A Case Study in Bad Customer Service

In my opinion, the quality of a company's customer service is BY FAR the most important ingredient of the numerous factors that go into a company brand reputation. Unfortunately, there are too many companies--even of the large, successful variety--that just don't get it.


I wrote previously about "The End of Customer Service" back in May, 2008. With people pinching pennies due to the great recession, it doesn't appear that things have gotten any better.

The impetus to write further on this topic came from a recent, painful personal experience. The source of my pain was DIRECTV.

Troubling developments for a long-time customer

I have been a DirecTV customer for roughly 13 years. This is a long time for a relationship with any consumer products or services company. I initially fell in love with the programming offered by the company, especially they wide variety of sports. I still find their programming compelling. Initially, I also found the customer service and support to be first rate in the beginning. Unfortunately, over time the level of service has declined from first rate to astonishingly bad.

The level of customer service began slowly deteriorated about five years ago. I suspect that it did because the company was struggling to show a profit. It appears somewhere in that timeframe management of the company transitioned from a customer-orientation to focusing strictly on short-term profitability. This led to some short-sighted policies, which I believe could eventually lead to the death of this company.

A long series of customer service and equipment incidents over the last several years left me so frustrated that I decided I could no longer remain a customer, and became resigned to finding another TV service provider.

The final straw

My last customer service experience was what put me over the edge. I had payed $400 for an NFL programming package, only to find 2 games into the season that one of my two receivers was no longer capable of receiving this premium programming. It wasn't really a technical issue, but a decision by DirecTV to no longer support this specific programming on that type of receiver. The receiver worked fine otherwise, and in fact had some key features not available on the more contemporary DirecTV models of comparable capability. I had paid good money for the receiver and had given the company a large premium programming fee for the NFL package that year (and many previous years), and I had not been told prior to renewing football subscription that year that the receiver would no longer receive this programming.

A few years back DirecTV had come under the control of Rupert Murdoch, which led to an equipment partnership with one of Murdoch's affiliated companies. I have one of these as my primary receiver, and it contains some of the worst software I've ever seen in a consumer electronics device. Because of this, I would have preferred to continue to use my old receiver, which works great. But I wanted to be able to access my expensive NFL package on my second receiver, and I felt that I was at least entitled to one that could do this without losing other features important in my current receiver--at not cost, given the circumstances.

What ensued was a Keystone-Cop like series of customer service episodes punctuated by poorly trained service reps, extremely long phone-support hold times and multiple equipment shipments back and forth. I won't bore you with every detail, but it started with an initial call which required 15-20 re-dials just to get through to the "hold" point, followed by a 1½ hours wait time. I'd like to say that was the worst part of the experience, but things actually went downhill from there.

At the end of this saga, I knew more about the internal customer service processes and procedures at DirecTV than most of the representatives I spoke with. It wasn't hard; most of them seemed to be clueless. Some of them were good people trying hard to help me--others just didn't caret. But many were inexperienced or poorly-trained, and nearly all of them were overwhelmed by the sheer complexity required to accomplish even the simplest task. Long story short, my simple request for a replacement receiver that would leave me happy paying DirecTV in excess of $100 every month was never fulfilled.

Even the CEO couldn't make it right

It was at this point I'd had enough, and was resigned to the fact that I needed to change TV service providers. It wasn't what I wanted--I felt I'd been pushed into a corner by the company's arrogance and incompetence. But first I needed to blow off some steam, and so I wrote an email to the DirecTV CEO, detailing my painful experience. To his credit, he immediately and personally responded, apologizing and agreeing that what happened to me should not have happened. He asked if he could still make the situation right, and promised to have his personal representatives contact me to fix the situation. I was pleased by his reaction.

I was quickly contacted by a member of the DIRECTV Customer Advocate Team, a small top-secret group that you wouldn't be aware of if you hadn't interacted with the highest levels of company management. She was very nice and understanding, and told me that she was empowered to do just about anything that was required to make me a happy customer once again.

Apparently she was empowered to do anything except fill my very simple request.

She offered me a lot of things, many which were desirable. But I was a bit stuck on principle at this point; I wanted to be able to watch my expensive NFL package on a second receiver with comparable features, with no additional money out of my pocket.

She told me she could take care of this, but with one big condition: I'd be locked in to 24 additional months with DirecTV. Apparently, any new equipment sent to a customer automatically triggered this additional 24 month commitment, which no one had the power to override--no exceptions.

Complete idiocy--and very bad business

Here there is a customer who has stayed with a company for 13 years and loves their programming, but has been treated badly by customer service, and feels wronged. Making him happy is going to cost you probably $25 extra to send him a premium receiver instead of a basic one. He'd like to find an excuse to stay, but ready to leave due to frustration. The response is to try to lock him in for 24 months against his will?

I was wondering: are there any managers trained in Marketing at DirecTV? Is there anyone in upper management that has actually ever dealt with a customer? Or are they all accountants?

So for all the software developers and manufacturers out there, what are the takeaways from this customer service tale of the absurd?

Takeaway Lessons

Your product/service isn't everything - I still love the DirecTV programming, but will be leaving because everything else surrounding it has turned bad.

Train your people - There is often a lot of turnover in the customer service department, and it's easy to skimp on training for people that might not be there too long. If you don't want to ruin your brand, Train & Retain! These folks ARE the company to the customers calling for help.

The customer is king - regardless of how desirable your offering is, the customer has alternatives. Treat him badly, and he will vote with his feet--its human nature.

Lock customers in with value, not contracts - that's where you'll find loyalty and long-term profitability. 24 month contracts will only create animosity with your customers--and represent a big opportunity for an upstart, more customer-focused competitor.

Don't be arrogant - Regardless of your market position, if a customer truly has been treated shabbily, swallow hard and do whatever it takes to make it right. Install a customer service culture of taking care of the customer, almost regardless of direct costs. The hidden costs of angry customers are very high from word of mouth and other bad publicity--especially in the Internet Age.

Don't let your accountants set Marketing and Customer Service Policy - As described above, the easily traceable short-term costs savings which are the focus of the financial guys, will be overwhelmed by less obvious negative effects on future revenue, due to damage to your brand.

So that's my sad story, and hopefully some valuable lessons for all of us as we formulate marketing and customer service policies. Do you have a customer service story of your own, negative or positive? Have a different view on the state of customer service today? Share with us in the comment section below.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Is The Tech Recovery Upon Us?

Let's face it, things still aren't great economically: unemployment is over 10% nationally in the US, credit is tight for small businesses as well as reduced access to investment capital, and consumer's moods, while improving are still not positive.

However, while I don't want to overstate the case, but I do believe we are on the way to recovery. This has strategic implications for software and tech companies.


A look at the positives:

Stock markets on the rise--The Dow Jones Industrial average is up nearly 65% in the last nine months. Tech stocks in particular have been strong: the benchmark NYSE Arca Computer Technology Index is up nearly 95% in the same period. This is from a very deep bottom, of course. But it adds considerable wealth increases optimism, which usually leads to positive momentum.

Search firms are adding their own staff-- ExecuNet's benchmark Search Firm Hiring Index has increased the last two quarters, after many quarters of decrease. This is a nice indicator of expected increased hiring by businesses overall.

Worldwide employment on the rise -- Manpower, Inc.'s Global Employment Outlook Survey for Q1 2010 states that the employment outlook is mostly positive in the Americas and Asia-Pacific, while still somewhat mixed in EMEA. Labor market strength in Asia-Pacific, which is becoming increasingly important as a consumer market, is expected to return to levels similar to before the global downturn.

VCs still have lots of money to invest -- After sitting on the sidelines in fear (like everyone else with money in their pockets) during this great recession, Venture Capitalists are starting to poke their heads out among the economic green shoots. They were sitting on huge amounts of capital that was raised in the pre-recession bubble environment, much of which is still not invested-but still accruing management fees. I have heard that there are now many limited partners filing lawsuits as a result of their funds lying fallow, which may stimulate an acceleration of VC investments in the coming year.

IT spending is forecast to rise -- After several down years and a very bad 2009, Garner is projecting an increase in excess of a 3% in IT spending worldwide in 2010. This is very important, and a bullish signal for the tech sector heading into the New Year.

