Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Tag: hardware

How Soon Should Your Software or Hardware Company Go International?

This is a question that frankly doesn’t come up often enough at early stage tech companies. There is usually an assumption that you first conquer your home market, and then sometime way down the road, when you are already flush and successful, it will be time to expand internationally. US-based tech companies are most guilty of this often questionable thinking.

What’s wrong with this approach, especially for US-based companies? After all, the US is the largest market in the world, and it’s far easier to sell to customers close by, then it is halfway around the world. With this the case, why should you use your scarce early-stage capital in a risky international expansion? This is how the thinking goes.

The problem is that you may be leaving significant low-hanging fruit on the table, at the very time that you need those customers the most. Let’s look at 4 important reasons to go international as soon as possible:

Reasons for Early International Business Development

Early adopters needed

As an early stage software or hardware company, you need to find early adopters of your product. These folks fit a certain psychographic profile, and they are rarer than the average customer. You sometimes need to cover the earth to find them. Limiting your geographic net unnecessarily only makes the job harder.

Distribution partnerships can provide tremendous leverage for a young company

This is one of the big reasons to go international that newbies don’t understand. They think that with all the money they are spending to penetrate the home market, selling internationally will be much more expensive yet. Not necessarily. In many markets, you can find distributors who will take on much or most of the marketing and sales load, reducing your investment tremendously and allowing you to leverage their existing relationships–rather than “starting from scratch”.

Many markets are less competitive than your home market, especially if it’s the US

Unless your home market is a tiny one, there are most likely many underserved markets available to you that have a lot of low hanging fruit. Why? Every startup software or tech company thinks the same and focuses initially on their home market. Since the bulk of the tech business is located in the US, it’s by far the most brutally competitive of all.

Beat your competition to the punch

Getting to a market early can often mean the difference between success and failure. If you’re the first one in a country or region, the early adopters and other low-hanging fruit are there for you alone. You will get your pick of the best distribution partners, and your product category will be “fresh” news for the media. Once established, it will be hard for later arriving competitors to push you down the market share ladder, even if they are larger than you overall.

So when should a company go International? The short answer is as soon as you can possibly do it. But what’s most important is to fully evaluate when “as soon as you can” actually is.

What to Evaluate Prior to Deciding to Go International

Your product must be stable

This should go without saying, but the only thing that causes a greater catastrophe than an unstable product is an unstable product distributed worldwide! Don’t do this–make sure things are solid before venturing away from where it’s easiest to “babysit” early problems.

Your product must be “market-tested” in your home market

While I’m a proponent of aggressive international business development at an early stage, there is such a thing as “too early”. Make sure that you know your product has a market before going far away from home. It’s a pointless exercise to be recruiting distributors and customers in foreign markets with a product that doesn’t really hit the mark, and one which doesn’t even had a reference customer list. If you can’t gain 10 or 20 or 30 customers close to home, heading far away likely won’t help.

Inventory or License only

Businesses that involve large amounts of inventory are one of my exceptions to aggressive early international development. That means hardware companies generally need to be more careful that software companies. Companies that distribute through retail channels involve more inventory than those who sell via VARs or direct, so they also need to be more cautious. The issues that come with inventory such as repairs and returns are exacerbated by borders and distance. So if you’re inventory intensive, maybe start with one smaller market rather than a large regional rollout, to test that everything goes smoothly before placing a big bet.

Direct or Channel distribution

If you have to establish your own local foreign operation, hire a bunch of people, rent office space, etc–you generally need to wait. Most startups can’t afford this type of risk and investment. However, although some feel this route is their preference due to control, it’s generally not mine. It’s quite risky and slows your international progress rate down significantly. Most companies can start out by using partners, and usually this is a good long run strategy as well. If you’re wildly successful and really feel the need for total control, you can always buy out distributors later on.

English or Local Language

English is the universal language of technology. In some vertical markets (such as IT software) English language-only products are fine. These are markets where you can make the fastest penetration after proving your product in your home market. If you do need local translations, they really aren’t that expensive in most cases and can be done quickly, and distribution partners can often help. But make sure that you don’t skimp on a good translation; nothing will hurt your local credibility more than language that isn’t proper, or at worst, makes no sense.

Safety, Legal or Electrical Specifications

This is also an area that can slow down the potential for fast international market development. Many countries or regions have safety or electrical standards that will require product modification or testing (and thereby investment). There are also legal aspects that need to be considered (European privacy laws when selling security or marketing software, as an example.) Don’t let these stop you from doing an evaluation of your international prospects, but these factors can change the calculus of your decision making.

SaaS

If you’re a software company using the SaaS model there may be very little downside to early international business development. If latency isn’t an issue for your product, you may need no international investment at all. Or maybe you need your servers hosted in other parts of the world to reduce latency issues, but this shouldn’t be a huge investment. You still need marketing in the local markets, either by your own direct (albeit remote) methods or through partners. But given the potential rewards, these investments should be a small price to pay.

Process or Cultural Differences

When you first go into a foreign market, it’s important to understand that you can’t fully comprehend the local culture, as well as how commerce functions. Listen more than you talk at first. Hire a consultant if you can afford to. Partners can also help greatly here. But if you are a savvy international business person it certainly raises your odds when attacking foreign markets early on.

Existing Demand

Are there customers “chomping at the bit” for the benefits your product offers? Or will there be a bit of an education process and a long sales cycle? Obvious existing demand is a key indicator for aggressive international business development.

The bottom line is that going international quickly can be a big boost to early growth for a tech company. Be careful, but not overly cautious. Evaluate your specific situation, and take the plunge if the odds are with you. What’s your take on the proper pace for international business development? Post a comment or send us your story.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on October 12, 2010
filed in Business Development, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Retail, SaaS, Startup/Early Stage, VARs, hardware, sales
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Why is Intel Buying McAfee?

Intel’s $7.68B announced acquisition of McAfee raised more that a few eyebrows, both in the marketplace and on Wall Street. Does it make sense? It’s hard to say at this point. So much depends upon execution, as well as potential synergies seen by Intel’s management which may not be obvious to outsiders.

 The price is almost 4X McAfee’s most recent annual revenue. That’s very, very pricey in almost everyone’s view. I’ve read a number of columns by others which analyze this deal from various viewpoints.

