Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Category: Distribution Channels

Software Product Marketing: Horizontal vs. Vertical

An important discussion for most software companies–both in the product planning stage and in the downstream active marketing phase–is the manner in which it will be marketed. The decisions to be made in each phase are separate but closely related. This set of discussions need to happen regardless of whether you are marketing a traditionally licensed application, an open source application or a SaaS application.

One of the more important aspects to this is whether the product will be aimed tightly at one or several vertical segments, or marketed more broadly to the widest possible audience. This is the crux of the vertical vs. horizontal decision. Let’s examine a few topics which can be useful in framing this discussion.

How specific is the “language” of your application to a vertical audience?

This is very important because in some product categories the unique business processes of a vertical can be very important, while in other categories there is great commonality in process and language across industries. If you’ve written your application specifically to solve one market segment’s unique problem, it’s probably VERY specific. When this is the case it’s pretty obvious that you’ll start (and possibly end) with a highly vertical marketing effort. Sometimes as thing go along you may find that you’ve solved a problem for market A, but it’s also useful in market segment B and C–although there often needs to be at least some modification. If you’ve solved a more generic problem that applies to many markets, the decision to market the solution horizontally or vertically can be much less clear.

How big is your overall market?

A key consideration when you’re entering a new market with a new product. The larger the market the more likely it is you will need to take a vertical approach get initial traction. In many cases this means verticalizing the product in the product development phase. But even if there isn’t a strong set of vertical needs with respect to product features and “language”, in large markets a vertical promotional approach may be required to build market traction. It is often far easier to build a brand name and market traction in a tight vertical before you move on to the next segment, than by taking a more scatter-shot approach with no vertical focus.

What is the level of competition in the overall market?

This question is related to first question above as strong competition often goes hand in hand with large markets. They are separate issues, however, and should be evaluated individually. If the level of competition is high, regardless of market size, a new entrant is likely to have a better chance of success with a more vertical approach. It there isn’t significant competition in the segment, you may be able to have success with a horizontal approach, which can be a more efficient way to use both product development resources and marketing dollars.

Market maturity: has the overall market verticalized already?

Regardless of the level of competition and the market size if the larger market has already evolved into a number of vertical sub-markets, it may be too late to take a horizontal approach. It is usually very difficult to defeat entrenched verticalized competitors when entering a market with a horizontal application. The exception to this would be a new competitor with a product that provides a quantum leap forward in functionality (usually as a result of a technological paradigm shift).

What level of marketing resources are available to you?

The level of marketing dollars available to you are quite important in formulating your approach to the vertical vs. horizontal question. As one example, let’s say you are entering a market that is large, quite competitive and you won’t have a lot of marketing budget available. In this case, it would be very important to develop the product upfront with the strongest vertical focus possible and market it accordingly. On the other extreme, you might be entering a market of modest overall size that hasn’t verticalized to a great degree to date and you are well funded, enabling a substantial marketing budget relative to the competition. It this case it might be an easy decision to take the ROI-efficient horizontal approach both from a product development and promotional perspective. There are many potential scenarios between these two extremes which unfortunately will lead to less obvious decision-making.

Is your software a “point” or “platform” application?

Most software applications are “point applications”, meaning they have little or no integration with the rest of the software infrastructure. In addition, any possible customization is generally intended to be done by the application vendor themselves or maybe their channel partners.

I define a software application as a “platform” when it utilizes an open API which enables BOTH channel partners and third party software vendors to write add-on applications which extends the platform software’s functionality in two key area:

1)      by adding “vertical” functionality not present in the platform software thereby enabling a complete solution for a specific vertical market.

2)      using the API to integrate the application with other parts of the software infrastructure

In this way a platform software application allows a software vendor to “have it’s cake and eat it too” with respect to the Horizontal vs. Vertical discussion. The platform software itself provides basic functionality which can be sold broadly across many markets, while the open APIs enable the product to be tightly customized for specific verticals as required, by both your channel partners and independent ISVs. The platform application can be a product manager’s dream and is the Holy Grail of software when it comes to efficiently serving as many market segments as possible by leveraging partner investments. But it’s not something that can be forced; there needs to be a natural reason for the platform to exist, or there will be no third parties willing to write the add-on applications so critical to the platform’s success. Without these add-on application a platform will more often than not die a quiet death in the marketplace.

In some cases, such as when you write an application which aimed at a problem specific to a single vertical market, the answer to this “vertical vs. horizontal” question is easy. In many other cases you’ve created a product which is useful across several market segments–but do you have the resources to attack multiple market segments simultaneously? How do you approach this common problem?  Leave a comment below with your take or shoot us an email with your questions.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

A Software Startup Video Case Study

Selling and Marketing Software Through the VAR Channel: Morettini on Management Video Series

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Musings on Software Market Segmentation and TV Morning Shows

I like to check out one of the morning TV shows on one of the major US-based networks for a few minutes, as I’m eating my breakfast cereal. There are 3 major programs on at the start of the day: NBC’s Today Show (the traditional market leader), ABC’s Good Morning America (the perennial runner-up) and the recently re-branded CBS This Morning in (last place for many years).

