Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Category: enterprise software

BYOD, Enterprise Mobile ISVs and Cross-Platform Support

One of the hottest trends in the technology industry these days is the phenomenon know as “Bring your own Device” or BYOD. For IT departments, this is the latest control-related nightmare they loath so much. The original technological shift from Mainframes to Minis and PCs was probably the start of many control-related sleep disturbances and BYOD continues the trend. Mobile computing in itself was bad enough from the perspective of the internal IT folk;. Mobile BYOD may be enough to push them all to drink.

But enough about anguish for the IT guys: what are the implications of BYOD for independent software vendors?

Cross-platform support

One of the major challenges–or opportunities–that I believe software vendors face in a BYOD world is the potentially wide variety of mobile platforms to support. Many readers are likely thinking “its only the iPhone/iOS and Android, so not a problem. Nothing else is relevant.”

Maybe-But bear with me for a bit.

Things aren’t always what they seem on the surface. For one thing, Android is hardly a single, tightly unified platform like iOS. It’s basically an open source operating system in which every OEM can (and often does) modify the OS to provide differentiation on their hardware platform. In a way this can be a good thing by spurring innovation; but if you’re a third party software vendor dependent on the parts of the OS that is often modified–it can also be viewed as problematic. But should it be?

Google has recently sought to rein in the fragmentation issue as the numerous hardware-focused variants were causing a lot of consternation in the third party software community. At a minimum this fragmentation causes a great deal of testing complexity, and at worst the necessity to maintain different code for each hardware OEM’s platform.

Back in the old days

This reminds me of back in the 80s in the early days of MS DOS. IBM had its PC DOS version and all of the other PC hardware OEMs had their own version of MS DOS as well–almost compatible with each other, but with just enough variation to cause problems. Needless to say, this caused problems in the ISV community which had to choose between supporting myriad platforms–or picking winners. Neither appeared to be a great choice.

Even if you don’t consider the Android fragmentation issue serious, I contend there are other similar platform support issues. In a world tightly controlled by the IT department, the platform choices might indeed be limited to Android and iOS. But what about Blackberry, Microsoft and any new platforms that might come along in this large and competitive market? Again I can almost see the smirking by some reading this: “those platforms are market also-rans with very small market shares. I don’t need to support them!”

Or do you?

Back in the old days–one more time

One more time I’ll take you way back for another analogous situation. In the 90s I was running a systems/network management software business targeted at the enterprise IT market. This was an “add-on” product business; our product ran on top of the Network Operating Systems (NOS) of the day. Back then, Novell Netware dominated the market with an estimated 60-80% share of the business. The other major NOS platforms (widely considered also-rans) were Banyan Vines (about 5-8% market share) and numerous OEM variants of Microsoft LAN Manager (10-15% share total). LAN Manager was slightly different depending upon the OEM hardware platform, much like Windows itself in the earlier example and Android today. The fragmentation of LAN Manager made it even less desirable for an add-on ISV market segment like our category.

All of our competitors looked at the market and designed their products to run strictly on Netware.  On the surface this made total sense. There was just one problem—in the enterprise IT market (the primary target for our segment) the customers are huge companies with a lot of buying power; they like to get vendors to do what they want. Of course, many enterprises did standardize on Novell Netware at that time.

We took a contrarian approach at the time and chose to extend our product, supporting both VINES and LAN Manager in addition to Netware. We found that the larger the company, the more heterogeneous their networking environments tended to be. Even if 90% of the systems within an enterprise were based upon Netware, there was a strong desire in enterprises for support of ALL of their networks companywide. So although Banyan and Microsoft LAN Manager each had a modest number of accounts using only their NOS (we won those by default), we were in a much stronger position than our competitors in the largest enterprises with heterogeneous network environments. We won far more than are share, and the additional revenue more than made up of the modest additional development cost and support complexity.

So how do software vendors capitalize?

I bore you with the old case study above because I believe BYOD in the Enterprise will only accentuate the benefits of supporting as many platforms as possible. Although many companies with highly influential IT departments will limit choice, this is really against the spirit of BYOD. While it may look unlikely to some right now, I see BYOD generally moving the enterprise mobile software market toward heterogeneous, multi-platform environments. Forward thinking ISVs would be wise to consider this in their product plans.

There are many new challenges that are already rising as the BYOD movement takes hold. BYOD in the enterprise is a rich area for discussion. In addition to the cross-platform support issue discussed here, there are major security, legal, support and economic/cost considerations to consider. Some of these issues don’t yet have great answers–maybe we’ll explore them in a later column. BYOD is a major paradigm shift for all segments of the IT business. I believe that there will be many more yet unforeseen factors that will greatly impact the landscape for enterprises, end users and software/hardware vendors as the situation matures.

