Retail Distribution of Software Products

Selling software at retail at one point in time was the "Holy Grail" for consumer, home office and small office software suppliers. That's where the volume was. Everything that a company did starting up was intended to build enough volume to get into a distributor, so they could then pursue shelf space at the major retailers of software.

But oh, how times have changed. The advent of the Internet and wide availability of broadband has made nearly every consumer and small business application downloadable with the click of a mouse, and a major credit card. In the meantime, major sellers of software have dropped like flies (CompUSA, Computer City) or have de-emphasized software in their retail assortment.

PROFITABLE retail distribution of software, which has been a major challenge for software companies dating back more than 20 years, has gotten tougher every year, as the retail distribution pipe shrinks. And even twenty years ago, it was already very tough, for small software companies, in particular. I've even seen a credible authority recently predict that distribution of software through retail outlets will CEASE TO EXIST within five years.

IS RETAIL SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION DEAD?

So should you forget about retail as a potential distribution channel for your consumer or SMB software application?

First of all, it's my opinion that the near term extinction of retail software distribution is greatly exaggerated. While it has been in decline for a very long time, and will continue to decline, it still has some life left. There is still quite a bit of software sold at retail. There are still some reasons that people buy at retail. And last but not least, nearly every thing in high technology takes more time to "go away" than the pundits predict. People just don't change their habits that quickly, no matter the technological reasons for that change to occur. Among several reasons people still buy at retail:

WHY PEOPLE STILL BUY SOFTWARE AT RETAIL

Impulse - They are in a store looking for something else, and happen upon a product that looks neat or useful. In this respect, software benefits from this "in-store effect", much like any other retail product.
Credibility - Buying software, or any other item over the Internet from some unknown company, is scary for many people. Just the fact that it's in a "touchable" package, and is "blessed" by the retailer stocking it, gives comfort to many, especially the mainstream and late adopter types.
Physical Media - Most folks want a backup copy of the application which they've put out good money for. Sure, you can burn a backup CD on your own. But to some folks that's technologically challenging--and seems like a lot of work to others.
Internet Phobia - There still are folks, more than want to admit it, that just aren't comfortable with the Internet, particularly the ecommerce aspects.

WHEN SHOULD A SOFTWARE VENDOR CONSIDER RETAIL DISTRIBUTION?

So in some cases, software vendors should still give consideration to packaging their products for retail distribution. What are the elements which may make retail still a viable distribution channel for a particular product line?

* A VERY hot product - In one of these rare instances where you've hit a product home run, it's beneficial to get your product in as many channels as possible. When you have a product "selling like hotcakes", retail can be ideal to help you maximize your return on the high demand. Make sure that you've proven that it's a brisk seller via other marketing and distribution methods BEFORE you enter the retail channel, however.
* A well-known brand - Almost nothing helps product sell through retail as much as a well-established brand. There is almost never anyone to "sell" your product in a retail store. You are relying almost soles on the box copy to be your salesman. In this situation, the credibility of a strong brand is often the difference between a customer purchasing, and leaving the box on the shelf.
* A related portfolio of products that can be sold to the same customer. It is very hard to make money on a single product being sold through retail channels. The upfront marketing programs and thin margins make breakeven a huge challenge for a single product company. However, if you can profit indirectly even if you just break even on the actual retail sale, by building your customer list and selling related products to them--that's a huge advantage.
* Add-on services to sell - Much like having a large portfolio of products, a single product vendor can also have a greater chance at profitability if the "retail product" is a front-end to other revenue generating services. Maybe the product leads to subscriptions to an add-on web-based service, or there are custom forms or other tangible supplies that can be sold to users of the software application.

These are a few of the circumstances where I would actually encourage an ISV to consider retail distribution. I want to caution that in the best of circumstances, this channel isn't for the "faint of heart". Startup costs are high, margins are generally lower than other forms of software distribution, and there are substantial inventory issues and risks. There's an old saying in the software business about retail distribution--"the only people who make money at it are the freight companies who ship the inventory back and forth among vendors, distributors and retailers". In short, it's a great place to lose money--if you aren't careful. I highly recommend that you retain an expert to help you through the process, if you are new to retail and decide that it may be appropriate for your products.

