Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Tag: distribution

Negotiating and Working with Large Technology OEM Partners

The Holy Grail for many software and technology companies, especially the early stage type, is the big deal. Everyone is looking for the big deal, the one that will fund the company’s early activities, provide market credibility and momentum in the marketplace. Of course, if it goes well, there can be nothing better. Many times the big deal takes the form of an OEM partnership with a much larger company. But often when these deals do happen, they end up fitting in the category of “be careful what you wish for”.

TARGET YOUR OEM PARTNERS CAREFULLY
This is where it all starts, good or bad. It’s important to pick compatible partners. Companies looking for large OEM partners are often blinded by the potential of what the OEM can do FOR their business. They often fail to pay any attention at all to what the OEM might do TO their business!

Can the partner cause severe channel conflict? Will they tie the small company up in endless meetings, procedures and negotiations? Do they have a corporate structure and culture so foreign to your way of doing business, where you end up pulling your hair out from frustration–unable to accomplish even the most simple business objective without moving mountains? Sometimes with large companies, its difficult even figure out who you need to speak with–let alone get a prompt, unambiguous answer.

Get to know your partners well before you sign a deal. It’s tempting to rush in before “they change their mind”, but the actual relationship is critical to potential success. It’s like dating before a marriage–no matter how attractive the partner is, you need to make sure you can live with them later on.

NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH
I don’t like to do deals with people that are sure they have the upper hand. If they think they can push you around–they almost certainly will. Usually one partner needs the other to a greater extent, but you want to try to avoid dealing with partners where you have no leverage at all. It generally doesn’t’ turn out well. Make sure that you negotiate a deal that you can live with. Above all, you need to have a “line in the sand” that you won’t cross–and be prepared to walk away if the negotiations cross that line.

This can be a painful and difficult thing to do when you are seeing big “dollar signs” in your eyes–and fear if you stay strong, you might blow the deal. But remember, you have something that the other side wants as well–or they wouldn’t be talking to you. If you don’t know what your minimum successful deal looks like, and you aren’t prepared to walk, you may sign a deal that you will regret. Not to mention tying up your time and resources, which might have been used working with a more compatible partner.

WORK ON EVEN TERMS
Once you’ve negotiated a deal that you can live with (and hopefully prosper with!), it’s time to get to work with your partner. Try to keep things as fair and even as possible in the relationship. Of course, it’s important to be accommodating to your partner, and respect the differences in operational procedures. Big OEMs will usually move slower than you, be more process-oriented and structured, and include more people in the relationship. All of this is fine, but it needs to be tempered so that the larger partner doesn’t “swallow all of you available resources whole”. It can easily happen if you don’t guard against it. They have more resources than you (but will always think they are busier!) as well as more process-driven requirements that need to be met. But don’t be afraid to draw the line at a reasonable point, and remind them that you have fewer people and resources available. Suggest a phone meeting instead of flying three people across the country–ask that they come to your place, rather than always trekking to their headquarters. Propose that one of there folks spearhead writing that joint position paper, instead of some scarce resource in your company–you get the picture. Sometimes larger companies will smother you without even knowing they are doing it–don’t be afraid to remind them that you need to do business a little differently.

KNOW WHEN TO SAY “NO”
If you’ve tried everything you know, politely, to keep the relationship equitable and reasonable–but it just isn’t–don’t be afraid to say NO. I meet many smaller company executives in my consulting practice whojust don’t feel they can do this with a larger partner. They’ll talk tough in internal meetings, but when back in discussions with the partner, the tough talk turns to submission. They just feel like the partner is too important to their business to risk ever offending them in any way. That attitude is a prescription for servitude for your company. I’m not suggesting being unpleasant; in fact, when standing up to a larger partner, it’s critical to be calm, polite and non-defensive. But by all means be firm in delivering the message of what your business can, cannot–and won’t'–do. If you don’t, what could be a profitable relationship can turn very sour.

HAVE REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
The last point I’d like to convey is that it’s important to have reasonable expectations in partnering with large OEMs. Many companies go into these deals believing they will be “company-makers”. In my experience, this rarely happens. Understand what the OEM can do for you, and build your business model around the most conservative projections of their performance that’s possible.

Companies usually turn to OEM products from partners to fill niches that they don’t fully understand, or don’t feel would pay back–if they invested in developing it themselves. It is very rare for products licensed or resold from partners to get anywhere near the push that internally-developed products do. Be realistic about this, and you won’t be disappointed. If revenue exceeds your conservative expectations, you’ll be overjoyed.

SUMMARY
That’s my condensed advice on working with the big software and technology OEMs of the world. This is a common activity for many companies–what’s been your own experience? Post a comment and let me know your own view.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

1 Comment by admin on December 14, 2007
filed in Business Development, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Software/Product Development, Startup/Early Stage, enterprise software, sales
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Channel Pricing Strategy for Software and Hardware Products

Pricing software products is always a difficult exercise. With high product development costs, but near zero costs of goods sold, there are many different strategies that people have followed successfully (and not so successfully!) over time. Pricing hardware products is a bit simpler because there is generally a significant cost of goods sold that acts as a governor on pricing behavior. But even with hardware, technology markets are dynamic and fast moving. And it’s a complex enough topic when all sales are going direct–once you bring channels into the picture, it only gets worse.

CHANNEL CONFLICT
The biggest concern most companies have when pricing for multiple channels is channel conflict. I have seen many companies who actually AVOID selling through channels for fear of the pricing implications it brings. They are afraid of a channel undercutting their direct sales force in price, and channel conflict in general, which arises as a result of different prices being presented to customers from representatives of different channels. But this doesn’t have to be so; with a savvy understanding of the implications of pricing actions. This comes from both experience, and “paying attention to what actually HAPPENS in the marketplace. If you price properly and run your channel programs well, you can sell successfully via multiple channels–with these channels living in relative harmony.

VALUE-BASE CHANNEL PRICING
I’ve written about value-based pricing before, in the context of the perceived value of a product, as seen by the end-user, being the guidepost for pricing actions. A similar concept exists for channel discounts. Rather than taking a simplistic approach and give the greatest discount to the channel players that move the most product ( a destructive strategy–more on that later), it’s important to measure how much “value” a particular channel provides both you and your end-user customers. Look at things like 24/7 support, inventory & product availability, technical expertise, credit services, and the like. In this case, it is helpful to let the cost of delivery of each of these attributes be your guide to the value they provide.