So what the heck does this have to do with software market segmentation, you ask?

I’ve been struck by how much the morning show race reminded me of the software industry has become more vertical over time. In particular, there are some strong parallels between the software business and the morning shows with respect to the product being “soft enough” to make relatively easy product changes as part of a new segmentation strategy.

Recent changes in strategy on the TV morning shows

The Today Show has been the “10,000 lb Gorilla” of the morning shows since the beginning of the category. They’ve had a large lead over their competitors across multiple changes in on-air personnel and even societal cultural changes over the years. The Today Show’s format has been aimed at a “horizontal” audience–a little bit of something for everyone. They start with hard news at the beginning of the show and it gradually becomes “lighter”, transitioning to Pop culture, celebrities and gossip as the show progresses through its marathon 4 hour time slot.

The other two major shows have taken a real beating at the hands of NBC in the ratings, with many tweaks to their formats and even more turnover in personnel over those many years. Fundamentally they have tried to compete by “building a better Today Show”, essentially competing head on with the market leader in a horizontal fashion. But over the last couple of years, ABC and more recently CBS have changed their strategy, utilizing a much sharper segmentation than at any point previously. ABC has essentially gone “younger and lighter” over the last couple of years. The show has the least serious tone and is the most “fun” of the three, focusing a lot of time on pop culture and other topics skewed toward younger viewers. It’s paid off. Good Morning America has taken a clear lead over the Today Show due primarily to this new segmentation and to a lesser extent some personnel missteps at NBC.

After many years in last place, CBS has segmented sharply in the other direction with a shorter 2 hour program focused almost entirely on hard news and staffed by serious, credible news people. It’s too early to say how successful this will ultimately be for CBS, but they have won over this writer and have picked up some market share overall-I’m watching consistently CBS in the morning for the first time. The Today Show has been struggling to remix it formula and regain its clear lead, looking much like a complacent large company that has grown fat, dumb and happy as a result of years of unchallenged success.

Software Market Equivalents

Ok, enough about TV morning shows! How does this relate to segmentation in the software market? A very similar situation albeit in a B2B rather than B2C market, is the ERP software market. The ERP market is also a very large, horizontal market–a mass B2B software market, if you will. Just about every company in the world needs some type of ERP software to run its business, from an entry-level, basic accounting application like Intuit’s Quickbooks all the way up to very expensive, complex enterprise suites such as offered by Oracle, Microsoft, SAP and Sage.

This of course is one form of verticalization–segmentation by target customer size and sophistication. Intuit and Oracle aren’t targeting the same segments. But the ERP market is so large that over time it has also segmented by industry; nearly every industry group of any significance now has ERP software vendors with specialized applications aimed at a narrow industrial segment.

Another similar example is Medical Practice Management Software. The last time I looked, there were over ONE THOUSAND software vendors with products targeting this very large market. You would think the software requirements of most medical practices would be pretty standard across the board. But because the market is so large and lucrative, nearly every market segment (Surgeons, Gynecologists, Dentists, Chiropractors, etc.) has it’s own sub-market of competitors, with applications that speak that particular medical practice’s lingo and strictly models its business processes.

I have a personal example from earlier in my career that illustrates how important segmentation can be as part of a software company’s overall strategy. I took over as CEO of an early stage mapping software company with excellent technology but an unsophisticated business strategy. While the company had a neat technical advantage over its larger competitors, the product otherwise was positioned directly against the market leaders in that space. The primary distribution channel for the mainstream mapping products of the time was computer and electronics retailers, a notoriously tough and expensive channel. I was able to make some headway in penetrating this channel. But even with our technical feature advantage it was already too late in the game and we lacked the resources to compete and win head-to-head with the larger market leaders of that time.

So we quickly came up with a segmentation strategy that proved quite helpful. Initially we took out some features away from our primary product and created an entry level product priced far below the mainstream mapping products. This allowed us to occupy the price leader position targeting the most price-sensitive consumers, and distribute through both consumer/gaming software stores of the time as well as mass market retailers such as drug and grocery stores. The mainstream mapping software players had almost no presence in these channels due to their higher price points. This entry level product, created with minimal development costs, allowed us to generate cash flow to fund our longer term segmentation strategy which was to target the B2B market. The mainstream mapping products were fairly generic and used by business people as well as consumers, but really designed for any consumer with no business-oriented features to speak of. We were able to create a premium, business-focused version of our product which we positioned as the mapping products for mobile workers/road warriors such as sales reps and service technicians. We included important business-specific features, such as integration with the popular CRM systems of the day, which weren’t found in any of the other mainstream mapping products of the day.

Important considerations in segmentation strategy

Hopefully we’ve established that segmentation of your software market can be a very powerful tool to compete with and outflank strong competitors and ultimately maximize the value of your business. So what are the important things to consider in formulating your segmentation strategy? Let’s look at a few:

Horizontal vs. Vertical – The first thing to consider is how horizontal your segment currently is and how vertical you think you need to be to compete effectively. There is a fine line here; the more horizontal you can remain (targeting multiple segments with the same product) the higher your product’s ultimate profit potential. But you must be realistic about your market position–go as “vertical” as you need to win–or your profit potential is likely zero!

