Negotiating and Working with Large Technology OEM Partners

The Holy Grail for many software and technology companies, especially the early stage type, is the big deal. Everyone is looking for the big deal, the one that will fund the company's early activities, provide market credibility and momentum in the marketplace. Of course, if it goes well, there can be nothing better. Many times the big deal takes the form of an OEM partnership with a much larger company. But often when these deals do happen, they end up fitting in the category of "be careful what you wish for".

TARGET YOUR OEM PARTNERS CAREFULLY
This is where it all starts, good or bad. It's important to pick compatible partners. Companies looking for large OEM partners are often blinded by the potential of what the OEM can do FOR their business. They often fail to pay any attention at all to what the OEM might do TO their business!

Can the partner cause severe channel conflict? Will they tie the small company up in endless meetings, procedures and negotiations? Do they have a corporate structure and culture so foreign to your way of doing business, where you end up pulling your hair out from frustration--unable to accomplish even the most simple business objective without moving mountains? Sometimes with large companies, its difficult even figure out who you need to speak with--let alone get a prompt, unambiguous answer.

Get to know your partners well before you sign a deal. It's tempting to rush in before "they change their mind", but the actual relationship is critical to potential success. It's like dating before a marriage--no matter how attractive the partner is, you need to make sure you can live with them later on.


NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH
I don't like to do deals with people that are sure they have the upper hand. If they think they can push you around--they almost certainly will. Usually one partner needs the other to a greater extent, but you want to try to avoid dealing with partners where you have no leverage at all. It generally doesn’t' turn out well. Make sure that you negotiate a deal that you can live with. Above all, you need to have a "line in the sand" that you won't cross--and be prepared to walk away if the negotiations cross that line.

This can be a painful and difficult thing to do when you are seeing big "dollar signs" in your eyes--and fear if you stay strong, you might blow the deal. But remember, you have something that the other side wants as well--or they wouldn't be talking to you. If you don't know what your minimum successful deal looks like, and you aren't prepared to walk, you may sign a deal that you will regret. Not to mention tying up your time and resources, which might have been used working with a more compatible partner.


WORK ON EVEN TERMS
Once you've negotiated a deal that you can live with (and hopefully prosper with!), it's time to get to work with your partner. Try to keep things as fair and even as possible in the relationship. Of course, it's important to be accommodating to your partner, and respect the differences in operational procedures. Big OEMs will usually move slower than you, be more process-oriented and structured, and include more people in the relationship. All of this is fine, but it needs to be tempered so that the larger partner doesn't "swallow all of you available resources whole". It can easily happen if you don't guard against it. They have more resources than you (but will always think they are busier!) as well as more process-driven requirements that need to be met. But don't be afraid to draw the line at a reasonable point, and remind them that you have fewer people and resources available. Suggest a phone meeting instead of flying three people across the country--ask that they come to your place, rather than always trekking to their headquarters. Propose that one of there folks spearhead writing that joint position paper, instead of some scarce resource in your company--you get the picture. Sometimes larger companies will smother you without even knowing they are doing it--don't be afraid to remind them that you need to do business a little differently.

KNOW WHEN TO SAY "NO"
If you've tried everything you know, politely, to keep the relationship equitable and reasonable--but it just isn't--don't be afraid to say NO. I meet many smaller company executives in my consulting practice whojust don't feel they can do this with a larger partner. They'll talk tough in internal meetings, but when back in discussions with the partner, the tough talk turns to submission. They just feel like the partner is too important to their business to risk ever offending them in any way. That attitude is a prescription for servitude for your company. I'm not suggesting being unpleasant; in fact, when standing up to a larger partner, it's critical to be calm, polite and non-defensive. But by all means be firm in delivering the message of what your business can, cannot--and won't'--do. If you don't, what could be a profitable relationship can turn very sour.


HAVE REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
The last point I'd like to convey is that it's important to have reasonable expectations in partnering with large OEMs. Many companies go into these deals believing they will be "company-makers". In my experience, this rarely happens. Understand what the OEM can do for you, and build your business model around the most conservative projections of their performance that's possible.

Companies usually turn to OEM products from partners to fill niches that they don't fully understand, or don't feel would pay back--if they invested in developing it themselves. It is very rare for products licensed or resold from partners to get anywhere near the push that internally-developed products do. Be realistic about this, and you won't be disappointed. If revenue exceeds your conservative expectations, you'll be overjoyed.


SUMMARY
That's my condensed advice on working with the big software and technology OEMs of the world. This is a common activity for many companies--what's been your own experience? Post a comment and let me know your own view.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Channel Pricing Strategy for Software and Hardware Products

Pricing software products is always a difficult exercise. With high product development costs, but near zero costs of goods sold, there are many different strategies that people have followed successfully (and not so successfully!) over time. Pricing hardware products is a bit simpler because there is generally a significant cost of goods sold that acts as a governor on pricing behavior. But even with hardware, technology markets are dynamic and fast moving. And it's a complex enough topic when all sales are going direct--once you bring channels into the picture, it only gets worse.

CHANNEL CONFLICT
The biggest concern most companies have when pricing for multiple channels is channel conflict. I have seen many companies who actually AVOID selling through channels for fear of the pricing implications it brings. They are afraid of a channel undercutting their direct sales force in price, and channel conflict in general, which arises as a result of different prices being presented to customers from representatives of different channels. But this doesn’t have to be so; with a savvy understanding of the implications of pricing actions. This comes from both experience, and "paying attention to what actually HAPPENS in the marketplace. If you price properly and run your channel programs well, you can sell successfully via multiple channels--with these channels living in relative harmony.

VALUE-BASE CHANNEL PRICING
I've written about value-based pricing before, in the context of the perceived value of a product, as seen by the end-user, being the guidepost for pricing actions. A similar concept exists for channel discounts. Rather than taking a simplistic approach and give the greatest discount to the channel players that move the most product ( a destructive strategy--more on that later), it's important to measure how much "value" a particular channel provides both you and your end-user customers. Look at things like 24/7 support, inventory & product availability, technical expertise, credit services, and the like. In this case, it is helpful to let the cost of delivery of each of these attributes be your guide to the value they provide.

VALUE-BASED CHANNEL DISCOUNT STRUCTURE
For example, you may figure that the cost of a VAR providing 24/7 support to end users (meaning YOUR company doesn't have to) is equal to 5% of the list price of the product. And the inventory held by a retailer (again, meaning YOUR company doesn't have to hold it, at a cost) is equal to 2% of the list price. And so on and so forth. Using this value-based method, you can calculate the actual costs borne by your partners in delivering marketplace value, and use this as a guidepost in building your channel discount schedules for various types of channel partners. This value-based channel pricing approach is not well-known, and seldom considered; most people seem to figure the only value worth extra discount is sales volume. If you use a value pricing approach, you actually have a chance to build a multi-channel strategy that "clicks on all cylinders" by providing discount structures that are equitable based upon cost and value associated with each channel.



