Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Category: VARs

Creating a Distribution Channel Where One Doesn’t Exist

One of the least well understood activities in growing a hardware or software business is the building of distribution channels. This looks very easy to the uninitiated, but in reality it’s extremely difficult. There are many subtleties that are far from obvious, and some aspects that are necessary for success are downright counter-intuitive. Building a distribution channel for your company is difficult in the best of circumstances.

How hard is it when there are no current, obvious existing channel partners already selling your category of products to start with?

It’s very hard. In fact, most people in the know would likely tell you to forget about it, and not even try. That might actually be pretty good advice, because this activity could easily become a real time and money sink if you’re not careful.

But the other side of the coin is that this might be the circumstance where building a channel carries the very highest potential payoff. One of the great truths I’ve discovered in my career is that the most effective marketing and sales strategies are the ones that haven’t yet become mainstream in your marketplace. Once a strategy or tactic becomes very popular, the results become watered down until at some point it’s marginally attractive at best. In terms of strategy, this move fits in the “high risk, high reward” category. But the payback, if successful, is extremely high.

In terms of strategy, creating your own channel definitely fits in the “high risk, high reward” category. Because while it’s very difficult, if successful, you alone among all competitors in your segment will have the leverage and resulting strategic advantage that a well-executed channel strategy can provide.

So the question is how do you go about this? Where do you even start if there are no existing channel partners for your category? Let’s take a look at a few places to mine that I’ve found some success in the past:

Adjancent Markets

This is the most fertile place to begin, imo. The first step is to think strategically about what type of software application or hardware product is complementary to yours. Whose product might it make sense to integrate with your own, for example? These types of potential strategic partners might also have existing channel partners that might be interested in selling your product as a companion product. An example scenario that I recently successfully implemented for a client was an analytics software company that uses a lot of data to help forecast and mitigate decision risk. We were able to attract a number of channel partners in two adjacent categories: Business Intelligence (BI) and Project Management. Both of these categories are large, with good-sized existing channels selling their solutions. BI creates a lot of date which could be used by my client’s software for forward-looking action, and the Project Management category involves a lot of complex decision-making and risk mitigation which was a natural fit for my client’s software.

Private Label/OEM products

Potential OEMs are another great place to look for channel partners. One obvious possibility is hardware OEMs for a software company, where the software might be integrated with the hardware for a full solution. If the hardware OEM has a channel, Voilà! you have a channel. Even if the hardware company isn’t interested in an OEM relationship, you might be able to entice them into a more vanilla reseller relationship with light or no integration. Lastly, you can always approach their channel directly to sell you software as an add-on product to the hardware vendor’s.

Former Employees

The first two categories above are pretty fertile with respect to creating a channel from scratch. After mining those two approaches, we’re getting into the area where you’ll need some really creative thinking. The first idea is former employees; I’ve seen many VARs who have started their systems integration business by specializing in their old employers products after leaving the mother ship. Another similar possibility is a former employee who lives in or moves to another country; they might start an entrepreneurial “exclusive” distributorship in that country.

Former Competitors

Very similar to the “Former Employee” category above is partnering with employees of former competitors whom you may know or come across. They will likely have similar knowledge and skill sets to your former employees, so the same type of potential applies. The only caveat here is you need to be careful of any existing relationships with your competitors or special agendas that could poison a potential relationship.

Product Fans

This category of prospective partner is again very similar to the former employee and competitor categories in terms of potential. A user or former user who loves your product and who you have a good relationship with can be a good candidate for an entrepreneurial VAR/distributor startup, whether domestic or international. The area to be careful of here is they may be very skilled in your product and some internal operating specialty, but may be poorly prepared to market, sell and run an overall business. This of course is a potential risk in the former employee and competitor categories as well.

These are some ways you can take the difficult step of creating your own channel from ground zero. Has anyone else tried this–what were your results? What are your ideas on how best to go about it? Please post a comment to expand the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

The Rise and Fall of Novell

Once again one of the great brand names of High Tech has been prominently in the news, this one  for it’s demise as a standalone company. This time it’s Novell, Inc.  Attachmate announced that it had closed its purchase of Novell, which becomes a brand of Attachmate.  The price was $2.2B–not chicken feed, but much less than the promise held by this company in the distant past.

This company holds a special place in my memory. In the early 90’s the Novell name was synonymous with Networking. The company was a pioneer in Corporate Networking, and played a major role in helping to create this market as we now know it. When I entered this market in 1990, the company’s core product, NetWare, held a commanding 70%+ market share in the networking software space, which was already very large at the time, and growing at a rapid rate. It was in this environment that I began my first general management position, starting up a systems and network management software business. Netware being the dominant NOS at the time, I got a very close look at the company’s activities, and some of the decisions and events that began Novell’s long decline. Novell is still a $1B business, but in terms of power and prominence, they are a shadow of the company I kept a close eye on in the 90s. There’s been speculation that the company would be an acquisition candidate for some time, so the news isn’t a big surprise. But it’s a story which is a cautionary tale, and many lessons for tech company management teams that don’t want to “blow it”.

So what caused the unfortunate change in fortunes for this former industry high-roller?

It’s a familiar story, actually, especially for those of you who are regular readers. The Novell story is particularly interesting, because several factors, each one itself capable of wreaking havoc on a solid company, came together to put this company into a long nosedive.

MICROSOFT-ITIS

The first problem was what I call “Microsoft-itis”. Novell became very successful on the back of its flagship NetWare platform, which drew the attention of Microsoft. Microsoft tends to become unhappy when any other software company grows too big, too fast. The upstart is then viewed as a potential threat in Redmond, as well as the fact that the market this other company has helped grow now becomes large enough to be attractive to MS. So the first problem was getting in the gun sight of Microsoft. Now, it’s hard to blame the company for this, it’s more of a side effect of success. This situation has caused problems for many a company, and is enough unto itself to throw a large majority of companies off their game. To have Microsoft target you is quite disconcerting, and if you don’t make the right decisions, you may be in serious trouble. How a company reacts to this challenge is critical, and in truth, often life or death.

ARROGANCE

Unfortunately, in some cases, being targeted by Microsoft sometimes builds a company up in its own view. It’s almost a baptism into the big-time. Microsoft is worried about us; we’re a peer to them now! We must really be smart! This leads to a false sense of security about the company’s true position in the market, leading to the second factor which can bring a company down—Arrogance.