 Let’s look at several potential rationales for this deal:

 Diversification into software and services

Intel can’t grow in PC semiconductors forever, and is very dependent on the semi business, which can be quite cyclical. Theoretically, attempting to grow by increasing software and services as a percentage of the business makes a lot of sense. But Intel hasn’t been very successful in the past in this very endeavor, which I’ll discuss more below.

 Technology synergies

Intel’s management has provided justification for this deal by talking about embedding security into its chips, as well as valuing highly McAfee’s embryonic security efforts in mobile devices and the cloud. I think these all have strategic merit–but are they worth anywhere near $7.68B?

 Cost synergies

While overlapping functions can lead to cost savings in many acquisitions, there are probably not a lot of costs to be taken out in this one. McAfee is a big company, in a different business than Intel’s core business. Sure, there may be some common functions like HR and finance that can be combined to some extent, but I don’t see cost savings to a material degree here.

 Use of cash flow

Intel generates a LOT of cash. They are one of the most successful tech companies of all times, and their PC processor business is nearly a monopoly, with terrific margins. So the cash is available, and it doesn’t make much sense to have it sitting in the bank earning 1%. THAT will kill your return on assets metric! It needs to be reinvested, or retuned to the shareholders…

 Growth

On the surface, buying a big software company could be a good growth strategy for Intel. Assuming as there is a good return on investment, then why not? It’s going to be hard for Intel to grow much farther in processors. About the only area big enough to make a big difference in their processor business is in mobile. This is a very competitive arena which they’ve failed miserably in to date.

 So that’s some of the reasons you might use to do a deal like this–but is that reality?

 The real reason deals like this happen

CASH: The biggest reason that this type of deal happens is because it can. In this particular case, tech companies like Intel want to be seen as growth companies. It seems to kill tech companies to pay their cash flow out in dividends. But once your company gets to a certain size, it’s hard to be a growth company. A lot of bad acquisitions happen in the process of trying to continue growth status past a reasonable point. But is this the best return on assets, or use of cash flow, for the stockholders?

 Why there is a good chance this acquisition won’t succeed

PRICE: Intel paid dearly for a very established security software player. They paid for the McAfee brand–but will they keep investing in it in the long run? History says that this business will eventually morph into “McAfee by Intel” and they “Intel Security Software”, if the business stays with Intel in the long run. Built into the price was also a large number of retail customers, a dealer and distribution network — but does Intel really want these things? If not, why pay for all of them?

 TECHNOLOGY: Listening to Intel, this seems to be a technology play–but McAfee is universally not considered to have the best technology in the space. They win to a great extent on brand and sheer market presence at this point–like many large companies. Since the price paid was very high–why not buy a smaller player with much better technology to integrate with silicon–for much less?

 CULTURAL FIT: Semiconductors and software are very different businesses. I’ve spent a lot of time in both. I have always said that the “Common Business Sense” that a management team falls back on when stressed, is a real problem when they are making decisions in an unfamiliar business. It doesn’t seem like brain surgery to manage a software business with a semi background, but there are subtle differences that tend to have massive consequences. Intel has bought a number of software businesses in the past–how many of them can you name? There is a reason for this, they tend to disappear in the large semiconductor bureaucracy and eventually wither away.

 Typical M&A ISSUES: Key McAfee personnel will have a tendency to “cash out” and leave after the acquisition. This is a normal issue in M&A, and when the acquirer is in a different space, this can be a particular problem. Possibly the fact that McAfee is already a large public company may reduce this issue. But if the real assets of a software company (the people) walk out the door, there isn’t much left for your $7.68B.

 In summary, I view this as a very questionable move by Intel. Intel has some very smart folks in management. Maybe they have some great strategic and tactical plans in mind, but if so, they’re keeping it all to themselves. For the stated reasons of embedding security in chips, mobile security and the cloud, they could have bought 2-3 innovative security software companies with bleeding edge technology–for a fraction of the price they’ll pay for McAfee. If this acquisition is to pay off, Intel will need to figure out how to leverage the McAfee brand, consumer franchise and distribution channels. I just don’t see this happening in the long run–I hope for Intel shareholders sake I’m wrong. Acquisitions are an area with room for a variety of opinions–what do you think?

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

5 Comments by admin on September 7, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, General Management, Mergers & Acquisitions, enterprise software
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Growing from a Startup to a Mid-Market Software or Hardware Company

Every stage of a company’s growth holds unique challenges. In my opinion, startup to about $2M in revenue for a software company, and startup to $10M for a hardware company is the hardest phase of all. But growing a business is almost always hard, and there are several natural revenue levels where companies tend to “get stuck”.

 As in the hardware/software contrast above, revenue levels for different business models can be quite different. So it’s hard to generalize strictly upon gross revenue levels. But undoubtedly there are stages that every company goes through (startup to profitability, profitability to stable small company, stable small company to midsized company, etc.) which represent points of inflection in terms of the way a company operates. For example, you need quite a bit more formal process to operate a large company than a very small one. The methods of capitalizing a large company are very different from a bootstrapped or VC-backed startup. There are many more possible examples; I’m sure you get the picture. For this article we’ll focus on growth into the Mid Market stage.

 First of all, there is no perfect definition of a “Mid-Market” company. People have defined it many different ways: by number of employees, revenue level and many other factors. For the purposes of this discussion, we’ll define a Mid Market company as one having between 100 and 999 employees. . Let’s take a look at some of the major changes required to successfully grow from a startup to a mid-market sized company:

Hiring

As a startup or smaller company, you’re often restricted by resource realities with respect to who you can hire. Startups are often forced to hire people with less direct experience than they’d like, and pay them less than the going rate in cash compensation. You often can’t fill every hole, even all the ones that you think are critical. People have to wear two or more hats, and the type of people you can attract might be those that really prefer the small company environment, or are dreaming big dreams based upon the stock options. In short, it’s continuous compromise. As you grow into the mid market you have more resources to pay market rates, and are generally more attractive to a larger pool of employee prospects.