What are your thoughts on the cross platform support issue we’ve raised in this article? Give us your take. And what are some other issues brought on by BYOD that aren’t widely being discussed yet? Post a comment so we can all benefit from your experiences.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

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Software Product Marketing: Horizontal vs. Vertical

An important discussion for most software companies–both in the product planning stage and in the downstream active marketing phase–is the manner in which it will be marketed. The decisions to be made in each phase are separate but closely related. This set of discussions need to happen regardless of whether you are marketing a traditionally licensed application, an open source application or a SaaS application.

One of the more important aspects to this is whether the product will be aimed tightly at one or several vertical segments, or marketed more broadly to the widest possible audience. This is the crux of the vertical vs. horizontal decision. Let’s examine a few topics which can be useful in framing this discussion.

How specific is the “language” of your application to a vertical audience?

This is very important because in some product categories the unique business processes of a vertical can be very important, while in other categories there is great commonality in process and language across industries. If you’ve written your application specifically to solve one market segment’s unique problem, it’s probably VERY specific. When this is the case it’s pretty obvious that you’ll start (and possibly end) with a highly vertical marketing effort. Sometimes as thing go along you may find that you’ve solved a problem for market A, but it’s also useful in market segment B and C–although there often needs to be at least some modification. If you’ve solved a more generic problem that applies to many markets, the decision to market the solution horizontally or vertically can be much less clear.

How big is your overall market?

A key consideration when you’re entering a new market with a new product. The larger the market the more likely it is you will need to take a vertical approach get initial traction. In many cases this means verticalizing the product in the product development phase. But even if there isn’t a strong set of vertical needs with respect to product features and “language”, in large markets a vertical promotional approach may be required to build market traction. It is often far easier to build a brand name and market traction in a tight vertical before you move on to the next segment, than by taking a more scatter-shot approach with no vertical focus.

What is the level of competition in the overall market?

This question is related to first question above as strong competition often goes hand in hand with large markets. They are separate issues, however, and should be evaluated individually. If the level of competition is high, regardless of market size, a new entrant is likely to have a better chance of success with a more vertical approach. It there isn’t significant competition in the segment, you may be able to have success with a horizontal approach, which can be a more efficient way to use both product development resources and marketing dollars.

Market maturity: has the overall market verticalized already?

Regardless of the level of competition and the market size if the larger market has already evolved into a number of vertical sub-markets, it may be too late to take a horizontal approach. It is usually very difficult to defeat entrenched verticalized competitors when entering a market with a horizontal application. The exception to this would be a new competitor with a product that provides a quantum leap forward in functionality (usually as a result of a technological paradigm shift).

What level of marketing resources are available to you?

The level of marketing dollars available to you are quite important in formulating your approach to the vertical vs. horizontal question. As one example, let’s say you are entering a market that is large, quite competitive and you won’t have a lot of marketing budget available. In this case, it would be very important to develop the product upfront with the strongest vertical focus possible and market it accordingly. On the other extreme, you might be entering a market of modest overall size that hasn’t verticalized to a great degree to date and you are well funded, enabling a substantial marketing budget relative to the competition. It this case it might be an easy decision to take the ROI-efficient horizontal approach both from a product development and promotional perspective. There are many potential scenarios between these two extremes which unfortunately will lead to less obvious decision-making.

Is your software a “point” or “platform” application?

Most software applications are “point applications”, meaning they have little or no integration with the rest of the software infrastructure. In addition, any possible customization is generally intended to be done by the application vendor themselves or maybe their channel partners.

I define a software application as a “platform” when it utilizes an open API which enables BOTH channel partners and third party software vendors to write add-on applications which extends the platform software’s functionality in two key area:

1)      by adding “vertical” functionality not present in the platform software thereby enabling a complete solution for a specific vertical market.

2)      using the API to integrate the application with other parts of the software infrastructure

In this way a platform software application allows a software vendor to “have it’s cake and eat it too” with respect to the Horizontal vs. Vertical discussion. The platform software itself provides basic functionality which can be sold broadly across many markets, while the open APIs enable the product to be tightly customized for specific verticals as required, by both your channel partners and independent ISVs. The platform application can be a product manager’s dream and is the Holy Grail of software when it comes to efficiently serving as many market segments as possible by leveraging partner investments. But it’s not something that can be forced; there needs to be a natural reason for the platform to exist, or there will be no third parties willing to write the add-on applications so critical to the platform’s success. Without these add-on application a platform will more often than not die a quiet death in the marketplace.

In some cases, such as when you write an application which aimed at a problem specific to a single vertical market, the answer to this “vertical vs. horizontal” question is easy. In many other cases you’ve created a product which is useful across several market segments–but do you have the resources to attack multiple market segments simultaneously? How do you approach this common problem?  Leave a comment below with your take or shoot us an email with your questions.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

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3 Comments by admin on February 16, 2013
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Product Marketing/Management, Promotion, SaaS, Software/Product Development, Startup/Early Stage, VARs, enterprise software
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How Important is a Strong Rolodex in the Software and Hardware Business?