Novell had plenty of excuses to be arrogant, even without Microsoft’s attention. They were truly dominating the Network Operating System business. The brand was dominant, the product was good, and the worldwide distribution network of VARs and distributors was second to none. Sales people at Novell no longer had to sell—they took orders. That led to a need to keep the big ball fast growth rolling, even as the market matured and became quite large. Wall Street, you know. Novell became known as a company that pushed, rather than created via pull marketing. There were numerous channel-stuffing scandals, so sales people could make their quarterly numbers and max out their bonus. No matter, things were well in hand, Novell was on a roll.

The closest competitor at the time was Banyan, with their VINES operating system. Banyan had a nice niche in the largest, WAN oriented corporations, but was no threat to Novell’s dominance. There was also a fast growing peer-to-peer player, Artisoft, who had a nice niche in the entry level market. Again, Artisoft posed no serious threat. And then there was Microsoft, with its alliance on the LAN Manager NOS with 3Com. At the time, Microsoft’s distribution strategy was still to primarily be an OEM supplier, preferring to let others take the lead in bringing the product to the end user market. They had piggybacked the hardware vendors with DOS and the emerging Windows 3.0, and were attempting to use that strategy in the Networking market with 3Com as their main partner. 3Com at the time was a dominant networking hardware vendor. They also teamed with many suppliers of UNIX software to create private label versions of LAN Manager for each UNIX flavor—HP UX, for instance. There were about 17 other platform partners, as I recall. It looked like a formidable syndicate which could challenge Novell for market leadership.

However, like many early Microsoft entrées into new markets, the offering was a joke. LAN Manager ran on top of OS/2, which should tell you something about its lack of success, right there. Technically inferior, with too many players involved to advance and support it, LAN Manager never gained significant traction vs. Netware, even with huge amounts of money being poured into development and marketing. Major new releases would be announced, each which was supposed be the one to give Novell a run for its money. It became a running joke in the network business. At this point, Novell looked invincible.

LOSING FOCUS

Then the arrogance at Novell rose to new levels. Apparently thinking Microsoft couldn’t beat them at their own game, Ray Noorda and senior management at Novell decided to also take on Microsoft on their own turf. Not only that, but to compete across many, many categories. They decided they wanted to become the new Microsoft, and in doing so opened a multi-front war against a larger competitor, with far more resources (See Hitler opening up the Russian front in the War against the Allies).

Novell bought WordPerfect to compete with MS Word, Quattro Pro to compete with Excel, and announced a dizzying array of additional new initiatives. (See Netscape taking a similar approach in its heyday, as well as Google is now, as we speak—that ought to be interesting). No one, I repeat, NO ONE, has won a multi-front war with Microsoft. The people that have fended them off (which is a small list), when MS has put them in their headlights, have done so by sticking to their knitting, and playing by the rules of their own market segment. Intuit is a notable example, which was able to keep MS in a minor role in the Personal Financial software segment, by advancing and focusing on its own offerings and current market.

WHAT HAPPENED?

Well, many of you who have been in High Tech for a while probably already know the result. Microsoft finally split with 3COM, developed Windows NT, essentially building Networking into the Operating System. This finally began to hurt Netware, and although it wasn’t an immediate rout, over time NT became the clear winner. The terminator of Redmond can be knocked down, but they almost never give up—they just go deeper into their pockets, and keep on coming.

The acquisitions that Novell made were already second or third tier products, and their markets were outside of Novell’s core market and competency. Drained of resources and fighting losing battles on many fronts, Novell was soundly defeated, ultimately selling off many of its acquisitions, retrenching and changing their strategy—quite a few times over the years, I might add. They went into a long, slow decline, and once this begins at a large company, it’s very difficult to truly turn it around.

WHAT IF?

So what would have happened it Novell hadn’t reacted like Netscape later did, choosing to battle it out toe-to-toe with Microsoft, blinded in a fit of rage and bravado? What if they had followed a similar strategy to the one that Intuit took? What if they had marshaled their resources, and kept their focus on maintaining the lead they had in Network Operating Systems and related businesses—which were pretty big markets in their own right? Hindsight is always 20/20, but my guess is that they would have had a much better chance of continued success—and possibly avoided the headlines in the Trade Magazines of the last few weeks.

Have you seen similar missteps in your own companies or markets?—please post a comment below to share the insights.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

International Expansion: Partner or Invest?

This is an age-old question facing software and hardware companies. In this article we’ll examine the pros and cons, as well as the specific conditions that should drive your decision process.

Two basic options confront a tech company considering a foray outside of their home market:

  1. Set up your own subsidiary hiring your own employees to “put on the ground”
  2. Partner with established traditional distributors or strategic partners in the target foreign market

Let’s look at some of the key factors to consider when designing an international business development strategy:

Available Capital

How much money does your company have available for international expansion? If the answer is “not much”, this alone can be the deciding factor in your decision. If capital is very scarce, you’re almost forced to start out using distribution partners. This isn’t all bad, in my opinion. Using partners initially when you are an international newbie is a much lower risk way to start, and allows you to learn this part of the business without “losing your shirt”. I’ve seen a number of control-oriented management teams invest large amounts of money by putting people on the ground in subsidiaries, only to waste it in spectacular failure. Often this failure is due to inexperience.

Product Price and Complexity

If you have a high priced, technically-complex product with a long sales cycle, you will tend to benefit more than others by having people on the ground in the foreign market. These are the types of products which are most often sold directly, even in home markets. In this scenario, even if capital is tight and you can’t afford to put down a fully-loaded subsidiary with a dedicated direct sales force in every foreign market, it still may make sense to put some folks on the ground. As an example, you might be able to afford a channel sales rep and a couple of field engineers to support a large network of sophisticated local country distributors and VARs, across an entire continent like Europe or Asia.

Management Skills

What is the skill set of your corporate management team? If no one on the team has any experience with indirect distribution, for example, it’s going to be pretty tough to successfully build a working distribution channel in FOREIGN MARKETS which are far from home, in more ways than one. In this case, the most cost effective thing to do is to add someone to the top management team with the requisite skills and experience, or at least retain a long term consultant. Going without this hire often seems the cheaper route initially, but in most cases this end up being “penny-wise but pound-foolish” in hindsight.