 But please, be careful–just because you can hire differently, doesn’t mean you should. I’ve seen folks get drunk on hiring at this phase, and get loaded down with overhead that makes running the business to optimal profitability much harder. There is also a tendency to go after people with big, blue chip company resumes, which can be very dangerous. If these candidates don’t also have experience in smaller companies, you’re setting yourself up for a very premature and inappropriate culture change. It’s important to guard against building a big company bureaucracy in a middle market company.

 Business processes

Much like in hiring, there is often a tendency to want to add too much process, too soon. In fact, I believe this is the absolute biggest danger executive management needs to guard against during this transition. The CEO and senior team are usually very aware that the business is outgrowing its current level of checks, balances and controls. Inevitably there is a need for additional and more formal processes. The typical mistake I see is that instead of adding carefully and gradually, folks want to radically change the business overnight. The result is often a still-modest-sized business operating like one with 20,000 employees: Meaning operating VERYSLOWLY. Guard against this! Mid Market companies still need to rely on speed and agility to compete with the corporate giants, who have many more competitive advantages that you can’t yet replicate.

 Scope of target market

Around the mid market stage, a single-product or single market segment company may be running out of room to grow at the rates it has historically enjoyed. This is a day of reckoning and a danger point that stops many promising companies in their tracks. If you need to expand into new products or markets, make sure that you do so rationally. Don’t go out and acquire a company in a complete different business, because your investment banker thinks it’s undervalued and a great buy. Do “diversify” into “adjacent” markets, taking one of your existing technologies into a different market, or introducing a new technology or product category to your existing market segment.

 Capitalization

This is the stage where you absolutely need to hire a serious CFO with financial market savvy and connections. Many startups have someone with a CFO title whose background is really accounting and financial controls. Or possibly and outsourced, part-time CFO. This usually is fine up to this stage. But once you are talking about opening new offices, funding a new market focus or new line of product technology, the game has changed. The skill set of controlling the company’s simple expenses, dealing with angel and VC investors now becomes inadequate. The company needs someone that understands raising money in institutional financial markets, along with the contacts that go with that knowledge. Budgeting and controls will also start to become more decentralized, requiring a different financial management style, as the company continues to grow into the upper end of the mid market phase.

 Distribution and regional offices

As your business grows into new markets and product categories, your distribution system must often change and grow with it. This might be the time that you begin to open offices in all the key geographic markets of the world. But don’t do this “just because it’s time”. It should be done only for good business reasons, such as increasing marketing in countries where a distributor won’t or can’t do what’s necessary. It might also be the time that a single distribution channel business needs to become multi-channel. For example, a direct-only company adds retail or VAR channels. Again, avoid the temptation to do these types of things because your business has grown to a certain stage. It adds complexity and overhead to your business, so make sure there are sound business reasons for the change.

 Product Development

Moving to a different customer set or new base technology can have a profound effect on the product planning and development process. It is often at this stage that you must stop relying on a single set of market veterans or insiders, who have been successful in bringing out products due to deep, long-term domain knowledge in your original market/product focus. Now is often the time where there needs to be a bit more standardized product planning and development process, as you broaden both the number and scope of development projects.

 The bottom line is that as you grow out of the startup phase, the way your business operates necessarily will need to adjust to continue strong growth. The biggest danger here is trying to “get big” before your time. While the big blue chip companies are often envied, trying to duplicate their current mode of operation while you’re just entering the mid-market stage is probably the best way to ensure that your company will never reach that blue chip status. “Get big” in the way you operate cautiously–because once you’ve bureaucratized your business, it’s very difficult going back.

 That’s my take on going from a startup to mid-market. Share your own growth stories with us to start a discussion.

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on June 8, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, General Management, Operations, Startup/Early Stage
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Is HP acquiring Palm a good idea?

To answer the question posed in the title, it definitely is if you’re Palm!

A long time player and sometime innovator in the mobile device marketplace, Palm was rapidly losing steam, market share and relevancy in the hyper-competitive Smartphone market. The company had staked its future on its new WebOS software platform and the recently release Pre SmartPhone.

 After a long period of decline due to an aging product line built on an obsolete software platform, the Palm Pre and its WebOS software was introduced to critical acclaim by industry reviewers and pundits. Had these introductions come a few years ago, they might have indeed turned around Palm’s fortunes.

 But competition in the SmartPhone marketplace has heated up to a white-hot level. After a promising early start, sales momentum of the new Pre products stalled, and this “last-stand” product introduction proved to be too little, too late. At nearly the first sign of Pre sales weakness top Palm executives began bailing out, while Telco partners quit promoting the product heavily, and it was also being dropped from the assortment of major retailers such as Radio Shack. The end was clearing in sight for this handheld industry pioneer.

In swoops HP to save what little shareholder equity was left. HP is on a roll, and in conjunction with their upward momentum they seem to be intent on acquiring everything available for sale, as well as competing in nearly every category of the technology business. This particular acquisition appears to me to be particularly high risk/high reward. It raises several key questions:

 Did HP pay too much?

Probably. The price HP is paying for Palm is about $1.2M, while most knowledgeable industry observers had placed the value below $500M. This is hard to understand for the casual observer, but you must remember that a company is worth what the highest bidder is willing to pay. Except for those on the inside of the deal-making, no one knows what the sizes of the competitive bids were. So it’s a bit pointless to speculate whether they paid more than they needed to. The better question is what is the intrinsic VALUE of Palm to a company like HP?

 A case can be made in this situation for bidding at a price that will prevent the transaction from dragging out. Software loses value quickly–especially in a fast-moving market like SmartPhones, and this is largely a software acquisition. Another big key to the valuation question is whether or not HP is able to hold together and retain the Palm team, especially the key developers. In most cases, buying a software business (which is the key asset of Palm) without the team is nearly worthless.

 Can HP compete in the SmartPhone business, and should they?

This is a huge question in my mind. Hewlett Packard is definitely becoming the 10,000 lb gorilla in the tech business. But even the biggest giants reach a limitation on resources, most importantly senior management bandwidth and market segment knowledge. IBM at one time looked much like HP today, competing actively in nearly every important technology market. Eventually IBM lost traction and did a painful restructuring focusing on services. Microsoft is huge and still dominant in software, but they’ve been far from successful everywhere they’ve invested. There are many examples in the tech business of competing in too many competitive markets at once. The often-used analogy (which still rings true) is to Hitler opening up a two front war by invading Russia. The old joke goes that had he been more focused, we might all be speaking German today. I am very skeptical of Hewlett Packard being able to win in all of the major markets they appear to be serious about at the moment.