I get this comment all the time: “We’re looking for a VP-Sales/VP-Business Development/Sales Manager/Sales Rep with a strong Rolodex in the (pick your market segment) market”. But how important is a rolodex in the IT business? In my opinion, not as important as many people seem to think…..

I realize that this is a contrarian viewpoint among those of us in the technology business.  Some may even view it as “stupid”. However, it’s not in any way a spontaneous comment, but an opinion I’ve developed over a long period of time. I’m sure I’ll get a lot of push back on this opinion, since it flies in the face of conventional wisdom. Here’s my argument:

What a rolodex does for you

First of all, of course a strong rolodex in a specific market segment is a good thing. To say otherwise is silly. But what does it really do for you? It may get a phone call returned or a meeting set up faster that it otherwise would. This is of course helpful, but far from critical in my mind, especially compared to other factors I’ll explore below. I should point out there are some market segments that are so closed that they appear almost tribal in nature. In those cases, including one example which is mentioned later in this article, a strong rolodex can move to near the top of the list of critical success factors. But in my experience these situations are rare and far from normal.

Many other things have to line up first

I’ve always maintained that sales reps get too much blame when they fail, and too much credit (and often outsized monetary rewards) when they’re successful. SO many things have to be done well in a company for a rep to have a chance. The executive managers must first capitalize the company adequately, or usually nothing works very well. Product Marketing must properly define a market opportunity that matches well with the company’s intellectual property and technical capabilities. The R&D folks must create a product which makes a contribution to the marketplace, offering a differential advantage over competitive offerings. Maybe all of this seems obvious; but none of it is easy. A lot can go wrong, and I believe every one of these activities is more difficult and important than having a pre-existing rolodex in the market. Even it this wasn’t true, it’s really difficult to attract the right sales reps (with or without an strong rolodex in your segment) without evidence that the above activities are going well.

Most important attributes for a technology sales rep

Smart – This may seem obvious, but all too often people looking for a “quick hit” underrate it’s importance or don’t adequately investigate intellect in their new sales hires.

Technology acumen – There are many good sales reps in the world. But regardless of whether we’re talking about hardware, semiconductors, traditional software or SaaS, there are far fewer that have the education, training and ability to quickly absorb complex and fast-moving technology that is fundamental to our business.

Work ethic – While intellect and technical competence are important, selling still isn’t brain surgery. But it’s a really difficult job that takes persistence, hard work and the self-confidence to keep going in the face of a lot of rejection. There is no substitute for a strong work ethic in a consistently high performing sales rep.

Ability to build relationships – this is key- and shouldn’t be confused with having a large rolodex of names and phone numbers. Just because someone knows a lot of people doesn’t mean those prospects necessarily wants to hear from them, or trusts them enough to buy from them. In many cases it’s just the opposite. If you have strong relationship-building skills, you can do it over and over again across any market segment. Give me a strong relationship-builder with no existing contacts in a market segment over a weaker relationship-builder who knows everyone in the segment–any day of the week.

Market segment experience and rolodex – these are beneficial qualities, there is on doubt. But I believe they are down the list in importance relative to those listed above.

An example of where your Rolodex IS CRITICAL

Now just because I don’t think a strong rolodex generally leads the list of important attributes in the software or hardware business, that doesn’t mean I feel that way in every case. The best example of when it’s VERY important is when raising capital from institutional sources, such as venture capitalists. Not only is it important to personally know them (or get an introduction from someone who knows them well) before a fund-raising approach, it’s critical to a bizarre degree. It’s not universal, but if you approach many VCs without leveraging an existing relationship you may in fact have blown any chance with them in the future, no matter how impressive the value proposition of your business. So this is a case where having a strong rolodex in place is paramount–but the details of this is better left for another article.

That’s what I think about the importance of a rolodex in the technology marketplace. I’ve personally moved among many different market segments in my career and don’t consider it all that difficult. The most difficult part is often convincing someone it isn’t all that difficult! While it can be helpful to have a strong rolodex, I believe it is placed way too high in many folks priorities in most cases.  If you disagree–post a comment below and tell us why, or just provide us with the wisdom of your own rolodex-related experiences.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

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A Software Startup Video Case Study

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Selling and Marketing Software Through the VAR Channel: Morettini on Management Video Series

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com
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Are There Any Software Segments The Cloud Won’t Swallow?

It’s become pretty clear in the last couple of years that we are heading irrevocably toward a cloud-dominated future in the software business. The evidence is irrefutable. To attempt to get a traditionally licensed PC or enterprise software business funded by an institutional investor would be a suicide mission these days.