Local Market Cost Structure

Each foreign market should be evaluated individually before deciding an approach for that market. For example, in large emerging markets with low costs (such as China, India, Brazil for many verticals) it may make sense to put your own people on the ground, regardless of the distribution strategy. When costs are low and the market is strategically important in the long run, the relative benefits of having your own subsidiary are high. In a high cost market with lower sales potential (Switzerland and Norway may be good examples for some businesses,) relying exclusively on a dedicated local partner may be a better way to go.

Availability of Partners

In some cases what may be the best strategy for your company and market in theory is overridden by facts on the ground. Many vertical software and hardware markets have a well established set of distributors and resellers dedicated to their marketplace. In these cases it’s relatively easy to find an appropriate distribution partner. But what if you’re in a business in which this ISN’T the case, which is not all that unusual? Or maybe there is an established channel, but you’re late to the game and all the obvious “good” partners are tied up with your competitors. Sometimes you may choose to not enter that market immediately. But if the geographic market is considered strategic, then you will need to choose a course that looks sub-optimal in theory. That might mean biting the bullet and outlaying the investment to start your own subsidiary. Or, you might find a local entrepreneur with the skill set to set up a new distributorship. If it’s a geographic market that you just HAVE to participate in, then you will find a way!

There are obviously a wide range of combinations and intermediate options, but “partner or invest” represent the extreme ends of potential strategies. In many cases (particularly large, established markets) the optimal distribution strategy will be a combination of these two main approaches: pairing a wholly-owned subsidiary with local distribution partners. In smaller markets, partnering with an established distributor or strategic partner may be the only viable strategy. In other cases, the optimal strategy may be dependent on the specific factors of a particular marketplace (local costs, available partners, etc).

What’s most important is to closely analyze your specific company’s situation and vertical market, as well as the “facts on the ground” in each individual geographic market. Resist the temptation to simply copy your competitor’s strategy or fall back on approaches that you are comfortable with from other vertical and geographic markets. That is how you make mistakes.

What’s your approach to international expansion? Post a comment and share your own personal experience.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

How Soon Should Your Software or Hardware Company Go International?

This is a question that frankly doesn’t come up often enough at early stage tech companies. There is usually an assumption that you first conquer your home market, and then sometime way down the road, when you are already flush and successful, it will be time to expand internationally. US-based tech companies are most guilty of this often questionable thinking.

What’s wrong with this approach, especially for US-based companies? After all, the US is the largest market in the world, and it’s far easier to sell to customers close by, then it is halfway around the world. With this the case, why should you use your scarce early-stage capital in a risky international expansion? This is how the thinking goes.

The problem is that you may be leaving significant low-hanging fruit on the table, at the very time that you need those customers the most. Let’s look at 4 important reasons to go international as soon as possible:

Reasons for Early International Business Development

Early adopters needed

As an early stage software or hardware company, you need to find early adopters of your product. These folks fit a certain psychographic profile, and they are rarer than the average customer. You sometimes need to cover the earth to find them. Limiting your geographic net unnecessarily only makes the job harder.

Distribution partnerships can provide tremendous leverage for a young company

This is one of the big reasons to go international that newbies don’t understand. They think that with all the money they are spending to penetrate the home market, selling internationally will be much more expensive yet. Not necessarily. In many markets, you can find distributors who will take on much or most of the marketing and sales load, reducing your investment tremendously and allowing you to leverage their existing relationships–rather than “starting from scratch”.

Many markets are less competitive than your home market, especially if it’s the US

Unless your home market is a tiny one, there are most likely many underserved markets available to you that have a lot of low hanging fruit. Why? Every startup software or tech company thinks the same and focuses initially on their home market. Since the bulk of the tech business is located in the US, it’s by far the most brutally competitive of all.

Beat your competition to the punch

Getting to a market early can often mean the difference between success and failure. If you’re the first one in a country or region, the early adopters and other low-hanging fruit are there for you alone. You will get your pick of the best distribution partners, and your product category will be “fresh” news for the media. Once established, it will be hard for later arriving competitors to push you down the market share ladder, even if they are larger than you overall.

So when should a company go International? The short answer is as soon as you can possibly do it. But what’s most important is to fully evaluate when “as soon as you can” actually is.

What to Evaluate Prior to Deciding to Go International

Your product must be stable

This should go without saying, but the only thing that causes a greater catastrophe than an unstable product is an unstable product distributed worldwide! Don’t do this–make sure things are solid before venturing away from where it’s easiest to “babysit” early problems.

Your product must be “market-tested” in your home market

While I’m a proponent of aggressive international business development at an early stage, there is such a thing as “too early”. Make sure that you know your product has a market before going far away from home. It’s a pointless exercise to be recruiting distributors and customers in foreign markets with a product that doesn’t really hit the mark, and one which doesn’t even had a reference customer list. If you can’t gain 10 or 20 or 30 customers close to home, heading far away likely won’t help.

Inventory or License only

Businesses that involve large amounts of inventory are one of my exceptions to aggressive early international development. That means hardware companies generally need to be more careful that software companies. Companies that distribute through retail channels involve more inventory than those who sell via VARs or direct, so they also need to be more cautious. The issues that come with inventory such as repairs and returns are exacerbated by borders and distance. So if you’re inventory intensive, maybe start with one smaller market rather than a large regional rollout, to test that everything goes smoothly before placing a big bet.

Direct or Channel distribution

If you have to establish your own local foreign operation, hire a bunch of people, rent office space, etc–you generally need to wait. Most startups can’t afford this type of risk and investment. However, although some feel this route is their preference due to control, it’s generally not mine. It’s quite risky and slows your international progress rate down significantly. Most companies can start out by using partners, and usually this is a good long run strategy as well. If you’re wildly successful and really feel the need for total control, you can always buy out distributors later on.

English or Local Language

English is the universal language of technology. In some vertical markets (such as IT software) English language-only products are fine. These are markets where you can make the fastest penetration after proving your product in your home market. If you do need local translations, they really aren’t that expensive in most cases and can be done quickly, and distribution partners can often help. But make sure that you don’t skimp on a good translation; nothing will hurt your local credibility more than language that isn’t proper, or at worst, makes no sense.

