Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Tag: CEO

Software Company Diversification

One of the difficult strategic decisions that software industry management teams have to make is finding the delicate balance between “focusing on the core business” and “not putting all of your eggs in one basket”.

One obvious way of differentiating how much diversification is appropriate for a specific company is by company size and maturity. A brand new startup better be very focused on doing one thing well or they may not last very long. A large, established company generally needs to have at least several new irons waiting in the fire as initial products and market segments mature, or they risk shrinking in size rather than continuing to grow. The two ends of the spectrum are pretty obvious, but there is a wide continuum of situations in between where the proper strategy isn’t as obvious. Let’s look at some factors to consider when formulating your own diversification strategy:

How much growth is left in your primary business/market/technology

This may be the first thing you should consider when contemplating the diversification question. If you’ve hit on a huge market opportunity with a lot of room to run and have gained good traction, it’s often unwise to develop “eyes bigger than your stomach”. In this environment your best growth opportunity is usually keeping your eyes on that single ball. Everything else being equal, a focused strategy is always easier to execute than a diversified one. So if you have explosive growth prospects ahead as far as the eye can see, it’s better to defer the diversification decision for sometime down the road.

Competition level in your primary business

Strong competition in your primary market is often a factor that can cause a management team to either look toward diversification or decide it needs to focus on it’s core market-depending on the details. The key is how competitive you are: if you are very competitive and yet caught in a heated battle with that strong competition the choice is often to stay focused. However, if that competition is so strong that your company is an also-ran, a decision to diversify is often taken. On the other end of the spectrum if the competition is weak, that may also allow you to more easily take on some diversification without the risk of losing hold of your profitable core business.

Level of available resources

This is a big key; if you only have the resources to do one thing well it’s critical to keep you focus on a single ball. It doesn’t matter if you have five great ideas–pick the one you think is best and sell out to be successful there. I often see early stage managers make this mistake. They aren’t sure which of their ideas is the best and this uncertainty causes them to split their very scarce resources among multiple paths. Unfortunately, this usually dooms them to not gaining critical momentum in a single area. It’s also important to measure all types of key resources when considering this factor, not just financial. Do you have enough skilled engineers, marketers or management bandwidth? If any of these or any number of other resources are in too short supply, diversification at this time is probably a bad idea.

Ease of extending proprietary technology into adjacent markets

This requires an evaluation of your existing IP. Often software companies have cutting edge technologies that can be adapted to other market segments and provide a similar differential advantage as in the initial core market. But what if the technology is very specialized, or you just can’t see another good market opportunity to invade using your existing technology as your entry advantage?  In these cases it’s best to be realistic and look at other ways of diversifying, such as acquiring new technology/product categories via M&A that are usable in your current segment.

Can you create or acquire new technologies which your existing market wants?

There’s a lot that goes into answering this question. A lot of it relates to your technical staff–are they specialists in your existing technologies, or do you have the type of talent that is constantly coming up with outside-the-box ideas and potential new products?

If there isn’t fertile ground internally for innovative new ideas you many need to look at acquisitions which can bring  fresh technologies and products to your pipeline. These don’t need to be huge, costly acquisitions; often you can acquire highly innovative startups which are little more than a small engineering team, a core product and a few initial customers.

Also, are your product managers identifying unmet needs from your existing user base? This is usually crucial to bringing SUCCESSFUL new products to existing markets, whether driven by internal development or acquisition of external technologies/products/companies.

Diversifying to Completely New Markets with Completely New Products/Technologies is very dangerous

Above all you want to avoid moving into a completely new market with a completely new product/technology. The odds of pulling this off successfully are very low, roughly equivalent to that of any brand new startup company. If fact, this is often referred to as a “restart”. It generally occurs when a company looks forward and sees certain failure ahead due to a hopelessly out-of-date technology or an evaporating market segment (often due to a technological sea change). I often see this from managements that are very discouraged and desperately seeking “greener grass on the other side of the fence”. But of course the grass isn’t always greener. This approach should be viewed as a last resort only; every attempt should be made to diversify into an area where there is some technological or market experience.

Like most strategic decisions, diversification in the software business isn’t inherently good or bad. The circumstances really dictate how much you should pursue.  What do you think about the strategic tradeoff between focus and prudent diversification?–leave a comment below with your experiences and views.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

5 Factors to Evaluate Whether You Have a Winning Corporate Culture – Video

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Separating Technology Wheat from the Chaff

In software and hardware businesses new ideas, technologies and products come down the pike at a rapid-fire pace. Many fail immediately and some muddle along before finally fizzling out. Some meet with modest success. Only a very select few turn into long run big hits. How can you tell which products will become hits, out of a sea of mediocrity?

Not many people can differentiate between these new ideas, technologies and products at an early enough stage to profit massively from it. Keep in mind I’m not talking about small successes, but the really big ones. The ability pick the big winners out early is a rare skill set, yet one that is applicable across a wide swath of functions including general management, product planning/management, inventors, venture investing, stock analysis/selection and many more.

Short of having a brilliant mind, multidisciplinary worldview and the ability to see the future—how do you go about maximizing bets on what will hit it big and what won’t? Here are some questions that may be useful to ask when making your evaluation:

Does it solve a fundamental problem, bend a cost curve or create a new playing field?

Not every new product is based upon a fundamental technical breakthrough—but it sure helps! After all, innovation is still the basis of the technology business. This is where you look first when seeking big ideas you can profit from, something that fundamentally changes the game in a particular marketplace. One of the most spectacular examples of a breakthrough that met all three of these criteria is the personal computer. It solved some fundamental problems of the time associated with mainframe computing, certainly bent the cost curve of computing downward (and continues to due so even today) and created an entirely new ecosystem with broad societal implications. Meeting all three of these criteria is a very tall order that you won’t see often, but passing one of these three tests is almost essential for a big-time winner with staying power.