Whether it’s SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, Cloud-based, web-based, Internet-based—WHATEVER, it’s all still basically the same thing. Some folks get very snippy about all the different definitions, but they are all just different segments or interpretations of the same model: Software hosted outside of the customer’s premises and available via an Internet browser. Although the technology has improved dramatically over time, it’s really the same basic idea as ASP (application service provider) model from back before the Internet stock bubble burst.

In many cases this trend is happening for good reasons, with the primary one being the simplicity the model offers end-users. But like anything, it’s not the perfect fit in all instances. For example, I’m still not convinced this model will ever be definitely cheaper than solutions that rely more on local computing power. For that to happen, I think we’re going to need to go back to the era of much cheaper dumb terminals to replace our powerful PCs. Having all that desktop power and storage (and the associated costs) sitting on your desks unused is pretty inefficient.

In addition, I also don’t believe SaaS and other cloud-based variants are necessarily the most profitable business models for every software vendor, even though institutional investors love it.  I recently had a conversation with a venture capitalist and I asked him why the VC community was so in love with software in the cloud, specifically SaaS-based models. After some discussion about the various elements of SaaS and customer premise-based software models, it really came down to something simple: traditionally licensed software companies are valued at 1-3X revenue and SaaS-based companies are valued at 5-6X revenues. Of course, it’s all about the money and this makes perfect sense. But will this valuation gap be sustainable, or is it a market inefficiency that will go away over time? But I digress, that’s a topic for a different debate….

There are some very good (and maybe not so good) reasons that certain segments won’t come completely under the spell of cloud-based computing. Let’s take a look at a few areas where I forecast the cloud won’t become dominant:

Banking

This is one of the toughest software market segments there is. Banks are notoriously difficult to penetrate, and security is paramount. I believe this will be one of the toughest segments for cloud-based solutions to penetrate, and will be even harder to dominate. Certainly they’ll be a lot of cloud-based applications in non-critical functions. But anything that gets at the core banking functions, including customer data or money will be kept private. That might be a traditional on-premises solutions or private cloud-based apps, but anything sensitive from a security viewpoint will be held tight.

Government

I believe this will be a similar situation here to the Banking market. Certainly the Cloud has already penetrated many areas of the government, and will continue to do so. But there are larges segments of government services where the data is just too sensitive. We’ve seen a lot of embarrassing breaches lately with respect to intelligence data that absolutely needs to remain secret. I think we’ll see a pullback from this data being available via the Internet, rather than moving deeper in that direction.

Open Source and Mobile

Outside of the cloud, these are the two software segments that institutional investors will still put money into. It’s true that many mobile applications have a cloud-based back-end, and a lot of Open Source platforms are used to generate cloud-based apps. But both of these areas represent code that will sit on customer-controlled assets and will slow the adoption of a centralized model where all computing is done in the publicly-accessible cloud.

Buyers vs. Renters

Some folks just like to own stuff. While the rental model works for many due to the reduction in software and hardware investment, which saves capital for other purposes, others feel that renting is wasteful. Indeed, SaaS and other lease/rental-oriented models aren’t necessarily the cheapest in the long run. This is really a psychographic attribute that isn’t likely to change among those so-inclined.

100% Service Levels required

The Internet is a long way from the old AT&T Ma Bell monopoly when it comes to service levels. Have you ever had the power go out at a company you work at? In this day and age, when that happens, everything immediately stops. With the every-increasing reliance on Internet-based technologies (and being accelerated by cloud-based apps), the Internet connection going down can have roughly the same effect. The Amazon EC2 Cloud Services outage in April 2011 gives a sneak preview of what can happen to productivity levels if service levels are compromised on a wide scale or for a long period of time.

Security Conscious (and the Paranoid)

There are many out there among us that have their own safes rather than using a Bank’s safe-deposit box, or are building safes rooms or bomb shelters to protect against perceived threats they view as inevitable. Many others are simply very cautious and prudent, and that means holding things close to the vest and not embracing the newest technologies until they are viewed as bulletproof. The profiles vary from the prudent to the paranoid, but the common thread will be slow or no adoption of technologies that are viewed as giving up control of something important.

As we embrace cloud-based applications at an extremely fast rate, my own feeling is that we are headed toward a major, high-profile event that will slow adoption considerably. I’m not sure what form that will take, but it could easily be a major data security breach that causes real damage to a lot of people, or an Internet-based outage that brings a bunch of businesses to their knees. There are many examples already which support that these types of events are quite possible. Several times a year now I get a notice that my private data has been compromised by one vendor or another. The Amazon EC2 outage discussed above already gave a number of people pause about being held captive by this model.