The IPO market window appears to be opening -- Security software company Fortinet had a very successful offering in November. Meru Networks, a supplier of wireless LAN solutions, announced today it planned to raise $86M in an initial public offering. IPOs tend to drive increased capital access up and down the food chain, and that window has been closed for some time. If it opens significantly, that bodes well for growth in the software and tech sector.


No more bubbles - at least anytime soon

We're not heading toward another bubble anytime soon. It appears we're headed for moderate, but hopefully sustainable growth as a result of our two catastrophic burst bubble in the last decade. Government debt, commercial real estate and inflation potential are concerns in the long run, but appear to be manageable in the near term.


What should tech companies do?

First of all, don't be stupid and increase spending if your situation doesn't support it -- credit is still very tight, and access to investment capital still remains below typical levels of the last decade. So make sure your plans are supported by cash flow, or in the case of early stage companies, at least access to reasonable levels of debt financing or investment capital.

If you are able to spend, it's a great time to grow fast or take share from competitors -- when the economy is just starting to take off and buying is accelerating, act before your cautious competitors have come out of their shells.

In general, companies tend to be too conservative in their investment and hiring plans -- Take note that hiring tends to peak at the apex of an economic cycle, just before growth slows or turns negative. In fact, many experts consider strong hiring a leading indicator of an economy that's lost its momentum. I've never been a fan of hiring just because you have the money and growth rate to support it. This is a leading cause of bloated cost structures and bureaucratic, slow moving organizations. But most companies are pretty lean in staff after several years of recession. So if you really do need people, it's more productive to hire them now as we begin an up cycle, instead of waiting until the very end of it as so often happens.

That's my forecast and advice for the software and technology business sector as we enter 2010. What's your forecast? I'd love to hear it. Post a comment or shoot me an email to add your own spin to this discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil via email at info@pjmconsult.com.

VAR vs. Retail Distribution in Software and Technology Markets

There is much talk in the software and technology industry about distribution through the "Channel". Generically that means selling through some type of a third party company, rather than selling directly to the end customer. But in reality the "Channel" includes a wide variety of disparate types of third party resellers. Today we'll take a look at when to consider partnering with two of the main channel reseller types, VARs and Retailer--which also happen to be two of the most different.


What's the difference between a VAR and a Retailer?

Let's start with the retailer, as that's a bit more obvious. With respect to software and hardware products, we're talking about computer, specialty electronics and mass market stores, independents as well as regional and national chains. Retail is both a B2C channel and a B2B channel, especially when talking about serving the small and medium size business (SBM) market. While retailers may offer some "value-added" services such as extended warranties, delivery, installation, etc., the main purpose of a retail store is quite simple. The retailer serves primarily as a point-of-sale location, holding inventory and enabling end customers to have immediate access to products at favorable prices.

VARs (Value-Added-Resellers) are in many respects the polar opposite to retailers. The VAR channel is strictly B2B, and sells to both large enterprises and the SMB market. Usually there isn't a retail storefront--if there is, it's not a big part of the business. Expensive retail space is avoided to minimize their real estate costs, because walk-in traffic isn't part of the business model. Unlike retailers, VARs are focused on selling their services, such as installation, configuration, integration, customization, etc, rather than turning over large quantities of products. VARs aren't interested in having a large "assortment" of products like retailers. This is a key point that channel newbie are prone to miss--at great cost to their company. While VARs do sell products, they are motivated to do so in only two instances:

1) Core products which are strategic because the VAR's services are built around them
2) Easy to sell, demand-driven commodity products requested by their customer base

If you take just one thing away from this article, let it be this: VARs aren’t dying to sell most products. If your product doesn't fit into one of the two categories above, you will be pushing on a rope trying to make progress in the VAR channel.

Is one of these channel types "better" than another?

One is not superior to the other. Each reseller type is better for different product types and circumstances. They both can be used quite profitably, but they serve different purposes. It's important when designing a channel strategy to start with the end customer and work backwards. Where would the end customer like to buy? How important is price vs. services and support? What reseller type best meets the desires and needs of your target customer type(s)?

When you should use the VAR channel

While VARs aren't product-oriented businesses, in aggregate they are still a very important channel for many product types. If you have a product which requires a high level of support, or "value-added" services such as expert installation, integration with other products, customization or 24/7 support, VARs can play a key role in your distribution strategy. If you have a popular commodity product, they can be useful (in aggregate) to greatly expand your distribution points. The VAR channel is highly segmented by vertical market, so if your product has a vertical orientation (networking, medical, insurance, etc.) this often creates an opportunity for VARs to be an important channel partner.

When you should use the Retail channel

Retailers are usually best for horizontal, commodity or mature products. They are effective at providing broad, immediate access to your products across a wide geographic area. Retailers typically are "inventory turn" oriented in their business models, and tend to work on thin margins. So if keeping your price point low is important while still using a third party channel, they are an excellent choice. Of course the fact that they provide instant access to your products during business hours can be a very important asset.

Can you use both VARs and Retailers for the same product?

Yes, but you must know what you are doing, or you may end up very sorry that you did. Since VARs and retailers bring very different things to your distribution, there is a strong chance of serious channel conflict if you use both reseller types for the same product. The biggest potential issue is degradation of your product street price, because while VARs typically work off high product margins and low turnover, retailers are the opposite. Retailers optimize their businesses for high inventory turnover, while accepting low product margins. The low margin strategy causes the street price of your product to fall for all channels distributing your product. If the street prices drop too low, the margins may drop too far to be interesting to VARs (even though they are focused primarily on their service offerings). Companies new to multi-channel distribution sometime make this problem even more acute by offering price discounts based on volume, which makes the situation even worse. A volume-based pricing strategy favors the higher volume retail channel, and also incentivizes even deeper street price drops, to create higher volumes and resulting better wholesale prices. Multi-channel pricing is a complex area fraught with danger for the uninitiated--new players should solicit outside advice, and tread carefully.

VARs and retailers can be important, high volume distribution channels for many software and tech companies. They can each be primary distribution channels, or combined with direct a sales approach and other channels to form highly efficient multi-channel distribution networks. More distribution is not always better, however. Companies need to know what they are doing when proceeding with a multi-channel strategy, or risk doing great damage to their sales and marketing efforts.

That's how I view using VARs and retail in your distribution strategy. How do you see it? Post a comment to get a discussion going. Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

Will SaaS Lead to the Death of Software Product Management?

There is a lot of talk in the software business these days about changing business models, particularly the trend toward SaaS (Software as a Service).

Will SaaS business models dominate the software business?

Many consultants, pundits and other industry figures are proclaiming that SaaS will very soon take over the world; saying if you're not on the bus soon, you're going to be out of business. I believe this is a bit overstated, but the strong trend toward the SaaS business model can't be denied.

My opinion on SaaS adoption: When bandwidth is unlimited and close to free, all IT systems are totally secure, the Internet is as reliable as old AT&T and every customer in the world decides they want to rent everything and own nothing--then I'll agree that SaaS is heading toward 100% market share. As I said above there's a strong trend in this direction, but we're a long way from there.

Is software product management dead?

I've written about SaaS a number of times before, and since it has become very important in the software business I'll continue to do so frequently. What I want to address today is another opinion some "experts" are also espousing: that the trend toward SaaS means the end of the Product Management function in the software business.

I find this statement to be downright silly.

When following this debate, it's important to take notice that many of the folks proselytizing these opinions have businesses whose success is based upon these predictions actually coming true. It's always important to consider conflicts of interest among the debaters.

In one recent webinar they trotted out a SaaS software company that was growing briskly every year with no product managers in the company. What wasn't said is that it was always possible to find software companies (of the traditional sort) who didn't have a product management function. Software companies are often founded by programmers, and they haven't always seen the need for Product Management. There are very successful companies where the developers talk directly to the customers, with no product managers at all. However, the facts are that a very small percentage of companies that do business this way are successful, and its usually based upon special circumstances: the rare developer who understands markets and customers as well as he does coding, markets where the developers themselves are perfect customer proxies, etc.

So while software companies without Product Managers have always been out there, it just hasn't been a broad formula for success. Trotting out one SaaS company successfully doing business this way (incidentally, I saw some big holes in their model long-term) doesn't impress me much.

I'm not defending the status quo--I'll say it once again, there is a huge move to SaaS in the software biz. Many (and maybe most) will be doing business this way in the near future. However, like most over-hyped trends, this are some pretty big overstatements being thrown around.