There are many more angles to cover on this topic. To name a few, the need for a relationship with a major distributor of software to retailers, what marketing programs to use, the importance of a retail package--and much more. As important as they are, we'll have to leave the detailed mechanics of getting your software into retail distribution (and making a profit!) for a later article.

SUMMARY

So don't dismiss retail distribution of your software applications completely, even in this age of Internet instant gratification. But make sure that you are doing it for the right reasons, with a solid plan for how it will benefit your company. If your company is entering retail for the first time, consider retaining an expert to reduce your risk of failure.

I'd enjoy hearing your own experiences with retail distribution, past and present, as well as your attitude about this channel today. Post a comment so we can all learn from your experience.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Negotiating and Working with Large Technology OEM Partners

The Holy Grail for many software and technology companies, especially the early stage type, is the big deal. Everyone is looking for the big deal, the one that will fund the company's early activities, provide market credibility and momentum in the marketplace. Of course, if it goes well, there can be nothing better. Many times the big deal takes the form of an OEM partnership with a much larger company. But often when these deals do happen, they end up fitting in the category of "be careful what you wish for".

TARGET YOUR OEM PARTNERS CAREFULLY
This is where it all starts, good or bad. It's important to pick compatible partners. Companies looking for large OEM partners are often blinded by the potential of what the OEM can do FOR their business. They often fail to pay any attention at all to what the OEM might do TO their business!

Can the partner cause severe channel conflict? Will they tie the small company up in endless meetings, procedures and negotiations? Do they have a corporate structure and culture so foreign to your way of doing business, where you end up pulling your hair out from frustration--unable to accomplish even the most simple business objective without moving mountains? Sometimes with large companies, its difficult even figure out who you need to speak with--let alone get a prompt, unambiguous answer.

Get to know your partners well before you sign a deal. It's tempting to rush in before "they change their mind", but the actual relationship is critical to potential success. It's like dating before a marriage--no matter how attractive the partner is, you need to make sure you can live with them later on.


NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH
I don't like to do deals with people that are sure they have the upper hand. If they think they can push you around--they almost certainly will. Usually one partner needs the other to a greater extent, but you want to try to avoid dealing with partners where you have no leverage at all. It generally doesn’t' turn out well. Make sure that you negotiate a deal that you can live with. Above all, you need to have a "line in the sand" that you won't cross--and be prepared to walk away if the negotiations cross that line.

This can be a painful and difficult thing to do when you are seeing big "dollar signs" in your eyes--and fear if you stay strong, you might blow the deal. But remember, you have something that the other side wants as well--or they wouldn't be talking to you. If you don't know what your minimum successful deal looks like, and you aren't prepared to walk, you may sign a deal that you will regret. Not to mention tying up your time and resources, which might have been used working with a more compatible partner.


WORK ON EVEN TERMS
Once you've negotiated a deal that you can live with (and hopefully prosper with!), it's time to get to work with your partner. Try to keep things as fair and even as possible in the relationship. Of course, it's important to be accommodating to your partner, and respect the differences in operational procedures. Big OEMs will usually move slower than you, be more process-oriented and structured, and include more people in the relationship. All of this is fine, but it needs to be tempered so that the larger partner doesn't "swallow all of you available resources whole". It can easily happen if you don't guard against it. They have more resources than you (but will always think they are busier!) as well as more process-driven requirements that need to be met. But don't be afraid to draw the line at a reasonable point, and remind them that you have fewer people and resources available. Suggest a phone meeting instead of flying three people across the country--ask that they come to your place, rather than always trekking to their headquarters. Propose that one of there folks spearhead writing that joint position paper, instead of some scarce resource in your company--you get the picture. Sometimes larger companies will smother you without even knowing they are doing it--don't be afraid to remind them that you need to do business a little differently.