LIMIT VOLUME DISCOUNTS
If you choose the "more volume=greater discount approach, your multi-channel strategy is a house of cards which will soon collapse around you. One channel will quickly grow to dominate, and the other channel types will soon quit selling on your behalf, and wither away.


THE GOAL IS TO MAXIMIZE SALES THROUGH ALL CHANNELS
Again, the key is to not let one channel dominate. Ideally, you would like all channels to be presenting prices to the end customer that are equal. In reality, that pretty much can't happen without price fixing (which some folks may be able to get away with, but that's another story….). But you should strive as much as possible to have end user pricing equity for all channels. But this is where the counter-intuitive part of this discussion comes in to play. Most people pricing high tech products have a tendency to price based upon the volume of product a particular channel player can move. It seems logical--why wouldn't you want to incent and reward a partner with better margins if they are selling more products?

While this appears logical, it is actually penny-wise and pound-foolish. In fact, it is usually catastrophic to your plans to maximize sales through multiple channels. Let's look at a simple case of how this often "breaks" a multi-channel strategy for a common case: a vendor selling through both retailers and VARs.

A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Retailers provide a vendor with a point of purchase holding inventory, where their customers can go to immediately purchase a product. VARs often don't hold inventory, but provide other services important to the vendor and some customers, such as tech support, training and integration with other software and hardware products. Each may have an important role to play in the overall strategy to maximize vendor sales.

But the retailer will usually be a high volume partner, with the VAR less likely to be a volume outlet (although the VAR CHANNEL, in total, may hold great promise to move volume). If you structure your pricing by volume, the retailer will get better discounts. Because individual VARs generally have higher costs spread over lower product volumes, they actually need HIGHER discounts to stay even in pricing potential to the Retailer. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that retailers tend to be volume-oriented, usually accepting a relatively small, fixed margin on everything they sell. If you provide discounts based upon the volume that a partner moves, what will happen is inevitable: The retailer will take over your channel business, because the VARs will be "squeezed out" by the relatively low prices charged by the retailer. They won't be able to make a profit on your products, so they will ignore the business, and you will lose the opportunity to realize significant sales through the large (in aggregate) VAR channel, especially those customers that desire the service and support they supply. I am oversimplifying this situation, of course, because VARs are more interested in the service revenue that a product can pull, than they are in product margins. But I have seen this scenario play out many times and kill product sales through VARs channel that might otherwise generate health sales through that channel. This can be a heavy penalty for naïve technology product managers who are charged with pricing their products and moving them through multiple channels, but who don't fully realize the consequences of their actions.

SUMMARY
Pricing seems pretty simple on the surface--when channels are involved, it's anything but. It's important to fully think through the downstream effects of your pricing policies when multiple distribution channel are involved. Let me know if you have questions, or you own channel pricing stories that you'd like to share.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Forecasting New Technology Products

Forecasting is a thankless job. It's a lot like being a referee or umpire in your favorite sport; the only time a game official is noticed is when they do something wrong! Similarly, a forecaster's primary aim is too stay out of the "news".

Make no mistake; forecasting is a very important function in any business. In the software business, your whole business plan could be riding on meeting the forecast to fund growth and product development. In a hardware business, it's even worse--you have to worry about creating too much or too little inventory--either of which can be a huge problem for your business.

HARD IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES

It's bad enough when you are trying to forecast an existing, mature product, in a mature industry. This is a difficult and complex task, using well known techniques such as smoothing, trending and seasonality to fine tune the next month or annual forecast.

Early in my career, at Hewlett Packard, I spend 4 months in a special assignment dedicated solely to improving forecast accuracy. The marketing department was engaged in an ongoing argument with manufacturing over inventory levels. Not surprisingly, manufacturing wanted the inventory levels to be lean, while marketing favored a more robust number. This was because manufacturing was being graded on their costs and at that time "owned" the inventory; while Marketing was graded on revenue--and low inventory levels usually lead to missed sales opportunities.

I became a Lotus spreadsheet guru, and we used everything we could find to try to improve our forecast accuracy. Keep in mind that these were high tech products (computer printers), but successful product lines with significant historical data available. Try as we might, the best we could ever do was to get within 25% of the eventual unit sales number.

NEW TECHNOLOGY PRODUCT ARE THE WORST POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR FORECASTERS

The main message here is that forecasting in any product in high tech industries is almost impossible, from an accuracy perspective. Forecasting accurately the performance of NEW PRODUCTS in technology markets is TRULY impossible to do accurately. With brutal competition, a tight market research budget, vague notions of market size, an early stage on the user acceptance curve, and often the reality of an unknown brand, forecasters of new technology products needs to make sure they don't end up in substance abuse clinics. But of course, even though it's hard-- it's still VERY important. So what's a forecaster to do?

There are two basic methodologies that I typically utilize when attempting to forecast sales for a new technology product:


TOP DOWN FORECASTING METHOD

The first approach that I usually engage is what I like to call the "top down" method. You might also call this the "Macro" approach. This is an exercise of defining the size of your total addressable market using market research or number of potential users, and also estimating what a reasonable share will be for your product, given the various attributes of your market position. Consider everything you can in your analysis: your marketing budget, brand strength, an unbiased view of how your product stacks up vs. the competition, etc. It may be helpful to put it all in a spreadsheet, and quantify the various important attributes of your company/product vs. your competition. Be careful about assigning too much precision to these numbers; remember that garbage in equals' garbage out. But if you go through this exercise thoughtfully, it can be very helpful in analyzing your relative market position. In this case, obtaining your top down forecast is then as easy as multiplying the share you think you can obtain, times the market size that you came up via research.


BOTTOM UP FORECASTING METHOD

After I've done the top down or Macro forecast, I like to use what I call a bottoms up or "Micro" approach as a sanity check. To do this, you want to gather information on what you think you can sell from individual stakeholders in the sales area: direct field sales reps, Online/Web store, dealers, international distributors, etc. It's helpful to gather info from any channel that will be a significant contributor to sales for this new product. Usually it's impractical to do a complete survey of everyone that may be involved in the sales effort. What's important is to obtain a representative sample that is both broad enough and deep enough that the data you gather has some significance. At that point, you can "normalize" the data. For example, say you were able to gather data from a broad cross-section of sales points, totaling approximately 10% of the total sales infrastructure. You would then multiply the total number of units/dollars you obtained from your sales entities times 10, to reach a bottoms up forecast totaling 100%.