VALUE-BASED CHANNEL DISCOUNT STRUCTURE
For example, you may figure that the cost of a VAR providing 24/7 support to end users (meaning YOUR company doesn’t have to) is equal to 5% of the list price of the product. And the inventory held by a retailer (again, meaning YOUR company doesn’t have to hold it, at a cost) is equal to 2% of the list price. And so on and so forth. Using this value-based method, you can calculate the actual costs borne by your partners in delivering marketplace value, and use this as a guidepost in building your channel discount schedules for various types of channel partners. This value-based channel pricing approach is not well-known, and seldom considered; most people seem to figure the only value worth extra discount is sales volume. If you use a value pricing approach, you actually have a chance to build a multi-channel strategy that “clicks on all cylinders” by providing discount structures that are equitable based upon cost and value associated with each channel.

LIMIT VOLUME DISCOUNTS
If you choose the “more volume=greater discount approach, your multi-channel strategy is a house of cards which will soon collapse around you. One channel will quickly grow to dominate, and the other channel types will soon quit selling on your behalf, and wither away.

THE GOAL IS TO MAXIMIZE SALES THROUGH ALL CHANNELS
Again, the key is to not let one channel dominate. Ideally, you would like all channels to be presenting prices to the end customer that are equal. In reality, that pretty much can’t happen without price fixing (which some folks may be able to get away with, but that’s another story….). But you should strive as much as possible to have end user pricing equity for all channels. But this is where the counter-intuitive part of this discussion comes in to play. Most people pricing high tech products have a tendency to price based upon the volume of product a particular channel player can move. It seems logical–why wouldn’t you want to incent and reward a partner with better margins if they are selling more products?

While this appears logical, it is actually penny-wise and pound-foolish. In fact, it is usually catastrophic to your plans to maximize sales through multiple channels. Let’s look at a simple case of how this often “breaks” a multi-channel strategy for a common case: a vendor selling through both retailers and VARs.

A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Retailers provide a vendor with a point of purchase holding inventory, where their customers can go to immediately purchase a product. VARs often don’t hold inventory, but provide other services important to the vendor and some customers, such as tech support, training and integration with other software and hardware products. Each may have an important role to play in the overall strategy to maximize vendor sales.

But the retailer will usually be a high volume partner, with the VAR less likely to be a volume outlet (although the VAR CHANNEL, in total, may hold great promise to move volume). If you structure your pricing by volume, the retailer will get better discounts. Because individual VARs generally have higher costs spread over lower product volumes, they actually need HIGHER discounts to stay even in pricing potential to the Retailer. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that retailers tend to be volume-oriented, usually accepting a relatively small, fixed margin on everything they sell. If you provide discounts based upon the volume that a partner moves, what will happen is inevitable: The retailer will take over your channel business, because the VARs will be “squeezed out” by the relatively low prices charged by the retailer. They won’t be able to make a profit on your products, so they will ignore the business, and you will lose the opportunity to realize significant sales through the large (in aggregate) VAR channel, especially those customers that desire the service and support they supply. I am oversimplifying this situation, of course, because VARs are more interested in the service revenue that a product can pull, than they are in product margins. But I have seen this scenario play out many times and kill product sales through VARs channel that might otherwise generate health sales through that channel. This can be a heavy penalty for naïve technology product managers who are charged with pricing their products and moving them through multiple channels, but who don’t fully realize the consequences of their actions.

SUMMARY
Pricing seems pretty simple on the surface–when channels are involved, it’s anything but. It’s important to fully think through the downstream effects of your pricing policies when multiple distribution channel are involved. Let me know if you have questions, or you own channel pricing stories that you’d like to share.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

No Comments by admin on November 23, 2007
filed in B2C, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Pricing, Product Marketing/Management, enterprise software, hardware
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Dell Computer

Dell has been in the news recently, and like many big companies that have had a glitch in their performance, not in a good way.

Slowing revenue growth, accounting scandals and customer service issues–you’ve heard it all before. By the way, where was the seminar that all big company managements attended, encouraging them to cut corners on their financial reporting practices? It seems that the same pattern has been replicated to an astounding degree across a broad array of large corporations. There has to be some root cause of this; too much smoke in this area to be a coincidence. And of course, the “Professional CEO” relieved of his duties–and replaced by the company founder, returning on a white horse to his original role to refocus the company.

These things have been so common in corporate America. Business writers may have been able to perform an automated “search and replace” in their word processor and write a new, yet the same, story for each additional corporation unfortunate enough to make the headlines. So what’s the deal with Dell–the details always tell the real story–and what happens from here?

ENORMOUS SUCCESS OVER TIME

First off, I want to give Dell Computer and Michael Dell their just due. This is one of the great success stories in corporate history. Started in a dorm room, Mr. Dell built the company into the dominant PC maker of its time, with a long history of exceptional growth and profitability. The company used the direct model at the time when it was counter-intuitive that this would allow a long run of success–which it did. The story of Dell is much more about what has been done right–than wrong. I had some limited contact with Mr. Dell years after Dell was already a large company. He was courteous and thoughtful and very impressive. I have nothing but great respect for the company and its founder.

Probably the strongest endorsement I can make of my opinion of the company, is that the last 3 computers that I’ve purchased have been Dells–even though I am a proud alumnus of HP.

THE FATE OF ALL BIG COMPANIES

But Dell has definitely hit a major pothole, and has had its reputation tarnished on many levels. As I’ve written before, these things inevitably happen to all successful large companies. Nothing great lasts forever–and it should be pointed out that at Dell, it’s lasted a very long time.

Growth has leveled off, and they are no longer the darling of Wall Street’s growth followers. Accounting scandals always reduce a company in the eyes of the public, and firing your CEO, who you’ve been raving about for a while, doesn’t exactly induce confidence in your future. But I think the biggest issue for Dell, is that they’ve taken their eye off of the ball when it comes to quality–and even more importantly–customer service.

I’ve written about this in the past, and I think it has played a primary role in Dell’s current problems. When I bought my first Dell computer, quality was almost unquestioned, and customer service and support was a real strength. Unlimited support was bundled in with the product, and it was great. Contrast that with the situation today: Now you are buying a product which is perceived as lower quality, and you almost can’t talk to anyone about anything without a charge. If you are allowed to speak someone in support, it’s hit or miss whether they are knowledgeable, or speak your language fluently. I really believe that the root of the problems has been what I’d call “too much of a good thing”: The relentless drive to reduce costs. As the PC business matured, Dell was far and away the low cost producer, and used this fact to great advantage. I believe that they got carried away with this strategy, and took their eye off of the ball of what made the company great in the first place. Service/Support quality has become such an issue for Dell that they’ve acknowledged it publicly, and announced plans to make significant investments to fix customer service. But real damage to the Dell brand has already been done, in my opinion. I, along with many others, will be looking closely at HP and other competitors when it comes to future computer and related technology purchases.