KNOW WHEN TO SAY "NO"
If you've tried everything you know, politely, to keep the relationship equitable and reasonable--but it just isn't--don't be afraid to say NO. I meet many smaller company executives in my consulting practice whojust don't feel they can do this with a larger partner. They'll talk tough in internal meetings, but when back in discussions with the partner, the tough talk turns to submission. They just feel like the partner is too important to their business to risk ever offending them in any way. That attitude is a prescription for servitude for your company. I'm not suggesting being unpleasant; in fact, when standing up to a larger partner, it's critical to be calm, polite and non-defensive. But by all means be firm in delivering the message of what your business can, cannot--and won't'--do. If you don't, what could be a profitable relationship can turn very sour.


HAVE REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
The last point I'd like to convey is that it's important to have reasonable expectations in partnering with large OEMs. Many companies go into these deals believing they will be "company-makers". In my experience, this rarely happens. Understand what the OEM can do for you, and build your business model around the most conservative projections of their performance that's possible.

Companies usually turn to OEM products from partners to fill niches that they don't fully understand, or don't feel would pay back--if they invested in developing it themselves. It is very rare for products licensed or resold from partners to get anywhere near the push that internally-developed products do. Be realistic about this, and you won't be disappointed. If revenue exceeds your conservative expectations, you'll be overjoyed.


SUMMARY
That's my condensed advice on working with the big software and technology OEMs of the world. This is a common activity for many companies--what's been your own experience? Post a comment and let me know your own view.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Channel Pricing Strategy for Software and Hardware Products

Pricing software products is always a difficult exercise. With high product development costs, but near zero costs of goods sold, there are many different strategies that people have followed successfully (and not so successfully!) over time. Pricing hardware products is a bit simpler because there is generally a significant cost of goods sold that acts as a governor on pricing behavior. But even with hardware, technology markets are dynamic and fast moving. And it's a complex enough topic when all sales are going direct--once you bring channels into the picture, it only gets worse.

CHANNEL CONFLICT
The biggest concern most companies have when pricing for multiple channels is channel conflict. I have seen many companies who actually AVOID selling through channels for fear of the pricing implications it brings. They are afraid of a channel undercutting their direct sales force in price, and channel conflict in general, which arises as a result of different prices being presented to customers from representatives of different channels. But this doesn’t have to be so; with a savvy understanding of the implications of pricing actions. This comes from both experience, and "paying attention to what actually HAPPENS in the marketplace. If you price properly and run your channel programs well, you can sell successfully via multiple channels--with these channels living in relative harmony.

VALUE-BASE CHANNEL PRICING
I've written about value-based pricing before, in the context of the perceived value of a product, as seen by the end-user, being the guidepost for pricing actions. A similar concept exists for channel discounts. Rather than taking a simplistic approach and give the greatest discount to the channel players that move the most product ( a destructive strategy--more on that later), it's important to measure how much "value" a particular channel provides both you and your end-user customers. Look at things like 24/7 support, inventory & product availability, technical expertise, credit services, and the like. In this case, it is helpful to let the cost of delivery of each of these attributes be your guide to the value they provide.

VALUE-BASED CHANNEL DISCOUNT STRUCTURE
For example, you may figure that the cost of a VAR providing 24/7 support to end users (meaning YOUR company doesn't have to) is equal to 5% of the list price of the product. And the inventory held by a retailer (again, meaning YOUR company doesn't have to hold it, at a cost) is equal to 2% of the list price. And so on and so forth. Using this value-based method, you can calculate the actual costs borne by your partners in delivering marketplace value, and use this as a guidepost in building your channel discount schedules for various types of channel partners. This value-based channel pricing approach is not well-known, and seldom considered; most people seem to figure the only value worth extra discount is sales volume. If you use a value pricing approach, you actually have a chance to build a multi-channel strategy that "clicks on all cylinders" by providing discount structures that are equitable based upon cost and value associated with each channel.



LIMIT VOLUME DISCOUNTS
If you choose the "more volume=greater discount approach, your multi-channel strategy is a house of cards which will soon collapse around you. One channel will quickly grow to dominate, and the other channel types will soon quit selling on your behalf, and wither away.