DO YOU HAVE CONVERGENCE?

The key to this exercise is to discover whether your two views of the market are close enough that they appear to be focusing on the same topic! If they do, you may be in pretty good shape with your forecast. If they are off by an order of magnitude, it's probably time to reconsider some of your assumptions.


SUMMARY

So there's my advice on how to approach the unenviable task of forecasting a brand new technology product. It's a high risk, high return activity under the best of circumstances--and ideal conditions are seldom found in this activity in the technology space. But if you are able to construct both a top down and a bottoms up forecast, and the two numbers at least fall in the same ballpark, you're probably on the right track.

Give it a shot yourself next time you're faced with this forecasting daunting task. Feel free to shoot me an email with your questions, or leave a comment for discussion.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

System Integration vs. Product Development

I've recently engaged on assignments with two new clients. Both of them have businesses selling to large, blue chip customers. Customers of the size that are used to "having it their way"; as a result, getting a deal with them often includes the need for a lot of customization.

The interesting thing about these two clients is how they perceive and approach that need to customize.

A Tale of Two Companies

Company A views customization somewhat as a pain and distraction, something to be controlled--I am assisting them with creating a standard solution offering menu outlining the "Base" offering, with a list of options available at an added cost. They really want to discourage certain customizations, absolutely won't do some things that will be asked, and want to make sure that they charge dearly for items that they find painful. They have the classic mentality of a product company; they want to do the amount of customization necessary to make a large sale to this important customer--but NO more than they have to.

Company B, which also considers itself a product company, has a very different mentality about customization. They welcome it, pride themselves on it, and position themselves to these potential large clients as someone that can quickly bring solutions to the client, customized to their desires. They want their big account reps to be scouring the big accounts for unique pain points or opportunities, which might fall within the company's core capabilities, enabling them to propose a customized solution. In fact, up till now, their product development approach has really been to find out what individual accounts want--and build it for them.

So which of these two business models is the best way for technology companies to go?

System Integration Business Models

Advantages:
*More flexible and able to change with shifts in the marketplace
*Not as capital-intensive due to less "betting" on upfront product development
*Easier to grow business organically with internally-generated capital than in a product business

Disadvantages:
*Less risk due to lower upfront investments
*More competition; System Integration is an "easier-entry" business
*Generally lower operating margins
*Growth is less scalable than a product-oriented company

Product-Focused Business Models

Advantages:
*Provides greater opportunity for strategic advantage and resulting fast growth
*Less competition if a product/brand/technology differential advantage is created
*Can scale much quicker if a hit product is developed
*Higher operating margins if product is successful
*Usually more marketing-driven and less labor-intensive
*If creating a very large company is the goal, much easier to raise outside capital

Disadvantages:
*Much more risk of "crib death", resulting in complete capital loss if first product has problems in development or marketing
*Harder to "get over the hump"; success is harder to come by, and success often happens as a step function after a difficult startup period

First of all, I want to emphasize that there isn't necessarily a "wrong" approach with either of these business models. You can make a lot of money pursuing either model. Both of the companies I have used as models have managed to attract blue chip customer which would be the envy of any company. What we are really talking about here is the difference between a classic product-driven company and a system integrator.

Company A is that classic product-driven company. They customize when they have to, but also have a point where they will say "no".

Company B also self-identifies itself as a product company, and in fact they have built their business around a small number of standard offerings. But as their core strategic advantage they really are utilizing relationships, the ability to customize beyond what standard product companies (especially larger ones) are willing to do, as well as to react very quickly to customer requests. They've built a very nice business doing this, but have some frustrations as well. They are highly dependent upon a small number of major accounts for virtually all of their revenue, and have the major revenue/profit swings that are associated with this type of business--up one year, back down the next. They also are in constant fear that a larger company will come along and "take away" their marketplace, because they've continuously failed to create new products which build upon a core offering which is very dated technologically. The core offering appears long-in-tooth and vulnerable. This company is very account-focused, and the lack of a market focus has kept them from being able to create additional, broadly marketable products which provide them with a strong proprietary advantage (and causes a lack of sleep at night!)

Company A understands who they are and what they want. That doesn't guarantee success, but it makes it much easier to build a plan that everyone agrees on. At that point success or failure usually depends upon execution, unless the plan is awful. If failure ensues in this scenario, more times than not, the problem is in execution. Company B's biggest problem is that they are floating right in the middle between the two business models. They are trying to leverage both of these business models, and struggling with execution, in some ways with both.

SUMMARY
It isn't impossible to combine these two business models successfully. I'm sure that many of you can't point to several examples of such a very successful compromise. In fact, many technology companies combine both of these models to some extent, with good success. But I find that usually, a company identifies itself primarily as a product company first, or a systems integrator. That identification is their strategic focus, and takes precedence when prioritizing the use of always scarce assets.

The secondary business model is usually utilized on an opportunistic basis. Product companies integrate and customize as needed to get a big deal. Integrators create "products" to fill the needs of a big account, and sometimes happily find they are saleable to other accounts. Occasionally, these "products" prove so widely saleable that they are spun off into a separate product company, or the integrator changes its focus into becoming a full-blown product company.

The most important thing, in my opinion, is to understand who you are, and what you are trying to accomplish strategically. It's the company's that are trying to leverage both business models at once, without one model taking the lead, that gets itself in a heap of trouble. That's my opinion--what's yours?

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Steve Jobs, the iPhone and Apple Strategy - have we seen this story before?

Apple computer and its red-hot iPhone have dominated the business news recently. By all accounts, with good reason. I haven't had the opportunity to play around with an iPhone yet, but the early reviews have been very positive. Initial interest demand has been high, especially given the usual amount of mystery and intrigue woven by Mr. Jobs and the folks at Apple.

For a first-time entry in to a large, competitive business such as cell phones--you've got to be impressed. Yet I've got this vague feeling of familiarity when it comes to this story--I somehow feel that I've seen it and heard it all before….

THE RETURN OF JOBS

Apple Computer since the return of Steve Jobs from the hinterlands has felt a lot like the Apple from Jobs initial run at Apple. He's restored the company's attitude, and dominates publicity, product direction and what feels like nearly every little detail about the company. Not bad for what is roughly a $20B company. It speaks to how strong and impressive Mr. Jobs' personality and skill set really is. He has done a tremendous job bringing Apple back from the brink, and it appears that they may be headed to heights that weren't even approach in his first tenure at the company.