SO WHERE DO THEY GO FROM HERE?

All great companies hit this point eventually, and with all the company has going for it, the problems are imminently fixable. Unlike most companies that hit a bump in the road at this point, it doesn’t appear that it has happened because the company has become grossly “fat, dumb and happy”, with a bloated bureaucracy. No doubt there is some bureaucracy with a company this size, but ironically, cutting in the wrong places has been the major problem. Michael Dell has announced that he will look at “new strategies” for the company in his return to the CEO role. I consider this a positive. Often founders want to “go back to the future”, and return to what they know made them successful in the first place–I don’t believe that this is the right answer here.

THE OBVIOUS ANSWERS

The first thing is to fix customer service and support, regardless of the cost. The brand will continue to suffer without this, and that would ultimately be deadly. Mr. Dell has announced that he plans to greatly reduce the number of direct reports to the CEO. If done for the right reasons, I applaud this directive.

Even in a famously lean company like Dell, a company at this size tends to become pretty bureaucratic. There tends to be a lot of people around with curious, abstract job titles, who only serve to slow down, and get in the way of progress. Personnel in companies this size often end up spending a lot of time in large internal meetings–talking to each other, instead of listening to the market. Getting ahead in a company at this mature stage often is dependent on bureaucratic skills, rather that creating actual marketplace value. It’s usually important to cull the herd of extraneous roles, and simplify and focus business processes on only those things that create revenue and profit. This looks painful in the short run, but the company actually runs much more smoothly in the long run.

THE NOT SO OBVIOUS ANSWERS

A more difficult decision is whether to remain with a largely “direct-only” business model. This is particularly difficult for Dell, because it has always been what they’ve hung their hats on. In fact, years ago when I had a few discussions with senior managers at the company, the feeling among upper management was that they didn’t know how to do other forms of distribution, and that they had failed in their few toe dips into indirect waters.

In hindsight, at that time, the decision to remain primarily direct-only was the right one. Enormous value has been created with that strategy–you can’t question it in hindsight. But at this stage of the company’s development, I believe that they really need to rethink this. There is evidence that they’ve run out of steam with a direct-only distribution model. In fact, Dell has been dealing with the channel in a very low key manner for years. But both sides have sort of looked at it like “dealing with the devil”: do it because you have to, but be careful not to get burned.

In my opinion, while it may appear risky, it is time for Dell to look at becoming a company that wants to be a real business partner with the channel. Do they want to have a real chance to stay a growth company?(which I assume they do–this is where the high stock P/Es are). If so, there are few other choices other than indirect distribution, at their current size, that will enable the kind of growth opportunities required for real growth. As they’ve looked farther from their core computer offering, to find other things to push through their direct pipe, they’ve been much less successful–as generally is the case. They’ve not become a real player in consumer electronics, and
while they were initially pretty good at giving away printers–they were not so good at selling them, or more importantly, the consumables which are the money maker in that business. The company should proceed carefully and thoughtfully in this regard. I’m sure that Mr. Dell has other initiatives that he is considering, but I’d be shocked if consideration of a major indirect distribution push isn’t high on his list of possibilities.

SUMMARY

What happens from here? Your guess is as good as mine. It should be very interesting to watch what new strategy emerges, and if this company famous for execution can return to those ways–especially if the future includes a major strategy shift. Corporations that have been as successful as Dell for as long as it has usually have 9 lives (see Apple Computer), and Dell is only on its second, by my count. So I wouldn’t bet against them.

That’s my opinion–what’s yours? Post a comment or send me an email.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on February 13, 2007
filed in B2C, Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, General Management, Online Marketing, Retail, VARs, sales
tagged , , , , , , , , , ,

Marketing and Selling Technology Products through the Value-Added Reseller (VAR) Channel

Selling through multiple channels is one of my preferred strategies in technology marketing. If done properly, it allows a company to fully exploit its expensive, hard-earned intellectual property to the maximum extent. One of the most popular channels (and one of my favorites) used to sell B2B software and hardware is the Value-added Reseller, or VAR channel.

VARS ARE THE DISTRIBUTION HOLY GRAIL FOR MANY STARTUP COMPANIES

In fact, with a great many startup software and technology companies, building a VAR channel network to sell their companies products is the first thing they want to do, upon releasing their first product. This is especially true when the founding management team primarily comes from a technical background. The thinking goes; they are technologists who have created a great product. They don’t have a lot of experience selling or marketing–and most of the startup money has gone to, and will continue to go to developing products. Why not just recruit a bunch of resellers to market and sell their product for them? Sounds like a great idea on the surface, doesn’t it?

Unfortunately, there are few strategies that are more flawed, and which have continuously led to failure than this one.

Let’s contrast the realities of the VAR channel, against this simplistic notion that has been tried again and again, without success:

WHAT VARS DON’T DO

1) First of all, VARs DON’T market. At least not YOUR products, anyway (they may market their services). So the very first flaw in this strategy is that it is based on a gross misconception of what a VAR typically does.

2) VARs don’t create new markets. VARs are great at selling into established markets and further expanding already growing ones. Missionary sales: brand new markets, categories and products? Not so much.

3) They don’t sell a wide variety, or a large assortment of products. In fact, VARs are focused on actively selling VERY FEW products–if they are even focused on selling products at all.

4) VARs aren’t motivated by high product margins.

5) The individual VAR does not exist to help YOUR company make money.

Now if you’re not a sales or marketing professional with experience working with the VAR channel, you’re probably very confused by the list just above. So what is it that VARs actually do? And why is it worth dealing with them at all!

What happens time and time again is that a technologist startup CEO will pursue the VAR channel as their exclusive distribution channel, without knowing any of the points in the list above. Their effort will fail miserably, and they will then scramble to begin selling their product directly, or through some other means. They will swear off the VAR channel forever, and I do mean swear:

“Those !!@#$%^^* resellers are good for nothing. They take a big cut of your margins, while adding no value in return. I’ll never deal with them again.”

I can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard some version of the quote above.

But the VAR channel is a major force in the technology business, and if you know what you’re doing, it can be used to great leverage by your company. So let’s now take a more realistic look at what VARs CAN DO:

WHAT VARS ACTUALLY DO

1) First and foremost, VARs are in business to sell their own HIGH MARGIN SERVICES. That is why they exist, and how they put bread on the table. This revelation may be discouraging to some product vendors, but you must understand and respect this above all, if you hope to leverage this channel. The only exception to this is the “core” product, which will be discussed later in this article.