THE GOAL IS TO MAXIMIZE SALES THROUGH ALL CHANNELS
Again, the key is to not let one channel dominate. Ideally, you would like all channels to be presenting prices to the end customer that are equal. In reality, that pretty much can't happen without price fixing (which some folks may be able to get away with, but that's another story….). But you should strive as much as possible to have end user pricing equity for all channels. But this is where the counter-intuitive part of this discussion comes in to play. Most people pricing high tech products have a tendency to price based upon the volume of product a particular channel player can move. It seems logical--why wouldn't you want to incent and reward a partner with better margins if they are selling more products?

While this appears logical, it is actually penny-wise and pound-foolish. In fact, it is usually catastrophic to your plans to maximize sales through multiple channels. Let's look at a simple case of how this often "breaks" a multi-channel strategy for a common case: a vendor selling through both retailers and VARs.

A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Retailers provide a vendor with a point of purchase holding inventory, where their customers can go to immediately purchase a product. VARs often don't hold inventory, but provide other services important to the vendor and some customers, such as tech support, training and integration with other software and hardware products. Each may have an important role to play in the overall strategy to maximize vendor sales.

But the retailer will usually be a high volume partner, with the VAR less likely to be a volume outlet (although the VAR CHANNEL, in total, may hold great promise to move volume). If you structure your pricing by volume, the retailer will get better discounts. Because individual VARs generally have higher costs spread over lower product volumes, they actually need HIGHER discounts to stay even in pricing potential to the Retailer. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that retailers tend to be volume-oriented, usually accepting a relatively small, fixed margin on everything they sell. If you provide discounts based upon the volume that a partner moves, what will happen is inevitable: The retailer will take over your channel business, because the VARs will be "squeezed out" by the relatively low prices charged by the retailer. They won't be able to make a profit on your products, so they will ignore the business, and you will lose the opportunity to realize significant sales through the large (in aggregate) VAR channel, especially those customers that desire the service and support they supply. I am oversimplifying this situation, of course, because VARs are more interested in the service revenue that a product can pull, than they are in product margins. But I have seen this scenario play out many times and kill product sales through VARs channel that might otherwise generate health sales through that channel. This can be a heavy penalty for naïve technology product managers who are charged with pricing their products and moving them through multiple channels, but who don't fully realize the consequences of their actions.

SUMMARY
Pricing seems pretty simple on the surface--when channels are involved, it's anything but. It's important to fully think through the downstream effects of your pricing policies when multiple distribution channel are involved. Let me know if you have questions, or you own channel pricing stories that you'd like to share.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Dell Computer

Dell has been in the news recently, and like many big companies that have had a glitch in their performance, not in a good way.

Slowing revenue growth, accounting scandals and customer service issues--you've heard it all before. By the way, where was the seminar that all big company managements attended, encouraging them to cut corners on their financial reporting practices? It seems that the same pattern has been replicated to an astounding degree across a broad array of large corporations. There has to be some root cause of this; too much smoke in this area to be a coincidence. And of course, the "Professional CEO" relieved of his duties--and replaced by the company founder, returning on a white horse to his original role to refocus the company.

These things have been so common in corporate America. Business writers may have been able to perform an automated "search and replace" in their word processor and write a new, yet the same, story for each additional corporation unfortunate enough to make the headlines. So what's the deal with Dell--the details always tell the real story--and what happens from here?


ENORMOUS SUCCESS OVER TIME

First off, I want to give Dell Computer and Michael Dell their just due. This is one of the great success stories in corporate history. Started in a dorm room, Mr. Dell built the company into the dominant PC maker of its time, with a long history of exceptional growth and profitability. The company used the direct model at the time when it was counter-intuitive that this would allow a long run of success--which it did. The story of Dell is much more about what has been done right--than wrong. I had some limited contact with Mr. Dell years after Dell was already a large company. He was courteous and thoughtful and very impressive. I have nothing but great respect for the company and its founder.

Probably the strongest endorsement I can make of my opinion of the company, is that the last 3 computers that I've purchased have been Dells--even though I am a proud alumnus of HP.


