Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Category: SaaS

What’s Up With HP?

As regular readers will know, I am a Hewlett Packard alumnus and a longtime admirer of the company. I worked at HP in the eighties, and with hindsight it was one of the finest periods of my career. It was a GREAT place to work, as documented by books and case studies written about the company. My time there definitely had a major effect in shaping my management philosophies.

The more recent -periods at HP have seen a lot of change and a fair amount of turmoil not typical in the company’s first 60 years or so.

Let’s analyze some of the recent events and assess the overall strategic situation:

Firing of Leo Apotheker

What a disaster this was. To hire a new CEO with a major change in strategic direction in mind, then let him go in less than a year is not good. What isn’t known is was the new strategy totally conceived by Mr. Apotheker, or was he brought in to support a new strategy favored by the HP board. Either way, it’s an awful mess for such a major company, and the HP board has not distinguished itself in the last decade.

The new strategy itself while risky on the surface wasn’t the real problem, imo. The communication of the new direction was the real disaster, and smacked of incompetence. Don’t announce you’re “going to sell the business”–that does nothing for valuations. If you’re going to sell it, get on with it and sell it without premature public announcements. By most accounts Mr. Apotheker’s short reign was punctuated by missteps, retractions, chronically missing financial targets and general bumbling. My sources inside the company say that he had lost just about everyone’s confidence, from employees to shareholders to the board. It’s hard to say if that’s fair; new managers can be sabotaged by entrenched forces against change. And major changes were on the way. But the buck needs to stop with the CEO, and it certainly did in this case.

Planned Sale of the PC business

To be honest, I go back and forward on this one. Back in my HP days the PC business was a money-losing, also-ran business with tiny margins. The corporate line of thinking at the time was that HP HAD to be in the PC business, it was so central to everything else the company wanted to do, and the computing world revolved around PCs. I never bought it. In fact, the PC folks got in the way of many things we wanted to accomplish in the peripherals segment of the business, specifically connecting to and partnering with all the other PC makers.

The PC business remains a low margin one today, but one that HP has established a leading position in. I haven’t studied the balance sheet, but I doubt the PC business is so capital-intensive that it would prevent HP from having the money to adequately invest in a new direction. I don’t think selling it off is a stupid move, but announcing it as a first step seems extreme, and only served to make everyone involved nervous about what the future holds.

Eliminating the Tablets/WebOS

Another PR disaster and one that was totally avoidable. The problem was in buying Palm in the first place, and paying a billion dollars for a company that had almost completely failed in the marketplace. Then introducing a new line of tablet computers to great fanfare, almost immediately obsoleting them, and then announcing you’ll be making a few more because everyone love the fire-sale obsolescence pricing–it appeared that the left hand didn’t know what the right hand was doing.

By most accounts the WebOS is a nice piece of software. The problem is that this move was so very late to the game. If it had been done a few years earlier, it might have been a savvy deal, and allowed HP to make a major move into mobile devices with a differentiated product offering. But by the time of this acquisition, Palm was already discredited and Apple, Android and Blackberry had solidified the top leadership positions. And the price was completely ridiculous for as failed company. You can put this one on Mark Hurd, as it came on his watch.

Buying Autonomy

HP recently announced completion of the Autonomy acquisition, paying a dear price for this enterprise software company. Autonomy is a good acquisition if you’re intent on growing software as a share of revenue; the only issue is the price. It was very high, but one must remember that HP’s overall revenues are north of $125 BILLION. Autonomy adds less than $1B in revenue, which is a drop in the bucket relative to HP’s size. With a purchase price of over $10B, HP paid more than 11X revenues–pretty pricey even by today’s inflated SaaS valuations. Autonomy will have to be an exceptional growth in engine for this to pay off. Only time will tell.

Copying the IBM playbook

The IBM playbook was to sell off low margin, lower growth hardware business such as PCs (IBM sold its PC business to Lenovo, a shocking move at the time). Then focus on increasing software and services revenues relentlessly, for a long period of time. It’s worked extremely well for IBM, although I remember there were some tough times in the beginning. Would it work as well for HP, who appears interested in copying IBM’s strategy? I’m not a big fan of copying other company’s strategies, although on the surface the two companies are similar. The key to success or failure is usually execution in most cases of corporate strategy. Executing this strategy would also take a very long time to have an impact on HP’s financials. HP’s software share of total corporate revenue was less than 3% in 2010.  There are only so many $1B+ software companies out there. Most software acquisitions on their own will have a minimum effect on HP’s overall revenues, unless they went after one of the few industry giants–which would truly shock me.  HP has become strong in services after it’s acquisition of EDS in 2008, but is still much less prominent in services than IBM. So even with an aggressive acquisition program and strong organic growth, HP looks to be a hardware-dominated company for a long time in the future.

Meg Whitman appointed CEO

It’s hard to say what influence this will have on the corporate strategy. Ms. Whitman is a seasoned CEO who has been involved in great success, although one could argue that she was very fortunate to benefit from a snowball rolling downhill with Ebay. In addition, her background is heavily consumer products with almost nothing in the enterprise space, which is HP’s supposed new direction. HP’s business is only 25% consumer products, and if you eliminate the massive PC business, it becomes a whole lot less. I never underestimate smart people or their ability to adapt, and she definitely fits in the smart category. But experienced business people also tend to fall back on the comfort level of their past experience and what they understand best. It will be very interesting to watch as Ms. Whitman’s tenure evolves, especially how she affects the previously announced strategy.

What happens next?

I think that HP ends up keeping the PC business, while at least in the short term attempting to become more software and services intensive. You’ll see more software and services acquisitions. But I wouldn’t be surprised to see the flight away from consumer-oriented businesses to abate as long as Meg Whitman is CEO.

I also think that the original IBM-style strategy will be difficult–but not impossible–for HP to implement. For this approach to work, shareholders, employees and the board will all need to be very patient and supportive of the plan. Meg Whitman will really need to believe in it as well, and as discussed above, her background is far from a perfect fit for where they’re headed. My guess is that this strategy won’t be given enough rope for it to work and we’ll see another change of direction in the medium-term, but you never know. That’s what makes this kind of speculation so much fun!

What’s your take on the future direction of HP? Where are they headed, and does it end well or not?  I’m interested in your analysis of recent events at the company; post a comment to share your views and continue the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

7 Comments by admin on October 17, 2011
filed in B2C, Business Models, Corporate Strategy, General Management, Mergers & Acquisitions, SaaS, enterprise software, hardware
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How Soon Should Your Software or Hardware Company Go International?

This is a question that frankly doesn’t come up often enough at early stage tech companies. There is usually an assumption that you first conquer your home market, and then sometime way down the road, when you are already flush and successful, it will be time to expand internationally. US-based tech companies are most guilty of this often questionable thinking.

What’s wrong with this approach, especially for US-based companies? After all, the US is the largest market in the world, and it’s far easier to sell to customers close by, then it is halfway around the world. With this the case, why should you use your scarce early-stage capital in a risky international expansion? This is how the thinking goes.