Where does it fit in the marketplace?

There are certainly many great stories of fundamental research breakthroughs without immediate, obvious market applications that ultimately found a market and became a great hit. The problem occurs when the second step—finding a market—is given short shrift, or skipped completely. This can happen when there is pure excitement and the folks funding the project have a purely technical viewpoint. The number of big successes without expert market vetting is actually pretty rare although there have been some spectacular exceptions.

We’ve all heard of the invention of super glue by accident. And Thomas Watson Senior, Chairman of the IBM Corporation in 1943 was quoted as saying: “I think there is a world market for about five computers.” Five units do not make a commercial market, but IBM made the investment anyway—and look how that turned out. But in reality the number of fundamental breakthroughs in the research lab dwarfs the number of truly successful, innovative new commercial products. So it’s important to not get too excited about these breakthroughs until a commercial application becomes obvious and realistic. Avoid at all costs the proverbial “Cure looking for a disease”, regardless of the almost mythical stories of a few massive winners borne from purely technical circumstances.

How does it compare to alternative solutions, both current and forecasted?

After deciding the breakthrough isn’t a cure looking for a disease and which market segment it fits in, it’s also very important to evaluate how it stacks up vs. rival technologies and products. And not just with respect to a current market snapshot, but looking forward as well. Forecasting really comes into play here; which technical platform has the longest runway? An example is satellite TV vs. Cable TV. When Satellite TV came into play it took a lot of market share quickly by providing innovative new services which the utility-like Cable TV companies were slow to match. But in the long run the wired infrastructure of the CableCos may provide a strategic technical advantage in that long running battle that may enable a more advanced and diverse product set.

Do the owners have what it takes to bring it to market?

This question applies not only when evaluating someone else’s product or technology—but also your own. Realistic self-reflection is important here. There have been some great new innovations that have been wasted due to bad marketing, lack of financial resources or just plain ignorance and incompetence. These weaknesses often lead to the “ arrows in the back of the pioneer”, where the folks that initially bring out the “next big thing” fail or are quickly overtaken by a more tactically skilled competitor, who improves on the idea and/or out-executes them in the market. The software spreadsheet market is instructive here, conjuring up images of several bigger fish progressively swallowing smaller ones. Visicalc was the original spreadsheet innovator overtaken by Lotus who was then in turn overtaken by MS Excel. The resources and capabilities of the innovation’s owner matters a great deal in the long run.

Is it defensible?

This is what often separates the “flash in the pan” from a true long term winner. Defensibility can be defined by the traditional technology means of patents, copyrights and trade secrets. But there are more subtle ways of defense that can be very successful in the long run: branding, entrenched distribution channels, strategic partnerships and cost advantages.

Especially in the software and hardware businesses there are tons of fast followers, who are lying in wait for an emerging trend or new market segment, where they can apply deep resources and tactical skill to out-execute the pioneers. In hardware markets the major Japanese manufacturers long ago mastered this model by taking US inventions and productizing them cheaper and better. The large Korean manufacturers then found success with this same model and most recently it’s been replicated by the Chinese. In the software business Microsoft and other large software companies have grown by either mimicking or buying up technology leaders who have pioneered a new market segment. However it’s done–make sure the next big thing is defensible before betting on it becoming a big-time, long term winner.

Does it pass muster from every angle?

As stated earlier, it really helps to be a “renaissance man” man with a multidisciplinary worldview. But people meeting that description are in very short supply, so it’s really important to employ experts across several key disciplines such as technology, finance, manufacturing and marketing, to evaluate market potential and possible weaknesses. In the technology business marketing and technology are usually the key differentiating factors, so at a minimum make sure that expertise is brought to bear in those areas during your evaluation.

There you have my view—how to do separate the winners from the losers. Post a comment with your own view of this very debatable topic.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Is Your Tech Business Marketing or Sales Driven?

Software and hardware business are often segmented by the vertical or horizontal market they’re targeting, their technology platform, small vs. large companies and so on. One of the important ways to segment tech businesses, which isn’t often discussed, is by whether the company is sales-driven or marketing-driven in their customer acquisition strategies.

A balanced approach

Now some reading this article may ask “why wouldn’t you take a balanced approach”? Indeed, I don’t mean to suggest that either sales or marketing should be absent in the customer acquisition efforts of tech companies. There are a few scenarios that could be drawn up to support such a singular approach—but very few for sure. There are also some situations where the customer acquisition circumstances are “in between” in price, complexity, market size, etc. and you end up with a fairly balanced approach between marketing and sales. But in my experience the sales or marketing function will rise to the lead, more often than not.

Key criteria in choosing customer acquisition techniques

There are several considerations that often drive whether marketing or sales will dominate:

  • Product Complexity – This often decides whether or not a product can be truly driven to purchase by marketing or whether significant sales rep intervention will be required to close a deal. It should be noted that when product complexity is high, marketing support in the form of sales tools (examples: case studies, road map presentations by product management) will still be very important in the sales cycle. But this will generally be a sale that is driven by the sales force with marketing in a supporting role.
  • Product Price/ Typical Sale Size – The smaller the product price and typical sales size, the more likely you’ll be able to acquire customers exclusively through marketing, or in conjunction with inside sales that is largely “taking orders”. Conversely, products that cost a lot may require the extra interaction provided by an outside sales force (and the deal size also justifies the cost of the sales force).
  • Market Size – Very large markets with lots of customers are more easily and cost-effectively reached with effective marketing. A tight market with a small number of total prospects (think nuclear power plants) will usually be served almost exclusively by an outside sales force with minimal marketing intervention.
  • Use of Channels – While companies selling heavily through channels often need reps to call on the channel partners, far fewer channel reps are required than if the reps are dedicated to direct selling. Generally the heavier the use of third party channels in the customer acquisition approach, the more heavily the mix will lean toward investment in marketing.