2) VARs are very interested in things that apply to their own vertical focus. Although it wasn’t so true many years ago, most successful VARs these days have a very tight vertical focus.

3) Many VARs act as “thought leaders” for their corporate customers. So they are very interested in “what’s new” in the market, so they can stay on top of trends and remain market experts for their clients. This means that they will sometimes spend a lot of time talking to you about your new product, but never find the time to actually “sell” it (even if they have the best of intentions). In the busy world of the small VAR, client demands and selling the core product and services usually soak up all excess time.

4) VARs are often used as “aggregators” of purchases by corporate clients. This way, the corporation can use a single vendor point of contact for their technology purchases, greatly simplifying their purchasing process. They can also leverage the VAR as an evaluator/validator of new products and technologies. This makes them a very important part of the purchasing chain for many corporations.

5) If they put any real effort into selling products at all, it is usually into one or two “core” products that they have built their service offerings around. If you aren’t a product that pulls services, forget about getting high mindshare with the VAR.

6) When it comes to selling “non-core” products, VARs are almost completely driven by the demand they see in their installed customer base. They won’t often add in new products that they don’t see a demand for, unless they are really techie, early adopter types. And these techies will often add a product, but never find time to actually offer it (let alone sell it) to their customers.

7) The VAR channel is EXCELLENT at fulfilling demand for great new products into their existing, installed customer base.

8) VARs can be an excellent proxy for a vendor in installing, configuring and offering first level support. This can enable a vendor extend its reach and to leverage the VAR channels existing infrastructure rather than building out a large field organization (which depending on the product category, may not even be feasible).

So given the points outlined above, what are the “best practices” to follow when you are seeking to build and leverage a VAR channel?

VAR CHANNEL BEST PRACTICES

*Always sell your new product directly in the beginning. Even if you don’t plan to build a direct sales force and sell directly in the long run, it is critical to establish that the product works, and can be sold successfully. If you can’t sell your own product, no VAR will be able to either (and few smart ones will be willing to try). De-bug and systemize the sales process, make sure that your end user price points are right, and build a small reference account list–at a minimum. Only at this point should you begin to approach VARs to distribute your product.

*Marketing the product is the vendor’s responsibility. Do not naively think that the VAR will market the product for you, or that since you have VARs to sell, you don’t need to market at all. Remember, VARs are great at fulfilling demand among their existing customers–and very poor at creating it among new customers. The vendor must position its products in the market and create demand for them–otherwise your channel efforts will certainly fail

*Treat VARs like the valued business partners they should be. If you do sell direct, don’t “steal a deal” and take it direct just to make a few more points on one sale. Nothing is more short-sighted. Not only will this VAR not do business with you again, in any given vertical it’s a small community–and word gets around fast. You risk becoming a pariah in the VAR channel, and losing all the hard work that you put into building your network. My philosophy is: when in doubt, cut the VAR in on the deal. If you don’t feel he’s adding any value to your business, eliminate him from your network after the deal. But don’t use your low opinion of a particular VAR to convince yourself to cut him out of the deal. You risk cutting off your own nose in spite.

*Be realistic in what the VAR channel can do for you.
If you have a non-core offering, be happy that they “make it available” to their customer base, rather than expecting them to sell it actively. Remember, VARs are key influencers of their clients; just being available to endorse your product as something they offer, to a customer that hears about the product elsewhere, can be very valuable.

*Provide a reasonable margin, but don’t “throw margin away” thinking that it will motivate a VAR to actively push your product–if they otherwise would not. It won’t work, and you’ll just be giving away money for no reason–that you could use creating demand instead.

*For most products, make sure that you don’t over-distribute by signing up more VARs than your market will support. Even though greater margins might not make a VAR push your products, the erosion of margins to near zero will cause a VAR to eliminate your product from their portfolio. It’s better to leave a few deals on the table, than to risk demotivating your entire reseller network, because they are 6 competitors are bidding on every deal in an particular area. The exception to this is if you represent a “core” product that pulls significant service revenue, you can get away with a lot more stuff, because the product margins are trivial to the VAR compared to the lucrative service revenue. But in this case, be careful when using your market strength to abuse partners. People have long memories, and “what goes around, comes around.”

SUMMARY

That’s my primer on how to approach, and even more importantly, how NOT to approach doing business with Value-Added Resellers. Post a comment or send me an email to delve into this important topic further.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

7 Comments by admin on January 28, 2007
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Product Marketing/Management, Startup/Early Stage, VARs, enterprise software, sales
tagged , , , , , , , , , ,

Channel Conflict

In my consulting practice I’ve done a lot of work with software and hardware companies in channel development.  One of the hardest things to manage while growing a channel business is the inevitable conflict between all the players throughout your various distribution methods, including your direct sales force.

Of course, my colleagues in the channel might say you can limit this conflict by using the channel exclusively. That is the nature of channel conflict—all parties want the business for THEMSELVES. Much smoke is always blown by the various interested parties about what is right and fair, and commitments that were made and so on, but let’s face it—it’s basically self interest. They just want the business for themselves.

So what’s a company to do? Just sell direct, or just sell through VARs, or just sell through retail? Unless you have strict exclusive territories throughout your distributions system, problems will still arise. You’ll always have some kind of conflict (two direct reps or two resellers fighting over who should have an account), but at least you would eliminate cross-channel conflict, which can be particularly complex and nasty.

Limiting yourself to a single channel focus certainly may make your life less complicated, and less rife with conflict. But unfortunately, in most cases, you’ll be leaving a lot of money on the table. If you rule out any natural channels that can sell your product, you won’t be maximizing your return on your heavy investments in product IP, which should be one of the fundamental concerns of any business.

HAVE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO

So I say, sell through every channel that makes sense. If done poorly, it can and almost certainly will, be very messy. You’ll be sorry you did it, and probably become a convert to a single channel, or at least less complex, distribution model. But it doesn’t have to be so. Yes, you CAN have your cake and eat it, too.

There are many potential channels for your products: direct, OEM, one-step through VARs, 2-step through distributors/VARs, retailers, independent sales reps, strategic partner referrals, affiliates and more. In extreme cases, ALL of these potential channels may be appropriate ways to deliver your product to the market. The question I am often asked by clients is “How do you make it all work without it blowing up in your face?” The way you can do this is to live by two very simple rules:

1) DON’T EVER SCREW A REAL BUSINESS PARTNER

It actually sounds pretty simple and easy. Yet humans can be greedy creatures, and just a little greed in partnering can quickly ruin reputations for a long time. There’s the greedy VAR who thinks he deserves a piece of every deal with any customer within a 500 mile radius of his office—a customer he might have only sent a piece of mail, or cold-called a year before.

