Hire some outside help
Consultants have a very bad name in some areas—unfortunately, sometimes with good reason. But bringing in someone with deep marketing or management expertise, with a different viewpoint than the internal management team, can sometimes be the quickest way to new approaches that will turn the ship quickly. I’d recommend staying away from folks that that have a cookbook formula, have only been consultants and not operating executives, or take too much of an academic approach. Every company, market and point in time is different, and needs to be analyzed as such. But hiring the right outside consultant or firm who is creative, analytic and “been there and done that” can have a big impact. PJM Consulting has often worked as a change agent in these situations, and increasing or restarting traction is an area of specialty.

Look at entering an adjacent market
If it’s determined that your current market space is getting saturated, one of the first things to do is to look at adjacent spaces. Preferably, look somewhere that you can leverage your current marketing, distribution and brand, but also possibly where you can apply existing company technology to a different customer’s problem. The key here is don’t go to a complete green field, that looks attractive because it’s large or growing fast, but where you have no real business competing. Again, it’s best to be taking this step in anticipation of slowing growth in your current business—rather than waiting until it happens. Getting traction in new areas can take some time.

Consider M&A; to fill out your product line or distribution system
If you’ve been caught by a surprise slowdown and you need to do something quickly, a strategic acquisition can sometimes be the answer. I warn you to proceed with caution here. M&A; is fraught with danger—statistics show that most acquisitions don’t work out well. You need to think it through, proceed carefully, and don’t get overly excited
by the thrill of the deal chase. If done well, however, a strategic acquisition can be a real shortcut to entering an adjacent space, filling out your product line for an existing strong distribution system, or adding sales channels to your strong product offerings. This is another area where PJM Consulting has strong experience, and can offer assistance.

Think it through before you start shooting

There are obviously endless other potential ways to explore, when attempting to jump out of a revenue rut. I wanted to suggest a few to stimulate your thinking—and more importantly, steer you away from some “knee-jerk” reactions, that often make your situation even worse.

What have you done in the past when you need to restart growth? Post a comment below and fill us all in.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Should You License Your Technology?

So when should you license your technology to other companies? This can be a complicated question, since I always say “no one sells your product like you do.”

Depending upon your tendencies, there is a bias toward holding everything you develop close to the vest, unwilling to give that hard-earned technical advantage to another company. Or you may be on the other side of the fence, and want to very quickly “cash in” on a technological development—thinking that there are very large companies out there that can do a much better job selling the product than you can.

So really, what’s the right approach? Just like most other decisions facing managers of technology companies, there is no one simple answer. It really does depend on your situation.

Have a Process

The best way to approach a decision of this nature is through a methodical, logical process. It shouldn’t be done emotionally, or without proper data. To come to the optimal answer, you need to be very honest about the position of your own company in the market, your priorities, company strengths and weaknesses, and the level of resources available to you. In addition, you need to have a solid understanding of the potential of the technology in the market, whom might be an attractive licensee, how interested they may be, and “can you license to someone else and still sell your own version”?

These, and many other questions, should be answered before you reach a conclusion. All too often, however, I see companies make a snap decision on whether to pursue a licensing strategy or not. This is very strategic question for a company, yet I have seen the decision made on a whim—with less thought than “where should we have lunch today?”

What have you got?

So let’s walk through an example process. First of all, what have you got–really? Is this IP something that is a fundamental step forward, or a “nice to have?” Things that are fundamentally unique, you will want to think very carefully about before sharing with others. It may be the best thing to do, but I would recommend thinking it through most carefully, if you have something truly unique and desirable. Lesser inventions carry lesser risks of lost opportunity costs, if they are licensed out.

Does it fit the Core Business?

Second, how does it fit with your current business? If it doesn’t fit with your core business, and you have no reason to “run away” from your core business, the decision becomes a lot easier. If your current business is thriving and you have quite of bit of runway left to pursue in that market, opening up a second business has a high likelihood of becoming a distraction—potentially harming the core business. Plus, it is very likely in this instance, that you will not be able to do the new opportunity justice, anyway. So to avoid sub-optimal outcomes in both business areas, it almost always makes more sense to license the technology to another player, whose business is a better fit—and one who will dedicate the resources required to gain success.

Can you “have your cake and eat it too”?

Third, if it does fit the core business, can you license it to other segments on a non-exclusive basis? This is an important question to consider. If the answer is yes, I call this “having you cake and eating it too.” The answer to this question is dependent upon a couple of things. Are there “fences” that can be set up between your market segment, and that of the potential licensee?