Safety, Legal or Electrical Specifications

This is also an area that can slow down the potential for fast international market development. Many countries or regions have safety or electrical standards that will require product modification or testing (and thereby investment). There are also legal aspects that need to be considered (European privacy laws when selling security or marketing software, as an example.) Don’t let these stop you from doing an evaluation of your international prospects, but these factors can change the calculus of your decision making.

SaaS

If you’re a software company using the SaaS model there may be very little downside to early international business development. If latency isn’t an issue for your product, you may need no international investment at all. Or maybe you need your servers hosted in other parts of the world to reduce latency issues, but this shouldn’t be a huge investment. You still need marketing in the local markets, either by your own direct (albeit remote) methods or through partners. But given the potential rewards, these investments should be a small price to pay.

Process or Cultural Differences

When you first go into a foreign market, it’s important to understand that you can’t fully comprehend the local culture, as well as how commerce functions. Listen more than you talk at first. Hire a consultant if you can afford to. Partners can also help greatly here. But if you are a savvy international business person it certainly raises your odds when attacking foreign markets early on.

Existing Demand

Are there customers “chomping at the bit” for the benefits your product offers? Or will there be a bit of an education process and a long sales cycle? Obvious existing demand is a key indicator for aggressive international business development.

The bottom line is that going international quickly can be a big boost to early growth for a tech company. Be careful, but not overly cautious. Evaluate your specific situation, and take the plunge if the odds are with you. What’s your take on the proper pace for international business development? Post a comment or send us your story.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Selling SaaS through the VAR Channel

The move toward Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is the strongest trend in the software business in recent memory. It changes the software business model in a number of fundamental ways. For the purposes of this article, I’m assuming the reader has a basic understanding of the SaaS business model. I’m also going to assume a basic understand of what a Value Added Reseller (VAR) is and does. I’ll focus on the fit between SaaS and the VAR distribution channel.

 The VAR channel has been a major factor in the B2B software business for a long time. There are tens of thousands of VARs, most of them now focused on specific vertical markets. While it is still possible to find a horizontal VAR, in a market of any size you’ll likely find a nice number of VARs specializing on that segment of customers. As a result, anyone who is selling software (whether via traditional licensing or SaaS) would love to have this stable of key market influencers representing their product. Let’s take a look at the situation:

 Major SaaS strengths

  •  Simplicity of startup for the customer – For many SaaS apps, getting started is as simple as signing up, obtaining a user name and password. Contrast this with the lengthy, complex and sometimes extensive setup and configuration period for some B2B apps. (This strength is a potential problem for VARs).
  • Available from any web browser - This is one of the great capabilities driving the SaaS revolution. Of course, traditional apps can have a web-based interface as well, but SaaS apps by definition are web-centric. Browser-based apps can limit functionality in some cases, but is becoming less of an issue all the time.
  •  Simplicity of maintenance for the vendor - This is a big one. With traditional on-premises apps, the vendor has to deal with “pushing” updates to the client, often into wildly varying hardware and software environments. With SaaS, the vendor presses a button and the new version is universally available to everyone. This is a huge advantage leading to reduced rollout costs for the vendor, and less pain for the client. (Also a potential problem for VARs) 
  • Less IT infrastructure required by clients - Theoretically a company could nearly eliminate their IT department by adopting all SaaS apps. As a practical matter, this isn’t happening in companies of any size, and likely won’t. But any reduction in reliance on perennially overworked IT departments is usually seen as a good thing. (Potential problem for VARs, but also an opportunity)

 Major VAR motivations

 Sell Services (not products) – Contrary to the expectations of channel neophytes, VARs are generally seriously interested in products to the extent that they have the ability to generate service revenue for the VAR. (Early SaaS models eliminate many traditional service revenue streams)

 Secure ongoing revenue – VARs don’t own intellectual property(products) to stabilize long-term revenues as a rule, so they’re always interested in ways of “smoothing out” their business with predictable, ongoing revenue streams. (SaaS eliminates much traditional service revenue, but subscriptions open up new possibilities)

 Maintain client control – VARs are very sensitive about retaining control of the relationship with their clients. They view these relationships as hard-won, and without owning the intellectual property, they are probably the most strategic aspect of their business. (VARs shy away from vendors who try to wrest account control from them, and many new SaaS vendors have this “direct-first” mentality).

 The Gap

 The problem as discussed in the above paragraphs is that the ways VARs traditionally make money (installation, training, integration, customization, support, client control) have been eliminated or severely reduced as opportunities by first generation SaaS vendors. Frankly, it’s never been easy for any software vendor to recruit VARs who are “active” with their products. The current situation sets up the typical first generation SaaS vendor as an arch- enemy to VARs. The SaaS vendors aren’t attractive partners due to the lack of potential service revenue (and often aren’t looking to partner), but are targeting the VAR’s customer base. To some, it looks like the end of the VAR channel for anyone running a SaaS-based company. Sound like a caution sign to SaaS vendors, one which makes the vendor focus strictly on direct selling? Maybe–but let’s explore a few ideas for changing the equation.

 Ideas on how to bridge the gap and attract VARs to your SaaS offering

 There are some forward-thinking SaaS who have been able to leverage the VAR channel for their companies. But at this point, they are few and far between. For many of the reasons stated in the above paragraphs, there is no established, tried and true model for attracting VARs to a SaaS offering today.

The biggest thing I’d like you to consider with respect to the sentence underlined above, is that when things are least established, there is the MOST opportunity for newcomers. Since there is no established perfect SaaS/VAR cooperative business model yet, no SaaS player is dominating in this still very influential channel. For a newcomer, this creates great opportunity and potential payback for creative approaches. Let’s take a look at a few such ideas to attract VARs:

 Design your SaaS offering from the ground up for easy customization and integration

Unfortunately I don’t see many SaaS vendors considering channel strategy when designing their first product. In the early days of SaaS, enabling customization and integration with other products was tough to do. Now the tools are there to make it very possible, but it’s a lot harder if you try to do it “after the fact”, once your architecture has been set and the first commercial release is done. This one step can be a huge asset when you are later trying to design programs attractive to VARs, and it can of course be a huge advantage with certain end users as well.