The problem is that you may be leaving significant low-hanging fruit on the table, at the very time that you need those customers the most. Let’s look at 4 important reasons to go international as soon as possible:

Reasons for Early International Business Development

Early adopters needed

As an early stage software or hardware company, you need to find early adopters of your product. These folks fit a certain psychographic profile, and they are rarer than the average customer. You sometimes need to cover the earth to find them. Limiting your geographic net unnecessarily only makes the job harder.

Distribution partnerships can provide tremendous leverage for a young company

This is one of the big reasons to go international that newbies don’t understand. They think that with all the money they are spending to penetrate the home market, selling internationally will be much more expensive yet. Not necessarily. In many markets, you can find distributors who will take on much or most of the marketing and sales load, reducing your investment tremendously and allowing you to leverage their existing relationships–rather than “starting from scratch”.

Many markets are less competitive than your home market, especially if it’s the US

Unless your home market is a tiny one, there are most likely many underserved markets available to you that have a lot of low hanging fruit. Why? Every startup software or tech company thinks the same and focuses initially on their home market. Since the bulk of the tech business is located in the US, it’s by far the most brutally competitive of all.

Beat your competition to the punch

Getting to a market early can often mean the difference between success and failure. If you’re the first one in a country or region, the early adopters and other low-hanging fruit are there for you alone. You will get your pick of the best distribution partners, and your product category will be “fresh” news for the media. Once established, it will be hard for later arriving competitors to push you down the market share ladder, even if they are larger than you overall.

So when should a company go International? The short answer is as soon as you can possibly do it. But what’s most important is to fully evaluate when “as soon as you can” actually is.

What to Evaluate Prior to Deciding to Go International

Your product must be stable

This should go without saying, but the only thing that causes a greater catastrophe than an unstable product is an unstable product distributed worldwide! Don’t do this–make sure things are solid before venturing away from where it’s easiest to “babysit” early problems.

Your product must be “market-tested” in your home market

While I’m a proponent of aggressive international business development at an early stage, there is such a thing as “too early”. Make sure that you know your product has a market before going far away from home. It’s a pointless exercise to be recruiting distributors and customers in foreign markets with a product that doesn’t really hit the mark, and one which doesn’t even had a reference customer list. If you can’t gain 10 or 20 or 30 customers close to home, heading far away likely won’t help.

Inventory or License only

Businesses that involve large amounts of inventory are one of my exceptions to aggressive early international development. That means hardware companies generally need to be more careful that software companies. Companies that distribute through retail channels involve more inventory than those who sell via VARs or direct, so they also need to be more cautious. The issues that come with inventory such as repairs and returns are exacerbated by borders and distance. So if you’re inventory intensive, maybe start with one smaller market rather than a large regional rollout, to test that everything goes smoothly before placing a big bet.

Direct or Channel distribution

If you have to establish your own local foreign operation, hire a bunch of people, rent office space, etc–you generally need to wait. Most startups can’t afford this type of risk and investment. However, although some feel this route is their preference due to control, it’s generally not mine. It’s quite risky and slows your international progress rate down significantly. Most companies can start out by using partners, and usually this is a good long run strategy as well. If you’re wildly successful and really feel the need for total control, you can always buy out distributors later on.

English or Local Language

English is the universal language of technology. In some vertical markets (such as IT software) English language-only products are fine. These are markets where you can make the fastest penetration after proving your product in your home market. If you do need local translations, they really aren’t that expensive in most cases and can be done quickly, and distribution partners can often help. But make sure that you don’t skimp on a good translation; nothing will hurt your local credibility more than language that isn’t proper, or at worst, makes no sense.

Safety, Legal or Electrical Specifications

This is also an area that can slow down the potential for fast international market development. Many countries or regions have safety or electrical standards that will require product modification or testing (and thereby investment). There are also legal aspects that need to be considered (European privacy laws when selling security or marketing software, as an example.) Don’t let these stop you from doing an evaluation of your international prospects, but these factors can change the calculus of your decision making.

SaaS

If you’re a software company using the SaaS model there may be very little downside to early international business development. If latency isn’t an issue for your product, you may need no international investment at all. Or maybe you need your servers hosted in other parts of the world to reduce latency issues, but this shouldn’t be a huge investment. You still need marketing in the local markets, either by your own direct (albeit remote) methods or through partners. But given the potential rewards, these investments should be a small price to pay.

Process or Cultural Differences

When you first go into a foreign market, it’s important to understand that you can’t fully comprehend the local culture, as well as how commerce functions. Listen more than you talk at first. Hire a consultant if you can afford to. Partners can also help greatly here. But if you are a savvy international business person it certainly raises your odds when attacking foreign markets early on.

Existing Demand

Are there customers “chomping at the bit” for the benefits your product offers? Or will there be a bit of an education process and a long sales cycle? Obvious existing demand is a key indicator for aggressive international business development.

The bottom line is that going international quickly can be a big boost to early growth for a tech company. Be careful, but not overly cautious. Evaluate your specific situation, and take the plunge if the odds are with you. What’s your take on the proper pace for international business development? Post a comment or send us your story.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on October 12, 2010
filed in Business Development, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Retail, SaaS, Startup/Early Stage, VARs, hardware, sales
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Selling SaaS through the VAR Channel

The move toward Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is the strongest trend in the software business in recent memory. It changes the software business model in a number of fundamental ways. For the purposes of this article, I’m assuming the reader has a basic understanding of the SaaS business model. I’m also going to assume a basic understand of what a Value Added Reseller (VAR) is and does. I’ll focus on the fit between SaaS and the VAR distribution channel.

 The VAR channel has been a major factor in the B2B software business for a long time. There are tens of thousands of VARs, most of them now focused on specific vertical markets. While it is still possible to find a horizontal VAR, in a market of any size you’ll likely find a nice number of VARs specializing on that segment of customers. As a result, anyone who is selling software (whether via traditional licensing or SaaS) would love to have this stable of key market influencers representing their product. Let’s take a look at the situation:

 Major SaaS strengths

  •  Simplicity of startup for the customer – For many SaaS apps, getting started is as simple as signing up, obtaining a user name and password. Contrast this with the lengthy, complex and sometimes extensive setup and configuration period for some B2B apps. (This strength is a potential problem for VARs).
  • Available from any web browser - This is one of the great capabilities driving the SaaS revolution. Of course, traditional apps can have a web-based interface as well, but SaaS apps by definition are web-centric. Browser-based apps can limit functionality in some cases, but is becoming less of an issue all the time.
  •  Simplicity of maintenance for the vendor - This is a big one. With traditional on-premises apps, the vendor has to deal with “pushing” updates to the client, often into wildly varying hardware and software environments. With SaaS, the vendor presses a button and the new version is universally available to everyone. This is a huge advantage leading to reduced rollout costs for the vendor, and less pain for the client. (Also a potential problem for VARs) 
  • Less IT infrastructure required by clients - Theoretically a company could nearly eliminate their IT department by adopting all SaaS apps. As a practical matter, this isn’t happening in companies of any size, and likely won’t. But any reduction in reliance on perennially overworked IT departments is usually seen as a good thing. (Potential problem for VARs, but also an opportunity)

 Major VAR motivations

 Sell Services (not products) – Contrary to the expectations of channel neophytes, VARs are generally seriously interested in products to the extent that they have the ability to generate service revenue for the VAR. (Early SaaS models eliminate many traditional service revenue streams)

 Secure ongoing revenue – VARs don’t own intellectual property(products) to stabilize long-term revenues as a rule, so they’re always interested in ways of “smoothing out” their business with predictable, ongoing revenue streams. (SaaS eliminates much traditional service revenue, but subscriptions open up new possibilities)

 Maintain client control – VARs are very sensitive about retaining control of the relationship with their clients. They view these relationships as hard-won, and without owning the intellectual property, they are probably the most strategic aspect of their business. (VARs shy away from vendors who try to wrest account control from them, and many new SaaS vendors have this “direct-first” mentality).