There are many reasons that Apple and Steve Jobs, over a long period of time, have proved to be an interesting story. There are the breakthrough products, invention of new categories, tremendous highs and lows in financial results, strong, eccentric personalities, and boardroom intrigue--all multiplied when Jobs is factored in.

But the thing that I've always found most interesting about Apple has been its corporate strategy.

APPLE CORPORATE STRATEGY

Lets first give Steve Jobs and his strategies their due; he's done a whole bunch of things right. It's hard to imagine where this company would be if they hadn't brought him back for his second tour. But like most strong personalities, along with his myriad strengths--he's got a few quirks as well. Some might argue these quirks are actually weaknesses. I've always thought that his biggest weakness was being a "control freak". Some might argue that this is actually reflective of strength, indicative of a strong leader who is forcing a change in the status quo to his vision. At times it appears so.

For example, the original Mac was a great triumph at first. It set a new standard for PC usability and industrial design, and was a huge seller in the beginning. But in creating the Mac, Apple also:

1) Didn't use standard (Intel) chips, but more expensive ones from weaker competitors
2) Was a relatively "closed" system
3) Couldn't be upgraded much at all
4) Kept Prices and margins high, unsustainably so with hindsight

A SUSPECT BUSINESS MODEL?

Maybe most interesting of all from a strategic perspective, is Apple's choice of a business model. Apple has always been an innovator in software, with most of its differentiation coming in this area. (At least this is true since the Mac was introduced--the original Apple hit product, the Apple II, was pure hardward innovation.) Yet the company has always tried to make its margin selling hardware devices, bundling in its software with its hardware, mostly for free. I believe that this closed, single vendor, hardware/software bundled system approach can be the right strategy in creating a new market. It allows a pioneer to control the user experience, while realizing larger margins and profits in the short run to support innovation. But as markets grow big, that approach which works so well in the beginning often becomes an albatross as other players enter a larger market, and figure out how to take cost out of the system. These strategic choices (flaws?) were some of reasons that ultimately led the Mac platform to be a distant also-ran in the PC races (although one with a rabid core following), even though it had a large advantage in technology and a healthy market share initially.

iTUNES AND THE iPOD

Interestingly, Jobs followed a similar basic strategy with iTunes and the iPod. He innovated with cool, hip industrial design, a classically simple but elegant user interface, and (maybe most importantly) broke the logjam with the Record labels on downloadable songs--for the first time creating a site with a truly wide selection of mainstream songs, downloadable without hassle. He once again has kept this a pretty closed system, not allowing other devices to download to iTunes, or other music sites to feed the iPod--although he has shown signs of opening this up recently. Once again, pricing is pretty high, relative to competitive "systems". Apple has so far been able to keep a comfortable lead in the online music space--but using a timeline which is required to measure markets of this scope--one must remember, it is still very early in the game.

My feeling about this "closed system approach" that Jobs favors, is that in consumer electronics and computing, it often works very well for a while--but then backfires as the market grows and matures. Technology commoditizes, and markets eventually lean toward openness--which provides greater choice and lower costs to users. Jobs waited way too long with the Mac, and retreated on the strategy when Apple belately tried to open up the platform, just as he returned for his second run with the company. Apple may be headed toward open PC computing again with the new MacTel platform, but in my opinion, that ship has likely sailed long ago. It would be a long hard pull for the Mac to once again compete as a mainstream PC platform. Of course Steve Jobs is nothing if not audacious, so I wouldn't put it past him to try.

iPHONE STRATEGY - GOOD & BAD

This brings us to the iPhone. Apple has been up and down during it's corporate life, more often than a cat with nine lives. Right now, Apple is definitely riding on a high. When you take a look at this iPhone recent introduction, there is a whole bunch of familiar Apple/Jobs strategy going on. You see the innovation pointed at a major market that is populated by major players, but a relatively poor user experience. In this case it's the poor user experience of the cell phone industry, just like PCs and downloadable music, which were frustrating to consumers when Apple innovated in those markets. The innovation is out of the old Apple playbook: led by cool industrial design, and a breakthrough, simple but elegant user interface. All of this, along with typically brilliant Apple PR, has led to the iPhone "mania" that is reminiscent of past Apple introductions. The iPhone sure looks like a big hit at this point, and no doubt will be in the short run.

But will Apple and Jobs be able to sustain the iPhone momentum, like they have with the iPod/iTunes to date, or will the initial success fade like it did with the Mac? While Jobs is now a more seasoned, and even more successful electronics industry icon, I would argue that there still may be a few of the old flaws in his game. The price point Apple introduced the iPhone at is very high, relative to most cell phones with a similar level of capabilities. The phone was introduced with a battery that can't be upgraded by the user, something that has been standard in the cell phone market (and most portable consumer electronics) for many years. iPhone owners will have to send the product away to get the battery changed--who can go days without their phone? This is an incomprehensible mistake in strategy, in my opinion.

And finally, and most importantly, Apple chose the most "closed system" approach of all--the iPhone with only be available on one Cell Phone network, AT&T, for at least 5 years. I find this part of the strategy astounding. First of all, it seems to me to be completely unnecessary and yielding few benefits to the company. It appears that Apple did this to have leverage in their cell phone partner negotiations, allowing them to retain control on some items, and keeping their prices high. I think Apple is being penny-wise and pound foolish here. The have a hot product; now is the time to establish the Apple brand as the preferred high end supplier of smart phones. But they can now accomplish this in only a segment of the huge cellular audience, for completely artificial reasons. Shutting out the bulk of the market in this fleeting time of major advantage, for bit higher margins and control on a few areas that most cell phone manufacturers do without? It's hardly worth in my opinion.

Also, the Cellular Network Operator partner they have chosen is very suspect. While AT&T is the biggest wireless operator in the US market and a fine company, they are behind in the game technologically in the wireless Internet part of the cellular market--the very aspect in which the iPhone shines as a mobile device. So the wonderful new features brought to wireless web access by the iPhone will slow to a crawl on the inferior AT&T data network. It may be like running a great graphical user interface over a dial up modem--frustrating. If all you do is sit and wait for the network, it won't matter much how slick or intuitive the device UI is.

FLAWS IN APPLE'S iPHONE GAMEPLAN?

My feeling is that there may again be some major flaws in this most recent Apple strategy. This may again cause the company to give up an early lead, in a market in which they've contributed true innovation. I'm not privy to all of the information that Apple management is, of course. And it's always easy to second-guess from a distance, after the fact. So it's quite possible that I'm just missing something, and dead wrong in my take. Plus, the whole picture of Apple's market entry hasn't been revealed yet. For example, I haven't seen or heard anything about Apple's partnering strategy with Cellular operators outside the US, but I am very interested to see how this compares to the US strategy. Will the strategy be similar or very different internationally?