 Offer solid upfront margins, but focus on downstream revenue streams for your VARs

I recommend offering competitive upfront-sale margins, but going overboard here can be a waste of resources. Remember that VARs don’t build their business on upfront product sales revenue. Focus on finding ways VARs can make money dealing with you after the initial sale is complete. As an example, how about sharing downstream subscription revenue–but only if the VAR creates X amount of new sales revenue for the year? This is an example of a win/win which could lead to great loyalty to your offerings, tying the VAR’s interest to your business in the long run.

 Instead of building a large in-house consulting team, use VARs to help fill IT gaps for your customers

VARs have a lot of capability to offer services that your end users might require and demand. Rather than competing with VARs (and using scarce capital that could be deployed elsewhere), take a look at creating programs to utilize the best of your channel partners as your outsourced consulting team.

 Create a program to enable the outsourcing of upfront product training to your VARs

Initial product training is a great example of a “consulting service” to outsource to your channel. Most product groups see training as a necessary evil and an afterthought, often giving it away for free–while providing it with insufficient attention from the end user’s perspective. With the right tools, a VAR could turn this into a profit center for their business, reducing your utilization of key resources on a non-core activity, while tying the VAR tightly to your products.

 Be careful to allow your VARs to continue to lead in account management activities

In everything you do, keep in mind that the VAR is paranoid about account control (with good reason, unfortunately). Remember, you are in a business partnership with the VAR, and you need to trust them to do the right things for your joint business interests in the account. If you don’t feel like you can trust a particular VAR in this regard, don’t change your program to wrest account control from your channel. Stop doing business with that VAR.

I’m optimistic that adopting a few of these ideas can give you a leg up over the competition in building a productive channel business. I hope that you’ll find this article provocative, if not accurate in your view! This is an emerging, rapidly changing environment. Please post a comment with your own thoughts to expand the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Promoting Software and Hardware Products through the VAR Channel

With the exception of some software and hardware vendors who sell super-expensive products to the largest enterprises, a large percentage tech companies uses the Value Added Reseller (VAR) channel, to one extent or another. So how do you best go about doing this successfully? Create a great product, throw it to the channel, and sit back and collect the money?

If only it were so. Unfortunately, many tech companies new to the channel find out the hard way that you will fail by taking the word “seller” in the VAR label too seriously. For those of use with experience in the VAR channel, you know that it is still incumbent upon the vendor to create end user demand for their product. Yes, you need to market to VARs as well. And you will take whatever “push” you can get from the channel. But you must have an active promotional program aimed at end users for a realistic chance at channel success.

So what are the best marketing approaches to support channel sales activities? If depends, of course, on the specifics of your product, market, price point, etc. But let’s take a quick look at some popular promotion methods used in conjunction with channel sales. I’ll break it down into three basic categories:

End user demand creation

This is first and foremost the most critical activity. It’s an unfortunate fact that most new players in the channel don’t understand this initially. Many have to learn it through a painful hands-on lesson, which sometimes leads to rejecting use of the channel outright, due to spectacular failure. It may be counter-intuitive, but it doesn’t even matter whether you establish end user demand for your products by selling direct or via the channel. The important thing is that with few exceptions there needs to be serious interest in your products at the end user level if you’re to successfully sell through VARs. In fact, it’s almost always necessary to be successful selling directly to end users, before you can hope to have a successful VAR channel for your products. Almost any end user marketing method that fits with your product type and budget can be used to create this demand, but here are some commonly used promotional types:

• SEO (Search engine optimization)
• PPC (Pay per click) advertising
• Press relations
• White paper marketing
• Targeted online banner advertising
• Direct mail, but traditional and email
• Social media marketing (Blogs, Twitter, Linkedin, Facebook, etc.)
• Trade shows

VAR recruitment

In addition to creating end user demand, you’ll also want to market directly to VARs, to get them interested in actively working with you and your products. An important point to remember is that the VAR channel is very large, and generally segmented into many vertical categories. So however you approach them, don’t waste time (yours or theirs!) by contacting VARs who aren’t doing business in your target end user segments. Here’s some common recruitment approaches:

• Direct email through available VAR lists
• Phone campaign using available lists
• Internet research with direct email or phone approach
• Trade Shows (VARs frequent them, and it’s a great opportunity for personal contact)
• Have a highly successful product with strong end user pull (VARs will find you!)

Cooperative marketing with the channel

Lastly, once you’ve created end user demand and recruited enough VARs to have a “program”, you need to establish standard methods of working with your new partners to create and fulfill demand. VAR programs come in all shapes and sizes depending upon the market, and I’ve seen a wide variety of promotional opportunities included in these programs. One of my personal favorite “getting started” methods is to offer to pay for and execute a direct mail campaign (blind to the vendor, if necessary) introducing you and your product family as a new partner of the VAR. Below are some promotional activities that are very commonly included in VAR programs:

• Co-op advertising/promotion with the vendor provides funding for approved VAR-executed promotional programs up to a set percentage (3-6%) of sales of your products
• Free or discounted demo units
• Special pricing for large opportunities
• Co-selling with your in-house sales force
• Deal registration
• Additional discounts for completing product training, certifications or maintaining premium support levels
• Co-branded product literature and other use of the vendor’s logo
• Website and catalog listings of authorized or “preferred” VARs
• Rebates for volume sales (not recommended; fraught with danger)
• Vendor-funded introductory direct mail campaign

That’s my quick primer on successfully promoting your products for sale through the VAR channel. Many of you have your own experience in this area; post a comment or a question to activate our discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

VAR vs. Retail Distribution in Software and Technology Markets

There is much talk in the software and technology industry about distribution through the “Channel”. Generically that means selling through some type of a third party company, rather than selling directly to the end customer. But in reality the “Channel” includes a wide variety of disparate types of third party resellers. Today we’ll take a look at when to consider partnering with two of the main channel reseller types, VARs and Retailer–which also happen to be two of the most different.

What’s the difference between a VAR and a Retailer?

Let’s start with the retailer, as that’s a bit more obvious. With respect to software and hardware products, we’re talking about computer, specialty electronics and mass market stores, independents as well as regional and national chains. Retail is both a B2C channel and a B2B channel, especially when talking about serving the small and medium size business (SBM) market. While retailers may offer some “value-added” services such as extended warranties, delivery, installation, etc., the main purpose of a retail store is quite simple. The retailer serves primarily as a point-of-sale location, holding inventory and enabling end customers to have immediate access to products at favorable prices.