 The Gap

 The problem as discussed in the above paragraphs is that the ways VARs traditionally make money (installation, training, integration, customization, support, client control) have been eliminated or severely reduced as opportunities by first generation SaaS vendors. Frankly, it’s never been easy for any software vendor to recruit VARs who are “active” with their products. The current situation sets up the typical first generation SaaS vendor as an arch- enemy to VARs. The SaaS vendors aren’t attractive partners due to the lack of potential service revenue (and often aren’t looking to partner), but are targeting the VAR’s customer base. To some, it looks like the end of the VAR channel for anyone running a SaaS-based company. Sound like a caution sign to SaaS vendors, one which makes the vendor focus strictly on direct selling? Maybe–but let’s explore a few ideas for changing the equation.

 Ideas on how to bridge the gap and attract VARs to your SaaS offering

 There are some forward-thinking SaaS who have been able to leverage the VAR channel for their companies. But at this point, they are few and far between. For many of the reasons stated in the above paragraphs, there is no established, tried and true model for attracting VARs to a SaaS offering today.

The biggest thing I’d like you to consider with respect to the sentence underlined above, is that when things are least established, there is the MOST opportunity for newcomers. Since there is no established perfect SaaS/VAR cooperative business model yet, no SaaS player is dominating in this still very influential channel. For a newcomer, this creates great opportunity and potential payback for creative approaches. Let’s take a look at a few such ideas to attract VARs:

 Design your SaaS offering from the ground up for easy customization and integration

Unfortunately I don’t see many SaaS vendors considering channel strategy when designing their first product. In the early days of SaaS, enabling customization and integration with other products was tough to do. Now the tools are there to make it very possible, but it’s a lot harder if you try to do it “after the fact”, once your architecture has been set and the first commercial release is done. This one step can be a huge asset when you are later trying to design programs attractive to VARs, and it can of course be a huge advantage with certain end users as well.

 Offer solid upfront margins, but focus on downstream revenue streams for your VARs

I recommend offering competitive upfront-sale margins, but going overboard here can be a waste of resources. Remember that VARs don’t build their business on upfront product sales revenue. Focus on finding ways VARs can make money dealing with you after the initial sale is complete. As an example, how about sharing downstream subscription revenue–but only if the VAR creates X amount of new sales revenue for the year? This is an example of a win/win which could lead to great loyalty to your offerings, tying the VAR’s interest to your business in the long run.

 Instead of building a large in-house consulting team, use VARs to help fill IT gaps for your customers

VARs have a lot of capability to offer services that your end users might require and demand. Rather than competing with VARs (and using scarce capital that could be deployed elsewhere), take a look at creating programs to utilize the best of your channel partners as your outsourced consulting team.

 Create a program to enable the outsourcing of upfront product training to your VARs

Initial product training is a great example of a “consulting service” to outsource to your channel. Most product groups see training as a necessary evil and an afterthought, often giving it away for free–while providing it with insufficient attention from the end user’s perspective. With the right tools, a VAR could turn this into a profit center for their business, reducing your utilization of key resources on a non-core activity, while tying the VAR tightly to your products.

 Be careful to allow your VARs to continue to lead in account management activities

In everything you do, keep in mind that the VAR is paranoid about account control (with good reason, unfortunately). Remember, you are in a business partnership with the VAR, and you need to trust them to do the right things for your joint business interests in the account. If you don’t feel like you can trust a particular VAR in this regard, don’t change your program to wrest account control from your channel. Stop doing business with that VAR.

I’m optimistic that adopting a few of these ideas can give you a leg up over the competition in building a productive channel business. I hope that you’ll find this article provocative, if not accurate in your view! This is an emerging, rapidly changing environment. Please post a comment with your own thoughts to expand the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

2 Comments by admin on July 18, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Product Marketing/Management, SaaS, VARs, enterprise software
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Will SaaS Lead to the Death of Software Product Management?

There is a lot of talk in the software business these days about changing business models, particularly the trend toward SaaS (Software as a Service).

Will SaaS business models dominate the software business?

Many consultants, pundits and other industry figures are proclaiming that SaaS will very soon take over the world; saying if you’re not on the bus soon, you’re going to be out of business. I believe this is a bit overstated, but the strong trend toward the SaaS business model can’t be denied.

My opinion on SaaS adoption: When bandwidth is unlimited and close to free, all IT systems are totally secure, the Internet is as reliable as old AT&T; and every customer in the world decides they want to rent everything and own nothing–then I’ll agree that SaaS is heading toward 100% market share. As I said above there’s a strong trend in this direction, but we’re a long way from there.

Is software product management dead?

I’ve written about SaaS a number of times before, and since it has become very important in the software business I’ll continue to do so frequently. What I want to address today is another opinion some “experts” are also espousing: that the trend toward SaaS means the end of the Product Management function in the software business.

I find this statement to be downright silly.

When following this debate, it’s important to take notice that many of the folks proselytizing these opinions have businesses whose success is based upon these predictions actually coming true. It’s always important to consider conflicts of interest among the debaters.

In one recent webinar they trotted out a SaaS software company that was growing briskly every year with no product managers in the company. What wasn’t said is that it was always possible to find software companies (of the traditional sort) who didn’t have a product management function. Software companies are often founded by programmers, and they haven’t always seen the need for Product Management. There are very successful companies where the developers talk directly to the customers, with no product managers at all. However, the facts are that a very small percentage of companies that do business this way are successful, and its usually based upon special circumstances: the rare developer who understands markets and customers as well as he does coding, markets where the developers themselves are perfect customer proxies, etc.

So while software companies without Product Managers have always been out there, it just hasn’t been a broad formula for success. Trotting out one SaaS company successfully doing business this way (incidentally, I saw some big holes in their model long-term) doesn’t impress me much.

I’m not defending the status quo–I’ll say it once again, there is a huge move to SaaS in the software biz. Many (and maybe most) will be doing business this way in the near future. However, like most over-hyped trends, this are some pretty big overstatements being thrown around.