Marketing driven keys to success

  • Adequate marketing funds – If you’re going to be marketing-driven in your customer acquisition approach, you better dedicate enough money to fund marketing programs with superior performance. To do otherwise will cripple your business.
  • An objective, data driven culture – The beauty of a marketing-driven approach is that it can take much subjectivity out the management of optimizing your customer acquisition activities. Especially in this era of highly measurable online marketing, decisions should be made on what the data says—not on the whims of the CEO or some other senior executive.
  • Excellent inside sales in support – Except for very simple, low cost products where marketing can truly drive the sale all the way to completion—these days that often means a software download, SaaS signup or physical product order—it’s still important to have an efficient (but low cost) inside sales operation supporting your marketing machine.

Sales driven keys to success

  • Great sales people – Hiring good people is so very important in every area, but when your relying on an expensive outside sales force to drive revenue—you better hire the best reps you can afford and attract.
  • Success driven comp plan – If your success depends upon them, make sure your sales reps become really happy only when the company is happy as well.
  • Good marketing support in the form of lead generation programs and sales tools – Unless you have a tiny market with obvious, easily identifiable prospects, it’s still very important to have a marketing function which generates leads as well as supplies good sales tools.

The best approach isn’t always chosen

Unfortunately, logic and situation analysis doesn’t always win out when designing a customer acquisition strategy. Usually by the time a company grows to be large, their approach is in line with what’s best for the business. Of course, your chances of growing to be a big company are reduced if you make serious errors in sales and marketing strategy. But in any event, by the time a company is big they are usually utilizing both sales and marketing heavily and in the proper balance.

Startups and early stage companies are another matter. Often the emphasis on either sales or marketing is based on the experience of the founders and senior executives. If they’ve been successful in the past and their new company has a similar focus, maybe it’s fine and their approach works again. But a problem occurs when these executives start up a very different type of company than they’ve had success with in the past. It’s human nature to fall back on what I refer to as your “common business sense”, which is formed by your personal background and past experiences. This is when you can get a misalignment between what a company needs and the approach taken in the sales & marketing mix.

Even worse still is when the customer acquisition approach develops more or less haphazardly. This can happen when the founders of a company really don’t have much functional experience in sales or marketing. This occurs somewhat frequently in software and hardware companies, as many startups are created by technical types. In these cases there may be a fairly unsophisticated approach to both sales and marketing—and whatever works early may end up dominate. For example, a sales rep is hired who has some success, so the model becomes hire a lot more reps and turn them loose without much (or any) support on the marketing side. Or an early direct email campaign or online advertising generates some sales, so money is poured into that method. Unfortunately, these may not be the best approaches strategically for the business in the long run.

That’s what I think about Sales vs. Marketing driven orientations in software and hardware companies. What do you think? Post a comment with your own opinions or stories about what drives customer acquisition in high tech companies.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Does Your Company Have a Winning Culture?

I’ve been reading Bill and Dave (subtitled: How Hewlett and Packard built the World’s Greatest Company) by Michael Malone. He’s a great writer, and it’s an important business story; I heartily recommend it.

Being an ex-HPer, I have tremendous respect, bordering on reverence for the “HP Way”, which was the basis for the culture at Hewlett Packard for so many years. With the benefit of hindsight, it wasn’t perfect and there were definitely things I’d change. But you can’t argue with the results. Bill and Dave essentially founded Silicon Valley, and built an unbelievably successful company that grew like clockwork for nearly four decades. The HP Way is long gone and the company is nearly unrecognizable from the one I worked in. But to this day I don’t believe they’ve ever had a full year of negative profit results.

The term “Corporate Culture” has been defined many different ways by a lot of people, some of them so complex as to be unreadable. Here’s a definition that’s probably as good as most:

“The specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization and that control the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the organization.”

Maybe you have a better definition, but this one’s probably adequate for our discussion here.

Anyway, Malone’s book got me to thinking about corporate cultures at tech companies and their effect on a company’s performance. It’s something that I think is really undervalued in too many of today’s corporations. It’s often dismissed as a squishy, “soft” issue that’s unimportant to analytical senior managers.

Regardless of my HP bias, there have been a lot of very successful companies that have been built with very different cultures relative to HP’s in its heyday. One notable contrast would be IBM, a peer and competitor which as an east coast-based company had a much more traditional, hierarchical, button-down culture. But the IBM culture was revered as well, and the company was also wildly successful for a long period of time. As the saying goes, there’s more than one way to skin a cat (a very unfortunate idiom–who thought that one up?).

Cultures have been categorized many different ways including but not limited to “Work Hard, Play Hard Culture”, “Tough-Guy, Macho Culture”, “Process Culture”, “Bet-The-Company Culture”, and many more. In my mind, none of that matters much. What matters, in my opinion is does the culture drive positive results.

So you might surmise that the easiest way to define a great corporate culture is to look at financial results. That’s fine in the long run; with the benefit of hindsight, there probably is no better way to identify a great corporate culture than the decades of financial success such as HP and IBM enjoyed. But in the short run, financial results can be deceiving. It’s entirely possible to have a great short run of success even with a poisonous company culture.

So what’s the best way to measure whether you’ve built a great culture? The details vary at various successful software and hardware companies, but what are the common ingredients of a culture that sets the stage for long-term success? Here’s my shot at a list of the key attributes of winning corporate cultures:

Employees want to stay

For me, this may be the best gross indicator of a winning corporate culture. I know, you might say “That could means it’s a country club” with excellent compensation and low demands. But how often do you actually see that in a high performing company? Very seldom in my experience. In reality there is a great propensity for employees to take the view that “the grass is always greener”, and long to go somewhere else.