VARs (Value-Added-Resellers) are in many respects the polar opposite to retailers. The VAR channel is strictly B2B, and sells to both large enterprises and the SMB market. Usually there isn’t a retail storefront–if there is, it’s not a big part of the business. Expensive retail space is avoided to minimize their real estate costs, because walk-in traffic isn’t part of the business model. Unlike retailers, VARs are focused on selling their services, such as installation, configuration, integration, customization, etc, rather than turning over large quantities of products. VARs aren’t interested in having a large “assortment” of products like retailers. This is a key point that channel newbie are prone to miss–at great cost to their company. While VARs do sell products, they are motivated to do so in only two instances:

1) Core products which are strategic because the VAR’s services are built around them
2) Easy to sell, demand-driven commodity products requested by their customer base

If you take just one thing away from this article, let it be this: VARs aren’t dying to sell most products. If your product doesn’t fit into one of the two categories above, you will be pushing on a rope trying to make progress in the VAR channel.

Is one of these channel types “better” than another?

One is not superior to the other. Each reseller type is better for different product types and circumstances. They both can be used quite profitably, but they serve different purposes. It’s important when designing a channel strategy to start with the end customer and work backwards. Where would the end customer like to buy? How important is price vs. services and support? What reseller type best meets the desires and needs of your target customer type(s)?

When you should use the VAR channel

While VARs aren’t product-oriented businesses, in aggregate they are still a very important channel for many product types. If you have a product which requires a high level of support, or “value-added” services such as expert installation, integration with other products, customization or 24/7 support, VARs can play a key role in your distribution strategy. If you have a popular commodity product, they can be useful (in aggregate) to greatly expand your distribution points. The VAR channel is highly segmented by vertical market, so if your product has a vertical orientation (networking, medical, insurance, etc.) this often creates an opportunity for VARs to be an important channel partner.

When you should use the Retail channel

Retailers are usually best for horizontal, commodity or mature products. They are effective at providing broad, immediate access to your products across a wide geographic area. Retailers typically are “inventory turn” oriented in their business models, and tend to work on thin margins. So if keeping your price point low is important while still using a third party channel, they are an excellent choice. Of course the fact that they provide instant access to your products during business hours can be a very important asset.

Can you use both VARs and Retailers for the same product?

Yes, but you must know what you are doing, or you may end up very sorry that you did. Since VARs and retailers bring very different things to your distribution, there is a strong chance of serious channel conflict if you use both reseller types for the same product. The biggest potential issue is degradation of your product street price, because while VARs typically work off high product margins and low turnover, retailers are the opposite. Retailers optimize their businesses for high inventory turnover, while accepting low product margins. The low margin strategy causes the street price of your product to fall for all channels distributing your product. If the street prices drop too low, the margins may drop too far to be interesting to VARs (even though they are focused primarily on their service offerings). Companies new to multi-channel distribution sometime make this problem even more acute by offering price discounts based on volume, which makes the situation even worse. A volume-based pricing strategy favors the higher volume retail channel, and also incentivizes even deeper street price drops, to create higher volumes and resulting better wholesale prices. Multi-channel pricing is a complex area fraught with danger for the uninitiated–new players should solicit outside advice, and tread carefully.

VARs and retailers can be important, high volume distribution channels for many software and tech companies. They can each be primary distribution channels, or combined with direct a sales approach and other channels to form highly efficient multi-channel distribution networks. More distribution is not always better, however. Companies need to know what they are doing when proceeding with a multi-channel strategy, or risk doing great damage to their sales and marketing efforts.

That’s how I view using VARs and retail in your distribution strategy. How do you see it? Post a comment to get a discussion going. Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

Structuring Channel Discounts for Software and Technology Companies

Selling through sales and distribution channels of various types is very important to many software and tech companies. Yet channel programs, and specifically discount structures, are often thrown together quickly and haphazardly, without looking at any real hard data. Let’s examine some of the key items it’s advisable to consider, when structuring a channel discount program:

Market Norms
The absolute first place to start when considering channel discounts is to survey the SPECIFIC market that you are entering. By this I mean look at similar products through the EXACT profile of channel partners you are considering selling through. For example for consumer software, retail margins of 15-18% are common, whereas for a specific VAR segments the discount norms may be in the 25-40% range. If your discounts fall too far below the market norm, your program will likely fail. If discounts are set much higher than the market norm (without good reason), your company will be leaving considerable profits on the table. It is very important to do upfront research on actual conditions in your segment–don’t just “assume”! Preferably, you want to find out what your direct competitors are offering in terms of a channel program. This may seem obvious. But in my consulting practice at PJM Consulting, instead of using objective data, I see significant numbers of companies use their own theories about what the right discount structure SHOULD be from their perspective. This often ends up being the main reason for a painful “restart” of their channel program at a later date.

Product and Pricing Strategy (Street Price)
Channel discount structures cannot be constructed in a vacuum. They are but one component of your overall product and distribution strategy. As such, they must be consistent with the overall goals you establish for the product. If you are seeking to penetrate a new market or a new channel, it may be wise to be more aggressive than the market norms to gain market share and shelf space. If your market is more mature and you are in a harvest mode on a particular product line, it may be wise to minimize channel discounts to maximize profitability. In any event, consider channel discounts early in the product planning phase as part of your overall product pricing strategy.

Type of Channel
There are many different types of partners for software and tech companies that fall into the category of “channel resellers”. Computer retail, mass market retail, Value-Added resellers (VARs), Systems Integrators (SI), Domestic Distributors, International Distributors, Manufacturers Reps–and many more. Each of these reseller types are quite different from the others, and each add different types and levels of value to your distribution systems. Yet every one that you distribute through will be competing with the others (as well as your direct sales model), at least indirectly.

Multi-Channel Pricing Equity
It’s important if you are selling through more than one channel (including direct sales) to attempt to equalize, as much as possible, the street prices charged by the various channel types. The best way to do this is to consider the costs incurred by the various types of resellers in delivering your products to the target customer. For example, a VAR that provides support, pre-sales consulting and other services may need a higher level of discount to achieve an adequate profit margin than a retailer that simply is providing shelf space might. In reality, the retailer is likely to have a lower street price, but it is important to try to minimize this gap. Otherwise the VAR who may be providing important services to a segment of your customers may be driven out of the market, and refuse to sell your product–which is not in your company’s interests. The most common practice which causes inequities in channel pricing is a volume-driven discount model. New entrants to the channel often use this approach–why wouldn’t you want to incentivize volume sales by giving the biggest discounts to the largest volume sellers? Although this may work fine if you have a monolithic reseller channel, where all the players have the same business model and offer the same value add, it otherwise will quickly cause the problems discussed here. The resellers possessing the lowest cost structure and providing the lowest value-add will quickly dominate the market, driving the high-cost/high value-add resellers away. This may be ok with you; just make sure you explicitly consider this possibility before embarking on a volume-driven channel discount strategy.