Steve Jobs has contributed greatly to the development of the worldwide computer and electronics business. He has had many great successes, and also fallen a few times. He is an iconic figure who isn't afraid to take a stand. Apple has ridden Job's strategies to great heights several times; and also to great depths a time or two as well. Along the way Steve Jobs has provided a wealth of controversial material for columnists, writers, commentators and anyone else with an opinion. I am fascinated to watch as his strategy for this latest chapter, the iPhone, plays out in the marketplace.

So there you have it--that's my take. Post a comment and let me know what your own thoughts are on Mr. Jobs, Apple and the iPhone.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

The Haphazard Development of People in Early Stage High Tech Organizations

Many entrepreneurs start out giving little thought to how they will grow their embryonic technology business in the long run. They are totally focused on designing and releasing the first product, or making that first sale. This focus is usually a very positive thing in a new company, since grandiose plans of startups have a way of getting derailed by the harsh realities of trying to survive.

Other more organized and contemplative entrepreneurial types have a master plan all laid out, including the steps on how they are going to grow their company all the way to the happy exit they have planned. This approach can be of great benefit as well; even though things won't go exactly as planned, it's great to have a road map that you can adjust as conditions change.

One thing that many younger organizations don't do so well, is in planning the development of their staff. Don't misunderstand; there are a lot of development opportunities for employees of newer and smaller companies. But this development often just "happens"; there is little thought that goes into it. A job needs to be done--and a particular body is more available than any other. The fit may not be ideal--and the amount of training given minimal. But the person is thrown in to sink or swim, because like the old saying "necessity is the mother of invention". It needs to happen, and it often works out well a surprisingly large amount of the time, given the haphazard way in which this "personnel development" often occurs.

But is this optimal, even within the constraints of a hard-charging software or hardware company? Most of the time, with a bit of foresight and a strategic pause, you can increase the odds of successfully stretching your current staff, into areas where expertise or experience are lacking. Below are five simple steps that may greatly increase your success rate in growing

Consider Psychographic Profiles Of Candidates In Your Hiring Choices
Like most things that are done in company development, if you hire the right people, things are likely to turn out better--no matter WHAT curves the marketplace throws your way. So try to think ahead when hiring that next entry-level employee, to fill the open clerical or support role. What other activities may need to be done in the near future? In what areas could this new employee be grown? Are you hiring the most flexible candidate, the type that will be most comfortable when you try to "stretch" them into an unfamiliar role? Will they freak out at being asked to perform a new and challenging activity, or will they embrace it as an attractive career growth opportunity? Try to think ahead, and the answer to your next personnel crises might be right down the hall.

Plan Ahead As Much As Possible
As mentioned above, it's really useful to try to think ahead to what functions will need staffing in the next 3, 6 or 9 months. This type of strategic thinking is difficult for many early stage managers, who are focused on getting through the end of the month. Unfortunately, this mentality often leads to hiring the person that will save a few nickels in initial salary, or has the most experience for the immediate position--therefore "hitting the ground running" with the least amount of training. But if you factor the medium and long term needs of your business into your hiring decisions, you may hire different candidate--who may add much more to the growth of the business over time.

Train At Least A Little--Don't Just Throw Them To The Wolves
Startups have a tendency to "throw people in the pool and see if they'll float". Many times managers will ask an employee to get started, and just do the best they can in the short term. It's often a crisis situation, and the manager intends to come back and train them when things settle down a bit. Unfortunately, in early stage companies, the situation NEVER settles down. As a result, you end up with an employee that fails, feels abandoned and neglected, or develops bad habits that become hard to undo. While it's hard to find the time or resources to provide training, for most people, it's an important factor in ultimately achieving success. So make it a priority to give the person in a new role some basic training, no matter what it takes.

Supplement And Train Using Consultants As Mentors
One great way to provide training and support to employees in new roles is to get some outside help. Many smaller companies don't believe that they can afford consultants, because their price tags for providing expertise and short term work are much higher than permanent employees. But that is usually "penny wise, but pound foolish". Most jobs that need doing, also need to be done right. If there isn't the expertise or senior management bandwidth available to train and support the employee in the new role, the job may not be done the way the manager intended--costing the company far more than the amount that outside help would. In these instances, an outside consultant is actually a very cost-effective way to prevent costly early mistakes, as well as putting the employee solidly on a track to long-term success in their new role.

Allow Room For Errors
Margin for error is usually less in early stage companies, with a resulting amount of high pressure to "get things right the first time". But it's unrealistic to think that someone new to a job, with minimal experience and support, will do everything perfectly the first time. Startup managers need to factor this into to their expectations, and plan for results to be a bit uneven at first. It's especially important that the demeanor of the manager makes the employee feel comfortable to take educated risks in the company's best interests, without feeling like any missteps could cost them their career.

SUMMARY
It's true that early stage tech companies can't afford to engage in the same type of organizational planning and personnel development that occurs in most giant corporations. However, that is somewhat offset by the vast opportunities for development that are found in these fast-changing, non-bureaucratic environments. Early stage tech companies are well served if they force themselves to engage in just a fraction of the planning done in larger corporations. Post a comment and let us know what you think about organizational development in startup companies.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Business Models in the SMB Market

The SMB market is typically a very popular topic for hardware and software companies. Every one wants to sell to the Enterprise market; as a result, competition is fierce and standards are very high. If you get to the Enterprise market early, with an innovation that creates a new category, you can find success if you are truly making a contribution to the market. But late entries into a market segment, as well as early stage companies competing with larger, established companies, often have a very tough go of it. In these situations, attention often turns to the Small and Medium-Size Business, or SMB, market.

And why not? At first blush, the SMB market appears to be huge, as well as underserved. It looks like a perfect haven for an early stage or turnaround company with a solid product, but not quite enough differentiation, brand name, or marketing muscle to push out the big boys in the Enterprise space. So the decision is made to focus on SMBs.


What's Wrong With This Decision?

There is nothing wrong with this decision, per se--if it's done with eyes open, for the right reasons. But too often, it is done to run away from a problem (the inability to penetrate enterprises), rather than run to a great opportunity. A lot of times, companies see the SMB market as easier turf; simply a larger, less competitive market than the Enterprise market. Major problems can result from this type of mentality, and I see it quite often in my consulting practice. Companies that enter the SMB market from this perspective usually aren't fully prepared to do what it takes to be successful, in what is a very different type of market than they may be familiar with. So where are the land mines in the SMB marketplace?