SKILLED product management will always be important

The argument being made is that many of the functions Product Managers currently perform are obsolete under the SaaS model. With continuous development more practical using SaaS, there may be fewer (or no) new version introductions. So the old waterfall chart with MRDs being created for the new version may go away along with new product introductions. I'm sure you get the picture. SaaS is a pretty fundamental change to the software business model, so you wouldn't expect a product manager's job to be stagnant under such change.

But those predicting the death of product management are focusing on the more mundane aspects of Product Management. The essence of this critical function is the ability to understand markets and match widespread, aggregate customer needs to the technical skills and IP of your company--creating a PRODUCT which can be sold to these many people. It doesn't matter whether you deliver this PRODUCT over the Internet in a hosted manner using monthly subscriptions, or in the more traditional on-customer premises, licensed model. Product Management is about creating a profitable PRODUCT well-matched for a market segment. It matters not whether you are engaged in customer facing marketing/promotional activities, or upfront product planning--the product manager's understanding of market needs and how your company can fulfill those needs is crucial in a product business. Otherwise, you're just selling custom software--one-off's for every customer. That's a different business--not a bad one--and one you which doesn't require product managers.

Can Social Media replace Product Management?

Another thing being bandied about by my favorite pundits is the impact of communities and other social media for its potential impact on product development. The thinking goes that there will be much more direct interaction with the end customer, leading to tremendous amounts of data available to ISVs. While SaaS is very well suited to communities (although not exclusive--they can be well utilized by traditional licensed software vendors), the ability to more easily obtain direct customer comments, and maybe take votes on potential new features doesn't eliminate the need for product management. To the contrary. While communities and other forms of social media are very powerful tools, don't mistake more data and customer access with actionable market intelligence. Data needs to be interpreted, and skilled marketers are best positioned to discern who's telling you what and why--the underlying motivations behind any customer feedback. So all of this added customer access and resulting data will only put a premium on good product management, to use these powerful new tools and data for quicker action and to allow better product planning decisions. Remember, SaaS competitor down the road will have access to the same tools and data that you do.

It is rare to find a developer who has truly exceptional product management skills. That's not a knock on developers; as a whole they are an extremely sharp bunch. But specialization in life happens for a reason--very seldom is someone the best at everything. Developers are trained to write code and build applications, not understand markets or extract the "truth" from customers. Different types of people's brain's work differently, and a good developer and good product manager are an example of this.

I find that it's when a talented, open-minded development manager teams with a market-savvy product manager, that most great software applications are made. So no, I don't believe that the Product Management function is going away anytime soon in the software business. There are many important changes going on in the business, the SaaS business model not the least of these. With any change in business model, functional roles will evolve and change. But I believe strongly that Product Management is a fundamental, important role that will remain critical in software businesses far into the future.

That's what I think about SaaS and product management--what do you think? Post a comment to start the discussion! Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

Startup Mistakes by Software and Tech Companies

Starting a company, any kind of company is the hardest thing to do in business. Sez me.

It's also one of the most rewarding and fun, if you're built for the startup experience--though not everyone is. Technology startups have their own unique challenges. There are many different ways to drive off the road, some of which I list below. Keep in mind that no startup is perfect, and mistakes will be made. The future can not be forecast, and in a software or tech startup you're often flying nearly blind without a map, because you are trying to do something new and different.

In the end, if you are able to make it through, overcoming your mistakes may be the most satisfying part of the whole startup experience. So keep in mind that it's almost impossible to play a perfect game. On the other hand, it's crucial to steer clear of the mistakes which are often avoidable--because you only get some many chances to recover from errors.

Here are some of the common, often avoidable missteps to be aware of:

Too little capital
Sometimes this is unavoidable--but if you really don't have enough capital maybe you shouldn't start up in the first place. Activities such as software product development are notorious for going way past schedule and over budget. Most products don't move like a knife through butter with the first modest promotional campaign. So build a decent amount of backup money into your plan, because things rarely go as planned. If they do, great, you can use the money to accelerate growth. But when things don't go well, you'll at least give yourself a fighting chance, if you've set aside a bit of money for a rainy day.

Don't try to be a "Big Company" right off the bat
Many startup management teams are jealous of the resources available to their established competitors. These folks can become "Big Company Wannabes", a classic formula for going out of business early. Don't spend your precious time and resources on activities that don't efficiently bring the product out, or market it. Period. Lavish trade show booths, company parties, expensive or large offices, administrative assistants for all the execs, etc., etc. Don't hire a lot of big company people who don't have early stage experience--they are prone to the types of costly waste listed above.

No backup plan
It is a startup and you have to expect little margin for error in reaching success. But that's no excuse for a lack of strategic planning--within the constraints of your resources. A backup plan might be something simple: software companies going to open source if your high-priced commercial strategy meets resistance, a service-oriented revenue strategy with a cheap or free product, using a channel rather than building a full sales force, licensing your technology instead of marketing a full product to end users. It depends on your circumstances, but do try to have some type of a contingency plan going in.

The "Techies know everything" syndrome
This is a common malady in tech startups, because many new software and tech companies are led by management heavy in experience from the engineering or software development side of the business. Usually these folks are very smart, but in some cases also a bit full of themselves, unable to know their own blind spots. Those blind spots often appear in marketing and sales (which every engineer and software developer knows are easy, non-complex activities). The really smart guys quickly figure out those other parts of the business besides the tech stuff is hard as well, and make adjustments through education and bringing in outside expertise.

The "Technology is everything" syndrome
This is a corollary to the bullet point above. The technology and product is crucial in a tech startup, since it is usually the basis for your competitive advantage. But it's not everything, and many a startup has failed despite great technology and an exciting new product.

No marketing budget or in-house expertise
Believe it or not, I see a lot of companies with little or no promotional budget. Its insanity, but they only have enough money to get the product built, apparently thinking "if you build it they will come". This is nearly always a failure mode. If there is someone with marketing expertise among the founders, they usually won't allow this to happen. So secure a marketer on your founding management team, or at least find a close advisor you will listen to, early on.

Under-estimating time to market
This is a very common mistake. By definition, you are trying to do something new, which isn't forecast-able. So don't believe your own pretty Gantt charts--garbage-in equals garbage-out when it comes to schedules. Don't count on making it to the big trade show, commit to costly promotional activities with no recourse, or let the developers all plan to leave for that well-deserved month in Hawaii. Get the product done first. I tell you this with many painful experiences as a teacher, both personally in software and tech companies and through my clients.

Under-estimating time-to-success
Even if you are able to get the product out on time, that doesn't mean version one will hit the ground running. They often crawl, stumble and fall at first. After all, this is your first opportunity at really accurate market research. Even if the product is right on target, finding the marketing mix that works is generally trial and error. Many products don't find success until their second version is released, so have some money in the bank, and some emotional bandwidth available for this possibility.

Introducing a "buggy" product
This is one of my biggest pet peeves, especially for software products. Most products aren't fully stable when the developers think it is ready. They work on it so long and hard, that human nature wants it to be finished near the end--and dangerous shortcuts can be the result. Dedicate as many resources as you can spell to ensure a credible, third party view that the product is as stable as it can be, before the market gets the opportunity to "debug it" for you. You only get one chance to make a first impression. If the situation is bad enough, it can cost you your business.



There are my thoughts on what critical mistakes to avoid in a technology startup. I'm sure many of you have your own lessons and ideas to share. Post a comment to start the discussion! Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

Compensating the High Tech Sales Force

A very controversial topic within many software and other tech companies is how to best compensate the sales force. How much is required? How much is too much? What's the best mix of salary and incentive comp?

If you've read anything I've written before, you'll find my next comment familiar:

It all depends on your particular situation.

There is no across-the-board best practice for optimizing your sales force's performance via compensation strategy. Every company, market and competitive landscape is different at any given point in time.

Let's take a look at some of the more common variables and how they might affect your compensation strategy:


Established brand vs. startup
If you're a startup, plan on paying your sales reps more. It will be harder to attract great reps as a startup, unless you are in a special situation with an incredibly hot new product (of course, every startup CEO thinks this way about their product!). You may need to pay reps a higher base, and certainly richer commissions than your established competitors. Some of this can be mitigated if you are offering an equity opportunity, as discussed later. But for sure, prospective reps need to believe that there is a good chance they can make more money at your startup, or you won't be able to compete with established companies for the same level of folks. That's just a fact of life.