 Can putting two losers together ever create a winner?

Not usually. I can’t think of a single high profile successful instance of this, although I’m sure it’s happened before. It usually doesn’t work in such a highly competitive market as SmartPhones, however. Palm was around 5% market share and fading fast.  HP is very successful overall, but its iPaq SmartPhone has less than .1% market share–I’ll bet most of you are shocked to hear that HP was even in the SmartPhone market prior to this deal! When there is a reason that both companies are unsuccessful, it’s very difficult to change the equation simply by combining. Mergers often create more problems then they solve, regardless of how good they look on paper.

 Having said all this, there is some synergy here. There is a belief is that one reason the Pre wasn’t gaining much traction was Palm’s precarious financial position. No one wants to carry around a phone that could soon become an orphan. The HP acquisition should help immensely on that front. Hewlett Packard certainly has the financial might, industry muscle and influence to improve the position of a well regarded platform like the Palm Pre and WebOS platform.

 Will HP be patient and persistent enough to win in SmartPhones?

To me this is the biggest question. If you asked me 10 years ago I would have said no. As a former HP employee, at one time this wouldn’t have been the type of market that I would expect Hewlett Packard to have success. But since them I’ve seen the company persevere for decades as an also ran in the low margin, down and dirty PC business, and finally push Dell out of the top spot. There was a time when Dell (and a few others) used to laugh at HP in the PC market–but that ended a while ago.

 I’m convinced that this ever more powerful version of HP can succeed in SmartPhones if they so choose. But as discussed above, even in a giant company like this, can they win so many tough fights across so many difficult market segments? That is a different question entirely–and something may have to give. They might not be able to win on all fronts.

 Bottom line

The bottom line for me is that HP can probably muscle their way into the SmartPhone market if they want to bad enough. But can they do it while they also compete with Cisco in networking, IBM in services, and Dell in PCs–just to name a few? Even for a successful industry giant like Hewlett Packard is today, I believe in the concept of “biting off more than you can chew”. That is the real risk. One thing I think for sure is that this won’t play out quickly. Only time will tell whether HP ultimately has the market knowledge, patience, tenacity and will to win in this hit-driven and brutally competitive market. What’s your take on this high profile acquisition? Post a comment to rev up a discussion.

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

3 Comments by admin on May 14, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Mergers & Acquisitions, Retail, hardware
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Promoting Software and Hardware Products through the VAR Channel

With the exception of some software and hardware vendors who sell super-expensive products to the largest enterprises, a large percentage tech companies uses the Value Added Reseller (VAR) channel, to one extent or another. So how do you best go about doing this successfully? Create a great product, throw it to the channel, and sit back and collect the money?

If only it were so. Unfortunately, many tech companies new to the channel find out the hard way that you will fail by taking the word “seller” in the VAR label too seriously. For those of use with experience in the VAR channel, you know that it is still incumbent upon the vendor to create end user demand for their product. Yes, you need to market to VARs as well. And you will take whatever “push” you can get from the channel. But you must have an active promotional program aimed at end users for a realistic chance at channel success.

So what are the best marketing approaches to support channel sales activities? If depends, of course, on the specifics of your product, market, price point, etc. But let’s take a quick look at some popular promotion methods used in conjunction with channel sales. I’ll break it down into three basic categories:

End user demand creation

This is first and foremost the most critical activity. It’s an unfortunate fact that most new players in the channel don’t understand this initially. Many have to learn it through a painful hands-on lesson, which sometimes leads to rejecting use of the channel outright, due to spectacular failure. It may be counter-intuitive, but it doesn’t even matter whether you establish end user demand for your products by selling direct or via the channel. The important thing is that with few exceptions there needs to be serious interest in your products at the end user level if you’re to successfully sell through VARs. In fact, it’s almost always necessary to be successful selling directly to end users, before you can hope to have a successful VAR channel for your products. Almost any end user marketing method that fits with your product type and budget can be used to create this demand, but here are some commonly used promotional types:

• SEO (Search engine optimization)
• PPC (Pay per click) advertising
• Press relations
• White paper marketing
• Targeted online banner advertising
• Direct mail, but traditional and email
• Social media marketing (Blogs, Twitter, Linkedin, Facebook, etc.)
• Trade shows

VAR recruitment

In addition to creating end user demand, you’ll also want to market directly to VARs, to get them interested in actively working with you and your products. An important point to remember is that the VAR channel is very large, and generally segmented into many vertical categories. So however you approach them, don’t waste time (yours or theirs!) by contacting VARs who aren’t doing business in your target end user segments. Here’s some common recruitment approaches:

• Direct email through available VAR lists
• Phone campaign using available lists
• Internet research with direct email or phone approach
• Trade Shows (VARs frequent them, and it’s a great opportunity for personal contact)
• Have a highly successful product with strong end user pull (VARs will find you!)

Cooperative marketing with the channel

Lastly, once you’ve created end user demand and recruited enough VARs to have a “program”, you need to establish standard methods of working with your new partners to create and fulfill demand. VAR programs come in all shapes and sizes depending upon the market, and I’ve seen a wide variety of promotional opportunities included in these programs. One of my personal favorite “getting started” methods is to offer to pay for and execute a direct mail campaign (blind to the vendor, if necessary) introducing you and your product family as a new partner of the VAR. Below are some promotional activities that are very commonly included in VAR programs:

• Co-op advertising/promotion with the vendor provides funding for approved VAR-executed promotional programs up to a set percentage (3-6%) of sales of your products
• Free or discounted demo units
• Special pricing for large opportunities
• Co-selling with your in-house sales force
• Deal registration
• Additional discounts for completing product training, certifications or maintaining premium support levels
• Co-branded product literature and other use of the vendor’s logo
• Website and catalog listings of authorized or “preferred” VARs
• Rebates for volume sales (not recommended; fraught with danger)
• Vendor-funded introductory direct mail campaign

That’s my quick primer on successfully promoting your products for sale through the VAR channel. Many of you have your own experience in this area; post a comment or a question to activate our discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

4 Comments by admin on March 26, 2010
filed in Promotion, VARs
tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Compensating the High Tech Sales Force

A very controversial topic within many software and other tech companies is how to best compensate the sales force. How much is required? How much is too much? What’s the best mix of salary and incentive comp?