What's Not Obvious in Marketing to SMBs

The first thing to consider is that customer needs are often quite different. A lot of this depends upon what technology and market segment you are in, and whether your product is aimed more at the "S" (small) segment, or the "M" (medium) segment of the SMB space. For example, if you are selling a single user productivity tool which is useful staff accountants, you may not see much difference. If on the other hand you are marketing a company wide, networked application of some complexity, the differences may be huge. Like everything in technology marketing--the devil's in the details. Every situation needs to be evaluated closely, and treated differently on its individual merits. The most important thing is TO NOT ASSUME THAT THINGS ARE THE SAME BETWEEN SMBs AND ENTERPRISES IN YOUR CATEGORY. Do the work, evaluate the situation--don't assume. Assumptions, without verification, are what get you burned in this transition. Below is a list of some of the major differences in the SMB market:

IT Departments are small and less of a factor--if they exist at all.--In Enterprises you may be dealing with persnickety CIOs that want thing just so. In SMBs, if there is a CIO at all, he will be looking for an off the shelf SOLUTION that will "just get the job done". Or you may end up struggling to figure out how you can sell your complex solution, to a company that has NO IT DEPARTMENT AT ALL.

There is less money to spend--It's harder to make money with big ticket hardware and software, let alone customization and expensive services. Your products better have value - and margin - right out of the box.

Ease-of-use is even more critical--There probably is no training department or other corporate staff, and people are busier overall. If they can't figure out how to use it quickly, you're going to have a hard time selling it.

There is much less time available to purchase products--Even the sales process may be compressed, in terms of how much time the prospect spends reviewing your marketing literature, or talking to your sales people. The actual TIME ELAPSED during the sales cycle could be EVEN LONGER due to lack of time available to the prospect, but the INTENSITY of the purchasing engagement is often much less.

How Do You Need To Structure Your Business Model Differently?

Lower prices-- They just can't, and won't pay the same prices that you can get in the Enterprise space, in most cases. So you'd better come into this segment with a price and value proposition that makes sense to these price-sensitive customers.

Marketing vs. sales--The SMB market is more marketing intensive, with respect to marketing/sales ratios, than the Enterprise market. There are many more customers; the average sale amount is much lower, and much less face time available for direct sales. While in many respects Enterprises are the most demanding customers in the world, you've got to be a better marketer to succeed in the SMB space than you need to in the Enterprise world.

Low cost sales force-- With much lower average sales amounts, and much less time available on the customer side, it is usually impractical to have a large, high-cost field sales force. Inside sales forces are the general rule in this market. If you have a product that demands customization and hands-on support, VARs are a good adjunct to consider. The more they are taking orders generated from marketing, and the less they are cold calling prospects, the better.

Better usability and reliability-- You'll need many more units being sold to get to the same level of Enterprise revenue, across a much larger customer base, with much less (if any) maintenance revenue to fund a large support staff. Your product better work when it's installed and better be very easy to use over time. Unless you have a highly customizable solution and are using VARs as a channel, SaaS is a great platform for delivering software to this market.

Little or No IT support--The good news is that there is no prickly IT committee or staff that you have to "go through" to sell to the real users. The bad news is that if even the littlest thing goes wrong, there's no one internally at the customer to pick up the slack--you're going to hear about it directly from the user--over an over again.

Summary

The SMB market is actually a simplistic catch-all phrase for a large, heterogeneous group of markets. But it is a useful abstraction, as a starting point for understanding how to penetrate and thrive in B2B marketing to smaller companies. I hope this short introduction is useful--feel free to pitch in and post a comment adding to this topic.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Is It Time to Sell Your Hardware or Software Company?

This is the point that most, if not all, technology entrepreneurs aspire to reach. They dream of selling their company and laying on a beach somewhere, a colorful drink with the requisite umbrella, cooling in their hand.

There are a few of you out there that would never sell your company (it's your identity, after all), preferring to work forever lest you slow down and quickly deteriorate. But that's another story; we'll save your psychoanalysis for another day…

Some of you that want to sell your company have the most grandiose plan of all in mind: An initial public offering (IPO) through a brand name investment banker, bringing not only unimaginable riches, but fame along with that fortune. But that rarely happens--we'll also table that discussion for another column…

So let's get back to the great majority of you out there, who set out to some day cash in all of your hard work, by selling your company directly to another company. How do you know when the time is right?

WHAT MAKES PEOPLE WANT TO SELL

There are many triggers that set off serious reflection about whether or not to pursue a sale of a software or tech company. Let's examine a few of the more common:

1) A potential acquirer approaches the company with an offer
2) A strategic partnership grows closer, and it seems to make sense to grow closer still
3) Business is bad, and the principals begin to worry about losing everything
4) Negative cash flow is starving the business, forcing a sale to ward off bankruptcy
5) The owners need cash for another reason; be it investing in another business, or personal reasons
6) The owner/operators are burnt out, and no longer enjoy the business
7) Business has been robust, and the owners astutely consider whether now is the time to maximize their return, and minimize their risk by selling now
8) It becomes clear that there is a viable business, but is better suited/more valuable within a larger company
9) It's time for the owners to retire (it seems that very few high tech entrepreneurs make it that far!)

These are the most common reasons that come to mind--it is certainly not a complete list. Although we are talking about companies, the decision to sell ultimately comes down to a personal decision by one or a few individuals. So the reasons that these decisions happen are as varied as the population overall.

Given this list of common rationale for considering a sale, what are the RIGHT and WRONG reasons to consider a sale--if you want to maximize your return within your particular circumstances?

WRONG REASONS TO SELL

On an impulse--you've been running your business, not even think about selling your company. An offer comes along, and you get caught up in it--without having planned for it. Or things have been going poorly, and you are at an emotional low. Acting in these circumstances is similar to married, divorced or starting a new business--don't do it without thinking it through, or planning it properly.
Fear--don't sell just because you are scared; that's probably the best way to leave money on the table. There are ups and downs to every technology business. In my experience, things usually aren't as bad as they look at a specific "down" point in time--or as good as it looks at an "up" time. It's important to look at the prospects of a business over a period of time, considering both how things have gone and the forward-looking forecast.
Sales are in decline--this is the worst time to sell. If you do this, all leverage goes to the buyer. Of course, panic sets in, as you see your valuation melting away, and human instinct is to "get what you can" before it degrades further. But first consider the situation--is it reasonable that you can turn it around and reignite growth? Is the decline all specific to your business, or is it a cyclical market, or a bad economy overall--which might turn around in some reasonable time period? Sometimes selling under these circumstances is the right thing to do, and is unavoidable. But with proper planning, you may be able to sell your company BEFORE this happens, or turn it around first.