So that’s my take on some areas we’ll see little (or at least slow) adoption of public cloud-based software models. Do you see other areas I left out? I’m sure this will be a bit controversial as well—some out there disagree and believe the Cloud will take over the world. I’d like to hear from all of you, regardless of your view. Post a comment to add to the debate.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

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Optimal Levels of Formal Process in High Tech Companies

The level of process in an organization is a pretty esoteric topic that I haven’t seen discussed very often, or in very much depth. Yet I believe it is critically important to any CEO looking to grow a company, particularly a software or hardware technology based company.

The reason I believe it is so important is that, in aggregate, how process-oriented your company culture is effects every nook and cranny of company operations. Oftentimes, however, senior management doesn’t even explicitly think about how much process they want governing company operations. More often than not, this part of the culture grows in a random and haphazard manner, driven by unforeseen key events that shape the level of process. Sometimes the level of structure varies dramatically by department. In these cases, managers below the senior executive level usually are driving department cultures that may or may not be process-oriented, depending upon their own operating styles. The key takeaway here is that process levels often aren’t being driven strategically, but occurring tactically or even haphazardly. This is usually a mistake–here’s why I think so.

In technology companies, in particular, the level of processes can make or destroy your business. There are three reasons that I feel there is much more sensitivity in high tech companies to process levels:

  1. The rapid evolution of technology and technology markets
  2. The need to innovate if you want to thrive in technology businesses
  3. The necessity and difficulty of constantly ‘taming” new technology

I’ll use as an example a recent experience with a client to illustrate my point. The client is a small but growing software company. They have in their culture a high level of chaos, as is common with many growing, young software businesses. The company was bootstrapped and grown out of what started as a service business, and possesses very little in the way of corporate controls or processes.

On the positive side they are very responsive, fast-moving and innovative, able to capitalize on changes in technology and inefficiencies in the market. These are very important qualities in a software startup, particularly one of the thinly capitalized variety. These attributes are the very reason they’ve been able to crack through the very early stage that kills many startups, and has allowed them to grow and thrive.

But there’s a flip-side to this type of unstructured corporate environment, however. This company lacks the discipline that is required to “stick to the plan”. Indeed, there is very little planning going on to begin with! This operating style fits great in the segments of the business where innovation is critical, such as conceiving new products. But in other areas where a more disciplined, structured approach is important, performance is much lower and is a drag on company results. While excellent at conceiving and quickly prototyping new products, follow-on releases often come out much later than planned. QA is not a formal function and the initial new releases and documentation are lower quality than they could and indeed should be. The website has very little oversight and is littered with a lack of consistency, broken links, old content and grammar & spelling errors. We’ve  worked on correcting these problems — carefully — without killing the very environment that is enabling success. It’s tricky to fix without “throwing the baby out with the bathwater”.

This is just one example, and of course the level of process needed to run IBM optimally is fundamentally different from that of an early stage software startup. In your particular company, it may be very important to have a high level of formal process in one department–and just as important to minimize the level of process in another. This may be quite different altogether in other companies.

So how do you know that you need to adjust your level of process in a strategic sense? Here are a few guidelines to get you thinking about where your process level stacks up vs. what may be optimal:

Your competitors are beating you to the punch

This is a sure sign that you are bureaucratic and process-oriented relative to your market. While there may be good reasons for the processes you have installed, being consistently behind in responding to market needs can have a very negative effect on your growth prospects.

You are constantly releasing “flawed” products into the market

This is the converse to the first point above. It usually indicates you moving too fast, with too little process and structure in product development, QA and release. In truth, the end results of this approach is usually worse that being beaten to market.

Employees are complaining about so much process

I always listen to what employees are saying; they are the “canary in coal mine”, often a leading indicator of issues that later show up in your financial statements. The caveat here is that these types of complaints can also indicate a hiring problem. Make sure you’re not hiring people who’s operating style aren’t a good fit with the way the company needs to operate.

Employees are complaining about the lack of process controls

The converse to the point directly above is when employees are complaining about how much chaos exists in the company. While the point above about watch for hiring mismatches rings true here as well, this is often the time you need to take a hard look at adding some structure to how you operate.

There’s absolutely no “chaos” in your organization–and little or no innovation as well

I have a rule of thumb when it comes to pricing new products: if no one is complaining about price, you probably are leaving money on the table. My “chaos corollary” is similar: if there is no chaos in your operations that folks are complaining about, you probably have created an environment so process-oriented it will limit your innovation and resulting revenue.

Generally speaking, I have a bias towards a little less process and a bit more chaos in software and hardware companies. Often excessive process is just a bad band-aid covering up poor hiring practices. Nothing allows you to minimize process like a strong, responsible, empowered group of employees. Creating the environment to hire and retain highly responsible people generally leads to a company getting done everything it needs to, with a good level of innovation to boot–while keeping formal process to a minimum.