SKILLED product management will always be important

The argument being made is that many of the functions Product Managers currently perform are obsolete under the SaaS model. With continuous development more practical using SaaS, there may be fewer (or no) new version introductions. So the old waterfall chart with MRDs being created for the new version may go away along with new product introductions. I’m sure you get the picture. SaaS is a pretty fundamental change to the software business model, so you wouldn’t expect a product manager’s job to be stagnant under such change.

But those predicting the death of product management are focusing on the more mundane aspects of Product Management. The essence of this critical function is the ability to understand markets and match widespread, aggregate customer needs to the technical skills and IP of your company–creating a PRODUCT which can be sold to these many people. It doesn’t matter whether you deliver this PRODUCT over the Internet in a hosted manner using monthly subscriptions, or in the more traditional on-customer premises, licensed model. Product Management is about creating a profitable PRODUCT well-matched for a market segment. It matters not whether you are engaged in customer facing marketing/promotional activities, or upfront product planning–the product manager’s understanding of market needs and how your company can fulfill those needs is crucial in a product business. Otherwise, you’re just selling custom software–one-off’s for every customer. That’s a different business–not a bad one–and one you which doesn’t require product managers.

Can Social Media replace Product Management?

Another thing being bandied about by my favorite pundits is the impact of communities and other social media for its potential impact on product development. The thinking goes that there will be much more direct interaction with the end customer, leading to tremendous amounts of data available to ISVs. While SaaS is very well suited to communities (although not exclusive–they can be well utilized by traditional licensed software vendors), the ability to more easily obtain direct customer comments, and maybe take votes on potential new features doesn’t eliminate the need for product management. To the contrary. While communities and other forms of social media are very powerful tools, don’t mistake more data and customer access with actionable market intelligence. Data needs to be interpreted, and skilled marketers are best positioned to discern who’s telling you what and why–the underlying motivations behind any customer feedback. So all of this added customer access and resulting data will only put a premium on good product management, to use these powerful new tools and data for quicker action and to allow better product planning decisions. Remember, SaaS competitor down the road will have access to the same tools and data that you do.

It is rare to find a developer who has truly exceptional product management skills. That’s not a knock on developers; as a whole they are an extremely sharp bunch. But specialization in life happens for a reason–very seldom is someone the best at everything. Developers are trained to write code and build applications, not understand markets or extract the “truth” from customers. Different types of people’s brain’s work differently, and a good developer and good product manager are an example of this.

I find that it’s when a talented, open-minded development manager teams with a market-savvy product manager, that most great software applications are made. So no, I don’t believe that the Product Management function is going away anytime soon in the software business. There are many important changes going on in the business, the SaaS business model not the least of these. With any change in business model, functional roles will evolve and change. But I believe strongly that Product Management is a fundamental, important role that will remain critical in software businesses far into the future.

That’s what I think about SaaS and product management–what do you think? Post a comment to start the discussion! Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

3 Comments by admin on October 12, 2009
filed in Corporate Strategy, Product Marketing/Management, SaaS, Social media, Software/Product Development
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Cloud Computing, SaaS and Such–Have We Read This Story Before?

I have this incredible feeling of déjà vu.

Cloud computing and Software as a Service is all the rage. In my practice at PJM Consulting, I am very involved in software startup activity. Nearly every new software company that I see today is being built on the Software as a Service business model. It’s all the rage–so much so that it appears that any self-respecting software entrepreneur would be embarrassed to start a company using the traditional software licensing model. Even if an entrepreneur was so inclined, good luck finding a VC who would even consider funding such a company. No one wants to look like a dinosaur.

It’s all well and good–there is definitely a real trend toward SaaS and Cloud Computing, with many good reasons for it. But most high technology trends are initially a bit over-hyped, and tend to get ahead of themselves. In addition, this particular story seems ever so familiar to a tech veteran that’s been around for a few of these cycles.

The first bit of history this reminds me of is the old terminal/mainframe model from the early years of computing. There were some real advantages to this model, but also some big disadvantages as well–which opened the door for the golden age of PCs and networking.

The second era that the current SaaS wave reminds me of is “Web 1.0″, when Web-based hosted software (then called ASP rather than the modern SaaS terminology), was first going to take over the world. The current trend seems so very similar because it was around the Web 1.0 years of the late 90s/early 2000 when the traditional software license business model was first proclaimed dead. At that time nearly every new business plan was based upon an ASP model.

So some of this fast-moving Cloud Computing or SaaS trend is new–but much of it could be viewed as recycled from past trends. Let’s look at the Pros and Cons of this computing model:

ADVANTAGES

* Enables “Utility-Style” computing – variable expense instead of. capital investment
* Allows an end run around overwhelmed IT departments (like PC networking did)
* Supposedly “On-demand”–use only what you need, when you need it
* More efficient use of compute resources by time-slicing large farms of cost-efficient computing resources
* Web-based allows anywhere, anytime availability
* Off-site storage of data assists disaster recovery preparedness

DISADVANTAGES

* Immature and inherently more difficult Security
* More difficult integration with other applications
* Internet latency
* Internet reliability
* Data resides outside the company firewall
* Costs over time aren’t necessarily lower for customers
* Lower margins for software vendors–aren’t always accounted for in current pricing

SUMMARY

I believe that the trend toward computing in the cloud will continue, but there will be some stumbles and pullbacks along the way. Cloud Computing and SaaS has some inherent strengths–but also some under-publicized weaknesses. Many software vendors are overlooking the weaknesses at this time, as is typical of any new and hyped technology. Traditional licensed software hosted by the user still has its strengths and a definite place in the market. Like many mature technologies and business models, the death of traditional software licensing has been greatly exaggerated. Once the early hype passes, decisions on whether to computer within the firewall or in the cloud will once again be made on the individual merits, costs and user needs for a particular application within a particular company. That’s how I see it–post a comment with your opinion so we can look at all viewpoints.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

9 Comments by admin on May 4, 2009
filed in Corporate Strategy, General Management, Operations, SaaS, Software/Product Development, enterprise software
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Google Chrome–a Strategic Platform or just another Browser?

Google’s new Chrome Browser came out a few weeks ago to quite a bit of attention. It’s big news 1) because it’s from Google and 2) it brings back memories of the “browser wars”, and seems like it could potentially signal the next big battleground in the intense rivalry between Google and Microsoft.

I’ve downloaded Chrome and played with it a bit, but this isn’t intended to be a technical review of Chrome’s merits. It seems reasonably snappy, and has Google’s typical minimalist design philosophy, including a single box for multiple functions (search, address bar, etc.). Your personal preferences will decide whether you like that or not. It has some nice features such as tabbed browsing, which theoretically should prevent one bad browser window from crashing all open browser windows–much like when Windows became multi-threaded. Nice stuff, but doesn’t really fundamentally change the browser game. But technically it’s still a beta anyway (of course just about everything is with Google), and it will evolve over time–so it’s not really time to judge it from a technical perspective anyway.

What I want to do is to examine Chrome as a strategic move by Google with respect to the software and online worlds–what does it really mean, where will it take the market, and what are its chances for success?