The best people rise to the top

This is another really key indicator of a company culture “clicking on all cylinders”. Particularly in larger organizations, political skills often are the dominant talent required to rise to the top of the org chart. There’s nothing wrong with this–it’s a skill set that’s very important to successfully influencing large, complex organizations and moving them in the right direction. The ability to connect with people and bring them to your position cannot be understated as a needed attribute of a corporate leader. But it’s important that these political skills are also paired with strong business savvy. The best leaders not only have the ability to “win the internal meeting”, but also the analytical and decision-making skills to drive the company to win in the marketplace. Sadly, all too often I’ve seen that those rising to the top are not exceptional in both these categories. A great corporate culture should facilitate the identification, retention and promotion of such well-rounded leaders.

Employees speak well of the company to outsiders

Everyone loves to bitch about their job and idiosyncrasies of where they work. But I find that in companies with the very best cultures, the word gets out about how great a place is to work, because great places to work are frankly, very rare. This means that you’ve created such a great environment that your employees brag about it to their friends and external colleagues, overcoming that very strong human propensity to view their jobs in a negative light.

Opinions flow freely without fear of retribution

This one probably isn’t a hard and fast rule. I’ve seen traditional hierarchical organizations that were very successful. In those instances, you tend to see opinions flow down from the top much more often than you see them flowing openly from below. But I believe in most successful “modern” corporation cultures, this is a pretty typical attribute.

Don’t have to overpay to attract talent

You might think of this one downstream result of positive vibe from the previous four categories. If you’ve created a fair, stimulating, challenging and comfortable work environment, you don’t have to work very hard to restock it with new employees. In many cases you won’t even have to look for them–they will find you. In companies with the very best cultures, outsiders practically beat down the door to get hired. That means your pay packages won’t need to “set the market”, they’ll just need to be “in the market” to attract great talent.

So that’s my list–what’s yours? What’s your view on which company has the finest corporate culture? Post a comment to expand the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

What’s Up With HP?

As regular readers will know, I am a Hewlett Packard alumnus and a longtime admirer of the company. I worked at HP in the eighties, and with hindsight it was one of the finest periods of my career. It was a GREAT place to work, as documented by books and case studies written about the company. My time there definitely had a major effect in shaping my management philosophies.

The more recent -periods at HP have seen a lot of change and a fair amount of turmoil not typical in the company’s first 60 years or so.

Let’s analyze some of the recent events and assess the overall strategic situation:

Firing of Leo Apotheker

What a disaster this was. To hire a new CEO with a major change in strategic direction in mind, then let him go in less than a year is not good. What isn’t known is was the new strategy totally conceived by Mr. Apotheker, or was he brought in to support a new strategy favored by the HP board. Either way, it’s an awful mess for such a major company, and the HP board has not distinguished itself in the last decade.

The new strategy itself while risky on the surface wasn’t the real problem, imo. The communication of the new direction was the real disaster, and smacked of incompetence. Don’t announce you’re “going to sell the business”–that does nothing for valuations. If you’re going to sell it, get on with it and sell it without premature public announcements. By most accounts Mr. Apotheker’s short reign was punctuated by missteps, retractions, chronically missing financial targets and general bumbling. My sources inside the company say that he had lost just about everyone’s confidence, from employees to shareholders to the board. It’s hard to say if that’s fair; new managers can be sabotaged by entrenched forces against change. And major changes were on the way. But the buck needs to stop with the CEO, and it certainly did in this case.

Planned Sale of the PC business

To be honest, I go back and forward on this one. Back in my HP days the PC business was a money-losing, also-ran business with tiny margins. The corporate line of thinking at the time was that HP HAD to be in the PC business, it was so central to everything else the company wanted to do, and the computing world revolved around PCs. I never bought it. In fact, the PC folks got in the way of many things we wanted to accomplish in the peripherals segment of the business, specifically connecting to and partnering with all the other PC makers.

The PC business remains a low margin one today, but one that HP has established a leading position in. I haven’t studied the balance sheet, but I doubt the PC business is so capital-intensive that it would prevent HP from having the money to adequately invest in a new direction. I don’t think selling it off is a stupid move, but announcing it as a first step seems extreme, and only served to make everyone involved nervous about what the future holds.

Eliminating the Tablets/WebOS

Another PR disaster and one that was totally avoidable. The problem was in buying Palm in the first place, and paying a billion dollars for a company that had almost completely failed in the marketplace. Then introducing a new line of tablet computers to great fanfare, almost immediately obsoleting them, and then announcing you’ll be making a few more because everyone love the fire-sale obsolescence pricing–it appeared that the left hand didn’t know what the right hand was doing.

By most accounts the WebOS is a nice piece of software. The problem is that this move was so very late to the game. If it had been done a few years earlier, it might have been a savvy deal, and allowed HP to make a major move into mobile devices with a differentiated product offering. But by the time of this acquisition, Palm was already discredited and Apple, Android and Blackberry had solidified the top leadership positions. And the price was completely ridiculous for as failed company. You can put this one on Mark Hurd, as it came on his watch.

Buying Autonomy

HP recently announced completion of the Autonomy acquisition, paying a dear price for this enterprise software company. Autonomy is a good acquisition if you’re intent on growing software as a share of revenue; the only issue is the price. It was very high, but one must remember that HP’s overall revenues are north of $125 BILLION. Autonomy adds less than $1B in revenue, which is a drop in the bucket relative to HP’s size. With a purchase price of over $10B, HP paid more than 11X revenues–pretty pricey even by today’s inflated SaaS valuations. Autonomy will have to be an exceptional growth in engine for this to pay off. Only time will tell.