Value Added
One of the things that I recommend considering explicitly up front is: what is the key value-add that you are seeking from the channel? Is it pre-sales consulting, installation services, post-sale support, shelf space and inventory for immediate customer access, or one of many other factors? Make sure you understand what channel value-add is most important to you, and build protections into your discount structure for the reseller type who best provides this value.

Components of Discounts
It’s not always necessary (or wise) to offer a single, monolithic discount level for resellers. How you structure your discounts components should be closely tied to your product and pricing strategy–what you are trying to accomplish with your overall channel strategy. For example, if you are trying to manage your street price at a certain level, it can be dangerous to offer a large discount to certain types of resellers who may pass that discount on as a lower street price. Yet this segment of resellers (for example, retailers) may be an important, high volume channel for your product type. In this case, it may be wise to offer additional, conditional discount for activities that you value. Again as an example, to keep your street price up but incentivize a high level of activities through retail, you could offer a high level of added discount for approved co-op marketing activities. A segmented discount structure driven by costs and value-add, rather than volume, is often the most effective structure to maximize multi-channel sales. This will also limit discount-driven reductions in street price, which ultimately can severely reduce profit levels and incentives to sell for both the vendor and all channel partners–if not properly controlled.

SUMMARY
Creating a Channel Discount Strategy and structure is NOT a theoretical exercise. It should be primarily a tactical exercise based on a realistic view of market conditions, and include collection and analysis of objective market data. While what you hope to accomplish with your discount strategy is important, the overwhelmingly most important factors in creating your discount strategy should be what is happening in your segment of the channel–and what will work best for your company. Try not to create a structure based on what you’d like to see with respect to the channel. Focus on creating a pragmatic, workable strategy upfront, to avoid an unsuccessful channel entry and painful restructuring that results. If you are new to the channel game, seeking outside assistance may help you avoid experiencing one of these painful false starts that happen frequently in the channel.

That’s my view of how best to create a channel discount structure. I welcome you to post a comment with your own thoughts on this important technology management decision.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Trade Shows for Software & Technology Firms – Do They Still Make Sense?

Let’s talk about what, for some people, is a marketing method from a bygone era: Trade shows, or Trade Fairs, as they’re referred to in most places outside of the US.

At one point in time, Trade Shows were a staple in most every tech company’s marketing budget–shows like Comdex, PC Expo, Network World and a host of others were annual rites of passage. But in this Internet age, they have been greatly reduced in the marketing mix, if not taken completely out of the picture.

There are many reasons for this. First and foremost, the ROI of tradeshows was always very questionable for most exhibitors. In marketing departments everywhere there were sharp discussions during budget time, on whether to continue the expense of the major shows. They always seemed important to be at, but usually it was pretty difficult to make a direct correlation to enough actual revenue, to justify the large expense. As the Internet became more prominent, this ROI looked even worse in comparison–as it did for many other “offline” marketing methods, such as traditional direct mail and print advertising.

So are tradeshows now obsolete? Probably not, but many marketing folks might say that they are on the endangered species list. So when, if at all, do traditional trade shows still make sense today? And what should your goals be, if you do decide to invest in a show or two? Let’s take a quick look at 4 points relevant to each of these two questions.

4 REASONS IT MAKE SENSE TO GO TO A TRADE SHOWA CONTRARIAN APPROACH
One of the major enduring tactics of marketing is to “zig when your competitors zag”. If you are in a market where a show is still well attended, but vendors are starting to stay home rather than pay for booths, you may have an opportunity. If your competitors aren’t there, you have a larger, captive audience of prospects to strut your stuff to. One of the basic tenets of a good marketing program is to find a “communications channel” which isn’t too crowded. With trade shows falling out of favor in marketing budgets, there is potential to benefit from a contrarian approach in some markets.

INTRODUCTION INTO A NEW MARKET
This is always one of the strongest reasons to attend a few shows. If you have a brand new company, or your company is entering a market space it hasn’t previously participated in, a couple of well-selected shows can be a very good investment. Remember, you only get one chance to make a first impression.

INTRODUCTION OF A NEW PRODUCT
Much like a company entering a new market, a new product introduction is a very traditional reason to exhibit at a trade show. In my opinion, introducing new products at shows has historically been over-estimated as a marketing tactic. Sure, the press is there covering the show, but if 50 other vendors are also announcing new products, your new product might get lost, or at least get less press coverage then if you announced two weeks before or after the show. Remember the comment above about over-crowded communications channel?. In some cases, announcing at a show fits this description. This can still be a very sound marketing tactic–just do careful research and planning to ensure it is a net positive.

IMPORTANCE OF HIGH TOUCH
If you have a product that absolutely requires some hands-on or personal selling before prospects buy, trade shows can be an excellent investment. For example, if the product is quite expensive, or an expert demo sells far more than prospect downloads from your site. I have a software company client at PJM Consulting who is in a market where expert demos are essential; they have grown the company, to a great extent with trade shows, and almost always can demonstrate a profit on their show budgets.

4 GOALS TO ENSURE A HIGH RETURN FROM A TRADE SHOW

PRESS COVERAGE
This is always one of the most important reasons to go to many shows. If it is an important show, the press will be there in full force. You really need to plan PR tactics ahead of time, however, as all of the other exhibitors have the same goal of getting press appointments and coverage. It is CRITICAL to plan far ahead in securing appointments with target editors, and have a “tease” of substantial news to obtain the appointment. Editor’s schedules fill up far in advance. Properly planned, the show can pay for itself here by eliminating the need for a dedicated press tour. But if not well planned, you will end up “wasting” your product introduction or other news, resulting in little or no press coverage.