THE FATE OF ALL BIG COMPANIES

But Dell has definitely hit a major pothole, and has had its reputation tarnished on many levels. As I've written before, these things inevitably happen to all successful large companies. Nothing great lasts forever--and it should be pointed out that at Dell, it's lasted a very long time.

Growth has leveled off, and they are no longer the darling of Wall Street's growth followers. Accounting scandals always reduce a company in the eyes of the public, and firing your CEO, who you've been raving about for a while, doesn't exactly induce confidence in your future. But I think the biggest issue for Dell, is that they've taken their eye off of the ball when it comes to quality--and even more importantly--customer service.

I've written about this in the past, and I think it has played a primary role in Dell's current problems. When I bought my first Dell computer, quality was almost unquestioned, and customer service and support was a real strength. Unlimited support was bundled in with the product, and it was great. Contrast that with the situation today: Now you are buying a product which is perceived as lower quality, and you almost can't talk to anyone about anything without a charge. If you are allowed to speak someone in support, it's hit or miss whether they are knowledgeable, or speak your language fluently. I really believe that the root of the problems has been what I'd call "too much of a good thing": The relentless drive to reduce costs. As the PC business matured, Dell was far and away the low cost producer, and used this fact to great advantage. I believe that they got carried away with this strategy, and took their eye off of the ball of what made the company great in the first place. Service/Support quality has become such an issue for Dell that they've acknowledged it publicly, and announced plans to make significant investments to fix customer service. But real damage to the Dell brand has already been done, in my opinion. I, along with many others, will be looking closely at HP and other competitors when it comes to future computer and related technology purchases.


SO WHERE DO THEY GO FROM HERE?

All great companies hit this point eventually, and with all the company has going for it, the problems are imminently fixable. Unlike most companies that hit a bump in the road at this point, it doesn't appear that it has happened because the company has become grossly "fat, dumb and happy", with a bloated bureaucracy. No doubt there is some bureaucracy with a company this size, but ironically, cutting in the wrong places has been the major problem. Michael Dell has announced that he will look at "new strategies" for the company in his return to the CEO role. I consider this a positive. Often founders want to "go back to the future", and return to what they know made them successful in the first place--I don't believe that this is the right answer here.


THE OBVIOUS ANSWERS

The first thing is to fix customer service and support, regardless of the cost. The brand will continue to suffer without this, and that would ultimately be deadly. Mr. Dell has announced that he plans to greatly reduce the number of direct reports to the CEO. If done for the right reasons, I applaud this directive.

Even in a famously lean company like Dell, a company at this size tends to become pretty bureaucratic. There tends to be a lot of people around with curious, abstract job titles, who only serve to slow down, and get in the way of progress. Personnel in companies this size often end up spending a lot of time in large internal meetings--talking to each other, instead of listening to the market. Getting ahead in a company at this mature stage often is dependent on bureaucratic skills, rather that creating actual marketplace value. It's usually important to cull the herd of extraneous roles, and simplify and focus business processes on only those things that create revenue and profit. This looks painful in the short run, but the company actually runs much more smoothly in the long run.

THE NOT SO OBVIOUS ANSWERS

A more difficult decision is whether to remain with a largely "direct-only" business model. This is particularly difficult for Dell, because it has always been what they've hung their hats on. In fact, years ago when I had a few discussions with senior managers at the company, the feeling among upper management was that they didn't know how to do other forms of distribution, and that they had failed in their few toe dips into indirect waters.

In hindsight, at that time, the decision to remain primarily direct-only was the right one. Enormous value has been created with that strategy--you can't question it in hindsight. But at this stage of the company's development, I believe that they really need to rethink this. There is evidence that they've run out of steam with a direct-only distribution model. In fact, Dell has been dealing with the channel in a very low key manner for years. But both sides have sort of looked at it like "dealing with the devil": do it because you have to, but be careful not to get burned.