Market Maturity – The more mature the market is when you enter, the more likely it will be important to segment smartly and attack a vertical niche. Of course this or any single factor shouldn’t be used in a vacuum to create a strategy–many factors need to be considered in your segmentation decision.

Market Size – The larger the market size, the more likely it is that it’s ALREADY segmented and will likely force you to do the same. There are several prominent potential exceptions here, listed in the bullet points below.

Market experience of the company - Do you know the market well, and just as important, are you known by the market? In cases where you’re known and understand your market well, it raises your odds of success even entering with a more horizontal approach.

Levels of funding – Big companies with massive resources or heavily funded startups may be able to successfully  use a horizontal approach, although many confident late entrants of this type have failed in a variety of software market categories.

IP/Technology & other strategic advantages – A true innovator with market changing IP may also be able to attack and win in an established market using a horizontal approach, as they are effectively changing the ground rules of the market. But again, I’ve witnessed many companies very confident in their technical advantage that have ended up with their hats handed to them when competing head on in an established market.

Important upfront decision–but never too late to change

Like any important business consideration, it’s far better to optimally segment the market for your products up front then to wait until you are FORCED to do so. But just like a morning TV show, in the software business it’s relatively easy–at least compared to other technology categories such as computer hardware or semiconductors– and almost never too late to modify your target segments.

What’s your feeling on how best to approach segmentation in the software business? Post a comment so we can all benefit from your experiences.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Separating Technology Wheat from the Chaff

In software and hardware businesses new ideas, technologies and products come down the pike at a rapid-fire pace. Many fail immediately and some muddle along before finally fizzling out. Some meet with modest success. Only a very select few turn into long run big hits. How can you tell which products will become hits, out of a sea of mediocrity?

Not many people can differentiate between these new ideas, technologies and products at an early enough stage to profit massively from it. Keep in mind I’m not talking about small successes, but the really big ones. The ability pick the big winners out early is a rare skill set, yet one that is applicable across a wide swath of functions including general management, product planning/management, inventors, venture investing, stock analysis/selection and many more.

Short of having a brilliant mind, multidisciplinary worldview and the ability to see the future—how do you go about maximizing bets on what will hit it big and what won’t? Here are some questions that may be useful to ask when making your evaluation:

Does it solve a fundamental problem, bend a cost curve or create a new playing field?

Not every new product is based upon a fundamental technical breakthrough—but it sure helps! After all, innovation is still the basis of the technology business. This is where you look first when seeking big ideas you can profit from, something that fundamentally changes the game in a particular marketplace. One of the most spectacular examples of a breakthrough that met all three of these criteria is the personal computer. It solved some fundamental problems of the time associated with mainframe computing, certainly bent the cost curve of computing downward (and continues to due so even today) and created an entirely new ecosystem with broad societal implications. Meeting all three of these criteria is a very tall order that you won’t see often, but passing one of these three tests is almost essential for a big-time winner with staying power.

Where does it fit in the marketplace?

There are certainly many great stories of fundamental research breakthroughs without immediate, obvious market applications that ultimately found a market and became a great hit. The problem occurs when the second step—finding a market—is given short shrift, or skipped completely. This can happen when there is pure excitement and the folks funding the project have a purely technical viewpoint. The number of big successes without expert market vetting is actually pretty rare although there have been some spectacular exceptions.

We’ve all heard of the invention of super glue by accident. And Thomas Watson Senior, Chairman of the IBM Corporation in 1943 was quoted as saying: “I think there is a world market for about five computers.” Five units do not make a commercial market, but IBM made the investment anyway—and look how that turned out. But in reality the number of fundamental breakthroughs in the research lab dwarfs the number of truly successful, innovative new commercial products. So it’s important to not get too excited about these breakthroughs until a commercial application becomes obvious and realistic. Avoid at all costs the proverbial “Cure looking for a disease”, regardless of the almost mythical stories of a few massive winners borne from purely technical circumstances.

How does it compare to alternative solutions, both current and forecasted?

After deciding the breakthrough isn’t a cure looking for a disease and which market segment it fits in, it’s also very important to evaluate how it stacks up vs. rival technologies and products. And not just with respect to a current market snapshot, but looking forward as well. Forecasting really comes into play here; which technical platform has the longest runway? An example is satellite TV vs. Cable TV. When Satellite TV came into play it took a lot of market share quickly by providing innovative new services which the utility-like Cable TV companies were slow to match. But in the long run the wired infrastructure of the CableCos may provide a strategic technical advantage in that long running battle that may enable a more advanced and diverse product set.

Do the owners have what it takes to bring it to market?