Price Point
If your price points are higher, you may need to pay a higher base salary, if the total number of sales made will be low. Lower price points lend themselves to higher commissions and lower bases, because the rep will be able to start making money sooner, and more regularly.

Length of sales cycle
The sales cycle aspect is pretty straightforward, and tied closely to the price point discussion above. Price points and sales cycles almost always have a direct relationship. High price points lead to longer sales cycles, and low price points to shorter cycles. It's harder to compensate heavily on commission if there is a long sales cycle, because sales reps need to eat regularly, too. If you have a product that takes a long time to sell, make sure that you have a decent base salary for your reps, if you want to keep the good ones.

Growth vs. harvest
Companies generally highly value reps that can sell new products and into new accounts--they want to pay for growth. So the more you are asking your reps to do what is considered to be the hardest thing in sales -- sell "new"-- the higher the commission structure should be. Selling "new" is the highest form of risk in sales, and it should be compensated by the highest reward. Selling established products and selling into established accounts (harvesting) is not as risky, and as a result can often carry lower commission structures.

Initial sale vs. ongoing revenue
Similar to the growth vs. harvest discussion, sometime you are selling a product that has upfront revenue as well as ongoing revenue, typically from updates, replacements or services. You generally want to pay higher commissions for the upfront portion than you do the ongoing revenue. A good example of this is a traditional software license with an annual maintenance fee. If you pay commissions on the maintenance portion at all, in most circumstances the payout should be lower than the incentive on the upfront license fee.

Commodity vs. missionary sales
Commodity sales lend themselves to high commissions and low (sometimes even zero) base salaries. This is because sales cycles are usually short for commodities, and since they are by definition in big markets it's easier to make a base level of sales and resulting commissions, even for a new rep. By the very nature of commodities the rep's service is often a major differentiating success factor, so a comp mix toward commissions rewards the exceptional rep to really work hard. Missionary sales, on the other hand, require a great deal of patience by the rep, as well as a lot of hand-holding and relationship building. To keep good sales reps in such a situation, it's important to have base salaries which are adequate to enable the best sales reps to exhibit patience with the long sales process. Missionary sales are an area that really demands both high bases and strong commission structures, as they are one of the most demanding forms of selling.

Hunters vs. Farmers
Hunters obtain new accounts while Farmers maintain and maximize the sales into existing accounts. These two situations require two different sales personalities, and the compensation packages should be different as well. The hard-charging hunter will require a decent base salary, but really needs the high commission structure to keep him motivated. The Farmer is likely to be a more stability-oriented, relationship-building style of rep. A relatively higher base and lower commission structure is usually more comfortable for reps in situation.

Equity
In most cases, the playing field is slanted toward established companies when it comes to compensating and attracting sales reps. Equity participation can be the great equalizer for startups in compensation. Every company has a different view of how broadly to offer equity. But a startup that offers equity participation to its sales force can often give up less in cash compensation. For risk-taking reps, equity can even be the deciding factor in recruiting, in some cases. The lure of equity that might grow into a significant stake at a successful startup can help pull a rep from a more established job.


So what specifically should you be paying your reps? Laying out actual numbers is beyond the scope of this discussion, because there are too many factors and potential situations to generalize. All the factors above come into play in structuring a sales compensation package, as well as factors such as inside vs. outside sales. Every situation is different, and competitive factors also come into play, if you're competing directly with your rivals for reps. Local market circumstances, as well as the overall economy, can also play a strong role in setting the final package.

Above all, if you want to optimize the performance of your sales force using compensation as a tool, you must do your homework. Don't just quickly come up with something that "sounds good" or is "how you've done if before". Analyze the situation of your unique company at this particular point in time, and at certainly consider at a minimum the factors mentioned above.

That's my thinking on how to compensate your sales force--what's yours? Post a comment below or shoot me an email if there is a particular situation you'd like to discuss.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

All atwitter About Twitter Marketing

There's been a lot said and written about the newest Social Media craze, Twitter.

Particularly in the popular press, there's also been a lot of misinformation. Sometimes the only way to get the real story is to try it yourself. I thought I'd give it a shot, and throw in my two cents on what Twitter's really all about with respect to marketing.

I've been on Twitter for a few months now. As of today, I'm following around 45 people, and have about 45 following me as well. I think that at this point I've got a pretty good idea of what Twitter is and isn't. So here's my take:

WHAT TWITTER IS

Most fundamentally, it's a micro-blogging platform with a limitation of 140 characters per post. Most of you have almost certainly seen a blog online by now. Just like blog postings come in many shapes, sizes and topics, so do "tweets"--the term for an individual message or post on Twitter. "Following" someone on Twitter is akin to subscribing to updates on a blog.

The 140 character limitation is very extreme, and forces even the most verbose writers to be very brief. This can be a good thing. This 140 character limitation also allows Twitter to be available on even platforms with very limited resources, such as cell phones. This wide platform availability extends the potential uses for Twitter, greatly adding to its utility as a one-to-many instant-communication tool. Twitter is actually pretty simple.

WHAT TWITTER ISN'T

It's not robust--it's very limited by the 140 characters. So it isn't suitable for everything--certainly not anything that requires a lot of detail. You really can't publish anything of note directly on Twitter. It's not good for:

* Complex or lengthy communications
* Private communications, while possible, are probably best handled via other methods.
* It doesn't replace a Blog or website

Contrary to what you see in the popular mass media, it's not some weird cult of people who are inexplicably exchanging tweets on what they're having for breakfast. It's also not strictly an avenue for following the day to day minutiae of People Magazine's list of 100 top celebrities (Aston Kutcher's 1 million twitter followers notwithstanding) The biggest thing to remember about Twitter is that it's just a horizontal communications medium--which by itself isn't much of anything. Twitter is really what people decide to make of it.

WHAT TWITTER IS GOOD FOR

The uses for Twitter are almost as broad as the profile of its millions of users. It's hard to classify best uses because of this. But in simple terms, I find that the major uses of Twitter falls into a few categories--at least with respect to what interests a marketer:

Personal Communications with friends
In this respect, Twitter is like a simpler, quicker version of Facebook in how it's being used. This is where you see people broadcasting where they're having breakfast--those messages are really intended for their circle of close friends.

Personal Branding
An executive or professional using Twitter to increase awareness of his/her capabilities or work.

Business Branding
Similar to personal branding, but used by a business to provide exposure to the capabilities, products or services it offers.

Business Communications
This is the more tactical business use--restaurants broadcasting the specials of the day to their customer base, new product announcements, links to press releases, etc.

HOW BEST TO USE TWITTER

Have a strategy, and stay true to it
If you are using Twitter for business branding, don't continuously talk about what you're doing for fun that night. A more personal message occasionally which is of particular interest in fine, but remember your target audience. This is one of the biggest mistakes that a newbie Twitterer makes--they think being on Twitter means broadcasting their daily minutae. But for business conversations--who's interested in that? It's common sense. If you're using Twitter for business/marketng purposes, stay on topic at least most of the time. If you want to use Twitter extensively for multiple purposes, it might be best to create multiple personas.

Use it to listen and learn--not just broadcast
If you pick the right people to follow, Twitter can be an extremely efficient source of information in your chosen topical interests. You have to be careful--you can easily become obsessed, and Twitter can become a real time sink. But if you're judicious in your use, you can leverage the work of others to find things of interest to you. And by watching how other skilled Twitter users utilize the platform, you can learn how best to use the tool yourself.

Use links
Even though the 140 character limit won't allow complex messages, links are allowed, and are very powerful in Twitter. Often Tweets are "teasers" or introductions to the linked document. For example, I broadcast the availability of new articles on my Blog by posting a Twitter message

Use keywords
One of the most powerful aspects of Twitter is the ability to easily "re-tweet" a message, or pass it along to your own Twitter network of followers. This makes Twitter a very powerful viral platform in getting the word out on your chosen topic. If you include keywords in your tweet that are relevant to your target audience, the viral aspect can really enhance the breadth of delivery of your marketing message.

That's a take on Twitter after a few months of use. I'm sure many of you have different experiences with this exciting new platform--post a comment and let's get the discussion going!