I recommend holding off adding new processes until you absolutely have to, because going the other direction is much more difficult. But in fact, it’s important to have the proper balance if you want your company to function optimally. Analyze what the proper level of structure and process is not just for your company overall, but in each discrete operating segment of your business.

There you have it–my view on how to analyze and instill the proper amount of formal process for your company. What’s your view on this topic? Post a comment to expand the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

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4 Comments by admin on April 21, 2012
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Creating a Distribution Channel Where One Doesn’t Exist

One of the least well understood activities in growing a hardware or software business is the building of distribution channels. This looks very easy to the uninitiated, but in reality it’s extremely difficult. There are many subtleties that are far from obvious, and some aspects that are necessary for success are downright counter-intuitive. Building a distribution channel for your company is difficult in the best of circumstances.

How hard is it when there are no current, obvious existing channel partners already selling your category of products to start with?

It’s very hard. In fact, most people in the know would likely tell you to forget about it, and not even try. That might actually be pretty good advice, because this activity could easily become a real time and money sink if you’re not careful.

But the other side of the coin is that this might be the circumstance where building a channel carries the very highest potential payoff. One of the great truths I’ve discovered in my career is that the most effective marketing and sales strategies are the ones that haven’t yet become mainstream in your marketplace. Once a strategy or tactic becomes very popular, the results become watered down until at some point it’s marginally attractive at best. In terms of strategy, this move fits in the “high risk, high reward” category. But the payback, if successful, is extremely high.

In terms of strategy, creating your own channel definitely fits in the “high risk, high reward” category. Because while it’s very difficult, if successful, you alone among all competitors in your segment will have the leverage and resulting strategic advantage that a well-executed channel strategy can provide.

So the question is how do you go about this? Where do you even start if there are no existing channel partners for your category? Let’s take a look at a few places to mine that I’ve found some success in the past:

Adjancent Markets

This is the most fertile place to begin, imo. The first step is to think strategically about what type of software application or hardware product is complementary to yours. Whose product might it make sense to integrate with your own, for example? These types of potential strategic partners might also have existing channel partners that might be interested in selling your product as a companion product. An example scenario that I recently successfully implemented for a client was an analytics software company that uses a lot of data to help forecast and mitigate decision risk. We were able to attract a number of channel partners in two adjacent categories: Business Intelligence (BI) and Project Management. Both of these categories are large, with good-sized existing channels selling their solutions. BI creates a lot of date which could be used by my client’s software for forward-looking action, and the Project Management category involves a lot of complex decision-making and risk mitigation which was a natural fit for my client’s software.

Private Label/OEM products

Potential OEMs are another great place to look for channel partners. One obvious possibility is hardware OEMs for a software company, where the software might be integrated with the hardware for a full solution. If the hardware OEM has a channel, Voilà! you have a channel. Even if the hardware company isn’t interested in an OEM relationship, you might be able to entice them into a more vanilla reseller relationship with light or no integration. Lastly, you can always approach their channel directly to sell you software as an add-on product to the hardware vendor’s.

Former Employees

The first two categories above are pretty fertile with respect to creating a channel from scratch. After mining those two approaches, we’re getting into the area where you’ll need some really creative thinking. The first idea is former employees; I’ve seen many VARs who have started their systems integration business by specializing in their old employers products after leaving the mother ship. Another similar possibility is a former employee who lives in or moves to another country; they might start an entrepreneurial “exclusive” distributorship in that country.

Former Competitors

Very similar to the “Former Employee” category above is partnering with employees of former competitors whom you may know or come across. They will likely have similar knowledge and skill sets to your former employees, so the same type of potential applies. The only caveat here is you need to be careful of any existing relationships with your competitors or special agendas that could poison a potential relationship.

Product Fans

This category of prospective partner is again very similar to the former employee and competitor categories in terms of potential. A user or former user who loves your product and who you have a good relationship with can be a good candidate for an entrepreneurial VAR/distributor startup, whether domestic or international. The area to be careful of here is they may be very skilled in your product and some internal operating specialty, but may be poorly prepared to market, sell and run an overall business. This of course is a potential risk in the former employee and competitor categories as well.

These are some ways you can take the difficult step of creating your own channel from ground zero. Has anyone else tried this–what were your results? What are your ideas on how best to go about it? Please post a comment to expand the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

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1 Comment by admin on February 6, 2012
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Extending Your Technology With Spinoff Products

Many software and hardware businesses, particularly smaller ones, are religiously focused on a specific vertical market. As well they should; focus is one of the most important attributes that can bring a business from startup to a strong growing business. This is often one of the key areas I concentrate on with many of my consulting clients. Many businesses just can’t turn down any sort of deal, no matter what the effect it has on their existing product development plans or other key corporate initiatives.