This question applies not only when evaluating someone else’s product or technology—but also your own. Realistic self-reflection is important here. There have been some great new innovations that have been wasted due to bad marketing, lack of financial resources or just plain ignorance and incompetence. These weaknesses often lead to the “ arrows in the back of the pioneer”, where the folks that initially bring out the “next big thing” fail or are quickly overtaken by a more tactically skilled competitor, who improves on the idea and/or out-executes them in the market. The software spreadsheet market is instructive here, conjuring up images of several bigger fish progressively swallowing smaller ones. Visicalc was the original spreadsheet innovator overtaken by Lotus who was then in turn overtaken by MS Excel. The resources and capabilities of the innovation’s owner matters a great deal in the long run.

Is it defensible?

This is what often separates the “flash in the pan” from a true long term winner. Defensibility can be defined by the traditional technology means of patents, copyrights and trade secrets. But there are more subtle ways of defense that can be very successful in the long run: branding, entrenched distribution channels, strategic partnerships and cost advantages.

Especially in the software and hardware businesses there are tons of fast followers, who are lying in wait for an emerging trend or new market segment, where they can apply deep resources and tactical skill to out-execute the pioneers. In hardware markets the major Japanese manufacturers long ago mastered this model by taking US inventions and productizing them cheaper and better. The large Korean manufacturers then found success with this same model and most recently it’s been replicated by the Chinese. In the software business Microsoft and other large software companies have grown by either mimicking or buying up technology leaders who have pioneered a new market segment. However it’s done–make sure the next big thing is defensible before betting on it becoming a big-time, long term winner.

Does it pass muster from every angle?

As stated earlier, it really helps to be a “renaissance man” man with a multidisciplinary worldview. But people meeting that description are in very short supply, so it’s really important to employ experts across several key disciplines such as technology, finance, manufacturing and marketing, to evaluate market potential and possible weaknesses. In the technology business marketing and technology are usually the key differentiating factors, so at a minimum make sure that expertise is brought to bear in those areas during your evaluation.

There you have my view—how to do separate the winners from the losers. Post a comment with your own view of this very debatable topic.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Is Your Tech Business Marketing or Sales Driven?

Software and hardware business are often segmented by the vertical or horizontal market they’re targeting, their technology platform, small vs. large companies and so on. One of the important ways to segment tech businesses, which isn’t often discussed, is by whether the company is sales-driven or marketing-driven in their customer acquisition strategies.

A balanced approach

Now some reading this article may ask “why wouldn’t you take a balanced approach”? Indeed, I don’t mean to suggest that either sales or marketing should be absent in the customer acquisition efforts of tech companies. There are a few scenarios that could be drawn up to support such a singular approach—but very few for sure. There are also some situations where the customer acquisition circumstances are “in between” in price, complexity, market size, etc. and you end up with a fairly balanced approach between marketing and sales. But in my experience the sales or marketing function will rise to the lead, more often than not.

Key criteria in choosing customer acquisition techniques

There are several considerations that often drive whether marketing or sales will dominate:

  • Product Complexity – This often decides whether or not a product can be truly driven to purchase by marketing or whether significant sales rep intervention will be required to close a deal. It should be noted that when product complexity is high, marketing support in the form of sales tools (examples: case studies, road map presentations by product management) will still be very important in the sales cycle. But this will generally be a sale that is driven by the sales force with marketing in a supporting role.
  • Product Price/ Typical Sale Size – The smaller the product price and typical sales size, the more likely you’ll be able to acquire customers exclusively through marketing, or in conjunction with inside sales that is largely “taking orders”. Conversely, products that cost a lot may require the extra interaction provided by an outside sales force (and the deal size also justifies the cost of the sales force).
  • Market Size – Very large markets with lots of customers are more easily and cost-effectively reached with effective marketing. A tight market with a small number of total prospects (think nuclear power plants) will usually be served almost exclusively by an outside sales force with minimal marketing intervention.
  • Use of Channels – While companies selling heavily through channels often need reps to call on the channel partners, far fewer channel reps are required than if the reps are dedicated to direct selling. Generally the heavier the use of third party channels in the customer acquisition approach, the more heavily the mix will lean toward investment in marketing.

Marketing driven keys to success

  • Adequate marketing funds – If you’re going to be marketing-driven in your customer acquisition approach, you better dedicate enough money to fund marketing programs with superior performance. To do otherwise will cripple your business.
  • An objective, data driven culture – The beauty of a marketing-driven approach is that it can take much subjectivity out the management of optimizing your customer acquisition activities. Especially in this era of highly measurable online marketing, decisions should be made on what the data says—not on the whims of the CEO or some other senior executive.
  • Excellent inside sales in support – Except for very simple, low cost products where marketing can truly drive the sale all the way to completion—these days that often means a software download, SaaS signup or physical product order—it’s still important to have an efficient (but low cost) inside sales operation supporting your marketing machine.

Sales driven keys to success

  • Great sales people – Hiring good people is so very important in every area, but when your relying on an expensive outside sales force to drive revenue—you better hire the best reps you can afford and attract.
  • Success driven comp plan – If your success depends upon them, make sure your sales reps become really happy only when the company is happy as well.
  • Good marketing support in the form of lead generation programs and sales tools – Unless you have a tiny market with obvious, easily identifiable prospects, it’s still very important to have a marketing function which generates leads as well as supplies good sales tools.