In my opinion, while it may appear risky, it is time for Dell to look at becoming a company that wants to be a real business partner with the channel. Do they want to have a real chance to stay a growth company?(which I assume they do--this is where the high stock P/Es are). If so, there are few other choices other than indirect distribution, at their current size, that will enable the kind of growth opportunities required for real growth. As they've looked farther from their core computer offering, to find other things to push through their direct pipe, they've been much less successful--as generally is the case. They've not become a real player in consumer electronics, and while they were initially pretty good at giving away printers--they were not so good at selling them, or more importantly, the consumables which are the money maker in that business. The company should proceed carefully and thoughtfully in this regard. I'm sure that Mr. Dell has other initiatives that he is considering, but I'd be shocked if consideration of a major indirect distribution push isn't high on his list of possibilities.


SUMMARY

What happens from here? Your guess is as good as mine. It should be very interesting to watch what new strategy emerges, and if this company famous for execution can return to those ways--especially if the future includes a major strategy shift. Corporations that have been as successful as Dell for as long as it has usually have 9 lives (see Apple Computer), and Dell is only on its second, by my count. So I wouldn't bet against them.

That's my opinion--what's yours? Post a comment or send me an email.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Marketing and Selling Technology Products through the Value-Added Reseller (VAR) Channel

Selling through multiple channels is one of my preferred strategies in technology marketing. If done properly, it allows a company to fully exploit its expensive, hard-earned intellectual property to the maximum extent. One of the most popular channels (and one of my favorites) used to sell B2B software and hardware is the Value-added Reseller, or VAR channel.

VARS ARE THE DISTRIBUTION HOLY GRAIL FOR MANY STARTUP COMPANIES

In fact, with a great many startup software and technology companies, building a VAR channel network to sell their companies products is the first thing they want to do, upon releasing their first product. This is especially true when the founding management team primarily comes from a technical background. The thinking goes; they are technologists who have created a great product. They don't have a lot of experience selling or marketing--and most of the startup money has gone to, and will continue to go to developing products. Why not just recruit a bunch of resellers to market and sell their product for them? Sounds like a great idea on the surface, doesn't it?

Unfortunately, there are few strategies that are more flawed, and which have continuously led to failure than this one.

Let's contrast the realities of the VAR channel, against this simplistic notion that has been tried again and again, without success:

WHAT VARS DON'T DO

1) First of all, VARs DON'T market. At least not YOUR products, anyway (they may market their services). So the very first flaw in this strategy is that it is based on a gross misconception of what a VAR typically does.

2) VARs don't create new markets. VARs are great at selling into established markets and further expanding already growing ones. Missionary sales: brand new markets, categories and products? Not so much.

3) They don't sell a wide variety, or a large assortment of products. In fact, VARs are focused on actively selling VERY FEW products--if they are even focused on selling products at all.

4) VARs aren't motivated by high product margins.

5) The individual VAR does not exist to help YOUR company make money.

Now if you're not a sales or marketing professional with experience working with the VAR channel, you're probably very confused by the list just above. So what is it that VARs actually do? And why is it worth dealing with them at all!

What happens time and time again is that a technologist startup CEO will pursue the VAR channel as their exclusive distribution channel, without knowing any of the points in the list above. Their effort will fail miserably, and they will then scramble to begin selling their product directly, or through some other means. They will swear off the VAR channel forever, and I do mean swear:

"Those !!@#$%^^* resellers are good for nothing. They take a big cut of your margins, while adding no value in return. I'll never deal with them again."

I can't tell you how many times I've heard some version of the quote above.


But the VAR channel is a major force in the technology business, and if you know what you're doing, it can be used to great leverage by your company. So let's now take a more realistic look at what VARs CAN DO:

WHAT VARS ACTUALLY DO

1) First and foremost, VARs are in business to sell their own HIGH MARGIN SERVICES. That is why they exist, and how they put bread on the table. This revelation may be discouraging to some product vendors, but you must understand and respect this above all, if you hope to leverage this channel. The only exception to this is the "core" product, which will be discussed later in this article.

2) VARs are very interested in things that apply to their own vertical focus. Although it wasn't so true many years ago, most successful VARs these days have a very tight vertical focus.