But more seriously, it only takes one weak-willed sales manager at a manufacturer or software developer, trying to make quota or maximize his income, to cause real havoc. If he attempts to cut a channel partner out of a deal that they drove, or had legitimate influence on—this is a mortal sin. Your channel partners will be outraged, and they will spread the word and not soon forget. Your reputation has been tainted, and that crucial trust that is necessary to make any business relationship work is now gone. Everything becomes harder. Partners aren’t willing to share information about what’s going on in accounts—maybe even withholding names on potential new deals. A struggle for account control, rather than teamwork, becomes the rule of the day.

So if it is a REAL partner, one who is trying to drive business to your mutual benefit, do whatever it takes to make it right. Give up short-term profitability to maintain a long-term profitable relationship. Don’t ever, ever screw a partner in the name of short-term gain. It can ruin your channel business long term.

2) DO ALLOW BUYERS TO PURCHASE THE PRODUCT FROM WHOM THEY WANT TO BUY IT

If you are honest and fair with people, potential channel conflict shouldn’t unnecessarily stop you from maximizing revenue by using multiple methods of delivering your product to the market. There is a range of customer profiles in the market.

Some want to buy everything through their trusted VAR/Integrator, who helps give them a third party evaluation of the product’s virtues. Others want to deal directly only with the manufacturer or developer of the specific product they are purchasing. A third category of buyers likes to buy as much as possible through their favorite large manufacturer—this is a great reason to OEM your product to the IBMs of the world. In each of these situations, the channel that is best positioned, via relationship or type of support, should and usually will get the deal. If your product isn’t available in that channel, you may not get the deal.

The last category of buyer, however, is different. This is the bargain basement buyer, the one who couldn’t care less who he buys from, as long as he gets the lowest price. These are the people that can wreak havoc on a multi-channel distribution system, if you aren’t careful.

BEWARE THE BARGAIN BASEMENT BUYER

It’s this price-conscious buyer that will often bring cross-channel conflict to the forefront. Since they are seeking the lowest price, they end up shopping the purchase across many potential sources for the product, creating great price competition among your channel partners. This is where conflict is often born. There are many tactical mechanisms to limit these situations (such as deal registration), which I won’t delve into. The main thing to have thought out is where these customers should end up buying. There are two basic approaches:

1) Tell your value-added channels that this price conscious buyer, who isn’t looking for any added value, isn’t going to buy from them. You might decide that this buyer is going to find the lowest price at retail (if that’s one of your channels), or maybe direct if they buy in volume. In this case, it’s important to set those expectations up front when you recruit channel partners. Let potential partners know where they fit, and where they don’t. They can walk away if they don’t like it; otherwise they’ve been warned. This is being fair and honest. Before potential partners invest in selling your products, they should have the real picture of what they’re getting into.

2) Conversely, you can strive for street price equity between channels. This gets tougher to do the more channel types you have, and also the larger your channel is in general. But it can be done. The main thing here is to avoid giving incremental channels discounts based upon volume. If you do, incentives are created for a channel player to discount to achieve volume—thereby lowering their costs, so they can win more business via even more aggressive discounting. This leads to a continuous downward spiral in your street price, and to unhappiness and channel conflict to such a degree that will drive you to drink, or at least a career change. It will get ugly. But if you limit your channels to those that truly are strategic for your product, and which add real value, it can be managed. The key is to set discount schedules based upon value-add and associated costs, rather than revenue or unit volume.

So there you have it. Sell through all the channels your product belongs in. Be honest and fair with you partners. Sounds pretty easy to me! Let me know how it sounds to you-post a comment below to add to the discussion.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

5 Comments by admin on July 31, 2005
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Retail, VARs
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Partnering

Forming Partnerships, or Strategic Alliances, is one of the key elements that make up the business development function in technology companies. I believe that alliances are underutilized, in many ways. Conceived and executed properly, alliances can greatly extend the partner companies reach in the marketplace.

VARIOUS AND SUNDRY PARTNERSHIPS

There are many types of collaboration that fall under the umbrella of “Partnering”. Let’s examine a few of the most common:

Third Party Programs—Probably the best understood category of partnering. Partnering in this manner is generally low risk, but low reward for both parties. A program usually consists of many smaller partners gaining modest benefits from a larger company. The larger company gains (or at least the illusion) from having a large number of partners working with their product/technology.

Industry Consortiums—Represents another well-understood category. Mild benefits are usually obtained by the participating parties, including some publicity, a stamp of approval, and the opportunity to network with other consortium members. The unique aspect of this form of partnering is its one-to-many relationship, as opposed to “one-to-one” or “one-to-few” relationships found in most partnerships.

Sales Agents—Many people might not consider sales agent relationships partnerships, at least not strategic. But they certainly are. There is usually a minimum of entanglement here, simply a contract that provides a commission for sales generated or leveraged. The product doesn’t change hands between the partners, and there is often less training and support involved, relative to other partnership types used for product distribution.

Service Agreements—These agreements occur when a company doesn’t want to relinquish the sales function for its products, but for some reason it needs a third party for servicing. These agreements are common in high-end hardware markets, where 24/7 on-site support is critical. Storage Hardware or Mainframes are good examples. They are also seen in more commodity markets, where a company has decided that service/support isn’t their core competency, and that a third party can handle service/support at a lower cost. The use of Indian Call Centers by PC manufacturers such as Dell is a recent example of this concept.

Distribution Agreements—This is a common, but often poorly executed form of partnership. The errors usually occur when the Channel partner is treated like an end-user, rather than the true partner they should be viewed as. Distributors and Resellers need to be treated as an extension of a company’s sales force. Sadly, they often are not, leading to such misguided policies such as channel stuffing and over-distribution, which lead to problems that become extremely difficult to resolve.

Joint Marketing—Cooperation on marketing matters should be where most companies reap the greatest benefits. Partnering in this area is really low risk, can have great benefits, and is a great way to get started with a new partner. There are so many ways that companies can cooperate in joint marketing; the list is really only limited by your imagination. Some of the ways I’ve been able to utilize these types of partnerships include discounted product promotional bundles, trade show space cost-sharing, joint press releases (of course!), sharing of prospect and customer lists, referrals, and joint direct mailings. The great thing is that there are many areas to explore, to find overlap in the two companies interests.

Product Integration—Integrating the products of two companies is what often comes to mind when you think of partnerships. It can make great sense, and the potential rewards are great. However, there are some reasons for caution, prior to jumping straight into this, as I’ll discuss below.