Let’s take a look at some of the potential ways that Chrome could affect the marketplace:

A Better Browser
Of course, PR propaganda always will say that this is the “real” reason for bringing out a new product such as this. When I was at HP we used to call this “making a contribution to the market”. Google in particular often gets sanctimonious about this type of thing, with all their “do no evil” and saving the world stuff. Does the world really need another, better browser? Not sure. Firefox and Safari, to name two, are already probably technically superior to IE, and while they’ve made some inroads in the marketplace, they still trail Microsoft by a wide margin. But history tells us that competition is a good thing, and a step forward on major platform like a browser can certainly be thought of as a gateway to allow software innovation to develop faster. Having a company like Google enter the fray should increase rate of innovation that’s possible in the online market.

An Application Development Platform
This is the position that many pundits suspect may be the major impact of Google’s move. In their introduction, Google talked quite a bit about “remaking” the browser for Web 3.0, if you will. And a fresh approach does make sense, given that Internet Explorer was conceived long before serious online applications were envisioned for the Web. With SaaS and Web 2-3-4.0 currently all the rage, having a browser platform designed from the bottom up to accommodate online software applications should be a good thing. If it’s all it’s cracked up to be, this could conceivably be a game-changer and a real threat to Microsoft. The key here is how much of the talk about re-architecting the Browser is real, and how much is hype. This will become more apparent over time as Chrome is further developed, and application developers take a look to see if there truly are features they can take advantage of to build better online apps for users.

An Additional Way To Track User Behavior
This is one of the more cynical viewpoints as to the major motivation behind Google’s introduction of Chrome. The thinking is that this is one more insidious move by Google to “big brother” your online activity. It’s no secret that Google uses web activity data they collect by various means (such as Google Analytics) to fine-tune their advertising business. Certainly owning browser could be seen as the “holy grail” towards creating a complete characterization of online activity. What else might they use this data for, in addition to fine tuning their advertising platform? That’s the question and concern.

A Way To Drive More Search Traffic And Adwords Revenue
Along the same lines as the bullet point directly above, owning the browser could be seen as the ultimate in terms of driving web traffic toward Google’s Adwords online advertising. The first thing you see upon downloading Chrome is the opportunity to switch to Google as your default search engine. How much will they do in this regard, either subtly or in a straightforward manner? As stated above, at a minimum, it gives them the opportunity to make Google the default search engine, which is critical to their base business. Only time will tell how much of a factor this is in Google’s Chrome strategy.

A “Real” Competitor Aimed At Microsoft IE To Make Them Defend Their Turf
Of all the bullet points I’m raising, this is the one I’m most sure of. Google and Microsoft are locked in one of those classic death matches for online software supremacy, and don’t miss an opportunity to tweak their arch-rival and make them sweat a bit. Going back to the application development argument above, there is a feeling that Chrome could serve as the basis for a suite of online Google apps to threaten obsolescence for Microsoft’s desktop software business. I don’t doubt that Google may try to do this. But even if from a technical and marketing perspective Chrome is only a modest success, it almost certainly will get Microsoft’s attention and cause them to expend resources and management attention on browser technology, to an extent they may not have preferred.

SUMMARY
Chrome is intriguing, but it’s too early to tell for sure what the major reason is for this Google initiative. They may not even know for sure themselves at this point. But the product, and more importantly the move itself, will likely make Microsoft react. The ensuing competition should be all good for the user and developer communities, as long as it doesn’t take us toward another tiresome and market-paralyzing “platform API” war. I’ll be following the future development of Chrome closely to see where it takes us–how about you?

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

No Comments by admin on October 9, 2008
filed in Corporate Strategy, Product Marketing/Management, SaaS, Software/Product Development
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Competing with Entrenched Software & Technology Industry Giants

A few years ago I was reading an article in the business section of our local newspaper about a new Search Engine name CUIL (pronounced Cool). I already knew about CUIL, because I had noticed that it had just recently indexed the PJM Consulting website. One of their claimed differentiating factors was that they’ve their search index was twice as large as Google’s is. In addition, they believe that they had improved the ranking algorithms, and they also present the results in a different way. The results offered fewer results per page, but more comprehensive information on each site, and often included a photo or other graphic. The premise of the article was that it could have a chance to be a real competitor vs. Google, or at least Yahoo and Microsoft, for market share in the huge search business. The founders had impressive pedigrees and came from Google on the technical side.

While the article gave credence to the possibility of CUIL being a potentially serious competitor to Google, Yahoo and MS, it also pointed out that quite a few companies have attempted to enter this fray, creating barely a blip in search engine market share to date.

I took a quick peek at CUIL–the presentation was definitely different and possibly superior for some tastes. But in my quick look I wasn’t terribly impressed with the relevancy of the search results. No matter how you present the data, the relevancy of the results is paramount in search. I stuck with Google, as it appears just about everyone did.

Did CUIL meet with any success at all? Well, they’re no longer in business, closing up shop in September 2010. They were barely around for two years. They’re took on what is arguably the most powerful technology company in the world today, attempting to compete with them in their core area of strength. So you can’t say that the odds of success were high, which they rarely are for any startup. And this might be the ultimate tough market to enter at this point. Microsoft has continuously poured money into competing with Google with little success, most recently with BING and the partnership with Yahoo. But this IS the technology business; everyone gets at least a puncher’s chance. The key to survival (if not success) is usually how well they execute, and it didn’t appear that CUIL executed very well.

But execution aside, what’s the best way to go about competing in the software and technology industries today? Should you just steer clear of the elephants of the industry? Many believe this is prudent, but I think it is not always necessary. Well, maybe going directly at Google’s search engine isn’t the best bet! But it wasn’t so very long ago that is was nearly impossible to get a venture capitalist to fund a company that was perceived to compete in a category with Microsoft (which could be viewed as MOST categories of the software business). Yet a short time later, Microsoft is considered in many ways a dinosaur, one that is quite beatable (don’t get the impression that I’m writing MS off–I’m not. Redmond may yet rise to dominate again).

If it isn’t insane to compete with the giants, what are some best strategic practices that an early stage tech company can adopt to give it the best chance to survive and thrive, when entering market categories with large, entrenched competitors?. Let’s take a look at a few ideas:

Make Sure that you can Differentiate – This would seem obvious for any business, but when you are going up against a huge company with a good brand–well, don’t even try it without significant differentiating factors. They don’t need to be product related, necessarily–it could be free and outstanding support, better price points, exceptional ease-of-use, or many other things. But don’t kid yourself–you will need REAL differentiation.

Pick a Niche, any Niche–at least to start – It is important to pick a small enough niche so that you can provide that true differentiation discussed above. Your investors may want you to attack a huge market, but if you don’t have that influence pushing you in that direction, pick a small area that you can have a higher chance of dominating when you’re new. If you are successful in your initial niche, you can then broaden out into adjacent segments. Down the road, maybe you take on the giant “head-on”; but starting out is NOT the time for this.