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

Business Intelligence Software 101

This month we have a guest Blogger: The Actuate Corporation Team. Acutuate is an Open Source Business Intelligence Software vendor. Hope you enjoy their post-Phil Morettini



Thanks to the global recession, companies worldwide are looking for ways to streamline their organizations and cut costs. Increasingly, they’re turning to business intelligence software to help find solutions. Developed by vendors like SAP, IBM, and Oracle, this highly customizable software enables businesses to analyze and mine data more effectively.

BI software is particularly useful for large-scale organizations with correspondingly large customer bases and data streams. With access to data analysis from across their organization, companies can respond to problems and implement change more rapidly. And in cases where a company needs to make layoffs, BI software can tap into data to track employee productivity.

In this way, business intelligence and reporting tools (BIRT) enable large organizations to be nimble. Fast food companies, for instance, can utilize BI software to see how sales, inventory and operations compare regionally and internationally. BI software can also track operational functionality, determining, say, the optimal staffing scenario for a financial services firm for any given economic conditions.

BI software can also be used to run detailed financial analyses on everything from revenues and expenses to cash flow, accounts receivable and profit statements. This analysis can be broken down further by business unit or region, and can point to trends across an organization. These reports can then, in turn, be implemented in planning, budgeting, monitoring and forecasting.

From a big-picture perspective, BI software can be used to inform strategic decisions. Some companies might analyze the most effective marketing techniques for a product launch in a particular region based on demographics and past performance data. Others might run the numbers on potential partnerships to forecast the likelihood of success.

In the case of direct mail marketers, BI software can be used to mine customer data to track new sales opportunities. Companies can pinpoint which potential buyers to target based on demographic information and prior purchase history, and likewise refine their messaging to reach those customers more effectively.

According to a recent article in BusinessWeek, companies from Carnival Cruises to Proctor & Gamble are utilizing BI software to beat the recession. P&G recently turned to software to analyze how the rise in gas prices was impacting consumer-shopping behavior. Carnival, meanwhile, mined their database to determine which prior customers to target as potential repeat sailors.

Even the federal government is jumping on the BIRT (URL: http://www.actuate.com/why-actuate/birt-to-actuate/) bandwagon, with the Environmental Protection Agency offering business intelligence software to its offices on a fee-per-user basis. As EPA program manager Timothy Hinds told NextGov.com, "We provide...business intelligence tools [and] analytics tools on a software-as-a-service model, as if we were a contractor. [Users] don't have to install anything.”

Because BI software is highly customized, it can be quite expensive. BusinessWeek reports that “companies can spend as little as thousands of dollars on BI software, or up to millions of dollars. A typical business intelligence deal in a large enterprise with a large vendor is somewhere from $150,000 to $300,000.”

BusinessWeek also points to a survey released by Gartner in January of more than 1,500 CIOs worldwide. That survey ranked BI software as the top technology spending priority for companies in 2009.



Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

Will Microsoft's BING Finally Bring Success in the Search Engine Market?

Microsoft's new search service is called BING, and takes a contrarian approach to the simple Google Interface. The BING interface is kind of a cross between Google and the Yahoo Directory, with a bit of Expedia, MapQuest, Shopping.com, UTube and Flicker thrown in for good measure. Never accuse Microsoft of being modest in their ambitions--this site takes on directly just about every major category in the online world.

I've given BING a quick look. It's polished and appears pretty comprehensive. The search results don't seem to be that much different from previous Microsoft efforts, although the interface's major categories may allow the finding of information more quickly than an elegantly simple one like Google's--if you know upfront the category of information that you're looking for.

HOW LIKELY IS SUCCESS?

Will they succeed? They have many times before in similar situations. They've been laughed at and written off in quite a number of markets over the years. MS has a bad corporate habit of releasing poor products in their first one, two, and even three incarnations. Any other company would give up after so many failures in a particular segment-but not Microsoft. Don't forget that as a software company, Microsoft has always seemed to believe that it is their god-given right to sell every line of software code written in the world.

There are many examples of Microsoft rising from the dead in software market segments. In spreadsheets, Excel was at one point in time a speck on the wall compared to Lotus 123. WordPerfect had a commanding lead over MS Word in word processing back in the DOS days. And a large number of MS Network Operating System Server software offerings (beginning with LAN Manager) were considered a joke relative to Novell Netware, for the longest time back in the 90s.

In all of these situations, Microsoft had the last laugh, soundly beating their seemingly entrenched and unbeatable rivals in large market segments. As a result of this corporate history, they believe that can beat anyone and rarely give up. Occasionally, I have seen them back off, notably after several tries competing with Intuit in personal financial software. But if it's considered a strategic, core segment by MS, they will throw a huge amount of resources at the segment, take large losses, and not give up until they've broken through.

I call them the Terminator of High Tech.

TERRIBLE TRACK RECORD IN ONLINE SERVICES

Of course, this isn't a pure software market, its online services. The problem for Microsoft with Bing and the search engine market in general is that they've been floundering almost completely, for a long period of time, in online services. In fact, they've not had much success in their history online at all. This is especially noteworthy in contrast to their domination of the desktop software business, and the competitive advantage their desktop monopoly should provide them in online services. Yet they've done poorly in almost everything online, and are a distant third in search engine marketing--not even all that close to a fading Yahoo.

So as most pundits will confirm, Microsoft has been terrible in the online world. This does not bode well for the possible success of Bing. But as I alluded to earlier, there is another side to this equation.

MICROSOFT CONSIDERS ONLINE SERVICES IN GENERAL AND SEARCH ENGINE MARKETING SPECIFICALLY, TO BE ABSOLUTELY AT THE CORE OF THEIR FUTURE SUCCESS--AND EVEN THEIR SURVIVAL.

Yes, this hugely successful company has always been a bit paranoid--which may be a bit on the humorous side given their overall success. But it has worked well for them over the years. It has given the company a sense of urgency which is very hard to generate in corporations of their size and stature. So anyone with a sense of history would be foolish to rule them out.

HOW CAN MS OUTFLANK GOOGLE?

But how are they going to defeat their competitors, mostly notably Google, this time in the online world? In my quick evaluation, I didn't see anything technically revolutionary, such as demonstrably more-relevant search results. Some people may prefer the Bing category-oriented interface better than Google's, but it will be a matter of taste--I can't see an overwhelming advantage here. In past cases MS may have overwhelmed a segment with marketing, or simply given away a product, to ensure defeat of a rival they feared could grow into a broad line Software competitor (Novell, Netscape, etc.). It's unclear to me what strategy they will be able to take to defeat Google, which is a dominant, embedded brand with wild profitability in Search Engine Advertising. But I believe they fear the Google franchise and know they need to crack to code to online success if they are going to retain their position in the long run. So don't expect any throwing in the towel any time soon.

Maybe Microsoft will hit upon some innovative strategy that will enable them to win the day in this crucial market. But the one thing I can think of right now, that may work in their favor, is deep pockets, longevity and sheer persistence. Google has also been unable to achieve success outside of their domination in their core Search Engine Marketing segment. This is very analogous to Microsoft's struggles outside of desktop software. The Search Engine advertising segment will eventually mature, and there are already some early signs of slowing. Plus Google risks killing the goose that laid their golden egg by raising their "Auction" bid rates to levels that will make it hard for their customers to make money--don't get me started on that. Advertisers may eventually take their advertising budgets elsewhere. So for MS in this crucial platform it may be a matter of hanging around, making incremental improvement to their Search Engine offerings, until Google shoots itself in the foot.

Doesn't sound like much of a strategy, I know. But stranger things have happened. Let me know what you thing of Microsoft's launch of Bing. Post a message or drop me an email.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Cloud Computing, SaaS and Such--Have We Read This Story Before?

I have this incredible feeling of déjà vu.

Cloud computing and Software as a Service is all the rage. In my practice at PJM Consulting, I am very involved in software startup activity. Nearly every new software company that I see today is being built on the Software as a Service business model. It's all the rage--so much so that it appears that any self-respecting software entrepreneur would be embarrassed to start a company using the traditional software licensing model. Even if an entrepreneur was so inclined, good luck finding a VC who would even consider funding such a company. No one wants to look like a dinosaur.