If you’ve read anything I’ve written before, you’ll find my next comment familiar:

It all depends on your particular situation.

There is no across-the-board best practice for optimizing your sales force’s performance via compensation strategy. Every company, market and competitive landscape is different at any given point in time.

Let’s take a look at some of the more common variables and how they might affect your compensation strategy:

Established brand vs. startup
If you’re a startup, plan on paying your sales reps more. It will be harder to attract great reps as a startup, unless you are in a special situation with an incredibly hot new product (of course, every startup CEO thinks this way about their product!). You may need to pay reps a higher base, and certainly richer commissions than your established competitors. Some of this can be mitigated if you are offering an equity opportunity, as discussed later. But for sure, prospective reps need to believe that there is a good chance they can make more money at your startup, or you won’t be able to compete with established companies for the same level of folks. That’s just a fact of life.

Price Point
If your price points are higher, you may need to pay a higher base salary, if the total number of sales made will be low. Lower price points lend themselves to higher commissions and lower bases, because the rep will be able to start making money sooner, and more regularly.

Length of sales cycle
The sales cycle aspect is pretty straightforward, and tied closely to the price point discussion above. Price points and sales cycles almost always have a direct relationship. High price points lead to longer sales cycles, and low price points to shorter cycles. It’s harder to compensate heavily on commission if there is a long sales cycle, because sales reps need to eat regularly, too. If you have a product that takes a long time to sell, make sure that you have a decent base salary for your reps, if you want to keep the good ones.

Growth vs. harvest
Companies generally highly value reps that can sell new products and into new accounts–they want to pay for growth. So the more you are asking your reps to do what is considered to be the hardest thing in sales — sell “new”– the higher the commission structure should be. Selling “new” is the highest form of risk in sales, and it should be compensated by the highest reward. Selling established products and selling into established accounts (harvesting) is not as risky, and as a result can often carry lower commission structures.

Initial sale vs. ongoing revenue
Similar to the growth vs. harvest discussion, sometime you are selling a product that has upfront revenue as well as ongoing revenue, typically from updates, replacements or services. You generally want to pay higher commissions for the upfront portion than you do the ongoing revenue. A good example of this is a traditional software license with an annual maintenance fee. If you pay commissions on the maintenance portion at all, in most circumstances the payout should be lower than the incentive on the upfront license fee.

Commodity vs. missionary sales
Commodity sales lend themselves to high commissions and low (sometimes even zero) base salaries. This is because sales cycles are usually short for commodities, and since they are by definition in big markets it’s easier to make a base level of sales and resulting commissions, even for a new rep. By the very nature of commodities the rep’s service is often a major differentiating success factor, so a comp mix toward commissions rewards the exceptional rep to really work hard. Missionary sales, on the other hand, require a great deal of patience by the rep, as well as a lot of hand-holding and relationship building. To keep good sales reps in such a situation, it’s important to have base salaries which are adequate to enable the best sales reps to exhibit patience with the long sales process. Missionary sales are an area that really demands both high bases and strong commission structures, as they are one of the most demanding forms of selling.

Hunters vs. Farmers
Hunters obtain new accounts while Farmers maintain and maximize the sales into existing accounts. These two situations require two different sales personalities, and the compensation packages should be different as well. The hard-charging hunter will require a decent base salary, but really needs the high commission structure to keep him motivated. The Farmer is likely to be a more stability-oriented, relationship-building style of rep. A relatively higher base and lower commission structure is usually more comfortable for reps in situation.

Equity
In most cases, the playing field is slanted toward established companies when it comes to compensating and attracting sales reps. Equity participation can be the great equalizer for startups in compensation. Every company has a different view of how broadly to offer equity. But a startup that offers equity participation to its sales force can often give up less in cash compensation. For risk-taking reps, equity can even be the deciding factor in recruiting, in some cases. The lure of equity that might grow into a significant stake at a successful startup can help pull a rep from a more established job.

So what specifically should you be paying your reps? Laying out actual numbers is beyond the scope of this discussion, because there are too many factors and potential situations to generalize. All the factors above come into play in structuring a sales compensation package, as well as factors such as inside vs. outside sales. Every situation is different, and competitive factors also come into play, if you’re competing directly with your rivals for reps. Local market circumstances, as well as the overall economy, can also play a strong role in setting the final package.

Above all, if you want to optimize the performance of your sales force using compensation as a tool, you must do your homework. Don’t just quickly come up with something that “sounds good” or is “how you’ve done if before”. Analyze the situation of your unique company at this particular point in time, and at certainly consider at a minimum the factors mentioned above.

That’s my thinking on how to compensate your sales force–what’s yours? Post a comment below or shoot me an email if there is a particular situation you’d like to discuss.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

2 Comments by admin on August 17, 2009
filed in Distribution Channels, Startup/Early Stage, sales
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Oracle is buying Sun?

Breaking News…. Oracle buys Sun!? What’s wrong with this picture?

What’s surprising is that a very large software company is buying a very large hardware company. You often see a hardware company buying a software company, but I can’t really think of a deal that’s gone the other way around. Certainly not at this level. My practice at PJM Consulting serves all kinds of technology companies–but a focus is on software. Although every situation is different, my typical advice is for software companies to stay away from hardware, if at all possible.

This news is very interesting on several levels:

Involvement of two high profile, strong personalities in the technology business
I’m talking about Larry Ellison and Scott McNealy. Of course, MCNealy no longer actively runs Sun, but he is still Chairman and a power to be dealt with. He was allegedly the force behind the killing of the potential deal with IBM. Apparently Larry and Scott are old buddies, so maybe there won’t be a problem. But these are two very strong-minded, controversial and sometimes outrageous leaders. Even though they are long time friends, they have never before played together so closely in the same sandbox. It wouldn’t be shocking to see a few disagreements, and some public drama as a result.