As an example, let’ say you have a new enterprise application that is different, but complementary, to your existing core product. This new product can be sold to the same type of large corporate customer that your existing product is sold to. But this new application also has strong potential in government markets, where you have no current presence. The government market is very different, and contacts are crucial to success. Instead of trying to build distribution into this new government market from scratch (which can be time-consuming), it is potentially a very wise move to license the new product to a company with existing, strong government business. They can sell it under their own label, put marketing money behind it, provide support, etc. In this way you have accessed that market, without entering into an area outside of your core competency, and without spreading around your scarce resources.

Non-exclusive licensing can be a great compromise

This is the type of “complementary” licensing deal that can be very effective in optimizing your total return on a technology. The key to this strategy is for there to be a good “fence”, so that you don’t create channel conflict between you and your licensee. In this example, you’re in the corporate market, and the licensee is in the government market. So it’s very clean and complementary, basically incremental revenue with little costs.

There are other examples of non-exclusive licensing where you end up competing with your own product under a licensee’s label. This can work as well, but it’s a lot trickier to manage. You will run into channel conflict issues, much like selling your own labeled product through reseller channels, with the added twist of another brand involved in the competition.

The final thing to consider is timing. How well protected is the technology, and how fast is the technological curve moving in this market space? If the market isn’t moving fast technologically, there may be no one overtaking you quickly. A sleepy, slow moving market tips the scales toward keeping the technology and developing the market for it in-house, rather than aggressively licensing it to others. Regardless of your resources, it becomes more likely that you will have time to exploit the IP, when there is little fear of someone leapfrogging your technology. If on the other hand, you’re positioned in a brutally competitive market with rapidly evolving technology, the arrow moves the other direction. In this case, IP is a fleeting advantage, and one that better be used ASAP, before it becomes obsolete. This scenario begs for a strategy of aggressively licensing the technology, to obtain the best return possible, in the short period of time that the IP will be relevant.

There is, of course, much more to consider when undertaking a decision to license/not license out your technology. This discussion provides an introduction to some of the major points that should absolutely be reviewed in any licensing discussion.

I’d love to hear some stories about your own licensing efforts, and hear points of view from a different angle. Post a comment or email me your thoughts.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Shooting Stars or Industry Stalwarts—What Makes a Great High Tech Company?

You’ve seen them many times. The software company that starts off like a bullet, racing at the high tech equivalent of 0-60 mph in 4 seconds. These companies come out of nowhere, and are an immediate factor in their market.

There are many examples, in nearly every major market segment. Netscape comes to mind as one of the more famous. Peregrine Systems here in San Diego is another example. I’m sure every reader can think of many more.

So what is the difference between one of these “shooting stars” and the Microsoft’s, Hewlett Packard’s and Dells of the world? After all, in the beginning, they pretty much all look alike on the surface.

Cutting Corners

I believe if you look under the covers, however, there are real differences. It’s the difference between a fast rising house of cards, and a mansion built to withstand Hurricane Katrina. You start with a solid foundation when you go to build something lasting—which of course a house of cards is lacking completely.

Now most of the time, people don’t intentionally set out to build a house of cards. It usually happens when the stress and strain of the marketplace gets in the way. That’s when management begins taking short cuts. It’s often an incremental thing. Cutting expenses in that key project, so that you can appease Wall Street by making next quarter’s numbers. Accepting just a slightly less than normal quality level, to allow that behind-schedule new product to finally get out the door. Hiring just a few less engineers than was in the plan for this year. Reducing the corporate, brand-supporting Ad buy—a ten percent reduction won’t hurt—will it?

It’s all just meant to be temporary—but cutting corners has a way of becoming permanent by default, especially when there is brutal competition, or extreme pressure from the Street.

Winners Maintain the Foundation

Every great company has a foundation that it is built on—and the care and maintenance of that foundation is a non-negotiable expense for long-term success. With HP, it was historically the R&D; budget and reliability of its products. The R&D; monster was always fed, because product innovation was what fueled the company’s growth for over 60 years. And for a long time, reliability was never compromised. The product might end up being a little too costly, a little too big, a little too heavy or late to market—but it was built like a tank, and the products were unquestioned leaders in reliability. Indeed, I would say that the HP brand stood for strong reliability for many years. Now that the company has lost it’s way a bit, I don’t know that the HP brand still has the same reliability cache, which it had in past years. Still it’s a quality brand; mind you, just not quite the same. The maniacal devotion to quality just isn’t quite there anymore. And it’s funny that just about the only thing that has been truly “invented” at HP in recent years is the word “Invent” being placed alongside the logo in advertising. Ironically, even with the dearth of HP engineering invention in recent years, R&D; expenses remain high relative to competitors—the worst of both worlds.