Copying the IBM playbook

The IBM playbook was to sell off low margin, lower growth hardware business such as PCs (IBM sold its PC business to Lenovo, a shocking move at the time). Then focus on increasing software and services revenues relentlessly, for a long period of time. It’s worked extremely well for IBM, although I remember there were some tough times in the beginning. Would it work as well for HP, who appears interested in copying IBM’s strategy? I’m not a big fan of copying other company’s strategies, although on the surface the two companies are similar. The key to success or failure is usually execution in most cases of corporate strategy. Executing this strategy would also take a very long time to have an impact on HP’s financials. HP’s software share of total corporate revenue was less than 3% in 2010.  There are only so many $1B+ software companies out there. Most software acquisitions on their own will have a minimum effect on HP’s overall revenues, unless they went after one of the few industry giants–which would truly shock me.  HP has become strong in services after it’s acquisition of EDS in 2008, but is still much less prominent in services than IBM. So even with an aggressive acquisition program and strong organic growth, HP looks to be a hardware-dominated company for a long time in the future.

Meg Whitman appointed CEO

It’s hard to say what influence this will have on the corporate strategy. Ms. Whitman is a seasoned CEO who has been involved in great success, although one could argue that she was very fortunate to benefit from a snowball rolling downhill with Ebay. In addition, her background is heavily consumer products with almost nothing in the enterprise space, which is HP’s supposed new direction. HP’s business is only 25% consumer products, and if you eliminate the massive PC business, it becomes a whole lot less. I never underestimate smart people or their ability to adapt, and she definitely fits in the smart category. But experienced business people also tend to fall back on the comfort level of their past experience and what they understand best. It will be very interesting to watch as Ms. Whitman’s tenure evolves, especially how she affects the previously announced strategy.

What happens next?

I think that HP ends up keeping the PC business, while at least in the short term attempting to become more software and services intensive. You’ll see more software and services acquisitions. But I wouldn’t be surprised to see the flight away from consumer-oriented businesses to abate as long as Meg Whitman is CEO.

I also think that the original IBM-style strategy will be difficult–but not impossible–for HP to implement. For this approach to work, shareholders, employees and the board will all need to be very patient and supportive of the plan. Meg Whitman will really need to believe in it as well, and as discussed above, her background is far from a perfect fit for where they’re headed. My guess is that this strategy won’t be given enough rope for it to work and we’ll see another change of direction in the medium-term, but you never know. That’s what makes this kind of speculation so much fun!

What’s your take on the future direction of HP? Where are they headed, and does it end well or not?  I’m interested in your analysis of recent events at the company; post a comment to share your views and continue the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Should Microsoft Break Up?

Once again there have been discussions in the press about breaking up Microsoft. Years ago it was the government pressing the issue because of Microsoft’s perceived monopolistic hold on a number of software markets. Now it’s being driven by shareholders, unhappy with the stock’s unimpressive performance over the last decade. MS management is not fond of the idea of being broken apart, as management’s tend to feel. Unless the CEO is a financial engineer by background, the management team generally has no interest in breaking up their kingdom. But is a breakup the best way to go in the long run for the company? Will MS shareholders be best served by such a strategy? Let’s go to some of the pros and cons.

Pro Breakup Arguments

A breakup could unlock value not reflected in the MS share price-

The share price has been roughly flat over the last eight years. This is for a company that still dominates many computer markets, and is enormously profitable. Something isn’t right. Some would say that some parts of this huge company are over shadowed by the dominant businesses, and therefore aren’t fully valued. Specifically, you could break out some fast growing businesses that might demand a higher multiple. Conversely some slow-growing, but large businesses which generate large amounts of cash flow could become great dividend payers, like the GM or AT&T of their golden years.

There are also some potential advantages not so obvious to financial engineers:

Smaller, less bureaucratic operating units

This is not to be underestimated in its power to unlock value and growth. Anyone who has ever worked in a large company, and then gone to a startup, can testify to what freedom from the corporate bureaucracy can bring. Everything happens faster, and innovation is unleashed. Thoughtful risk-taking is allowed, and hopefully encouraged. If you haven’t seen it, it’s hard to understand the huge change that can take place in employee attitudes and behavior when working is a more entrepreneurial environment.

Greater focus

Focus is one of the keys to most successful businesses, but is hard to quantify. When you are very large and feel the need to continue to grow, it’s easy to lose your way. Senior management has only so much bandwidth, and can have expertise in only so many areas. Once this bandwidth is exceeded or new business activity drifts into areas outside of core expertise, mistakes start to happen. When a business becomes too large and diverse the management almost always becomes sloppy, and sloppy wastes money and reduces profitability.

Greater ownership

If structured properly, folks usually feel greater ownership and work harder, knowing what they do might actually make a difference. Not to mention that they are more likely to be recognized and rewarded for their efforts which actually grow the business.

No Place to hide

This is true both for sub-par employees and poorly performing businesses. There are many places to hide in a bureaucracy. With large profits and so very many people, staff jobs abound without a clear need, and real jobs that need to be done are broken up into such small pieces that accountability for the bigger picture suffers. New business units can be run as money losers for years as pet projects of a senior executive. In a leaner, more focused organization, both these phenomenon tend to go away.

Con Breakup Arguments

Synergies

Many would say that you’d give up a lot of great synergies in any breakup. The Office business was built in large part on the shoulders of the Operating System business, as an example. And Microsoft has stayed very focused on software (with a few high profile exceptions like the X-Box), so many of the businesses do relate to each other in relevant ways.

Brand power

This may be the greatest argument, in my mind, against breaking up Microsoft. The power of the Microsoft brand is enormous; put the Microsoft name on any new software or computer-related product and, at a minimum, it becomes an immediate contender in it’s category. Many mediocre software products have become category leaders almost strictly due to the power of the Microsoft brand. In any breakup one of the companies would retain that brand, and the other progeny would certainly be large enough to establish strong brands quickly. But would it ever be the same?

Tradition

To some folks, it just wouldn’t feel right. This is Microsoft, after all. The alpha dogs of software. One of the great pioneers and dominant companies of American high tech. To some, it would be unthinkable to destroy such an American icon, like tearing down the Statue of Liberty.