Combining the Largest Revenue Database Product with the Largest in Unit Market Share
This aspect of the deal will not get as much attention as some of the others. But Oracle is the 500 lb Gorilla at the top end of the market, and the open source MYSQL is the most popular database choice at the low end, particularly in website development. This aspect likely won’t demand anti-trust scrutiny because they don’t really compete directly. But potential marketplace competition from MYSQL going up market, and Oracle bringing out lower cost solutions, is eliminated by this deal.

Software Company buying a Hardware Company
As I stated above, this is highly unusual, especially for companies of this size. Most established software companies have very high margins, and wouldn’t want to “pollute” their earnings with the lower margin, often commoditized hardware revenue. I can’t think of another comparable deal, looking back even into the distant past. The business models are pretty different. In hardware companies manufacturing efficiency and inventory control are major factors in business success; in most software businesses these are inconsequential factors to success. Hardware businesses tend to be more capital-intensive, while software businesses are very R&D; intensive. I could go on, but suffice it to say that the management of these businesses includes different functional skill sets. Why is Ellison interested in Sun? Just for the Java and the Solaris OS software, or is he really going to continue with the hardware business as well? Even though in some ways, Sun was a bargain at the price of just under $6B net. But if he’s just interested in the software pieces of Sun, the price looks pretty steep–Sun’s direct revenue from Java and Solaris is a pretty minimal portion of its total revenue. Ellison had a flirtation with hardware years ago with the Network Computer concept–could he really still be itching to become a fully integrated systems company?

What will Oracle Do With Sun’s Software?
To me, this is by far the most intriguing question raised by the deal. Solaris is a nice OS, and has a good installed base. But it’s never really had the same impact in the market since open source Linux came around. Java is pervasive in the computing arena, and in embedded systems as well. It has a huge impact on the Internet. It’s literally everywhere. But after trying to charge big money for Java in the early days, Sun decided to give it away. I was intimately involved in the embedded Java market in those early days. Sun initially looked like they had created a technology that could allow them to challenge Microsoft for computing dominance. I believe Microsoft was very worried at the time. But to say that Sun fumbled the ball would be way too kind. Frankly, their effort to commercialize Java was like something out of the Keystone Cops. I could detail their myriad missteps. To summarize, the biggest problem was that they were a hardware company attempting to commercialize a software product, which usually doesn’t work very well. Sun appeared not to have a clue as to what they were doing. Finally, they quit trying to directly make money at Java; they put it into open source and basically decided to give away the technology to anyone who wanted to use it. It looked to me like a way to spite Microsoft, more than anything.

What Happens to Java?
So where does that leave Oracle once they close the deal and own Java? What is their plan to leverage Java in the marketplace? Will they start trying to charge for it somehow? I think this is doubtful; there’s probably no going back on that decision at this point. I’m sure that Mr. Ellison and his team have something in mind–but I can’t imagine what it is. They’ve been very savvy at making some acquisitions that haven’t looked all that complementary, that have worked out well. So I wouldn’t bet against them. But I can help wonder if they haven’t stretched a bit too far in their minds to find synergy in this one. It reminds me a bit of Ebay’s very expensive purchase of Skype, which is now being unraveled because it just didn’t create any synergy. We shall see what happens–it should be interesting to watch this unfold.

SUMMARY
The prospective Sun-Oracle deal is one of the more interesting we’ve seen for a while. There shouldn’t be any major anti-trust issues with this deal, and it doesn’t appear that a higher bidder is likely to emerge. Watching the organizational integration (and possible divestment), as well as the interaction of the outsized personalities, should be entertaining at the very least. But most of all look for what Ellison does with Java–that’s where the real intrigue lays. Post a comment to give me your view of this deal.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

1 Comment by admin on April 22, 2009
filed in Business Development, Corporate Strategy, Mergers & Acquisitions, Software/Product Development, hardware
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Negotiating and Working with Large Technology OEM Partners

The Holy Grail for many software and technology companies, especially the early stage type, is the big deal. Everyone is looking for the big deal, the one that will fund the company’s early activities, provide market credibility and momentum in the marketplace. Of course, if it goes well, there can be nothing better. Many times the big deal takes the form of an OEM partnership with a much larger company. But often when these deals do happen, they end up fitting in the category of “be careful what you wish for”.

TARGET YOUR OEM PARTNERS CAREFULLY
This is where it all starts, good or bad. It’s important to pick compatible partners. Companies looking for large OEM partners are often blinded by the potential of what the OEM can do FOR their business. They often fail to pay any attention at all to what the OEM might do TO their business!

Can the partner cause severe channel conflict? Will they tie the small company up in endless meetings, procedures and negotiations? Do they have a corporate structure and culture so foreign to your way of doing business, where you end up pulling your hair out from frustration–unable to accomplish even the most simple business objective without moving mountains? Sometimes with large companies, its difficult even figure out who you need to speak with–let alone get a prompt, unambiguous answer.

Get to know your partners well before you sign a deal. It’s tempting to rush in before “they change their mind”, but the actual relationship is critical to potential success. It’s like dating before a marriage–no matter how attractive the partner is, you need to make sure you can live with them later on.

NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH
I don’t like to do deals with people that are sure they have the upper hand. If they think they can push you around–they almost certainly will. Usually one partner needs the other to a greater extent, but you want to try to avoid dealing with partners where you have no leverage at all. It generally doesn’t’ turn out well. Make sure that you negotiate a deal that you can live with. Above all, you need to have a “line in the sand” that you won’t cross–and be prepared to walk away if the negotiations cross that line.

This can be a painful and difficult thing to do when you are seeing big “dollar signs” in your eyes–and fear if you stay strong, you might blow the deal. But remember, you have something that the other side wants as well–or they wouldn’t be talking to you. If you don’t know what your minimum successful deal looks like, and you aren’t prepared to walk, you may sign a deal that you will regret. Not to mention tying up your time and resources, which might have been used working with a more compatible partner.