It's all well and good--there is definitely a real trend toward SaaS and Cloud Computing, with many good reasons for it. But most high technology trends are initially a bit over-hyped, and tend to get ahead of themselves. In addition, this particular story seems ever so familiar to a tech veteran that's been around for a few of these cycles.

The first bit of history this reminds me of is the old terminal/mainframe model from the early years of computing. There were some real advantages to this model, but also some big disadvantages as well--which opened the door for the golden age of PCs and networking.

The second era that the current SaaS wave reminds me of is "Web 1.0", when Web-based hosted software (then called ASP rather than the modern SaaS terminology), was first going to take over the world. The current trend seems so very similar because it was around the Web 1.0 years of the late 90s/early 2000 when the traditional software license business model was first proclaimed dead. At that time nearly every new business plan was based upon an ASP model.

So some of this fast-moving Cloud Computing or SaaS trend is new--but much of it could be viewed as recycled from past trends. Let's look at the Pros and Cons of this computing model:

ADVANTAGES

* Enables "Utility-Style" computing - variable expense instead of. capital investment
* Allows an end run around overwhelmed IT departments (like PC networking did)
* Supposedly "On-demand"--use only what you need, when you need it
* More efficient use of compute resources by time-slicing large farms of cost-efficient computing resources
* Web-based allows anywhere, anytime availability
* Off-site storage of data assists disaster recovery preparedness

DISADVANTAGES

* Immature and inherently more difficult Security
* More difficult integration with other applications
* Internet latency
* Internet reliability
* Data resides outside the company firewall
* Costs over time aren't necessarily lower for customers
* Lower margins for software vendors--aren't always accounted for in current pricing

SUMMARY

I believe that the trend toward computing in the cloud will continue, but there will be some stumbles and pullbacks along the way. Cloud Computing and SaaS has some inherent strengths--but also some under-publicized weaknesses. Many software vendors are overlooking the weaknesses at this time, as is typical of any new and hyped technology. Traditional licensed software hosted by the user still has its strengths and a definite place in the market. Like many mature technologies and business models, the death of traditional software licensing has been greatly exaggerated. Once the early hype passes, decisions on whether to computer within the firewall or in the cloud will once again be made on the individual merits, costs and user needs for a particular application within a particular company. That's how I see it--post a comment with your opinion so we can look at all viewpoints.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Oracle is buying Sun?

Breaking News…. Oracle buys Sun!? What's wrong with this picture?

What's surprising is that a very large software company is buying a very large hardware company. You often see a hardware company buying a software company, but I can't really think of a deal that's gone the other way around. Certainly not at this level. My practice at PJM Consulting serves all kinds of technology companies--but a focus is on software. Although every situation is different, my typical advice is for software companies to stay away from hardware, if at all possible.

This news is very interesting on several levels:

Involvement of two high profile, strong personalities in the technology business
I'm talking about Larry Ellison and Scott McNealy. Of course, MCNealy no longer actively runs Sun, but he is still Chairman and a power to be dealt with. He was allegedly the force behind the killing of the potential deal with IBM. Apparently Larry and Scott are old buddies, so maybe there won't be a problem. But these are two very strong-minded, controversial and sometimes outrageous leaders. Even though they are long time friends, they have never before played together so closely in the same sandbox. It wouldn't be shocking to see a few disagreements, and some public drama as a result.

Combining the Largest Revenue Database Product with the Largest in Unit Market Share
This aspect of the deal will not get as much attention as some of the others. But Oracle is the 500 lb Gorilla at the top end of the market, and the open source MYSQL is the most popular database choice at the low end, particularly in website development. This aspect likely won't demand anti-trust scrutiny because they don't really compete directly. But potential marketplace competition from MYSQL going up market, and Oracle bringing out lower cost solutions, is eliminated by this deal.

Software Company buying a Hardware Company
As I stated above, this is highly unusual, especially for companies of this size. Most established software companies have very high margins, and wouldn't want to "pollute" their earnings with the lower margin, often commoditized hardware revenue. I can't think of another comparable deal, looking back even into the distant past. The business models are pretty different. In hardware companies manufacturing efficiency and inventory control are major factors in business success; in most software businesses these are inconsequential factors to success. Hardware businesses tend to be more capital-intensive, while software businesses are very R&D intensive. I could go on, but suffice it to say that the management of these businesses includes different functional skill sets. Why is Ellison interested in Sun? Just for the Java and the Solaris OS software, or is he really going to continue with the hardware business as well? Even though in some ways, Sun was a bargain at the price of just under $6B net. But if he's just interested in the software pieces of Sun, the price looks pretty steep--Sun's direct revenue from Java and Solaris is a pretty minimal portion of its total revenue. Ellison had a flirtation with hardware years ago with the Network Computer concept--could he really still be itching to become a fully integrated systems company?

What will Oracle Do With Sun's Software?
To me, this is by far the most intriguing question raised by the deal. Solaris is a nice OS, and has a good installed base. But it's never really had the same impact in the market since open source Linux came around. Java is pervasive in the computing arena, and in embedded systems as well. It has a huge impact on the Internet. It's literally everywhere. But after trying to charge big money for Java in the early days, Sun decided to give it away. I was intimately involved in the embedded Java market in those early days. Sun initially looked like they had created a technology that could allow them to challenge Microsoft for computing dominance. I believe Microsoft was very worried at the time. But to say that Sun fumbled the ball would be way too kind. Frankly, their effort to commercialize Java was like something out of the Keystone Cops. I could detail their myriad missteps. To summarize, the biggest problem was that they were a hardware company attempting to commercialize a software product, which usually doesn't work very well. Sun appeared not to have a clue as to what they were doing. Finally, they quit trying to directly make money at Java; they put it into open source and basically decided to give away the technology to anyone who wanted to use it. It looked to me like a way to spite Microsoft, more than anything.

What Happens to Java?
So where does that leave Oracle once they close the deal and own Java? What is their plan to leverage Java in the marketplace? Will they start trying to charge for it somehow? I think this is doubtful; there's probably no going back on that decision at this point. I'm sure that Mr. Ellison and his team have something in mind--but I can't imagine what it is. They've been very savvy at making some acquisitions that haven't looked all that complementary, that have worked out well. So I wouldn't bet against them. But I can help wonder if they haven't stretched a bit too far in their minds to find synergy in this one. It reminds me a bit of Ebay's very expensive purchase of Skype, which is now being unraveled because it just didn't create any synergy. We shall see what happens--it should be interesting to watch this unfold.

SUMMARY
The prospective Sun-Oracle deal is one of the more interesting we've seen for a while. There shouldn't be any major anti-trust issues with this deal, and it doesn't appear that a higher bidder is likely to emerge. Watching the organizational integration (and possible divestment), as well as the interaction of the outsized personalities, should be entertaining at the very least. But most of all look for what Ellison does with Java--that's where the real intrigue lays. Post a comment to give me your view of this deal.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

White Papers in the High Tech and Software Marketing Mix

There are many marketing methods in Software and IT marketing that can be appropriate in some, but not all situations. I'd put White Papers in that category. The term "white paper" is a broadly used term, and can mean different things to different people. I define a white paper as a document written to provide insight or expertise specific to a market, process or product category.

PRODUCT & MARKET APPLICABILITY

White Papers are used far more often in B2B marketing than in B2C marketing. I have seen them used in a B2C environment, but only infrequently. A White Paper is most often useful when there is complex technology or work processes involved. In a B2C environment, they would usually only be used in an "early adopter" market where a product concept is new, and prices and sales cycles are still long.

MARKETING RATIONALE FOR WHITE PAPERS

Why use a White Paper at all? The best reason is to build credibility for your company or product. White papers are most frequently accessed by prospects early in the sales cycle, when a prospect is just beginning research on a product category. These documents allow company personnel to show off domain or technology expertise, which should reflect well on the product you eventually want to sell the prospect. The white paper shows off your company as thought leader in your category. It also allows you to subtly and gently position your company and product in the prospects mind, very early in the sales process. It is often helpful to designate one (or a few) people in the company as the author of the white paper and as an expert in the field.