Raise more money than you think you will need – Every once in a while a new company will “hit on all cylinders” from the very beginning. But in my consulting practice at PJM Consulting, I rarely see this. In fact, a good part of my practice is helping companies “pick up the pieces” after their initial business plan or execution has gone awry. No one likes to give up more equity than they need to, but things usually take longer to start working than you initially project. There are usually too many things that you don’t know, until you really get into the marketplace. Plus, it’s generally easier (and cheaper!) to raise a bit more money at first, than it is after that first misstep. A little extra funding in the bank can be a good insurance policy against a capital crisis early on.

DON’T try to be like them - A common mistake that I often see early stage companies make is trying to “be like the giant competitor”. Sometimes this comes from an inferiority complex, and sometimes because the founders come from one of the giant companies themselves. The last thing you want to do is create a big company bureaucracy. In most ways, you want to operate VERY DIFFERENTLY from you huge, slow-moving competitor. Resist the urge to create huge amounts of process before your company size dictates it as necessary. Be very careful about hiring away senior executives from you giant competitors, unless you are certain that they also have successfully operated in an early stage company before. Stay as fast and nimble for as long as you can–that is a primary advantage at this stage of a company’s development.

Recognize the giant’s execution weaknesses and beat them there – Analyze the large competitor’s business, and try to create your differentiation where they are weakest. It could be faster customer service, better channel relations, better ease-of-use, etc. If you concentrate your differentiation where they are doing the poorest job, it will accentuate the difference to the marketplace, and you will have a better chance of your advantage being recognized.

Focus, Focus, and Focus – This advice can be viewed as the culmination of the points above. Make sure that you don’t try to do any more than you can do EXCEPTIONALLY WELL at this stage. You can always expand your focus later. Remember, there is a good chance we would all be speaking German, if Hitler hadn’t prematurely opened up a second front with Russia in World War II. The tech landscape is littered with companies that followed an analogous strategy, with similar disastrous results (Novell and Netscape are two former high-flyers that immediately come to mind).

SUMMARY

As an early stage company entering a market where a major company or two are the known leaders, make sure that you don’t “bite off more than you can chew”. You can always expand your focus after initial success. Contracting your focus is usually quite a bit more painful, and many companies don’t make it through that transition. That’s my advice on how to attack a large, entrenched competitor. As usual, I’d be interested in seeing your comments.

Phil Morettini

PJM Consulting

www.pjmconsult.com

pm@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on August 15, 2008
filed in Corporate Strategy, Financing, General Management, Pricing, Product Marketing/Management, SaaS, Startup/Early Stage
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Will Web 2.0 Lead to a New Bubble?

So there’s a new “next big thing” happening in the high tech world–that’s feels very, very familiar. In fact, it seems a lot like “déjà vu all over again”, to quote one of my all time favorite philosophers–Yogi Berra. I’m talking about the Web 2.0 phenomenon. The question I present is–what’s the difference between Web 2.0 and 1.0? Although there are obvious differences technologically, and there are a few wildly successful companies following a Web 2.0 style model–my reply is “not a lot” is different.

SOCIAL NETWORKING IS THE BATTLEFIELD

The recent buyout of YouTube by Google for roughly $1.6 billion dollars is what finally set me off to write this article. You see, this is EXACTLY the type of transaction that was representative of the bubble years. An overnight success, with a lot of eyeballs (ok, TONS of eyeballs!) and essentially NO revenue turns it’s twenty-something founders into near billionaires, just months after starting the company. Ok, it was 2 years, but you get the point.

Now we haven’t seen a transaction quite like this in a long time, but they seem to be picking up steam. MySpace was snatched up similarly by Fox for about a half a billion, also with almost no revenue at the time. Facebook also looks like it will be sold soon, to one of the new or older media companies, for a big chunk of change.

What’s happening is the Internet market leaders such as Yahoo, Google, Amazon, Microsoft/MSN, and older media companies trying to keep up, like Fox and Time-Warner–are fighting to get and retain the lead in all the important mass market Internet categories. The hottest one at the moment is referred to as “Social Networking”. The idea is that in Web 2.0, the user is much more of a producer of content in addition to being a consumer of it, so that the idea of online users as passive consumers of content is now passé. This new wave is hitting big with sites that are getting huge growth in traffic, like YouTube and MySpace, which enable their users to produce and publish their own content. But how much money’s really in it?

All the big players are afraid of missing this wave, and like most big companies with respect to societal shifts–have missed the boat completely, or have fallen behind their more innovative startup competitors. And yes, I now categorize Google as one of those less innovative, bigger companies. As much as they’ve tried to avoid that fate, they’ve grown very big quickly–and haven’t had a home-grown hit for a while in “Internet time”.

EYEBALLS FIRST, PROFIT LATER

What strikes me as so familiar about all this is that social networking from Web 2.0 looks A LOT like the “Communities” phenomena of Web 1.0. Both represent an attempt to “get the eyeballs first” and “we’ll figure out how to monetize them later”. Both are based upon the idea of getting people together on a user-driven site, as opposed to selling a specific product or service. And both are driven by a business model where the main source of revenue is expected to be online advertising.

Now I happen to believe that YouTube and MySpace will end up being able to monetize those eyeballs. But does that mean that everyone will?

Some of you might say that the difference is that online advertising has been legitimatized by Google’s unbelievable success with contextual PPC adverting, with their search engine Ads and Adsense network. That success is irrefutable. But does that mean it will go on forever, and that the public will tolerate text ads (or something even MORE invasive) littering nearly every square inch of unused webspace? Personally, I don’t think so. There is definitely a place for online advertising, and I expect it to continue to grow robustly for the foreseeable future. But everyone seems to forget that online banner advertising was also highly successful at the beginning of Web 1.0–until the public got tired of it, and tuned it out. Advertising revenue online dropped like a rock, and many companies were destroyed in the process.

Google has done a great job of improving on the online advertising model so that Advertisers became successful, allowing Google to ride on that success by taking a nice cut of the take. But even today, it’s getting more difficult all the time to make PPC campaigns pay off. The days of easy direct conversions to sales are gone in most markets, and using PPC as a lead generation tool–while still good business for many–is far less compelling. Will the PPC market leaders continue to grow fast for a while longer? I’m sure. Will it flatten out at some point in the medium term? I’m sure of that also. Will most of those companies that are raising huge amounts of venture capital, with online Ad-centric business models, find the same level of success? I’ll bet you everything in my bank account against this. In fact, I think that there is room for surprisingly few additional big players who DEPEND upon online advertising for their success.

PUBLIC MARKET EXCESSES

The other aspect that seems to distinguishes the Web 2.0 wave from Web 1.0 history is the lack of overheating of IPOs. In fact, the IPO market for Tech companies overall still hasn’t really recovered from the Web 1.0 bubble. In addition to the burn marks that remain on Wall Street’s hands with respect to Tech companies, SARBOX has also made going public less attractive to all growth companies. Exit strategies are more often based upon a sale than an IPO these days. But two things here: just because it hasn’t happened yet–doesn’t mean these IPO excesses won’t reappear later in the cycle. I believe we are still early in this one. Secondly, I wouldn’t preclude some type of financial bubble, even without public IPOs of nearly no-revenue companies like in 2000. Anytime hype over-inflates the value of assets, the downstream consequences can be severe. If bidding wars by the established companies get too out of hand, it could still end up having a real negative impact on the stock market and the high tech business environment, down the road.