POTENTIAL PITFALLS

As discussed above, a partnership or alliance can take many forms. As a result, there is a lot of confusion and disagreement as to what even constitutes a “good” partnership. Let’s take a closer look at two partnering categories, and some common missteps:

The PaRtnership

You see a great many press releases go out trumpeting the partnership between company A and company B. The release goes on to discuss the great benefits that will accrue to customers and the two companies making the announcement. The language tends to be vague and laced with terminology like “synergy” and “market leading value proposition”. More often than not, that initial press release is the high point of the partnership, and little is heard about it subsequently. You may have heard the term “slide-ware” to describe products that exist only in PowerPoint. This type of partnership is the alliance equivalent to slide-ware—I call it a “PaRtner-ship.”

Product Integration Fiasco

On the other end of the partnership spectrum, technical folks usually think of alliances in terms of product integration. Technical integration can be the basis for a great partnership. However, it’s a lot of work and a big commitment for both parties. The danger is that the partners too quickly dive head long into the product integration work, basing their decision on an impulsive belief that it “makes sense”.

In a typical scenario, the two products are complementary, and from an engineering (and often customer) perspective it looks like a marriage made in heaven. Several dangers are lying in the weeds, however. First of all, any product development effort runs a high risk of failure. When you put together two disparate engineering teams who have never worked together on a project, that risk rises exponentially. Usually both engineering departments have their own product releases to worry about concurrently, which are always higher priority. Lack of communication, low priority, cultural differences and ego can easily conspire to lead to a failed integration project, or at least one lacking the features to be of much leverage in the market. At this point, the partners have spent a lot of money and precious engineering resources with little in return, leaving finger pointing, and a search for scapegoats as the next step.

In addition, it takes much more than good product integration for commercial success by the partners. If there isn’t a solid plan for marketing cooperation and distribution (see above!), even technically elegant product integration partnerships will leave both parties disappointed. Alliances that are born from product integration, unless carefully thought out and efficiently executed, can lead to disappointment by one or both of the partners.

There are many “gotchas” involved with working together to push and pull the combined solution in the market. It helps to have some practice working together prior to making the big bet on technical integration. That’s why I often recommend to my clients that product integration be a step down the road in an embryonic partnership, not a beginning.

PARTNERSHIPS MAKE SENSE—BUT EXECUTION IS KEY

So are partnerships to be avoided? Not at all! They are one of the areas that can make be a huge differentiator for your company in a competitive market. But the take-away message here is that too many partnerships are conceived as great ideas—and peak right there. Like most business activities, the devil is in the details, and execution is the key to success. When I’m working with smaller clients with limited capital for marketing and sales, I often recommend an aggressive partnering program. If executed correctly, the company and its partners can gain cost-efficiencies and marketing economies of scale far exceeding their own siz
e. But I have two key pieces of advice before you embark on a new partnering program:

1) The very definition of a partnership is a “win-win” relationship for BOTH parties. Takers don’t build winning partnerships—givers do. Offer to take the first step, do the first piece of the project. A partner that believes you are acting in his best interests will be very impressed, and willing to provide support that you never dreamed of. Build that relationship by being the first to “give”; the trust you build will came back to you multiple times and set the stage for a profitable, long term partnership.

2) Do start, but start small. I’ve discussed above the many pitfalls of moving too fast. It’s best to pick something easy, with obvious benefits to both parties. Working successfully on a small project creates momentum, and helps build the trust and familiarity that is crucial to success on more ambitious future projects. I will often suggest a simple list swap of prospects as an initial step. If either party views even that with suspicion, a blind mailing can be done to each other’s list, where the actual lists don’t change hands. Building a prospect or customer list is very capital-intensive; by partnering with just one other company, you can both double your lists overnight. It’s almost a certain Win-Win, creating excellent leverage, and no financial investment by either party. It’s easy to succeed, and sets the stage for discussions on additional collaboration.

I’m sure you get the picture—does this make sense to you? Post me a comment below so we can get this discussion going.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

4 Comments by admin on July 19, 2005
filed in Business Development, Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Mergers & Acquisitions, VARs
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US Government Sales & Marketing

What’s the difference between selling to the US Government and selling to the Commercial market?

It’s like night and day.

Sales and Marketing to the government is truly the flip side of commercial activities. You really can’t believe how different these markets are–until you’ve actually come from one side–and tried to go over to the other. I emphasize tried, because it usually doesn’t work out very well!

First of all, in the Government world the term “marketing” is a standard term. But its meaning in the government world is very different from its definition in the commercial world. When you hear someone talk about “Marketing” to the government—they really mean SELLING. That’s in large part because those businesses that deal primarily, or exclusively with the government really don’t do much in the way of marketing in the commercial markets sense.

Everything’s Different

In a traditional government contractor, there is usually no one with a sales title. There are often a couple of people with grand titles like “Vice President of Marketing” or “Vice President of Business Development”. These people have very little in the way of real marketing responsibilities–they are the chief sales people of the company. They are often former government employees, and in the case of a military contractor, frequently an ex-general or ex-colonel. Key to their hiring was that they are very well connected in the government or service branch that the company is targeting. Included in their charter are some “light” Marcom activities–putting together data sheets, and coordinating a few targeted trade shows.  That’s the extent of activities a commercial company would consider to be “marketing”. In addition to the dedicated “Marketing People”, much of the technical selling of individual deals is done at the project manager level.

Of course, it’s not just the sales & marketing functions that are so different in the government world vs. commercial. Almost everything is! The typical government contracting business model more closely resembles a grocery store, than it does a typical high tech company. Margins are very thin, but profit is pretty much guaranteed once you’ve secured a contract. Up front R&D (“IR&D;” in government terminology) is generally discouraged, as it’s a great way to lose money. IR&D; can also be funded by the government; that is utilized heavily but it has limitations. Spending an amount(without government funding) that would be modest in the commercial world on up front R&D can easily wipe out the thin margins that the government contracting business yields. The government contracting model works like this: Hire an ex-employee from the agency that you are targeting your “marketing” at. Leverage that relationship to secure the contract, with a minimum of up front product development expenses. Then hire the people to staff the project, and of course do a good job executing the project. Add new “marketer” from another agency–rinse and repeat.

So for those purely commercial readers out there, this must sound pretty different than what you’re used to. That’s only because it is! There is no Product Marketing/Product Management function in a true government contractor. In the government world your “market” is one customer, or a small number of customers, who are basically specifying the product for you. There are a few sales people, but as I mentioned earlier, they’re called marketing people. The actual marketing tasks are few and far between—collateral creation, trade shows, a party here or there.