This all comes down to preferences and judgment in the end. Some like scale and dominant brands like today’s Microsoft, others prefer the speed and flexibility that comes with smaller business units. Many believe that there is nothing like a dominant industry player to drive profits, while those with a contrary view would say that visibility of individual businesses and less bureaucracy lead to greater returns. In my opinion, every major corporation runs its course as a successful entity, eventually faltering under its own weight as it suffers the excesses of success. The trick is in knowing when this point comes–and it’s often not obvious, except in hindsight.

My view is that Microsoft has likely reached a point where a break up makes sense. You could segment MS into several still very strong separate compaies, which I believe would free them to focus on specific markets with much less bureaucratic drag. That’s my view–what’s yours?

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Integrating Sales and Marketing at Software and Technology Companies

In some but not all tech companies the Sales and Marketing functions are managed separately. They are separate but closely related functions that some people without a strong background in either function have a tendency to confuse. Normally, there is a VP or Director heading up the Marketing department, and another VP or Director leading the Sales staff. But it is also not unusual to see a VP or Director of Sales & Marketing who leads both functions.

This all seems benign enough, so what’s the issue? The issue comes when actual revenue fails to meet the forecast–that’s when the finger-pointing usually begins. Unfortunately not meeting forecasts is a common event in technology businesses, where forecasting of new software and tech products can be particularly challenging. When that finger-pointing starts, it often breaks out first between the Marketing and Sales departments–here’s how the ensuing “discussion” might go:

SALES: “You haven’t planned products that our customers want to by. You’ve priced them too high. And those leads that you’ve spent SO MUCH money on that you are giving us aren’t qualified and are essentially worthless to us.”

MARKETING: “You’re not selling the right products as we directed, or presenting the positioning of our product line properly. All you do is try to sell on price, constantly discounting and hurting our margins. If you’d follow up on all the leads we gave you, get off of the golf course and work more than 4 hours a day, you’d be well over quota and the company would be doing fine.”

Sales folks and Marketers are different types of people, and tend to view the world differently and from their own selfish perspectives. This often nasty “discussion” as simulated above is far from uncommon, and can get pretty ugly–which can really hurt a company in trying to reach its goals. So what’s the right way to get the Sales and Marketing departments to work together as a team, avoiding all of this counter-productive ugliness?

SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE POTENTIAL CONFLICT

The VP of Sales & Marketing
One way to greatly reduce this conflict is to have a common leadership for the Sales and Marketing functions. This usually means having a VP-Sales & Marketing in your organization. If you can find the right person to fill this role, this can actually be an excellent solution. Having a single leader can go a long way toward eliminating or at least greatly reducing this conflict, assuming he has a balanced background and perspective and is fair, not favoring one department over the other.

Good people to fill this role are out there–but are very rare in my opinion. There are far more managers who have been put in the position of VP-Sales & Marketing than there are those who are well suited for the role. Most of the time you end up with a manager that understands one function well and gives short shrift to or completely screws up the other function.  You will often find this combined VP position in companies that are not “marketing-intensive”, where the sales function is the dominant aspect of the job. If the Marketing function is truly less important, a company can get by with this structure, although it usually isn’t ideal. You can read more about the issues with a VP-Sales & Marketing role in a previous article that I’ve written entitled “Big S, little m“.

CEO Demands Communication and Cooperation
If care isn’t taken, the very different personality types in sales and marketing can lead to some pretty intense conflicts. I’ve been a soldier, captain and general on both sides in this war–and let me tell you, it isn’t pretty. I’ve also (effectively) filled the role of VP-Sales & Marketing, which is a story for another day. Much like the battles between Marketing and Engineering that I’ve previously written about, I have seen this battle play out regularly in the companies that I have worked for as an employee as well as at many of my clients in eight years as a consultant at PJM Consulting. Things can get out of hand very quickly, and paralyze a company.

In many cases, the key is how the CEO handles the situation. He must go well out of his way to be a fair arbitrator in these discussions. Even the most benign comment can appear to show favor to one side in the eyes of the other.  A CEO can’t ignore or deny the problem or assume it will be handled at the VP level. It is the CEO’s responsibility to prevent, recognize and fix this problem. As a CEO you must also be careful to avoid inadvertently making decisions or setting up policies that reward or tolerate company politics.

Departmental Social Integration
Not everything can be avoided or corrected through traditional management techniques. In this situation relationships are really the key.   I recommend planning social activities which allow sales and marketing department counterparts to get to know each other as “people” outside of their project activities. Since a successful sales/marketing interface relies heavily on relationships, it’s very important to closely monitor the personal relationship between VP-Marketing and VP-Sales. Also, make sure that the VPs are monitoring the counterpart relationships below them. Ensure both VPs are open and honest with about the relationship between departments. Also watch for arrogance (especially from “experienced veterans”) when screening potential new hires for either department that will interface with the other –arrogance often is the trigger which starts the battle between departments.

Integration of Departmental Functions
Encourage the sales department to get marketers in front of their customers. Hire marketing people that have had some sales or business development experience,  who understand dealing directly with customers–and know what’s it like when your living depends upon making your quota. Insist that the marketing department include the sales folks in determining what a “qualified lead” looks like. If you can get agreement on this up front on this important issue, much of the finger pointing goes away when things don’t go as planned.

Joint Goals and Compensation Structure
It currently isn’t common to design department or individual goals which cross marketing and sales functions, but if you can find a way to do this you are structurally setting up the desire and need for close cooperation. Design goals or MBOs to reward the two departments for working together. It’s crucial that you don’t ever allow one department to “get ahead” by blaming the other–tie them together as much as possible in your goal setting.

SUMMARY
To limit issues between sales and marketing functions and ensure that they “sing from the same sheet’, pay close attention to the specific individual departmental activities which can greatly effect the perceived performance of the other department. Optimizing the cooperation between sales and marketing demands an upfront look at things such as the corporate structure at the highest levels, the social fabric of the company, compensation structure and use of targets/goals, as well as formal cross-departmental reviews so each department can influence the other department’s approaches. All too often I see these things aren’t taken into consideration until after the fact–when things have already blown up and there is a mess to clean up.