The best approach isn’t always chosen

Unfortunately, logic and situation analysis doesn’t always win out when designing a customer acquisition strategy. Usually by the time a company grows to be large, their approach is in line with what’s best for the business. Of course, your chances of growing to be a big company are reduced if you make serious errors in sales and marketing strategy. But in any event, by the time a company is big they are usually utilizing both sales and marketing heavily and in the proper balance.

Startups and early stage companies are another matter. Often the emphasis on either sales or marketing is based on the experience of the founders and senior executives. If they’ve been successful in the past and their new company has a similar focus, maybe it’s fine and their approach works again. But a problem occurs when these executives start up a very different type of company than they’ve had success with in the past. It’s human nature to fall back on what I refer to as your “common business sense”, which is formed by your personal background and past experiences. This is when you can get a misalignment between what a company needs and the approach taken in the sales & marketing mix.

Even worse still is when the customer acquisition approach develops more or less haphazardly. This can happen when the founders of a company really don’t have much functional experience in sales or marketing. This occurs somewhat frequently in software and hardware companies, as many startups are created by technical types. In these cases there may be a fairly unsophisticated approach to both sales and marketing—and whatever works early may end up dominate. For example, a sales rep is hired who has some success, so the model becomes hire a lot more reps and turn them loose without much (or any) support on the marketing side. Or an early direct email campaign or online advertising generates some sales, so money is poured into that method. Unfortunately, these may not be the best approaches strategically for the business in the long run.

That’s what I think about Sales vs. Marketing driven orientations in software and hardware companies. What do you think? Post a comment with your own opinions or stories about what drives customer acquisition in high tech companies.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Creating a Distribution Channel Where One Doesn’t Exist

One of the least well understood activities in growing a hardware or software business is the building of distribution channels. This looks very easy to the uninitiated, but in reality it’s extremely difficult. There are many subtleties that are far from obvious, and some aspects that are necessary for success are downright counter-intuitive. Building a distribution channel for your company is difficult in the best of circumstances.

How hard is it when there are no current, obvious existing channel partners already selling your category of products to start with?

It’s very hard. In fact, most people in the know would likely tell you to forget about it, and not even try. That might actually be pretty good advice, because this activity could easily become a real time and money sink if you’re not careful.

But the other side of the coin is that this might be the circumstance where building a channel carries the very highest potential payoff. One of the great truths I’ve discovered in my career is that the most effective marketing and sales strategies are the ones that haven’t yet become mainstream in your marketplace. Once a strategy or tactic becomes very popular, the results become watered down until at some point it’s marginally attractive at best. In terms of strategy, this move fits in the “high risk, high reward” category. But the payback, if successful, is extremely high.

In terms of strategy, creating your own channel definitely fits in the “high risk, high reward” category. Because while it’s very difficult, if successful, you alone among all competitors in your segment will have the leverage and resulting strategic advantage that a well-executed channel strategy can provide.

So the question is how do you go about this? Where do you even start if there are no existing channel partners for your category? Let’s take a look at a few places to mine that I’ve found some success in the past:

Adjancent Markets

This is the most fertile place to begin, imo. The first step is to think strategically about what type of software application or hardware product is complementary to yours. Whose product might it make sense to integrate with your own, for example? These types of potential strategic partners might also have existing channel partners that might be interested in selling your product as a companion product. An example scenario that I recently successfully implemented for a client was an analytics software company that uses a lot of data to help forecast and mitigate decision risk. We were able to attract a number of channel partners in two adjacent categories: Business Intelligence (BI) and Project Management. Both of these categories are large, with good-sized existing channels selling their solutions. BI creates a lot of date which could be used by my client’s software for forward-looking action, and the Project Management category involves a lot of complex decision-making and risk mitigation which was a natural fit for my client’s software.

Private Label/OEM products

Potential OEMs are another great place to look for channel partners. One obvious possibility is hardware OEMs for a software company, where the software might be integrated with the hardware for a full solution. If the hardware OEM has a channel, Voilà! you have a channel. Even if the hardware company isn’t interested in an OEM relationship, you might be able to entice them into a more vanilla reseller relationship with light or no integration. Lastly, you can always approach their channel directly to sell you software as an add-on product to the hardware vendor’s.

Former Employees

The first two categories above are pretty fertile with respect to creating a channel from scratch. After mining those two approaches, we’re getting into the area where you’ll need some really creative thinking. The first idea is former employees; I’ve seen many VARs who have started their systems integration business by specializing in their old employers products after leaving the mother ship. Another similar possibility is a former employee who lives in or moves to another country; they might start an entrepreneurial “exclusive” distributorship in that country.

Former Competitors

Very similar to the “Former Employee” category above is partnering with employees of former competitors whom you may know or come across. They will likely have similar knowledge and skill sets to your former employees, so the same type of potential applies. The only caveat here is you need to be careful of any existing relationships with your competitors or special agendas that could poison a potential relationship.