3) Many VARs act as "thought leaders" for their corporate customers. So they are very interested in "what's new" in the market, so they can stay on top of trends and remain market experts for their clients. This means that they will sometimes spend a lot of time talking to you about your new product, but never find the time to actually "sell" it (even if they have the best of intentions). In the busy world of the small VAR, client demands and selling the core product and services usually soak up all excess time.

4) VARs are often used as "aggregators" of purchases by corporate clients. This way, the corporation can use a single vendor point of contact for their technology purchases, greatly simplifying their purchasing process. They can also leverage the VAR as an evaluator/validator of new products and technologies. This makes them a very important part of the purchasing chain for many corporations.

5) If they put any real effort into selling products at all, it is usually into one or two "core" products that they have built their service offerings around. If you aren't a product that pulls services, forget about getting high mindshare with the VAR.

6) When it comes to selling "non-core" products, VARs are almost completely driven by the demand they see in their installed customer base. They won't often add in new products that they don't see a demand for, unless they are really techie, early adopter types. And these techies will often add a product, but never find time to actually offer it (let alone sell it) to their customers.

7) The VAR channel is EXCELLENT at fulfilling demand for great new products into their existing, installed customer base.

8) VARs can be an excellent proxy for a vendor in installing, configuring and offering first level support. This can enable a vendor extend its reach and to leverage the VAR channels existing infrastructure rather than building out a large field organization (which depending on the product category, may not even be feasible).

So given the points outlined above, what are the "best practices" to follow when you are seeking to build and leverage a VAR channel?

VAR CHANNEL BEST PRACTICES

*Always sell your new product directly in the beginning. Even if you don't plan to build a direct sales force and sell directly in the long run, it is critical to establish that the product works, and can be sold successfully. If you can't sell your own product, no VAR will be able to either (and few smart ones will be willing to try). De-bug and systemize the sales process, make sure that your end user price points are right, and build a small reference account list--at a minimum. Only at this point should you begin to approach VARs to distribute your product.

*Marketing the product is the vendor's responsibility. Do not naively think that the VAR will market the product for you, or that since you have VARs to sell, you don't need to market at all. Remember, VARs are great at fulfilling demand among their existing customers--and very poor at creating it among new customers. The vendor must position its products in the market and create demand for them--otherwise your channel efforts will certainly fail

*Treat VARs like the valued business partners they should be. If you do sell direct, don't "steal a deal" and take it direct just to make a few more points on one sale. Nothing is more short-sighted. Not only will this VAR not do business with you again, in any given vertical it's a small community--and word gets around fast. You risk becoming a pariah in the VAR channel, and losing all the hard work that you put into building your network. My philosophy is: when in doubt, cut the VAR in on the deal. If you don't feel he's adding any value to your business, eliminate him from your network after the deal. But don't use your low opinion of a particular VAR to convince yourself to cut him out of the deal. You risk cutting off your own nose in spite.

*Be realistic in what the VAR channel can do for you. If you have a non-core offering, be happy that they "make it available" to their customer base, rather than expecting them to sell it actively. Remember, VARs are key influencers of their clients; just being available to endorse your product as something they offer, to a customer that hears about the product elsewhere, can be very valuable.

*Provide a reasonable margin, but don't "throw margin away" thinking that it will motivate a VAR to actively push your product--if they otherwise would not. It won't work, and you'll just be giving away money for no reason--that you could use creating demand instead.

*For most products, make sure that you don't over-distribute by signing up more VARs than your market will support. Even though greater margins might not make a VAR push your products, the erosion of margins to near zero will cause a VAR to eliminate your product from their portfolio. It's better to leave a few deals on the table, than to risk demotivating your entire reseller network, because they are 6 competitors are bidding on every deal in an particular area. The exception to this is if you represent a "core" product that pulls significant service revenue, you can get away with a lot more stuff, because the product margins are trivial to the VAR compared to the lucrative service revenue. But in this case, be careful when using your market strength to abuse partners. People have long memories, and "what goes around, comes around."

SUMMARY

That's my primer on how to approach, and even more importantly, how NOT to approach doing business with Value-Added Resellers. Post a comment or send me an email to delve into this important topic further.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/