EFFICIENCY OF INDUSTRY NETWORKING
Networking with the other exhibitors is often overlooked by many vendors. The focus is generally solely on customers, and maybe distribution channels. Often many companies with complementary offerings are attending exhibiting, along with a few competitors. This can be a great arena to begin or continue discussions with potential strategic partners. At a minimum, makes sure to set aside some time to walk the show floor, and see who might have synergy with your company. Even if you’re pressed for time, shake a few hands and gather some business cards–it can be an excellent setup for future discussions.

LOCAL CUSTOMER VISITS
This is also an area that holds potential to lift your show budget’s ROI, which is often overlooked by many exhibitors. You are flying staff to a faraway city–why not go in a couple of days early, and call on a few potential major customers? At a minimum, make sure you get those free show tickets that often go to waste out to local prospects in your database, so they can come to the show for a meeting or demo at your booth.

LOCAL CHANNEL VISITS
In the same vein as visits to customers, it makes a lot of sense to call on current or potential channel partners, once you decide you’ll be spending money going to a show in a certain region. Add a couple of days to your trip and visit a few key partners and prospective partners in the area. And make sure to invite them to the show well in advance and supply those free tickets, so you can see many more later at your booth.

SUMMARY
If you just fly to a city, set up your booth, and wait for new customers to flock by to see you–you are likely to be very disappointed in your return on investment. But if you use a tradeshow as a hub for a variety of related activity, adding a couple of key shows into your marketing mix can still bring a very nice ROI. The key is preparation and planning, to make sure your results are optimized. I’ve outlined a few reasons why it may make sense to exhibit at tradeshows/trade fairs even today, along with some ways to maximize your return. What’s your reason for attending tradeshows in the Internet Age? And what concrete results do you hope to achieve? Post a comment to continue this discussion.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

System Integration vs. Product Development

I’ve recently engaged on assignments with two new clients. Both of them have businesses selling to large, blue chip customers. Customers of the size that are used to “having it their way”; as a result, getting a deal with them often includes the need for a lot of customization.

The interesting thing about these two clients is how they perceive and approach that need to customize.

A Tale of Two Companies

Company A views customization somewhat as a pain and distraction, something to be controlled–I am assisting them with creating a standard solution offering menu outlining the “Base” offering, with a list of options available at an added cost. They really want to discourage certain customizations, absolutely won’t do some things that will be asked, and want to make sure that they charge dearly for items that they find painful. They have the classic mentality of a product company; they want to do the amount of customization necessary to make a large sale to this important customer–but NO more than they have to.

Company B, which also considers itself a product company, has a very different mentality about customization. They welcome it, pride themselves on it, and position themselves to these potential large clients as someone that can quickly bring solutions to the client, customized to their desires. They want their big account reps to be scouring the big accounts for unique pain points or opportunities, which might fall within the company’s core capabilities, enabling them to propose a customized solution. In fact, up till now, their product development approach has really been to find out what individual accounts want–and build it for them.

So which of these two business models is the best way for technology companies to go?

System Integration Business Models

Advantages:
*More flexible and able to change with shifts in the marketplace
*Not as capital-intensive due to less “betting” on upfront product development
*Easier to grow business organically with internally-generated capital than in a product business

Disadvantages:
*Less risk due to lower upfront investments
*More competition; System Integration is an “easier-entry” business
*Generally lower operating margins
*Growth is less scalable than a product-oriented company

Product-Focused Business Models

Advantages:
*Provides greater opportunity for strategic advantage and resulting fast growth
*Less competition if a product/brand/technology differential advantage is created
*Can scale much quicker if a hit product is developed
*Higher operating margins if product is successful
*Usually more marketing-driven and less labor-intensive
*If creating a very large company is the goal, much easier to raise outside capital

Disadvantages:
*Much more risk of “crib death”, resulting in complete capital loss if first product has problems in development or marketing
*Harder to “get over the hump”; success is harder to come by, and success often happens as a step function after a difficult startup period

First of all, I want to emphasize that there isn’t necessarily a “wrong” approach with either of these business models. You can make a lot of money pursuing either model. Both of the companies I have used as models have managed to attract blue chip customer which would be the envy of any company. What we are really talking about here is the difference between a classic product-driven company and a system integrator.

Company A is that classic product-driven company. They customize when they have to, but also have a point where they will say “no”.

Company B also self-identifies itself as a product company, and in fact they have built their business around a small number of standard offerings. But as their core strategic advantage they really are utilizing relationships, the ability to customize beyond what standard product companies (especially larger ones) are willing to do, as well as to react very quickly to customer requests. They’ve built a very nice business doing this, but have some frustrations as well. They are highly dependent upon a small number of major accounts for virtually all of their revenue, and have the major revenue/profit swings that are associated with this type of business–up one year, back down the next. They also are in constant fear that a larger company will come along and “take away” their marketplace, because they’ve continuously failed to create new products which build upon a core offering which is very dated technologically. The core offering appears long-in-tooth and vulnerable. This company is very account-focused, and the lack of a market focus has kept them from being able to create additional, broadly marketable products which provide them with a strong proprietary advantage (and causes a lack of sleep at night!)

Company A understands who they are and what they want. That doesn’t guarantee success, but it makes it much easier to build a plan that everyone agrees on. At that point success or failure usually depends upon execution, unless the plan is awful. If failure ensues in this scenario, more times than not, the problem is in execution. Company B’s biggest problem is that they are floating right in the middle between the two business models. They are trying to leverage both of these business models, and struggling with execution, in some ways with both.

SUMMARY
It isn’t impossible to combine these two business models successfully. I’m sure that many of you can’t point to several examples of such a very successful compromise. In fact, many technology companies combine both of these models to some extent, with good success. But I find that usually, a company identifies itself primarily as a product company first, or a systems integrator. That identification is their strategic focus, and takes precedence when prioritizing the use of always scarce assets.

The secondary business model is usually utilized on an opportunistic basis. Product companies integrate and customize as needed to get a big deal. Integrators create “products” to fill the needs of a big account, and sometimes happily find they are saleable to other accounts. Occasionally, these “products” prove so widely saleable that they are spun off into a separate product company, or the integrator changes its focus into becoming a full-blown product company.

The most important thing, in my opinion, is to understand who you are, and what you are trying to accomplish strategically. It’s the company’s that are trying to leverage both business models at once, without one model taking the lead, that gets itself in a heap of trouble. That’s my opinion–what’s yours?

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com