Product Fans

This category of prospective partner is again very similar to the former employee and competitor categories in terms of potential. A user or former user who loves your product and who you have a good relationship with can be a good candidate for an entrepreneurial VAR/distributor startup, whether domestic or international. The area to be careful of here is they may be very skilled in your product and some internal operating specialty, but may be poorly prepared to market, sell and run an overall business. This of course is a potential risk in the former employee and competitor categories as well.

These are some ways you can take the difficult step of creating your own channel from ground zero. Has anyone else tried this–what were your results? What are your ideas on how best to go about it? Please post a comment to expand the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Extending Your Technology With Spinoff Products

Many software and hardware businesses, particularly smaller ones, are religiously focused on a specific vertical market. As well they should; focus is one of the most important attributes that can bring a business from startup to a strong growing business. This is often one of the key areas I concentrate on with many of my consulting clients. Many businesses just can’t turn down any sort of deal, no matter what the effect it has on their existing product development plans or other key corporate initiatives.

But there is another side to the focus issue. Many tech companies have developed excellent, mature technology bases at huge expense. If that basic technology has a horizontal appeal, it can be quite profitable to spend a modest amount of additional effort to bring that technology to other adjacent markets that the company is currently not serving.

Care needs to be taken, of course, to not spread your marketing efforts too thin. But if you’re smart about it your company can increase, sometimes dramatically, the return on its product development investments. Let’s take a look at a few potential tactics, all of which I’ve used successfully both at companies I’ve run and with consulting clients:

Customize your products for adjacent markets

As an example, maybe you have an ERP software package aimed at retail markets. It might be quite easy to customize the product for other inventory-oriented businesses, such as distribution or service/repair businesses. By doing this you’ve created a potentially large new revenue source, at a fraction what building that product from scratch might cost. The trick in this instance is often marketing the product–read below for a couple of ideas on how to accomplish that without doubling your marketing budget.

Private Label/OEM products

Private labeling or OEMing your product to another vendor can be an excellent way to extend your product development ROI. It might be as simple as partnering with a non-competitive vendor who takes your existing product “as is” or with minor modifications, as well as changing the product identity and labeling. The target partner would be a company very strong in a market segment that you aren’t successful in, have no interest in directly marketing in, or simply is beyond your resource level. If done well, this is a win-win for both companies. Your company gets additional revenues with little to no additional costs (“pure profit”), while your partner gains additional revenue in it’s target market–without any product development investment.

Integration & bundling with other products

One of the best things a software vendor is to create a “developer’s version” of it’s product, which essentially consists of creating APIs (application programming interface) to the software. This allows easy integration with complementary software applications and even hardware. Back when I was CEO of a mapping software company with limited resources, we created a developer’s version which enabled both integration and bundling with a number of complementary applications, notably in the real estate and CRM segments. Once again, this tactic required only modest product development investment and enabled us to draw revenue from a number of different markets. We would never have had the resources to pursue these markets if we tried to build a new product from scratch as a company would traditionally do.

Different price points

Using my favorite mapping software company example, we were often forced to think creatively to wring out as much revenue as we could out from our existing technology. One of the other tactics we used was “de-feature” our existing $99 high-end consumer application to create a $9.95 version, which we then sold through mass market retailers of all kinds. Not only did this create more revenue, but the high volume business also created a bunch of opportunities to upgrade these entry level customers to our higher-end core product. This is a strategy I’ve used many times; you almost can’t go wrong when creating a larger customer base for your technology. I use the simplistic phrase “the more you sell, the more you sell” to illustrate the advantages of this approach.

Business vs. consumer version

At that very same mapping software company we used one other great approach to extending your technology: creating a B2B version of our consumer product which was aimed at road warriors such as sales and service professionals (the converse works just as well). The B2B version had a few additional features and we sold it via different channels and strategic partners. It didn’t have the unit volume of the consumer version, but the margins were much higher.

So there are a few ideas on how to extend the use of your IP to increase your overall ROI. What are your ideas on creatively utilizing existing assets to create additional growth? Please post a comment with your own thoughts so we can all benefit.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

The Rise and Fall of Novell

Once again one of the great brand names of High Tech has been prominently in the news, this one  for it’s demise as a standalone company. This time it’s Novell, Inc.  Attachmate announced that it had closed its purchase of Novell, which becomes a brand of Attachmate.  The price was $2.2B–not chicken feed, but much less than the promise held by this company in the distant past.

This company holds a special place in my memory. In the early 90’s the Novell name was synonymous with Networking. The company was a pioneer in Corporate Networking, and played a major role in helping to create this market as we now know it. When I entered this market in 1990, the company’s core product, NetWare, held a commanding 70%+ market share in the networking software space, which was already very large at the time, and growing at a rapid rate. It was in this environment that I began my first general management position, starting up a systems and network management software business. Netware being the dominant NOS at the time, I got a very close look at the company’s activities, and some of the decisions and events that began Novell’s long decline. Novell is still a $1B business, but in terms of power and prominence, they are a shadow of the company I kept a close eye on in the 90s. There’s been speculation that the company would be an acquisition candidate for some time, so the news isn’t a big surprise. But it’s a story which is a cautionary tale, and many lessons for tech company management teams that don’t want to “blow it”.