That’s my view on this all too common–but not often discussed–conflict. What has been your experience in this area? Post a comment and begin a discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Integrating the Marketing and Engineering Functions at Technology Companies

In most tech companies, Product Marketing and Product Development/Engineering are managed separately. There is usually one VP over the Product Development function and another VP over the overall marketing function, which usually includes future product marketing/planning.

While this is certainly an appropriate way to organize a tech company, there is a great danger in one are when it comes to these separate operating “silos”: the planning of new products.

I have a particularly strong opinion on this topic, with an extensive product marketing background and also having worked as a product developer earlier in my career (albeit in a non-tech business).

With respect to current products, the silo approach isn’t much of an issue. The day-to-day activities of the marketing and engineering departments are very different, and can be managed separately quite successfully.

It’s in the future product area that things can get messy. Product Marketing and Product Development both have a key role to play here, if the company is to optimize the process of planning, developing and introducing the best new product possible. The problems is that at every level, from the VP-level down to the engineering project managers and marketing product managers, the product marketing and engineering functions are often staffed by individuals with very different world outlooks when compared to their direct counterparts in the other department.

Inevitably, if care isn’t taken, these very different personality types can lead to some pretty intense conflicts. I’ve been a soldier, captain and general in this war–and let me tell you, at times it isn’t pretty. The battlefield often is the company’s strategic plan, which ends up in a trampled mess. I have seen this battle play out all too often in the companies that I have worked for as an employee, as well as at many of my clients in eight years as a consultant at PJM Consulting. It sometimes gets so ugly it paralyzes a company, putting it at a severe disadvantage vs. competitors who have less conflict.

THE “WRONG” WAYS TO HANDLE THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM

Unfortunately, most CEOs that I meet are not all that tuned in to how damaging these conflicts can become.

Often they will ignore or deny the problem, thinking it is a responsibility to be handled at the VP level.

Another strategy that I have seen companies put in place is to extract the product planning function from the marketing department, and put it under engineering. This will often greatly reduce or eliminate the conflict, but it is akin to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. As I said earlier, both marketing and engineering have a key role to play in product planning. This strategy effectively removes the voice of the customer, which is a key role that the marketing department should be playing in any successful software or tech company. As much as product developers think it looks easy, they seldom have the mentality or experience to accurately read markets or customers. Almost no one is great at everything; monitoring and reading markets and technical product development are two very different skill sets. Having both mentalities involved in a positive way via both departments leads to far better products in the end.

Finally, if they happen to have come from one side of the battle or the other, CEOs sometimes “take sides” in the battle–predetermining the winner. The problem is there is never any real winner in this battle–and the only certain loser is the company and its shareholders.

A CEO can choose to let Marketing have the upper hand–and this may work out adequately in commodity products where there is very little engineering differentiation. In any other circumstance, results will likely be sub-optimal.

Or he can let Engineering win and dominate the planning process–which is a very common occurrence in early stage, technically-driven software and hardware companies. But this generally only works well for products made by engineers, built for engineers (the early days of Hewlett Packard are an example of this strategy working successfully). For every company that has used this approach successfully there are probably hundreds or thousands that failed in large part because of it.

Ultimately, to make sure that this conflict and its dire consequences are avoided, there is one key thing that needs to happen:

IT IS THE CEO’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT, RECOGNIZE AND FIX THIS PROBLEM

So what steps can a software or hardware CEO take to be on the lookout for this problem–and more importantly, what can they do to prevent it from developing?

  • It’s all about relationships: closely monitor the personal relationship between the VP-Marketing and VP-Engineering
  • Make sure that the VPs are monitoring the relationships below them
  • Make sure they are both VPs are open and honest with you about the relationship between the departments
  • Plan activities which allow engineering and marketing counterparts to get to know each other as “people” outside of their project activities
  • Be careful that you don’t inadvertently make decisions or set up policies that reward or tolerate politics
  • Design goals and MBOs to reward the two departments for working together
  • Don’t ever allow one department to “get ahead” by blaming the other–tie them together as much as possible
  • Hire marketing personnel that can talk the language of engineers
  • Screen product development hires who will interact with Marketing without the not-uncommon attitude that engineers are “superior” human beings
  • Encourage the marketing department to get product developers in front of customers
  • Watch out for arrogance when screening potential new hires for either department that will need to interface with the other –arrogance is often the trigger which starts the battle rolling

SUMMARY

Marketing/Engineering conflict over the product planning process is a common problem that is often overlooked by tech company CEOs. A certain amount of creative tension can exist between the two departments and be totally healthy. All too often, though, this tension turns into a bloody fight which is destructive to the company’s prospects. It is not “fait accompli”, however. It can be minimized and even prevented by a watchful and proactive CEO.

That’s my take on a common issue which is rarely discussed out loud. Have you had your own issues in this area? Post a comment below to add to this discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Dell Computer

Dell has been in the news recently, and like many big companies that have had a glitch in their performance, not in a good way.

Slowing revenue growth, accounting scandals and customer service issues–you’ve heard it all before. By the way, where was the seminar that all big company managements attended, encouraging them to cut corners on their financial reporting practices? It seems that the same pattern has been replicated to an astounding degree across a broad array of large corporations. There has to be some root cause of this; too much smoke in this area to be a coincidence. And of course, the “Professional CEO” relieved of his duties–and replaced by the company founder, returning on a white horse to his original role to refocus the company.

These things have been so common in corporate America. Business writers may have been able to perform an automated “search and replace” in their word processor and write a new, yet the same, story for each additional corporation unfortunate enough to make the headlines. So what’s the deal with Dell–the details always tell the real story–and what happens from here?