WORK ON EVEN TERMS
Once you’ve negotiated a deal that you can live with (and hopefully prosper with!), it’s time to get to work with your partner. Try to keep things as fair and even as possible in the relationship. Of course, it’s important to be accommodating to your partner, and respect the differences in operational procedures. Big OEMs will usually move slower than you, be more process-oriented and structured, and include more people in the relationship. All of this is fine, but it needs to be tempered so that the larger partner doesn’t “swallow all of you available resources whole”. It can easily happen if you don’t guard against it. They have more resources than you (but will always think they are busier!) as well as more process-driven requirements that need to be met. But don’t be afraid to draw the line at a reasonable point, and remind them that you have fewer people and resources available. Suggest a phone meeting instead of flying three people across the country–ask that they come to your place, rather than always trekking to their headquarters. Propose that one of there folks spearhead writing that joint position paper, instead of some scarce resource in your company–you get the picture. Sometimes larger companies will smother you without even knowing they are doing it–don’t be afraid to remind them that you need to do business a little differently.

KNOW WHEN TO SAY “NO”
If you’ve tried everything you know, politely, to keep the relationship equitable and reasonable–but it just isn’t–don’t be afraid to say NO. I meet many smaller company executives in my consulting practice whojust don’t feel they can do this with a larger partner. They’ll talk tough in internal meetings, but when back in discussions with the partner, the tough talk turns to submission. They just feel like the partner is too important to their business to risk ever offending them in any way. That attitude is a prescription for servitude for your company. I’m not suggesting being unpleasant; in fact, when standing up to a larger partner, it’s critical to be calm, polite and non-defensive. But by all means be firm in delivering the message of what your business can, cannot–and won’t'–do. If you don’t, what could be a profitable relationship can turn very sour.

HAVE REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
The last point I’d like to convey is that it’s important to have reasonable expectations in partnering with large OEMs. Many companies go into these deals believing they will be “company-makers”. In my experience, this rarely happens. Understand what the OEM can do for you, and build your business model around the most conservative projections of their performance that’s possible.

Companies usually turn to OEM products from partners to fill niches that they don’t fully understand, or don’t feel would pay back–if they invested in developing it themselves. It is very rare for products licensed or resold from partners to get anywhere near the push that internally-developed products do. Be realistic about this, and you won’t be disappointed. If revenue exceeds your conservative expectations, you’ll be overjoyed.

SUMMARY
That’s my condensed advice on working with the big software and technology OEMs of the world. This is a common activity for many companies–what’s been your own experience? Post a comment and let me know your own view.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

1 Comment by admin on December 14, 2007
filed in Business Development, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Software/Product Development, Startup/Early Stage, enterprise software, sales
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Channel Pricing Strategy for Software and Hardware Products

Pricing software products is always a difficult exercise. With high product development costs, but near zero costs of goods sold, there are many different strategies that people have followed successfully (and not so successfully!) over time. Pricing hardware products is a bit simpler because there is generally a significant cost of goods sold that acts as a governor on pricing behavior. But even with hardware, technology markets are dynamic and fast moving. And it’s a complex enough topic when all sales are going direct–once you bring channels into the picture, it only gets worse.

CHANNEL CONFLICT
The biggest concern most companies have when pricing for multiple channels is channel conflict. I have seen many companies who actually AVOID selling through channels for fear of the pricing implications it brings. They are afraid of a channel undercutting their direct sales force in price, and channel conflict in general, which arises as a result of different prices being presented to customers from representatives of different channels. But this doesn’t have to be so; with a savvy understanding of the implications of pricing actions. This comes from both experience, and “paying attention to what actually HAPPENS in the marketplace. If you price properly and run your channel programs well, you can sell successfully via multiple channels–with these channels living in relative harmony.

VALUE-BASE CHANNEL PRICING
I’ve written about value-based pricing before, in the context of the perceived value of a product, as seen by the end-user, being the guidepost for pricing actions. A similar concept exists for channel discounts. Rather than taking a simplistic approach and give the greatest discount to the channel players that move the most product ( a destructive strategy–more on that later), it’s important to measure how much “value” a particular channel provides both you and your end-user customers. Look at things like 24/7 support, inventory & product availability, technical expertise, credit services, and the like. In this case, it is helpful to let the cost of delivery of each of these attributes be your guide to the value they provide.

VALUE-BASED CHANNEL DISCOUNT STRUCTURE
For example, you may figure that the cost of a VAR providing 24/7 support to end users (meaning YOUR company doesn’t have to) is equal to 5% of the list price of the product. And the inventory held by a retailer (again, meaning YOUR company doesn’t have to hold it, at a cost) is equal to 2% of the list price. And so on and so forth. Using this value-based method, you can calculate the actual costs borne by your partners in delivering marketplace value, and use this as a guidepost in building your channel discount schedules for various types of channel partners. This value-based channel pricing approach is not well-known, and seldom considered; most people seem to figure the only value worth extra discount is sales volume. If you use a value pricing approach, you actually have a chance to build a multi-channel strategy that “clicks on all cylinders” by providing discount structures that are equitable based upon cost and value associated with each channel.

LIMIT VOLUME DISCOUNTS
If you choose the “more volume=greater discount approach, your multi-channel strategy is a house of cards which will soon collapse around you. One channel will quickly grow to dominate, and the other channel types will soon quit selling on your behalf, and wither away.

THE GOAL IS TO MAXIMIZE SALES THROUGH ALL CHANNELS
Again, the key is to not let one channel dominate. Ideally, you would like all channels to be presenting prices to the end customer that are equal. In reality, that pretty much can’t happen without price fixing (which some folks may be able to get away with, but that’s another story….). But you should strive as much as possible to have end user pricing equity for all channels. But this is where the counter-intuitive part of this discussion comes in to play. Most people pricing high tech products have a tendency to price based upon the volume of product a particular channel player can move. It seems logical–why wouldn’t you want to incent and reward a partner with better margins if they are selling more products?

While this appears logical, it is actually penny-wise and pound-foolish. In fact, it is usually catastrophic to your plans to maximize sales through multiple channels. Let’s look at a simple case of how this often “breaks” a multi-channel strategy for a common case: a vendor selling through both retailers and VARs.

A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Retailers provide a vendor with a point of purchase holding inventory, where their customers can go to immediately purchase a product. VARs often don’t hold inventory, but provide other services important to the vendor and some customers, such as tech support, training and integration with other software and hardware products. Each may have an important role to play in the overall strategy to maximize vendor sales.