So what caused the unfortunate change in fortunes for this former industry high-roller?

It’s a familiar story, actually, especially for those of you who are regular readers. The Novell story is particularly interesting, because several factors, each one itself capable of wreaking havoc on a solid company, came together to put this company into a long nosedive.

MICROSOFT-ITIS

The first problem was what I call “Microsoft-itis”. Novell became very successful on the back of its flagship NetWare platform, which drew the attention of Microsoft. Microsoft tends to become unhappy when any other software company grows too big, too fast. The upstart is then viewed as a potential threat in Redmond, as well as the fact that the market this other company has helped grow now becomes large enough to be attractive to MS. So the first problem was getting in the gun sight of Microsoft. Now, it’s hard to blame the company for this, it’s more of a side effect of success. This situation has caused problems for many a company, and is enough unto itself to throw a large majority of companies off their game. To have Microsoft target you is quite disconcerting, and if you don’t make the right decisions, you may be in serious trouble. How a company reacts to this challenge is critical, and in truth, often life or death.

ARROGANCE

Unfortunately, in some cases, being targeted by Microsoft sometimes builds a company up in its own view. It’s almost a baptism into the big-time. Microsoft is worried about us; we’re a peer to them now! We must really be smart! This leads to a false sense of security about the company’s true position in the market, leading to the second factor which can bring a company down—Arrogance.

Novell had plenty of excuses to be arrogant, even without Microsoft’s attention. They were truly dominating the Network Operating System business. The brand was dominant, the product was good, and the worldwide distribution network of VARs and distributors was second to none. Sales people at Novell no longer had to sell—they took orders. That led to a need to keep the big ball fast growth rolling, even as the market matured and became quite large. Wall Street, you know. Novell became known as a company that pushed, rather than created via pull marketing. There were numerous channel-stuffing scandals, so sales people could make their quarterly numbers and max out their bonus. No matter, things were well in hand, Novell was on a roll.

The closest competitor at the time was Banyan, with their VINES operating system. Banyan had a nice niche in the largest, WAN oriented corporations, but was no threat to Novell’s dominance. There was also a fast growing peer-to-peer player, Artisoft, who had a nice niche in the entry level market. Again, Artisoft posed no serious threat. And then there was Microsoft, with its alliance on the LAN Manager NOS with 3Com. At the time, Microsoft’s distribution strategy was still to primarily be an OEM supplier, preferring to let others take the lead in bringing the product to the end user market. They had piggybacked the hardware vendors with DOS and the emerging Windows 3.0, and were attempting to use that strategy in the Networking market with 3Com as their main partner. 3Com at the time was a dominant networking hardware vendor. They also teamed with many suppliers of UNIX software to create private label versions of LAN Manager for each UNIX flavor—HP UX, for instance. There were about 17 other platform partners, as I recall. It looked like a formidable syndicate which could challenge Novell for market leadership.

However, like many early Microsoft entrées into new markets, the offering was a joke. LAN Manager ran on top of OS/2, which should tell you something about its lack of success, right there. Technically inferior, with too many players involved to advance and support it, LAN Manager never gained significant traction vs. Netware, even with huge amounts of money being poured into development and marketing. Major new releases would be announced, each which was supposed be the one to give Novell a run for its money. It became a running joke in the network business. At this point, Novell looked invincible.

LOSING FOCUS

Then the arrogance at Novell rose to new levels. Apparently thinking Microsoft couldn’t beat them at their own game, Ray Noorda and senior management at Novell decided to also take on Microsoft on their own turf. Not only that, but to compete across many, many categories. They decided they wanted to become the new Microsoft, and in doing so opened a multi-front war against a larger competitor, with far more resources (See Hitler opening up the Russian front in the War against the Allies).

Novell bought WordPerfect to compete with MS Word, Quattro Pro to compete with Excel, and announced a dizzying array of additional new initiatives. (See Netscape taking a similar approach in its heyday, as well as Google is now, as we speak—that ought to be interesting). No one, I repeat, NO ONE, has won a multi-front war with Microsoft. The people that have fended them off (which is a small list), when MS has put them in their headlights, have done so by sticking to their knitting, and playing by the rules of their own market segment. Intuit is a notable example, which was able to keep MS in a minor role in the Personal Financial software segment, by advancing and focusing on its own offerings and current market.

WHAT HAPPENED?

Well, many of you who have been in High Tech for a while probably already know the result. Microsoft finally split with 3COM, developed Windows NT, essentially building Networking into the Operating System. This finally began to hurt Netware, and although it wasn’t an immediate rout, over time NT became the clear winner. The terminator of Redmond can be knocked down, but they almost never give up—they just go deeper into their pockets, and keep on coming.