HISTORY HAS A WAY OF REPEATING ITSELF

My final thought on this topic is that in the High Tech world, there is almost always more money chasing the “next big thing” than can receive an adequate return. This inevitably leads to many excesses, including a level of hype that can only lead to disappointment, for those who get in late or with marginal business plans. The result is a boom-bust cycle that we see re-enact itself over and over again. My thesis is that “eyeballs first, figure out how to monetize later” has always been, and always will be a flawed approach, for all but the fortunate few. If you’re buying into Web 2.0 in a big way, Caveat Emptor–Let the Buyer Beware. A history lesson can sometimes be the most prolific forecaster of all.

Will there be a Web 2.0 bubble, much like the original dotcom bubble? It’s too early to tell. But as I’ve outlined above there are some hints in the news that a repeat might not be that far-fetched.

That’s my take on Web 2.0–what’s yours?

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

3 Comments by admin on October 22, 2006
filed in B2C, Business Models, Financing, Mergers & Acquisitions, SaaS, Social media, Software/Product Development, Startup/Early Stage

Is Advertising the Future of Software Revenue?

There is a strong movement toward Internet-based software applications. Of this, there is little doubt. I have written on the SaaS trend in the past, and believe it is real. But sometimes market trends such as the move toward SaaS are overstated, both in terms of the speed of change, and also how much change the trend will ultimately affect a market. We have a word for this overstatement of a trend: “hype”. So, is traditional software revenue model of licensing dead? Will all software eventually be “given away” to the end user, and supported solely by advertising revenue?

If you believe many of the pundits in the computer trade press, the answer is a resounding “yes”.

What do I believe? It’s a bunch of hooey.

I’ve got a few gray hairs, and have been in the technology business for a while. In technology, this type of hype is neither unusual nor infrequent. For background purposes, let’s backtrack a bit, to few recent, major “trends”, which were heralded as the “next big thing” by the mainstream technology trade press and associated analysts.

Java
What was predicted: Java was going to take over the world, it was a Microsoft killer. Sun Microsystems was to ascend to the position of King of the technology world.

What actually happened: There was tremendous PR hype far in advance of mature, usable technology and products. This was followed by headlines detailing the dismal failure of Java in the market, and the beginning of yet another down cycle for Sun. Java technology eventually matured and found a nice market space, although not a dominant one, and one that Sun seems to have failed to capitalize on directly. The most recent estimate I’ve seen of Java revenues for Sun is $10M annually.

Bluetooth
What was predicted: Bluetooth was going to be the next great wireless standard, blowing past the expensive and inferior 802.l1 standard. It would extend from cable replacement all the way to “smart networking”.

What actually happened: Unlike Java, which people saw as proprietary to Sun (with good reason), no one company “owned” Bluetooth. It was backed by a large consortium and standards committee. Unfortunately, like Java, it was grossly oversold very early on, both on its maturity and its ultimate potential. The trade press once again declared this new technology a failure—far before the development cycle was even able to deliver stable, useful products. 802.11 became the dominant wireless networking standard. Bluetooth has found a small niche in short cable replacement, primarily in the market for hands-free devices attached to mobile phones. Newer emerging standards such as UWB threaten to usurp in many of the market niches that Bluetooth has been able to establish, and is the new challenger to 802.11 for the wireless networking space.

Pen and Voice Computing (take your pick):
What was predicted: Many times over the years, tech industry pundits have proclaimed that by year xxxx, Pens and or Voice Recognition technologies will have rendered the trusty keyboard and mouse obsolete. We will be able to engage our computing platforms in a more natural manner, much like we do in “real world” interactions. The Apple Newton was to be only the first generation of soon to be ubiquitous pen-based computers, which would dominate our everyday computing world. Later, Bill Gates told us during a stage introduction in 2001, that he was “already using a tablet PC as his everyday computer.” Certainly all the experts, over the years, expected these technologies to mature and become mainstream, long before the year 2006.

What actually happened: We’re still waiting. I’m guessing that Bill G.’s clunky Tablet PC is sitting somewhere in the corner of his office—gathering dust. I haven’t tried to add it up, but I’m sure that many billions of dollars have gone down the drain (along with a bunch of high profile startups, and careers), trying to bring these technologies to the mass market. In the meantime, the technologies have continued to mature, and have found important niches. Pens have become useful in mobile computing, although keyboards have recently mounted a comeback in that area. Voice recognition continues to mature and has become very useful in the market for people with disabilities. The maturation of voice recognition can also be seen when you call a company using one of the newer automated attendants, as entry points to their call centers. They are much smarter and quite a bit less frustrating to use than the earlier attempts in the market, which helped coin the phrase “voice mail hell”.

WEB or DOT COM 1.0
What was predicted: All software was going to be Internet-based, free to end users, and supported by advertising revenue. Traditional licensing of software was old-fashioned and passé. Try getting an emerging software company with a traditional licensing model funded in the year 2000. If you weren’t laughed at by potential investors, you were at least viewed as a dinosaur.

What actually happened: I doubt if I need to spend too much time reviewing what happened, unless any of you were living in a cave in 2001.

So here we sit in 2006, in an era that the press been dubbed “Web 2.0”. Google is the hottest company on the planet, supported almost exclusively by advertising revenues. They are buying software companies left and right with inflated stock, eliminating license fees, and rolling the acquired products into their wildly successful advertising-supported model.

Once again I’ll pose the questions: So, is traditional software revenue via licensing dead? Will all software eventually be “given away” to the end user and supported by advertising?

Doesn’t Web 2.0 sound a lot like Web 1.0? My thesis is that it does, with a few obvious exceptions. Google has shown that in some cases, the advertising-supported model for software can work EXTREMELY well. And people aren’t in quite the crazy mood that they were in the late 90’s, when otherwise perfectly sane, experienced VCs and other business people appeared to lose their collective minds. Statements like “it’s not about the revenue, it’s about attracting the most eyeballs”, and “we’ll figure out how to monetize it later” were NORMAL. And let’s not forget my all time favorite “Your not spending money fast enough”.

I’m not suggesting that craziness is returning; because not enough time has past to forget the resulting pain wrought on the high tech industry. But I do believe, that in terms of ultimate effect and rate of change, the pundits once again are viewing a molehill, and proclaiming a mountain. Google is hugely successful. They’ve hit on a great formula that works for the Search Engine software business. The formula that they’ve created has allowed a great many people to build websites with excellent, useful content, and monetize that content, in whole or in part, with online advertising.