Difficult to make the Jump

As you imagine from the discussion above, it’s difficult to move between the two worlds. That’s the reason that nearly EVERY government contractor that has tried to enter commercial markets in any major way has failed abysmally. Government-oriented companies typically don’t have the entrepreneurial cultures found in commercial high tech companies. They lack fundamental Market Evaluation and Product Planning skills required for success in the commercial world—because it’s not required in their core market.

Senior managers at Government contractors are often profoundly aware of all of this. They may intellectually understand that they need to do things differently for their companies to make the jump to the commercial side. But especially if they have been very successful in the government business, a difficulty emerges that won’t be obvious on the surface. And this can be the worst of all: Successful senior managers tend to fall back on their what I like to call their “Common Business Sense” when they encounter new or stressful situations. Often they don’t even realize that they are doing it. Unfortunately, when an executive with a government contractor utilizes their “common business sense” to make a decision involving a commercial business, the results can be disastrous. The “right way” of doing things in the two businesses are so fundamentally different that it might work out better if they took the OPPOSITE path from what their instincts told them. Not an easy way to do business.

Commercial to Government

So what’s a C-level manager in a commercial company, which would like to secure some government orders, to do? Given the different business cultures of the two markets, it seems pretty daunting. Those poor government guys who have tried to go commercial have had their hats handed to them—does the same fate await me?

Fortunately, it doesn’t necessarily need to be so bad. If you are selling services, or highly customized products, you may need to closely replicate the government-contracting model, if you are going to be successful. If you are selling fairly standard products, however, it may be possible to gain significant government business leveraging your normal commercial marketing efforts.

A few years back, I was running a startup commercial software product group within a company that was otherwise a pure government contractor. It was a diversification effort for the company. Our sister groups within the company were all very successful, and extremely well connected within government contracting and procurement circles. I expected, and was promised, a lot of help in placing our products in large quantities within various government agencies and military branches. For a lot of different reasons, that help never materialized. But a funny thing happened—this startup software product group ended up with 40% of its revenue from US and foreign governments. This was without a government-specific product, no real marketing advantage provided by our well-connected parent, and no special government emphasis in our sales and marketing programs. Contrary to popular belief, if you have a great commercial standard product that has use within the government, the agencies and branches will find a way to purchase it. Our product was aimed at Network Administrators, and their needs were similar to their commercial counterparts. The government market is huge, and we did well in the government sector. With a few modest investments, however, we could have done even better. So what steps should a commercial company do to maximize its penetration in the government marketplace?

Tips for Success

Create a great product—Above all, your market research and product planning are the starting point to success. Make sure to include a few potential government customers in your upfront planning, which should ensure that you don’t miss any special requirements they might have. This is a huge market you don’t want to miss.

Have a modest entry-level price for your product—Even if in a production environment your product costs hundreds of thousands of dollars, or even millions, it’s very helpful to have a low entry-level price– ideally less than a thousand dollars per unit. This will allow a motivated prospect to acquire your product initially by “going around” the laborious, lengthy, confusing—and often competitive—contracting process. Even if you have to go through a contract later to secure the full production purchase price, the bidding process may then be “written to your specifications”.

Hire an experienced government sales executive—This can NEVER hurt. It really helps having someone who knows his way around your target agencies, to head your Government Sales Division.

Place your products on the GSA schedule via an established Government Reseller—Getting on the GSA (Government Services Agency) via your own company is a long and complex process. For most commercial entities, it isn’t worth the effort. It’s much easier to give up a few margin points to a reseller already on the schedule. It’s much easier for him to add your products. They won’t do much for you in the way of promotion, and I’ve found that being on the GSA schedule in most cases isn’t REQUIRED to buy your products (although some will tell you otherwise). But it does make it easier for the customer inside the government, and if nothing else, raises their comfort level. They will know that they won’t face a major hassle to buy your product.

That’s my take on selling to the US government. Hopefully there’s a nugget or two in there that can help you. Post a comment with a few of your own tips.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

1 Comment by admin on June 17, 2005
filed in Business Development, Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Marcom, Product Marketing/Management, Software/Product Development, VARs, market research, sales
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BIG S, little m

Don’t worry; this isn’t going to be an article about Sado-Masochism! Well, come to think of it, that term may apply to what some founders and senior managers in startups are doing to themselves and their companies. What I’m referring to is the VP who gets hired to manage both the Sales and Marketing functions. Oftentimes this turns out to be a job we call “VP-SALES & marketing”. Thus the phrase “Big S, little m”. The position is usually offered to a crack sales guy or gal, who also happens to have a marketing title somewhere in their job background.

JUST GO GET THE ORDERS

To high tech insiders the meaning is clear. The anointed candidate will be expected to go out and beat the bushes for customers, and bring in new orders quickly. Oh, and by the way, Mr. VP, you’ll also be in charge of producing data sheets and attending a few trade shows. You know, all that marketing stuff!

In most of these cases, I would recommend that anyone being approached for a job like this run in the other direction as fast as possible. These positions are usually classic “traps”. The attitude is “We’ve got a great new technology; all we need is someone to go knock on a few customer’s doors and bring the purchase orders back to headquarters”.

Hopefully, most  will recognize that this is a recipe for a very unhappy outcome. The founders and senior management will be unhappy with revenue and profits, the VP will be unhappy because he’s likely to get fired in 9-12 months. The other employees will be depressed and talking about how “Sales & Marketing” is the weak link in the company. And the investors, of course, will be very, very cranky.

Why does this occur? It often occurs when the key senior decision makers (CEO, CFO, Founders, etc.) don’t have a background or appreciation for the difficulty of the sales function. And it’s even more likely to happen when there is no key decision maker with a background in Marketing. The decision maker’s attitude also often includes an over-confidence in the role that superior technology plays in the overall success of a company.

IS TECHNOLOGY ENOUGH?

Certainly having a defensible technological advantage is a major factor in the success of a high tech company, especially when that company is in startup mode. The problem arises when management believes this by itself is enough to “win”. How hard is cold calling and knocking on doors for a sales force with an unknown company name? Not to mention an unproven product, which may solve a problem the customer may not yet know exists? I’ll give you a hint—it’s really, really hard!

Likely there is a lack of understanding of the crucial role marketing plays in establishing a new product in the marketplace. There may be a view that marketing is some theoretical, squishy function that is a waste of money, or maybe something that has value but the company just can’t afford. Management thinks we’ll introduce the product, sell a bunch and build the marketing function later. Unfortunately, that thinking is as backwards as can be, and will usually lead to the unhappy results discussed earlier in this article.