Microsoft was built on monopoly power and paranoia. And I don’t mean that in a negative sense. Depending upon your perspective, Microsoft either shrewdly created the DOS/Windows monopoly position it has enjoyed for years—or luckily fell into it. I suspect it was a bit of both, but no matter. Since realizing their position, Microsoft has never lost their aggressiveness, or failed to leverage their monopoly platform. Some believe they’ve overstepped at times, and I have always felt that they left a lot of money on the table rolling things into the Operating System—essentially given it away for free. But they’ve reacted every time there has been a threat—Apple, WordPerfect, Novell, Lotus, Netscape—the list of road-kill is quite long. Some of their moves may have been overkill, as their paranoia seems to present every software company in the world as a potential threat to their dominance. But they never took their eye off the ball, building and protecting their OS and Office franchise with as much firepower as required, for as long as it took. Even though Microsofties are very pleasant to deal with on an individual basis, the company as a whole is predatory. They believe it’s their birthright to sell every last line of software code in the world. I believe that this aggressive corporate culture is a big part of the foundation that Microsoft is built upon. It has let them survive and thrive since the infancy of the PC until today—alive and well for the fight with the latest pretender to their throne—Google. But more on Google later.

We’ve examined a couple of long time winners—now let’s look at one of those classic shooting stars—Netscape.

Formula for Losing

It looked like the next big thing—the Microsoft if the Internet Age. They were to be the successor to the throne. They were the darlings of High Tech, and Microsoft was shaking in its boots. It was one of those times where Bill, Steve and the Microsoft gang got caught napping a bit. They didn’t see the Tsunami of the Internet coming at them—until it was almost too late. But the boys from Redmond recovered in time, and put all hands on deck until they finally smothered the upstart Netscape. So what happened to Netscape?

Well, in large part, Microsoft happened to Netscape. Microsoft put together a Herculean effort to change their company to compete in the Internet Age. But they stumbled a bit a first, giving Netscape some breathing room. Early versions of Internet Explorer, like some much software out of Microsoft, were not very good. They were almost laughable, to be frank. But Microsoft is the Terminator of the software business. It just keeps throwing people and money at the problem, and version after version comes out until they get it right. Unfortunately, Netscape had never built a solid foundation to combat this onslaught, in my opinion. The browser was what they were about. But an early decision to use the browser as the “razor” in that classic razor/blades marketing strategy, turned ultimately into a flaw. Intending to make their money on Servers, I feel that they neglected to keep the Navigator Browser as the market leader. It was a tough battle, with Microsoft bundling IE into the OS. But they needed to find a way, through innovation, to keep Navigator in the forefront of the browser wars. It was a tough task—no doubt. But once that browser franchise began to erode, their reason for existence began to fade away. It was really their foundation—which began to crack when it wasn’t built to last. The other mistake, which compounded their plight, was fighting a multi-front war with Microsoft—much like Hitler in WWII. They didn’t have the corporate infrastructure or resources, but chose to compete head to head in every market Microsoft was in. Novell made the same mistake, both companies buying some second-rate competitors to Microsoft, just to get in the game. Instead, they should have focused their resources where they had a lead, and a chance to win—Netscape in Browsers, Novell in Networking. History tells us that the upstart must focus and win decisively in that first battlefield, before they move on. Or they almost certainly will be crushed.

How Will Google Do?

Which brings us back to Google. They are the current technology darling and high flier, next big thing, and the latest threat to Microsoft. Once again, Microsoft is treating this threat as real. Right now, we’re at that stage where it appears Google is winning. But I remember when Novell and Netscape were, too. It didn’t last. And I see some parallels emerging—Google is diversifying rapidly, even recently making noises about competing with Microsoft in office sof
tware. That would be a huge blunder, in my opinion. Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, is a veteran of mammoth battles with Microsoft from his time at both Sun and Novell. It will be interesting to see what he has learned from the past.

What do you think—is Google the next Microsoft, or will they end up as a footnote like Novell or Netscape? Post a comment and tell me what will happen—and why.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/