RIGHT REASONS TO SELL

You believe you've reached the peak of valuation--this seems obvious, but it is difficult to do. Finding the right time to sell is tricky; you don't want to exit too early and leave money on the table. So the inclination, given that tech businesses are value as a multiple of revenue or EEBITDA, is to hold on until growth stalls. But if you wait until you built up your sales so much that little "natural" growth" is left in your product/market cycle, the business may not look as attractive going forward, for potential buyers. Most strategic buyers, at least, would like to see growth prospects in a potential acquisition. So it might be best to "leave a little growth on the table"; it might lead to a higher multiple from the buyer.
You haven't been enjoying running the business for a very long time--I believe strongly this is a time to get out. If you have someone else whom you feel comfortable leaving in charge, that's fine. But otherwise, either you'll run it in to the ground from burnout, or you'll walk away and let someone else destroy it, because you just don't care anymore. Passion is important in our business; when it's gone, it's usually a good time to sell.
A fundamental shift in the market or your business--This could mean many things: you have lost a number of key people, the economics of your market changes, or a major investment will be required to keep the company on a growth path. The specifics here could be quite varied; the common thread is that with the change in fundamentals, there are real clouds on the horizon. This lead you to a thoughtful belief that continuing to operate the business as a standalone entity isn't optimal.

SUMMARY

An exit, or sale of your company, is a very important "life changing event" for the owners, founders and managers of a software or hardware company. I've seen sales come together very quickly, and completely unplanned. I view unplanned company sales as the business equivalent to a quicky divorce that comes out of an emotional event, without careful consideration, or an objective study of the alternatives and consequences. It is a once in a lifetime event for many, and should be given the careful consideration that those types of events deserve. That's my view--post a comment with your own Exit tales or opinions.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Organizational Structures in Software & High Tech Companies

So you've put together a hardware or software startup company. Chances are you didn't give a lot of thought to what the next step should be in organization development--you just wanted to bring in some revenue and find a way to keep the doors open. Or, maybe you gave it a great deal of thought, even before you bound your initial business plan--there are quite a few anal-retentive planning types out there--you know who you are!

I don't mean to make light of this issue; it's actually quite a serious one. Let's look at a few of the questions to consider when deciding how to organize your company, as well as a few options.

IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO PONDER

What are the strengths, weaknesses, and operating styles of the principals? I believe that this is a critical question to ponder, if one wants to organize the company successfully. One of my great examples is HP. Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard instituted a decentralized structure almost from the very beginning of Hewlett-Packard. They were careful to keep the units small, by breaking them up as they grew. In my opinion, this was one of the great drivers of HP's success, and worked well because it suited their personalities, as well as the folks that they hired. They believed in "Management by Walking Around", but also believed in motivating high performance by allowing their employees to use all of their talents, without unnecessary constraints. It seems simple, butit is often hard for managers (especially hands-on, entrepreneurial types) to give their employees enough rope and space to excel. I believe that this hands-off, decentralized approach only worked well because this style fit with Bill and Dave's personalities.

What are the key personality traits of your employees and target hires? Similar to the question about the principal's above, the organizational style needs to fit with the "personality" of your company, the culture. If you have a lot of type "A", self-motivated people with strong leadership skills, a decentralized org chart may fit better than a hierarchical, centralized approach.

Are there disparate technologies within the company? This is a big driver in deciding how to organize. If you have several different technologies, how do they fit together technically--if at all? Do they fit together from a market perspective? If there is a lot of synergy or need to coordinate between technologies/products, a centralized, hierarchical approach may work best. The less "fit" that there is between your core technologies or products, the more inclination I would have to organize using a decentralized, business unit approach. This assumes that the resources are available for a decentralized organization. But if resources are so scarce that you can't decentralize properly, does it make sense to try to be successful with multiple disparate products/technologies anyway?

Now let's take a look at some common ways to organize.

ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS

Hierarchical/Functional/Centralized - the classic organizational style of traditional businesses. The strength of this type of organization is that it is easier to optimize each function, as there are more resources available within each function in a centralized approach. This can enable a more sophisticated approach to best practices. On the downside, my first job was with a Big 3 Automotive manufacturer, which was VERY hierarchical and centralized. The company was SO hierarchical that it paralyzed the organization to a huge degree; trying to get even the simplest, small thing done had to go many levels up. It was like trying to turn a battleship on a dime, and really painful. I'm not a big fan of this style for larger organizations, but for smaller, single-market or single product companies, it generally is optimal.

Decentralized/Business Units - This is the polar opposite of the traditional hierarchical organization. It's my preference for growing companies who are starting to "spreading their wings" beyond their initial market or technology focus, as well as for larger companies. It's strength lies in the ability to keep lines of communications short, keeping personnel close to the marketplace, and motivate self-starters by providing more positions of broad responsibility. For medium-sized companies, the danger lies in decentralizing before there is really critical mass to run separate business units, which comes with some added costs due to duplication of functions. One good way to mitigate this is to centralize and share as many of the non-product specific functions as possible, such as finance, HR, quality control, etc. The key functions that absolutely need to reside in the business units are usually marketing, product development, possibly manufacturing (for hardware companies) and occasionally sales.

Product-Centric or Market-Centric- This is a variation that can be combined with either of the two major organizational structures above. For example, within your marketing department, there could be people assigned as product managers, or as market managers. Sometimes a hybrid approach is used, where there are product managers for unreleased products, and market managers for currently-marketed products.

Matrix - This organization style is "overlaid" on top of a more typical organizational structure, such as the types discussed above. The main idea is to set up "dotted line" teams, responsibilities and reporting structures that are desirable, but fall outside of the normal way a team is constituted within the main structure in use. For example, in a hierarchical organization, you might set up a matrixed, cross-functional team to put focus on the launch of an important new business initiative. This may give the new initiative more emphasis than it normally would get, given its modest contribution to the overall business at that point. If used properly, matrix management techniques can be a great way to dampen the negatives that are inevitable in any rigid organizational structure. It must be used with caution, however. If used too frequently, or without endowing the "head" of the matrix with real power to accomplish the desired goals, matrix organizations can quickly become ineffective and politically driven entities--and the butt of jokes around the water cooler.

This is just a quick take on a very complex topic. There are many different ways to organize a software or technology company for success--too many to discuss here. And we just touched on a few of the issues to consider. Hopefully this short article will stimulate some thinking on this topic, to avoid organizational structure which often form haphazardly as companies are started and grown. Post a comment if you have a take of your own.