Why IS marketing so important, and why is it such a critical mistake if it isn’t a major part of the new product process? It’s because marketing is crucial in every phase of introducing and growing the revenue of new products, from conception until end-of-life. In the beginning, an engineer may come up with a great new technology that appears to allow someone to do an existing task better. Or maybe it allows someone to do something that wasn’t even possible before. But that’s really just the beginning of the product development process. Product engineers aren’t trained to closely match customer needs with the features of this whiz-bang new technology. Often they think it’s easy – you just go ask the customer what he wants! But customers often don’t tell you the truth;  sometimes they lie, and sometimes they don’t even know what they really want. And even if they tell you the truth, it’s important to make sure that what these customers are telling you is representative of your entire target market segment. This is a task that looks intellectually easy on the surface, but for a lot of reasons, it’s very difficult to get right.

Sometimes companies do get it right even without an experienced, professional marketing function in place. Let’s assume for a moment that they do. There’s still a very long way to go before those purchase orders start pouring in. The product must be positioned properly, relative to the direct and indirect competition in the market. It needs to be priced so that the market is willing to take a close look, but not so high or low that it retards the product’s long-term profit potential. Will it be distributed only through the company’s direct sales force, or should we court VARs, distributors, retailers or OEMs? What kind of pricing can we offer those partners without creating gray markets or channel conflicts? And please, let’s not forget about creating a bit of demand for those poor guys and gals in the sales force. Cold calling really does suck! It’s not good for anyone, the sales reps or the company’s profitability, if cold-calling is going on the majority of time. It will “burn out” your sales force in no time.

Marketing programs that generate hot leads, or even complete sales, are much more cost-effective than relying on highly paid (but beleaguered) sales reps to do their own inefficient “door to door” marketing. And how should we generate those leads? Via PR, Advertising, Direct Marketing, Partnering, Search Engine Optimization, Paid Search Engine Ads, Trade Shows? The Marketing folks are the strategic quarterbacks of the organization who should be driving the answers to these questions—as well as executing the strategy within the required parameters.

IT MIGHT WORK—BUT DON’T BET ON IT

So does “BIG S, little m” NEVER work? Well, in some cases it not only works, it is even appropriate. Take the example of a semiconductor company selling a very niche chip to a vertical segment. They might have only 50 potential customers. In this case you REALLY CAN go ask the customer what he wants, and easily ask enough of them that you will end up building products that will apply to your entire target segment. With respect to lead generation, the target market is so small that traditional outbound marketing programs don’t make sense anyway, and that “door to door” marketing by your sales force might work just fine.

But I propose to you that this example scenario is the classic “exception that proves the rule”. In many, if not most cases, “BIG S, little m” will lead to failure – or at the very least, suboptimal performance. That’s my view—as always I’m very interested in hearing yours–post a comment!

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

4 Comments by admin on June 2, 2005
filed in Distribution Channels, General Management, Product Marketing/Management, Software/Product Development, Startup/Early Stage, VARs, enterprise software, hardware, sales
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Pricing High Tech Products

Pricing is always an interesting topic, but even more so in the High Tech and Software worlds. In the consumer products business, if there is a package of frozen peas from Green Giant that’s priced at $3.99, you’re not likely to see someone else offering the same-size package of peas priced at $14.99. But in High Tech, things are different.

The pace of innovation in the High Tech world leads to pricing that’s all over the map. It’s not unusual for a brand new competitor to come out at a higher price than the current established market leader—if their product is based on market-changing advances in product functionality due to a new technology. This is unheard of in most markets. Then you have the PC business, where rapid technological advancement over a long period of time has led to continuously lower prices—with great benefit to consumers but squeezing margin (and indeed many competitors) out of the market. Things move fast in High Tech.  Sometimes it’s a high initial price to harvest profits while you have a feature advantage, other times aggressive discounting based upon your lower cost structure due to less expensive technology. Whatever the case, you can often count on pricing moves to be dramatic, and to have a profound effect on High Tech market segment in the long-term.

So what’s the best way to price High Tech products? Is it best to add up your fixed costs and, allocate them to a forecasted number of units to ensure you are recovering your investment? Or is it better to take your variable product costs and use a standard multiplier derived from history? Maybe you just set your pricing based on the prices of your competitors. Or let your customers tell you what they’re willing to pay. While all of these approaches have merit and a place in pricing policy, none of them should be the over-riding factor in your pricing strategy.

So what is the most important factor to consider in Pricing? The most important thing to focus on in setting prices is VALUE. What is the value of your product to your customer as an economic, functional or emotional return? And how does the customer value the benefits of your product relative to your competitors?

So let’s talk about the nature of Value. Value is the underlying need or want that drives a customer to purchase a High Tech product. If the benefit that the product provides closely fulfills that want or need at an acceptable price, you have a sale! The most important consideration in value-based pricing is to SEGMENT your market properly prior to the pricing decision. Segmentation, by definition, is the process of separating the total addressable market into “buckets” or segments of potential customers who have similar values, and therefore will react similarly to a specific offer. What this means is that once you have divided your marketplace into appropriate market segments, you will be able to charge individual segments different prices that are based upon the perceived value the product provides them. Let’s look at an example of this segmentation approach, marketing a security software product to Corporate IT departments. Through your market research you have concluded that the potential customers with the highest pain threshold for the particular security problem you are solving are banks. By adding only a few banking-specific features to build a “fence” around this market segment, you may be able to charge a price for a banking-specific version of your product that far exceeds what other segments might pay. If you extend this model to multiple segments and do it properly, this approach will lead to far higher total revenue than if you set just one price for the entire market. The process of establishing value for each market segment, pricing to full value and communicating that value to the marketplace is the essence of Value-based pricing.

Finally it’s important also to remember that pricing actions should not be done in a vacuum. Pricing is one of the 4Ps of marketing, and all four are inter-related. You cannot properly price a product without at the same time considering the features and benefits of the product, as well as how it will be promoted and distributed. The price for an Internet-distributed software product will almost certainly need to be in a lower range than one distributed via a sophisticated direct sales force or VAR channel. And if you aren’t going to have much of a promotional budget, you most likely will need to be a price leader to have any chance of being successful. If your product is at a perceived value deficit, your price relative to the market leader will probably need to be aggressive. I’m sure you get the picture.

Pricing is a complex topic that many books have been written about. This post is meant to be an introduction to pricing in the High Tech world, and to get you thinking. I hope it’s been helpful. So when your next new product comes out, you’ll look a little harder before just pulling a price out of the air. Leave a comment with your own pricing observations and experiences…

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

1 Comment by admin on May 3, 2005
filed in Corporate Strategy, Online Marketing, Pricing, Product Marketing/Management, VARs, market research
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