But there is another side to the focus issue. Many tech companies have developed excellent, mature technology bases at huge expense. If that basic technology has a horizontal appeal, it can be quite profitable to spend a modest amount of additional effort to bring that technology to other adjacent markets that the company is currently not serving.

Care needs to be taken, of course, to not spread your marketing efforts too thin. But if you’re smart about it your company can increase, sometimes dramatically, the return on its product development investments. Let’s take a look at a few potential tactics, all of which I’ve used successfully both at companies I’ve run and with consulting clients:

Customize your products for adjacent markets

As an example, maybe you have an ERP software package aimed at retail markets. It might be quite easy to customize the product for other inventory-oriented businesses, such as distribution or service/repair businesses. By doing this you’ve created a potentially large new revenue source, at a fraction what building that product from scratch might cost. The trick in this instance is often marketing the product–read below for a couple of ideas on how to accomplish that without doubling your marketing budget.

Private Label/OEM products

Private labeling or OEMing your product to another vendor can be an excellent way to extend your product development ROI. It might be as simple as partnering with a non-competitive vendor who takes your existing product “as is” or with minor modifications, as well as changing the product identity and labeling. The target partner would be a company very strong in a market segment that you aren’t successful in, have no interest in directly marketing in, or simply is beyond your resource level. If done well, this is a win-win for both companies. Your company gets additional revenues with little to no additional costs (“pure profit”), while your partner gains additional revenue in it’s target market–without any product development investment.

Integration & bundling with other products

One of the best things a software vendor is to create a “developer’s version” of it’s product, which essentially consists of creating APIs (application programming interface) to the software. This allows easy integration with complementary software applications and even hardware. Back when I was CEO of a mapping software company with limited resources, we created a developer’s version which enabled both integration and bundling with a number of complementary applications, notably in the real estate and CRM segments. Once again, this tactic required only modest product development investment and enabled us to draw revenue from a number of different markets. We would never have had the resources to pursue these markets if we tried to build a new product from scratch as a company would traditionally do.

Different price points

Using my favorite mapping software company example, we were often forced to think creatively to wring out as much revenue as we could out from our existing technology. One of the other tactics we used was “de-feature” our existing $99 high-end consumer application to create a $9.95 version, which we then sold through mass market retailers of all kinds. Not only did this create more revenue, but the high volume business also created a bunch of opportunities to upgrade these entry level customers to our higher-end core product. This is a strategy I’ve used many times; you almost can’t go wrong when creating a larger customer base for your technology. I use the simplistic phrase “the more you sell, the more you sell” to illustrate the advantages of this approach.

Business vs. consumer version

At that very same mapping software company we used one other great approach to extending your technology: creating a B2B version of our consumer product which was aimed at road warriors such as sales and service professionals (the converse works just as well). The B2B version had a few additional features and we sold it via different channels and strategic partners. It didn’t have the unit volume of the consumer version, but the margins were much higher.

So there are a few ideas on how to extend the use of your IP to increase your overall ROI. What are your ideas on creatively utilizing existing assets to create additional growth? Please post a comment with your own thoughts so we can all benefit.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

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1 Comment by admin on December 5, 2011
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What’s Up With HP?

As regular readers will know, I am a Hewlett Packard alumnus and a longtime admirer of the company. I worked at HP in the eighties, and with hindsight it was one of the finest periods of my career. It was a GREAT place to work, as documented by books and case studies written about the company. My time there definitely had a major effect in shaping my management philosophies.

The more recent -periods at HP have seen a lot of change and a fair amount of turmoil not typical in the company’s first 60 years or so.

Let’s analyze some of the recent events and assess the overall strategic situation:

Firing of Leo Apotheker

What a disaster this was. To hire a new CEO with a major change in strategic direction in mind, then let him go in less than a year is not good. What isn’t known is was the new strategy totally conceived by Mr. Apotheker, or was he brought in to support a new strategy favored by the HP board. Either way, it’s an awful mess for such a major company, and the HP board has not distinguished itself in the last decade.

The new strategy itself while risky on the surface wasn’t the real problem, imo. The communication of the new direction was the real disaster, and smacked of incompetence. Don’t announce you’re “going to sell the business”–that does nothing for valuations. If you’re going to sell it, get on with it and sell it without premature public announcements. By most accounts Mr. Apotheker’s short reign was punctuated by missteps, retractions, chronically missing financial targets and general bumbling. My sources inside the company say that he had lost just about everyone’s confidence, from employees to shareholders to the board. It’s hard to say if that’s fair; new managers can be sabotaged by entrenched forces against change. And major changes were on the way. But the buck needs to stop with the CEO, and it certainly did in this case.