The acquisitions that Novell made were already second or third tier products, and their markets were outside of Novell’s core market and competency. Drained of resources and fighting losing battles on many fronts, Novell was soundly defeated, ultimately selling off many of its acquisitions, retrenching and changing their strategy—quite a few times over the years, I might add. They went into a long, slow decline, and once this begins at a large company, it’s very difficult to truly turn it around.

WHAT IF?

So what would have happened it Novell hadn’t reacted like Netscape later did, choosing to battle it out toe-to-toe with Microsoft, blinded in a fit of rage and bravado? What if they had followed a similar strategy to the one that Intuit took? What if they had marshaled their resources, and kept their focus on maintaining the lead they had in Network Operating Systems and related businesses—which were pretty big markets in their own right? Hindsight is always 20/20, but my guess is that they would have had a much better chance of continued success—and possibly avoided the headlines in the Trade Magazines of the last few weeks.

Have you seen similar missteps in your own companies or markets?—please post a comment below to share the insights.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

International Expansion: Partner or Invest?

This is an age-old question facing software and hardware companies. In this article we’ll examine the pros and cons, as well as the specific conditions that should drive your decision process.

Two basic options confront a tech company considering a foray outside of their home market:

  1. Set up your own subsidiary hiring your own employees to “put on the ground”
  2. Partner with established traditional distributors or strategic partners in the target foreign market

Let’s look at some of the key factors to consider when designing an international business development strategy:

Available Capital

How much money does your company have available for international expansion? If the answer is “not much”, this alone can be the deciding factor in your decision. If capital is very scarce, you’re almost forced to start out using distribution partners. This isn’t all bad, in my opinion. Using partners initially when you are an international newbie is a much lower risk way to start, and allows you to learn this part of the business without “losing your shirt”. I’ve seen a number of control-oriented management teams invest large amounts of money by putting people on the ground in subsidiaries, only to waste it in spectacular failure. Often this failure is due to inexperience.

Product Price and Complexity

If you have a high priced, technically-complex product with a long sales cycle, you will tend to benefit more than others by having people on the ground in the foreign market. These are the types of products which are most often sold directly, even in home markets. In this scenario, even if capital is tight and you can’t afford to put down a fully-loaded subsidiary with a dedicated direct sales force in every foreign market, it still may make sense to put some folks on the ground. As an example, you might be able to afford a channel sales rep and a couple of field engineers to support a large network of sophisticated local country distributors and VARs, across an entire continent like Europe or Asia.

Management Skills

What is the skill set of your corporate management team? If no one on the team has any experience with indirect distribution, for example, it’s going to be pretty tough to successfully build a working distribution channel in FOREIGN MARKETS which are far from home, in more ways than one. In this case, the most cost effective thing to do is to add someone to the top management team with the requisite skills and experience, or at least retain a long term consultant. Going without this hire often seems the cheaper route initially, but in most cases this end up being “penny-wise but pound-foolish” in hindsight.

Local Market Cost Structure

Each foreign market should be evaluated individually before deciding an approach for that market. For example, in large emerging markets with low costs (such as China, India, Brazil for many verticals) it may make sense to put your own people on the ground, regardless of the distribution strategy. When costs are low and the market is strategically important in the long run, the relative benefits of having your own subsidiary are high. In a high cost market with lower sales potential (Switzerland and Norway may be good examples for some businesses,) relying exclusively on a dedicated local partner may be a better way to go.

Availability of Partners

In some cases what may be the best strategy for your company and market in theory is overridden by facts on the ground. Many vertical software and hardware markets have a well established set of distributors and resellers dedicated to their marketplace. In these cases it’s relatively easy to find an appropriate distribution partner. But what if you’re in a business in which this ISN’T the case, which is not all that unusual? Or maybe there is an established channel, but you’re late to the game and all the obvious “good” partners are tied up with your competitors. Sometimes you may choose to not enter that market immediately. But if the geographic market is considered strategic, then you will need to choose a course that looks sub-optimal in theory. That might mean biting the bullet and outlaying the investment to start your own subsidiary. Or, you might find a local entrepreneur with the skill set to set up a new distributorship. If it’s a geographic market that you just HAVE to participate in, then you will find a way!

There are obviously a wide range of combinations and intermediate options, but “partner or invest” represent the extreme ends of potential strategies. In many cases (particularly large, established markets) the optimal distribution strategy will be a combination of these two main approaches: pairing a wholly-owned subsidiary with local distribution partners. In smaller markets, partnering with an established distributor or strategic partner may be the only viable strategy. In other cases, the optimal strategy may be dependent on the specific factors of a particular marketplace (local costs, available partners, etc).

What’s most important is to closely analyze your specific company’s situation and vertical market, as well as the “facts on the ground” in each individual geographic market. Resist the temptation to simply copy your competitor’s strategy or fall back on approaches that you are comfortable with from other vertical and geographic markets. That is how you make mistakes.

What’s your approach to international expansion? Post a comment and share your own personal experience.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com