Phil Morettini

PJM Consulting

www.pjmconsult.com

Dell Computer

Dell has been in the news recently, and like many big companies that have had a glitch in their performance, not in a good way.

Slowing revenue growth, accounting scandals and customer service issues--you've heard it all before. By the way, where was the seminar that all big company managements attended, encouraging them to cut corners on their financial reporting practices? It seems that the same pattern has been replicated to an astounding degree across a broad array of large corporations. There has to be some root cause of this; too much smoke in this area to be a coincidence. And of course, the "Professional CEO" relieved of his duties--and replaced by the company founder, returning on a white horse to his original role to refocus the company.

These things have been so common in corporate America. Business writers may have been able to perform an automated "search and replace" in their word processor and write a new, yet the same, story for each additional corporation unfortunate enough to make the headlines. So what's the deal with Dell--the details always tell the real story--and what happens from here?


ENORMOUS SUCCESS OVER TIME

First off, I want to give Dell Computer and Michael Dell their just due. This is one of the great success stories in corporate history. Started in a dorm room, Mr. Dell built the company into the dominant PC maker of its time, with a long history of exceptional growth and profitability. The company used the direct model at the time when it was counter-intuitive that this would allow a long run of success--which it did. The story of Dell is much more about what has been done right--than wrong. I had some limited contact with Mr. Dell years after Dell was already a large company. He was courteous and thoughtful and very impressive. I have nothing but great respect for the company and its founder.

Probably the strongest endorsement I can make of my opinion of the company, is that the last 3 computers that I've purchased have been Dells--even though I am a proud alumnus of HP.


THE FATE OF ALL BIG COMPANIES

But Dell has definitely hit a major pothole, and has had its reputation tarnished on many levels. As I've written before, these things inevitably happen to all successful large companies. Nothing great lasts forever--and it should be pointed out that at Dell, it's lasted a very long time.

Growth has leveled off, and they are no longer the darling of Wall Street's growth followers. Accounting scandals always reduce a company in the eyes of the public, and firing your CEO, who you've been raving about for a while, doesn't exactly induce confidence in your future. But I think the biggest issue for Dell, is that they've taken their eye off of the ball when it comes to quality--and even more importantly--customer service.

I've written about this in the past, and I think it has played a primary role in Dell's current problems. When I bought my first Dell computer, quality was almost unquestioned, and customer service and support was a real strength. Unlimited support was bundled in with the product, and it was great. Contrast that with the situation today: Now you are buying a product which is perceived as lower quality, and you almost can't talk to anyone about anything without a charge. If you are allowed to speak someone in support, it's hit or miss whether they are knowledgeable, or speak your language fluently. I really believe that the root of the problems has been what I'd call "too much of a good thing": The relentless drive to reduce costs. As the PC business matured, Dell was far and away the low cost producer, and used this fact to great advantage. I believe that they got carried away with this strategy, and took their eye off of the ball of what made the company great in the first place. Service/Support quality has become such an issue for Dell that they've acknowledged it publicly, and announced plans to make significant investments to fix customer service. But real damage to the Dell brand has already been done, in my opinion. I, along with many others, will be looking closely at HP and other competitors when it comes to future computer and related technology purchases.


SO WHERE DO THEY GO FROM HERE?

All great companies hit this point eventually, and with all the company has going for it, the problems are imminently fixable. Unlike most companies that hit a bump in the road at this point, it doesn't appear that it has happened because the company has become grossly "fat, dumb and happy", with a bloated bureaucracy. No doubt there is some bureaucracy with a company this size, but ironically, cutting in the wrong places has been the major problem. Michael Dell has announced that he will look at "new strategies" for the company in his return to the CEO role. I consider this a positive. Often founders want to "go back to the future", and return to what they know made them successful in the first place--I don't believe that this is the right answer here.


THE OBVIOUS ANSWERS

The first thing is to fix customer service and support, regardless of the cost. The brand will continue to suffer without this, and that would ultimately be deadly. Mr. Dell has announced that he plans to greatly reduce the number of direct reports to the CEO. If done for the right reasons, I applaud this directive.

Even in a famously lean company like Dell, a company at this size tends to become pretty bureaucratic. There tends to be a lot of people around with curious, abstract job titles, who only serve to slow down, and get in the way of progress. Personnel in companies this size often end up spending a lot of time in large internal meetings--talking to each other, instead of listening to the market. Getting ahead in a company at this mature stage often is dependent on bureaucratic skills, rather that creating actual marketplace value. It's usually important to cull the herd of extraneous roles, and simplify and focus business processes on only those things that create revenue and profit. This looks painful in the short run, but the company actually runs much more smoothly in the long run.

THE NOT SO OBVIOUS ANSWERS

A more difficult decision is whether to remain with a largely "direct-only" business model. This is particularly difficult for Dell, because it has always been what they've hung their hats on. In fact, years ago when I had a few discussions with senior managers at the company, the feeling among upper management was that they didn't know how to do other forms of distribution, and that they had failed in their few toe dips into indirect waters.

In hindsight, at that time, the decision to remain primarily direct-only was the right one. Enormous value has been created with that strategy--you can't question it in hindsight. But at this stage of the company's development, I believe that they really need to rethink this. There is evidence that they've run out of steam with a direct-only distribution model. In fact, Dell has been dealing with the channel in a very low key manner for years. But both sides have sort of looked at it like "dealing with the devil": do it because you have to, but be careful not to get burned.

In my opinion, while it may appear risky, it is time for Dell to look at becoming a company that wants to be a real business partner with the channel. Do they want to have a real chance to stay a growth company?(which I assume they do--this is where the high stock P/Es are). If so, there are few other choices other than indirect distribution, at their current size, that will enable the kind of growth opportunities required for real growth. As they've looked farther from their core computer offering, to find other things to push through their direct pipe, they've been much less successful--as generally is the case. They've not become a real player in consumer electronics, and while they were initially pretty good at giving away printers--they were not so good at selling them, or more importantly, the consumables which are the money maker in that business. The company should proceed carefully and thoughtfully in this regard. I'm sure that Mr. Dell has other initiatives that he is considering, but I'd be shocked if consideration of a major indirect distribution push isn't high on his list of possibilities.


SUMMARY

What happens from here? Your guess is as good as mine. It should be very interesting to watch what new strategy emerges, and if this company famous for execution can return to those ways--especially if the future includes a major strategy shift. Corporations that have been as successful as Dell for as long as it has usually have 9 lives (see Apple Computer), and Dell is only on its second, by my count. So I wouldn't bet against them.

That's my opinion--what's yours? Post a comment or send me an email.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com