Planned Sale of the PC business

To be honest, I go back and forward on this one. Back in my HP days the PC business was a money-losing, also-ran business with tiny margins. The corporate line of thinking at the time was that HP HAD to be in the PC business, it was so central to everything else the company wanted to do, and the computing world revolved around PCs. I never bought it. In fact, the PC folks got in the way of many things we wanted to accomplish in the peripherals segment of the business, specifically connecting to and partnering with all the other PC makers.

The PC business remains a low margin one today, but one that HP has established a leading position in. I haven’t studied the balance sheet, but I doubt the PC business is so capital-intensive that it would prevent HP from having the money to adequately invest in a new direction. I don’t think selling it off is a stupid move, but announcing it as a first step seems extreme, and only served to make everyone involved nervous about what the future holds.

Eliminating the Tablets/WebOS

Another PR disaster and one that was totally avoidable. The problem was in buying Palm in the first place, and paying a billion dollars for a company that had almost completely failed in the marketplace. Then introducing a new line of tablet computers to great fanfare, almost immediately obsoleting them, and then announcing you’ll be making a few more because everyone love the fire-sale obsolescence pricing–it appeared that the left hand didn’t know what the right hand was doing.

By most accounts the WebOS is a nice piece of software. The problem is that this move was so very late to the game. If it had been done a few years earlier, it might have been a savvy deal, and allowed HP to make a major move into mobile devices with a differentiated product offering. But by the time of this acquisition, Palm was already discredited and Apple, Android and Blackberry had solidified the top leadership positions. And the price was completely ridiculous for as failed company. You can put this one on Mark Hurd, as it came on his watch.

Buying Autonomy

HP recently announced completion of the Autonomy acquisition, paying a dear price for this enterprise software company. Autonomy is a good acquisition if you’re intent on growing software as a share of revenue; the only issue is the price. It was very high, but one must remember that HP’s overall revenues are north of $125 BILLION. Autonomy adds less than $1B in revenue, which is a drop in the bucket relative to HP’s size. With a purchase price of over $10B, HP paid more than 11X revenues–pretty pricey even by today’s inflated SaaS valuations. Autonomy will have to be an exceptional growth in engine for this to pay off. Only time will tell.

Copying the IBM playbook

The IBM playbook was to sell off low margin, lower growth hardware business such as PCs (IBM sold its PC business to Lenovo, a shocking move at the time). Then focus on increasing software and services revenues relentlessly, for a long period of time. It’s worked extremely well for IBM, although I remember there were some tough times in the beginning. Would it work as well for HP, who appears interested in copying IBM’s strategy? I’m not a big fan of copying other company’s strategies, although on the surface the two companies are similar. The key to success or failure is usually execution in most cases of corporate strategy. Executing this strategy would also take a very long time to have an impact on HP’s financials. HP’s software share of total corporate revenue was less than 3% in 2010.  There are only so many $1B+ software companies out there. Most software acquisitions on their own will have a minimum effect on HP’s overall revenues, unless they went after one of the few industry giants–which would truly shock me.  HP has become strong in services after it’s acquisition of EDS in 2008, but is still much less prominent in services than IBM. So even with an aggressive acquisition program and strong organic growth, HP looks to be a hardware-dominated company for a long time in the future.

Meg Whitman appointed CEO

It’s hard to say what influence this will have on the corporate strategy. Ms. Whitman is a seasoned CEO who has been involved in great success, although one could argue that she was very fortunate to benefit from a snowball rolling downhill with Ebay. In addition, her background is heavily consumer products with almost nothing in the enterprise space, which is HP’s supposed new direction. HP’s business is only 25% consumer products, and if you eliminate the massive PC business, it becomes a whole lot less. I never underestimate smart people or their ability to adapt, and she definitely fits in the smart category. But experienced business people also tend to fall back on the comfort level of their past experience and what they understand best. It will be very interesting to watch as Ms. Whitman’s tenure evolves, especially how she affects the previously announced strategy.

What happens next?

I think that HP ends up keeping the PC business, while at least in the short term attempting to become more software and services intensive. You’ll see more software and services acquisitions. But I wouldn’t be surprised to see the flight away from consumer-oriented businesses to abate as long as Meg Whitman is CEO.

I also think that the original IBM-style strategy will be difficult–but not impossible–for HP to implement. For this approach to work, shareholders, employees and the board will all need to be very patient and supportive of the plan. Meg Whitman will really need to believe in it as well, and as discussed above, her background is far from a perfect fit for where they’re headed. My guess is that this strategy won’t be given enough rope for it to work and we’ll see another change of direction in the medium-term, but you never know. That’s what makes this kind of speculation so much fun!

What’s your take on the future direction of HP? Where are they headed, and does it end well or not?  I’m interested in your analysis of recent events at the company; post a comment to share your views and continue the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

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7 Comments by admin on October 17, 2011
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