ENORMOUS SUCCESS OVER TIME

First off, I want to give Dell Computer and Michael Dell their just due. This is one of the great success stories in corporate history. Started in a dorm room, Mr. Dell built the company into the dominant PC maker of its time, with a long history of exceptional growth and profitability. The company used the direct model at the time when it was counter-intuitive that this would allow a long run of success–which it did. The story of Dell is much more about what has been done right–than wrong. I had some limited contact with Mr. Dell years after Dell was already a large company. He was courteous and thoughtful and very impressive. I have nothing but great respect for the company and its founder.

Probably the strongest endorsement I can make of my opinion of the company, is that the last 3 computers that I’ve purchased have been Dells–even though I am a proud alumnus of HP.

THE FATE OF ALL BIG COMPANIES

But Dell has definitely hit a major pothole, and has had its reputation tarnished on many levels. As I’ve written before, these things inevitably happen to all successful large companies. Nothing great lasts forever–and it should be pointed out that at Dell, it’s lasted a very long time.

Growth has leveled off, and they are no longer the darling of Wall Street’s growth followers. Accounting scandals always reduce a company in the eyes of the public, and firing your CEO, who you’ve been raving about for a while, doesn’t exactly induce confidence in your future. But I think the biggest issue for Dell, is that they’ve taken their eye off of the ball when it comes to quality–and even more importantly–customer service.

I’ve written about this in the past, and I think it has played a primary role in Dell’s current problems. When I bought my first Dell computer, quality was almost unquestioned, and customer service and support was a real strength. Unlimited support was bundled in with the product, and it was great. Contrast that with the situation today: Now you are buying a product which is perceived as lower quality, and you almost can’t talk to anyone about anything without a charge. If you are allowed to speak someone in support, it’s hit or miss whether they are knowledgeable, or speak your language fluently. I really believe that the root of the problems has been what I’d call “too much of a good thing”: The relentless drive to reduce costs. As the PC business matured, Dell was far and away the low cost producer, and used this fact to great advantage. I believe that they got carried away with this strategy, and took their eye off of the ball of what made the company great in the first place. Service/Support quality has become such an issue for Dell that they’ve acknowledged it publicly, and announced plans to make significant investments to fix customer service. But real damage to the Dell brand has already been done, in my opinion. I, along with many others, will be looking closely at HP and other competitors when it comes to future computer and related technology purchases.

SO WHERE DO THEY GO FROM HERE?

All great companies hit this point eventually, and with all the company has going for it, the problems are imminently fixable. Unlike most companies that hit a bump in the road at this point, it doesn’t appear that it has happened because the company has become grossly “fat, dumb and happy”, with a bloated bureaucracy. No doubt there is some bureaucracy with a company this size, but ironically, cutting in the wrong places has been the major problem. Michael Dell has announced that he will look at “new strategies” for the company in his return to the CEO role. I consider this a positive. Often founders want to “go back to the future”, and return to what they know made them successful in the first place–I don’t believe that this is the right answer here.

THE OBVIOUS ANSWERS

The first thing is to fix customer service and support, regardless of the cost. The brand will continue to suffer without this, and that would ultimately be deadly. Mr. Dell has announced that he plans to greatly reduce the number of direct reports to the CEO. If done for the right reasons, I applaud this directive.

Even in a famously lean company like Dell, a company at this size tends to become pretty bureaucratic. There tends to be a lot of people around with curious, abstract job titles, who only serve to slow down, and get in the way of progress. Personnel in companies this size often end up spending a lot of time in large internal meetings–talking to each other, instead of listening to the market. Getting ahead in a company at this mature stage often is dependent on bureaucratic skills, rather that creating actual marketplace value. It’s usually important to cull the herd of extraneous roles, and simplify and focus business processes on only those things that create revenue and profit. This looks painful in the short run, but the company actually runs much more smoothly in the long run.

THE NOT SO OBVIOUS ANSWERS

A more difficult decision is whether to remain with a largely “direct-only” business model. This is particularly difficult for Dell, because it has always been what they’ve hung their hats on. In fact, years ago when I had a few discussions with senior managers at the company, the feeling among upper management was that they didn’t know how to do other forms of distribution, and that they had failed in their few toe dips into indirect waters.

In hindsight, at that time, the decision to remain primarily direct-only was the right one. Enormous value has been created with that strategy–you can’t question it in hindsight. But at this stage of the company’s development, I believe that they really need to rethink this. There is evidence that they’ve run out of steam with a direct-only distribution model. In fact, Dell has been dealing with the channel in a very low key manner for years. But both sides have sort of looked at it like “dealing with the devil”: do it because you have to, but be careful not to get burned.

In my opinion, while it may appear risky, it is time for Dell to look at becoming a company that wants to be a real business partner with the channel. Do they want to have a real chance to stay a growth company?(which I assume they do–this is where the high stock P/Es are). If so, there are few other choices other than indirect distribution, at their current size, that will enable the kind of growth opportunities required for real growth. As they’ve looked farther from their core computer offering, to find other things to push through their direct pipe, they’ve been much less successful–as generally is the case. They’ve not become a real player in consumer electronics, and
while they were initially pretty good at giving away printers–they were not so good at selling them, or more importantly, the consumables which are the money maker in that business. The company should proceed carefully and thoughtfully in this regard. I’m sure that Mr. Dell has other initiatives that he is considering, but I’d be shocked if consideration of a major indirect distribution push isn’t high on his list of possibilities.

SUMMARY

What happens from here? Your guess is as good as mine. It should be very interesting to watch what new strategy emerges, and if this company famous for execution can return to those ways–especially if the future includes a major strategy shift. Corporations that have been as successful as Dell for as long as it has usually have 9 lives (see Apple Computer), and Dell is only on its second, by my count. So I wouldn’t bet against them.

That’s my opinion–what’s yours? Post a comment or send me an email.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com