THE "RIGHT WAY" TO DO WHITE PAPERS

So what are the key factors to creating a successful white paper? Here's a few:

* Written by a domain or technical expert
* Succinct-no fluff or overt marketing, to the point
* Aimed directly at your target prospects
* Provides valuable information to your target
* Mostly solution-agnostic, any product or company promotion must be subtle

WHAT NOT TO DO IN A WHITE PAPER

And what are the things to avoid a wasted effort? Keep these points in mind:

* Can't be a product brochure -no relentless promotion
* Don't make it the length of a book
* Never stretch the truth
* If it's too general, so that no one will invest time to read it

BEST USES FOR WHITE PAPER

What can you do with your white paper, once you've put in the time, money and effort to create one? There are many good uses--here's a few to consider:

* It will contribute positively to Search Engine Optimization on your website
* An excellent item to use in a PPC campaign offer
* A great email marketing campaign offer
*An important intermediate step in the sales process; often useful just after a website visit, but prior to a webinar or product trial
* Versatile as "lead bait"; regardless of the medium or campaign, you should require contact info from the prospect prior to a white paper download
*Assists in moving a prospect along without "high touch" interactions--helping automate the sales process and shorten the sales cycle

SUMMARY

White papers can be very valuable tools in a number of market segments. These documents should be used to differentiate your company as a progressive thought-leader in your market category. The optimal goal for a successful white paper is to position your company as a preferred vendor or serious alternative for prospects in your market segment. This is accomplished by demonstrating expertise and providing credible, valuable and unbiased information which is valued by the target prospect. It is NOT accomplished by "tooting your own horn", playing fast and loose with facts, or duplicating your company brochure. If you want to be a successful white paper marketer, it's important to restrain yourself from tactics in the latter category. That's what I think about making white papers an important part of your marketing mix. Please post a comment and add your experience and thoughts on this topic.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

The Future of Venture Capital Funding in High Tech

Like almost every aspect of the current economy, Venture Capital Fundings of High Tech and Software startups are way down.

There is pressure on virtually every segment of our economy, and the worldwide financial system is in by far the greatest disarray of our lifetime. The preferred exit strategy for Venture Capitalists, the IPO, pretty much shut down quite a while back. Financial returns at Venture funds have taken a hit like everything else financial, and VCs are definitely not in good position to attract new capital in the near term--given the current frantic flight to quality by investors. Things look dire in the VC business. There are even suggestions by many people, including some prominent VCs, that the long running and revered Venture Capital business model is "broken", and that it will cease to exist as we now know it.

So what really is going to happen? Is the end of the world near? (well…maybe, based on the news headlines every day). Will a software or technology entrepreneur be able to fund their company via the VC route in the future? Let's take a look at some of the things I expect to see happen.

SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS
First of all, I don't believe the end of the world is near. Nor do I think that the Venture Capital business is going away. There is a fair bit of pain left to go in this very down economic cycle, and the VC business will be no exception. So in the short term, new VC funds will have a difficult time raising money, startup capital will remain very tight, valuations will be lower and the whole experience of raising money will be even more painful than normal (and it's always painful). Many VC-backed startups which haven't gotten sufficient traction have been told if they don't have 12-18 months of cash in the bank, additional funds won't be forthcoming. But make no mistake, there are software and tech companies closing funding rounds every day. VCs still have not deployed a very large amount funds they raised in better times--that money needs to be put to work. There is still money out there in the short term for deserving business plans. And in the long run, the economy will rebound and things will go back to "normal". I do believe that the Venture Capital business needs to make some adjustments, however--so it will probably be a "new normal".

HOME RUNS VS. SOLID SINGLES AND DOUBLES
One of the staples of the VC business model has been finding "home runs", meaning those companies that can grow large enough for an IPO. These are few and far between. VCs have always said they would gladly invest in 5 to 10 failures to find that one big hit. The IPO market has essentially gone away for the time being, which puts a lot of pressure on the basic premise of how to make money as a VC. I've always thought the "big hit" model was lunacy, and akin to throwing darts at a board--it's so hard trying to pick out who the huge winners are going to be a startup stage. There's a lot of luck involved in a company getting to an IPO, and even more luck involved in picking them out at birth. This strategy seemed to work fine when the markets were consistently heading up and to the right, and quite a few companies could do an IPO and get a billion dollar market cap. But I've always thought the very basis of investing and company building is in finding those companies that can give you a return on your money, skillfully balancing risk and reward. Considering those companies that have truly developed a strategic advantage and a sound business plan, some of them may get very big, others not so much--depending upon the specifics of their target market and business. But VCs for years have been basing investment decisions almost solely upon huge markets and the potential for the big hit. I think it was lazy investing, and that part of the VC business model may need some adjustment.

VC COMPENSATION MODELS
As VC fund size and limited partner returns increased during this golden era of VC funds, so too did the compensation to the General Partners of the fund. When funds and returns were outsized, limited partners swallowed hard or looked the other way. It's analgous to a mutual fund with a hefty management fee--when the returns are great, it's no problem. But in times like today, the small fees associated with an index fund look pretty good compared to that underperform mutual fund with active, expensive management. VC fund Annual Management Fees which have typically been in the 2-3% range will likely be reduced, or maybe even go away entirely. The 20% carry standard will probably hold, and may even go up and bit if there is heavy pressure to reduce the management fees. LPs won't mind the carry if they are realizing good returns. What does this mean for the software/tech entrepreneur? It may not mean much, on the surface. But I do think it will require VCs to do more homework on their potential investments, which possibly gives an edge to those entrepreneurs will less dramatic, smaller business plans, but better risk profiles.

THE OXYMORON OF "LATE STAGE VENTURE CAPITAL"
I've always thought that the idea of "late stage" venture capital was kind of a joke. However, the Venture Capital business has been moving this direction for quite a while. Part of the reason is that VC funds have gotten so big that it's hard to deploy all of the money with "real" startup investing. And also it's a less risky way to get to that big IPO payoff. But really, these late stage funds have gotten pretty similar to Private Equity firms, except their time horizon may be shorter. So maybe these investors should really just be re-classified--in many ways they don't look anything like their early stage brethren. At this stage, there are usually many other potential sources of capital. I believe that this late stage segment of the venture capital business is one that is due to shrink the most in the near term.


CAPITAL-EFFICIENT BUSINESSES VS. KISSING FROGS TO FIND THE "BIG ONE"
I think that the Venture business will trend back to true startup investing, and will reduce it's reliance on the long home run as its basic method of making money. This is where they really add value to the "business-creation value chain". What I expect to see is a renewed search for businesses which are "capital efficient". What I mean by this are companies that will turn an invested dollar into a high multiple of that investment, in terms of revenue, profits and valuation. You might say this has always been true. But the key difference, I believe, is that that venture funds will be smaller, and as a result will feel less pressure to fund high risk, high ceiling businesses where a lot of capital needs to be deployed. As I stated earlier, VCs with large funds have previously felt that the economics of their business demanded this approach. With smaller funds, I believe that capital efficient businesses in smaller markets will no longer be ignored. Solid singles and doubles may come back in vogue (for those of you that understand baseball analogies!).


IS MONEY REALLY "SMART'? OPERATIONAL EXPERTISE VS. FINANCIAL GUYS
I've always felt that the idea of "smart money" has always been a fallacy, or least one that was greatly overblown in the Venture Capital business. I know that there are A LOT of people that will disagree with me on this point. A lot of startup advisors will tell you that it's imperative to raise money from investors who will provide much more than cash. I think it's a bunch of malarkey. No doubt that there are some experienced, skilled and very well-connected VCs that can provide a strategic advantage to entrepreneurs, who are fortunate enough to attract them as investors. But with money being a commodity, this is mostly about a VC firm trying to differentiate and provide a value-add. Fundamentally, the need for capital and the need for advice and other business assistance aren't tied at the hip. Both are often needed, but they don't need to come from the same place--they are important, but separate ingredients to the successful startup recipe. If you can get both in one package, that's great. But too many VCs present themselves as experts in areas where they've really just been investors. This is especially true for those many VCs that come from a financial background, rather than from a high tech startup management background. Frankly, entrepreneurs need to be careful of utilizing faulty advice, regardless of whether it comes from someone who has put money in their company or not. Having money in a pocket should not be confused with operational knowledge or expertise. I'm not sure whether it will happen or not, but I'd like to see the Venture Capital business present a more realistic view of the value that they are adding--it's not the same in all cases.