But I strongly disagree that this is the future of all—or even most—software applications. If you look at the Google phenomena closely, I believe it is a special case. The Search Engine business is a mass market; nearly everyone uses one these days. It is also a large market with almost an infinite number of identifiable submarkets of customers, which is what allows Google to sell so much advertising, to so many different customers. When you do a search in Google, you are essentially joining one of those submarkets, making you identifiable to the vendors in that space. There is also the wonderful fact for Google that their version of online advertising looks a lot like their “free product”—the search results, and their ads are reasonable direct replacement alongside those results. In fact, a large number of (even sophisti
cated) people don’t even realize they are responding to advertising when they click on a “Sponsored Link” result. There are probably a number of other mass market applications that will provide a similar opportunity, for using an advertising-only revenue model.

But for most software applications, I don’t believe that this model will be work. Most software applications are focused on a smaller market. In many cases, the ongoing R&D; to support these important—but not universally needed—applications, may be nearly as high as developing a Search Engine. There may be advertising opportunities available to online version of these applications, but the revenue in most cases may be far less than what is required to fund R&D;, marketing and sales—while still make a reasonable profit. I also don’t believe that clicking on advertising will be nearly as “natural” while working on a spreadsheet, writing a letter, or doing your online banking. I think that even Google is making a mistake by eliminating license fees for many of the applications they are acquiring, in their recent M&A; frenzy. Everyone gives them a pass on their strategy, because of the wave they are currently riding. But that doesn’t mean that it’s the right one. Only time will tell for sure. I remember a similar point in the development of Netscape (one of the Google’s of the past) where everyone thought Netscape could do no wrong. In the end, their strategy looked very flawed, and of course they failed to execute—which is generally even more important to success.

Certainly advertising form factors and technology may adapt to these newer online applications—but that’s a big if, and counts on innovation. I’m sure many software companies with advertising-only business models are being funded TODAY. Sounds a lot like “we’ll figure out how to monetize it later”, to me.

Another interesting point to consider that in other forms of media, advertising as a revenue source is taking a beating vs. user fees. High Profile examples include television (cable & pay per view vs. traditional free networks with advertising), and the emerging Satellite radio.

My expectation is that there will be a few major successes, like Google, that rely exclusively on Advertising for revenue. There will also be a larger number of companies that augment their licensing revenue with advertising. But for the foreseeable future, I see licensing revenue remaining as the backbone of software business models.

The moral of this story is, don’t always believe what you hear. It’s very hard to predict what will really happen in High Tech. Sometimes what is shouted the loudest in the technology business, turns out to be laughably wrong, in hindsight.

That’s my unvarnished opinion—go ahead and shoot holes in it! I’m curious to hear other opinions and supporting facts.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on June 21, 2006
filed in B2C, Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Financing, General Management, Online Marketing, SaaS, Startup/Early Stage

Software as a Service

How should Software be delivered to users? Via traditional licenses? As “free” services supported by advertising? Or using a rental model referred to under several different labels such as Hosted, ASP, On Demand or SaaS. This has been very much in debate over the last few years. Back in the dot-com boom, the selling of software licenses was proclaimed to be dead. Everything was to be a service on the Internet, and much of it was going to be advertising-supported instead of paid for by the user. We all know how that turned out!

Of course, while that model failed at that time, that doesn’t mean that it eventually won’t happen. Hype has a way of getting in the way of reality. Hype can lead to retardation of the market for great ideas, when the inevitable disappointment in the early stage of a technology sets in. But there have been some very notable major successes that came out of the dot- com era. Search Engines are the most notable, and have actually succeeded while staying true to the advertising-supported model. Search engines are nothing more than hosted software, delivered “free” for use by end-users—and supported primarily by advertising revenue from services like AdWords and Overture (recently renamed Yahoo Search Marketing). The search engine companies are arguably the hottest segment of the software industry at this point. But while they broke through in a major way, thousands of companies (and billions in Venture Capital) went down the drain attempting to follow essentially the same model.

On the ASP side, there have also been successes as well. The most notable today is salesforce.com, which has gone along way toward transforming the way CRM is delivered to companies. Salesforce.com and its direct competitors have delivered great benefits in this space, and have gone a long way toward legitimatizing the ASP model for business customers. Marc Benioff, Salesforce’s CEO, is very visible and colorful. He has made a big splash by proclaiming traditional software licensing to be dead, that the era of On Demand software is upon us. Is this true—or bluster?

Like anything else, I think it’s a bit of both—but mostly bluster at this point. My take on this issue is one of market segmentation: there are customers who will embrace the ASP model for concrete business reasons as well as their psychographic profile, and on the other end of the spectrum there are conservative clients who will profess to never embrace it. Let’s look at some of the pros and cons of the ASP model vs. Traditional licensing:

Traditional Licensing

Pros
- Customer owns a perpetual license to the software–positive for many reasons
- Data resides within the company—don’t rely on outside vendor for mission-critical data
- Somewhat protected if SW vendor goes out of business
- Greater ability to integrate with other third party and in-house applications

Cons
- Must support the software internally
- Keeping up to date on releases and rolling them out can be a complex headache
- IT is constantly overworked and unavailable for support, costing users productivity
- Increased hardware budget and systems complexity
- Cost of software must be capitalized

ASP Model

Pros
- Back office support is offloaded to ASP
- Less hardware to buy and maintain
- Cost of software can be expensed
- Software updates are transparent and automatic
- Great for independent operations and branch offices
- Familiar Browser interface reduces training costs
- Appeals to users who don’t have huge capital budgets or are more comfortable with smaller bets

Cons
- If something goes wrong, less ability to fix it quickly internally—you’re at the whim of an outside vendor
- Mission-Critical data is in the hands of a supplier, which scares a lot of people
- More susceptible to price increases by the vendor
- Less integration potential and control by the customer, particularly with in-house apps.

One of the most important factors, cost, really can’t be put in the favor of either model. There is no inherent cost advantage to either model—the lowest cost solution will be determined by the relative efficiencies of the customer’s IT department vs. the ASP, and the pricing aggressiveness of the ASP and traditional software vendor.

So what will happen in the software market? Will everything quickly be converted to an ASP model, or is this a fad that is going to quickly pass once again? I believe that for a very long time both models will be important, with a slow shift toward the ASP model. The early shifts will take place in the apps where it is most compelling. CRM fits into this category because the desirability to have it available to people in the field anywhere via a browser far exceeds any negatives. Accounting Software? Engineering Software? I don’t believe that the case is very compelling at the moment in these categories. After an initial shift toward the ASP model, it’s my forecast that for a long time these two delivery schemes will co-exist, as different market segments based upon unique business needs and psychographic preference within the software user community.

So what to do if you’re the VP-Marketing or CEO of a software company looking at this issue? Don’t just look at it on the surface and embrace the ASP model as the wave of the future or simply reject it as a fad. Analyze your particular market to see if this new model makes sense for your product family. In many cases it will make sense to offer both an ASP delivery option and traditional licensing. If it is practical to offer both, you will most likely maximize the financial return on the IP of your company using this strategy. That’s my view—I’d like to hear yours.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

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filed in B2C, Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Product Marketing/Management, SaaS, Software/Product Development, enterprise software