But the retailer will usually be a high volume partner, with the VAR less likely to be a volume outlet (although the VAR CHANNEL, in total, may hold great promise to move volume). If you structure your pricing by volume, the retailer will get better discounts. Because individual VARs generally have higher costs spread over lower product volumes, they actually need HIGHER discounts to stay even in pricing potential to the Retailer. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that retailers tend to be volume-oriented, usually accepting a relatively small, fixed margin on everything they sell. If you provide discounts based upon the volume that a partner moves, what will happen is inevitable: The retailer will take over your channel business, because the VARs will be “squeezed out” by the relatively low prices charged by the retailer. They won’t be able to make a profit on your products, so they will ignore the business, and you will lose the opportunity to realize significant sales through the large (in aggregate) VAR channel, especially those customers that desire the service and support they supply. I am oversimplifying this situation, of course, because VARs are more interested in the service revenue that a product can pull, than they are in product margins. But I have seen this scenario play out many times and kill product sales through VARs channel that might otherwise generate health sales through that channel. This can be a heavy penalty for naïve technology product managers who are charged with pricing their products and moving them through multiple channels, but who don’t fully realize the consequences of their actions.

SUMMARY
Pricing seems pretty simple on the surface–when channels are involved, it’s anything but. It’s important to fully think through the downstream effects of your pricing policies when multiple distribution channel are involved. Let me know if you have questions, or you own channel pricing stories that you’d like to share.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

No Comments by admin on November 23, 2007
filed in B2C, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Pricing, Product Marketing/Management, enterprise software, hardware
tagged , , , , , , , , , , ,

Forecasting New Technology Products

Forecasting is a thankless job. It’s a lot like being a referee or umpire in your favorite sport; the only time a game official is noticed is when they do something wrong! Similarly, a forecaster’s primary aim is too stay out of the “news”.

Make no mistake; forecasting is a very important function in any business. In the software business, your whole business plan could be riding on meeting the forecast to fund growth and product development. In a hardware business, it’s even worse–you have to worry about creating too much or too little inventory–either of which can be a huge problem for your business.

HARD IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES

It’s bad enough when you are trying to forecast an existing, mature product, in a mature industry. This is a difficult and complex task, using well known techniques such as smoothing, trending and seasonality to fine tune the next month or annual forecast.

Early in my career, at Hewlett Packard, I spend 4 months in a special assignment dedicated solely to improving forecast accuracy. The marketing department was engaged in an ongoing argument with manufacturing over inventory levels. Not surprisingly, manufacturing wanted the inventory levels to be lean, while marketing favored a more robust number. This was because manufacturing was being graded on their costs and at that time “owned” the inventory; while Marketing was graded on revenue–and low inventory levels usually lead to missed sales opportunities.

I became a Lotus spreadsheet guru, and we used everything we could find to try to improve our forecast accuracy. Keep in mind that these were high tech products (computer printers), but successful product lines with significant historical data available. Try as we might, the best we could ever do was to get within 25% of the eventual unit sales number.

NEW TECHNOLOGY PRODUCT ARE THE WORST POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR FORECASTERS

The main message here is that forecasting in any product in high tech industries is almost impossible, from an accuracy perspective. Forecasting accurately the performance of NEW PRODUCTS in technology markets is TRULY impossible to do accurately. With brutal competition, a tight market research budget, vague notions of market size, an early stage on the user acceptance curve, and often the reality of an unknown brand, forecasters of new technology products needs to make sure they don’t end up in substance abuse clinics. But of course, even though it’s hard– it’s still VERY important. So what’s a forecaster to do?

There are two basic methodologies that I typically utilize when attempting to forecast sales for a new technology product:

TOP DOWN FORECASTING METHOD

The first approach that I usually engage is what I like to call the “top down” method. You might also call this the “Macro” approach. This is an exercise of defining the size of your total addressable market using market research or number of potential users, and also estimating what a reasonable share will be for your product, given the various attributes of your market position. Consider everything you can in your analysis: your marketing budget, brand strength, an unbiased view of how your product stacks up vs. the competition, etc. It may be helpful to put it all in a spreadsheet, and quantify the various important attributes of your company/product vs. your competition. Be careful about assigning too much precision to these numbers; remember that garbage in equals’ garbage out. But if you go through this exercise thoughtfully, it can be very helpful in analyzing your relative market position. In this case, obtaining your top down forecast is then as easy as multiplying the share you think you can obtain, times the market size that you came up via research.

BOTTOM UP FORECASTING METHOD

After I’ve done the top down or Macro forecast, I like to use what I call a bottoms up or “Micro” approach as a sanity check. To do this, you want to gather information on what you think you can sell from individual stakeholders in the sales area: direct field sales reps, Online/Web store, dealers, international distributors, etc. It’s helpful to gather info from any channel that will be a significant contributor to sales for this new product. Usually it’s impractical to do a complete survey of everyone that may be involved in the sales effort. What’s important is to obtain a representative sample that is both broad enough and deep enough that the data you gather has some significance. At that point, you can “normalize” the data. For example, say you were able to gather data from a broad cross-section of sales points, totaling approximately 10% of the total sales infrastructure. You would then multiply the total number of units/dollars you obtained from your sales entities times 10, to reach a bottoms up forecast totaling 100%.

DO YOU HAVE CONVERGENCE?

The key to this exercise is to discover whether your two views of the market are close enough that they appear to be focusing on the same topic! If they do, you may be in pretty good shape with your forecast. If they are off by an order of magnitude, it’s probably time to reconsider some of your assumptions.

SUMMARY

So there’s my advice on how to approach the unenviable task of forecasting a brand new technology product. It’s a high risk, high return activity under the best of circumstances–and ideal conditions are seldom found in this activity in the technology space. But if you are able to construct both a top down and a bottoms up forecast, and the two numbers at least fall in the same ballpark, you’re probably on the right track.

Give it a shot yourself next time you’re faced with this forecasting daunting task. Feel free to shoot me an email with your questions, or leave a comment for discussion.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

4 Comments by admin on October 17, 2007
filed in Pricing, Product Marketing/Management, market research
tagged , , , , , , , ,
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