SUMMARY: WILL VC FUNDING GO AWAY?
The short answer is "definitely not". I do think that the bubble excesses have highlighted some weaknesses in the Venture Capital model. There will be adjustments to it--just like there will be adjustments in many other businesses, as a result of our economic duress. I've offered some ideas to get everyone thinking--please feel free to disagree, or otherwise add to the discussion. I'd welcome everyone to post a comment, if you have an additional take on this always interesting topic.


Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Inside TeleSales versus Outside Sales in Software and High Tech Companies

There are many ways to deliver your software and technology products to the market. For example, one and two step distribution through third party channels, direct marketing/sales over the Internet, OEM relationships and many variations of these, as well as other methods.

One classic method of delivering products to the marketplace is by using a direct sales force. Within the direct sales methodology, two of the most popular variations are an outside sales force and an inside telesales group.

Inside sales forces utilizing telesales are cheaper per rep, so your cost of sales is reduced, and you can potentially afford more reps. Outside sales forces can provide additional credibility and stronger relationship with the account. How do you choose between the two methods? Does it sometimes make sense to use both? Let's take a look at some of the key aspects to consider when making this decision:

PRODUCT COMPLEXITY AND LENGTH OF SALES CYCLE
Probably the most important consideration in this discussion is the complexity of your product offerings, and the corresponding typical length of your sales cycle. Simple products with shorter sales cycles obviously lend themselves to the less expensive telesales approach. If you have a complex product that requires more in the way of hands-on demos, application engineering and other high-touch sales support, an outside sales force may be warranted.

BRAND STRENGTH AND STAGE OF COMPANY LIFECYCLE
Another important factor is the position of your company in the marketplace. Take an example of two companies selling the same product, to the same market. The newer company with less market presence and a weaker brand may require an outside sales force to maximize its market penetration. The more established brand and company might be able to get by with a lower cost inside telesales approach in similar circumstances.

PRODUCT PRICING
Product price is another important element in this discussion. All things being equal, higher priced products are more likely to require outside sales, while more modestly priced ones may be able to be sold effectively with only an inside sales force. Low price products, unless sold in high volumes, may just not profitably support the use of an outside sales organization.

TARGET CUSTOMER PROFILE
Is the target company large or small, is the prospect themselves young or old, progressive or traditional? It's important to understand your customer profile and buying style in deciding how best it will be to sell to them. This is of course often decided on a case-by-case basis for individual customers. But in making this decision on how to structure your direct sales force, it's important to characterize your target market in aggregate. For example, if the bulk of your target market is older, traditional companies and you are trying to sell to their IT departments, you'd better strongly consider building an outside sales force. Many of these customers come from the old "Glass House" era that was dominated by IBM, and are used to having sales people physically call on them. On the other hand, your prime prospects may be in a newer, SMB market segment that has prospects who are more comfortable with remote communications methods. These folks also have less staff, and less corresponding time to meet with outside reps. These targets may be well-served by a competent inside sales force.

HYBRID SALES STRUCTURE
In some cases a mix of inside telesales and outside reps works best. Here are two examples of when this might be optimal: 1) Outside reps for Major Accounts, Inside reps for the rest of the territory and 2) a product with a low sales price that lends itself to an inside sales force, but the product is something that major accounts can use in great quantities, justifying an outside sales force to call specifically on these accounts.

COMPANY CAPITALIZATION
How much money does the company have? Sometimes, there just isn't enough capital to initially invest in an outside sales force, even if the situation ideally calls for it. In these cases, it makes sense to start with an inside sales force, and do the best you can. There are many ways to compensate in this situation, even if it's not ideal. We'll cover the details of this scenario in another article. Suffice it to say that it's preferable to get by with a sales structure that may not be optimal, rather than bankrupt the company with an outside sales force that it can't yet afford. I've seen this occur more than once in my practice at PJM Consulting.


SUMMARY
Like any other key structural decision that senior management faces in developing a software or technology company, it's important to carefully consider the details of your particular circumstances. Many times managers will quickly settle on replicating what they know, and are comfortable with from their past experience, or simply attempt to copy what the market leader does. Both of these approaches leave you vulnerable to a potential critical strategic mistake. Be thoughtful upfront in your approach to how to structure your direct sales force, and you are likely to be rewarded with optimal push in your chosen market segment.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Effective Management During an Economic Crisis

This month we're doing something a bit different--we have a guest post from Holly McCarthy. Please be aware that Ms. McCarthy is not affiliated with PJM Consulting, and the views expressed in this post are her own.


In the current economic climate, there is much that can still be done to turn business around. Certainly, technology has come a long way in helping businesses to maximize productivity with a minimum amount of manpower. While this is a great advantage over the economic crises of years past, the fact remains that effective management and leadership is still a key factor in maintaining the integrity of any business that wants to stick around after the dust has settled.

Leading by Example

Management will need to take the reins of companies and lead by example for the best results as the economy continues to waver in the coming months. Being able to roll up one’s sleeves and get down to business will show employees just what it takes to get the job done right. Unemployment is at its highest in nearly sixteen years, so many people may be in fear of losing their jobs. Showing that you are ready and willing to help out in the trenches will help boost morale and bring your team together in the process.

Ask for Input

Crowdsourcing is becoming increasingly more popular among businesses. While you may not wish to go outside the scope of your company for ideas, asking those who work for you for suggestions and ideas helps bring employees together and builds a stronger office culture in the process. Getting ideas from those within the company and giving credit where credit is due is a very effective way to turn things around and get your business back on track.

Trim the Fat

Unfortunately, there comes a time when a company must make the decision to let go of some employees. Take time to carefully evaluate your staff and find out where the weak links are. Some duties may need to be consolidated into other positions and this should be done within reason. The employees who are left will more than likely be happy to take on a few extra duties to secure their jobs. Although this is not the best possible solution, it may be the only way to help keep a business afloat.

Be Proactive

It is very important in these times to refrain from being reactionary. While things may continue to change from day to day, create a plan of action for keeping your doors open beyond the crisis. What changes can be made? Where can money be saved? Look at all of your options and leave no stone unturned; figuring out a way to stay afloat and ahead of the curve should be your number one objective until things turn back around.

This post was contributed by Holly McCarthy, who writes on the subject of the job search. She invites your feedback at hollymccarthy12 at gmail dot com

What Happens to Apple after Steve Jobs?

I've written several times on Steve Jobs and Apple, one of the most fascinating companies and executives that we've seen in the history of high technology.

I don't mean to make this a morbid article; the current speculation on Steve Job's health has been well-documented. I hope that Mr. Jobs is fine, and that he has many more years of good health, with a continued long reign at Apple.

But it does raise a slightly different question that is interesting to ponder. There has always be a "cult of personality" surrounding Apple and Steve Jobs. In fact, when Jobs recently announced that his recent weight loss was do to a minor hormone imbalance rather than a reoccurrence of cancer, the stock was up 4% that day. Mr. Jobs is joined at the hip with Apple in the investment community and public's eyes. Jobs will leave Apple at some point, hopefully to go into a happy retirement, as I stated above. Regardless of the circumstances of his leaving, what will become of the company once he is gone?

I can think of no tech company more closely associated with a founder/CEO than Apple and Jobs. Gates and Microsoft certainly are in that league, and I'm sure that you can think of others. But I doubt if you can think of any combination that is clearly more high profile and closely-linked.

Jobs has obviously been a major driver of Apple's current success, and has enriched its many shareholders and other stakeholders. While it may be blasphemy to the Apple faithful, especially in recent times, in my opinion he has also been responsible for some of the company's periodic downturns. Whether viewed strictly as the company's savoir, or also an unstable dictator that has wrought big swings in the company's performance over a long period of time--it's undeniable that an unusual amount of responsibility has laid in Job's hands--especially for a company of Apple's enormous size. He is known to be detailed-oriented and involved (from a positive perspective), and a micro-manager and poor delegator assuming a more negative viewpoint. The basic premise of this article is that once he leaves Apple, there will be a leadership vacuum. This isn't necessarily a prescription for catastrophe--but it is rarely a good thing for a company, at least in the short term. So what are the broader lessons we can glean from this fascinating situation with respect to managing high tech businesses? Apple really isn't a rare case--tech companies cultures are built around their founder/CEO quite often, as I see often in my practice at PJM Consulting. This is a case study that can be instructive for many managers. Let's take a look at a few potential lessons:

Difficult or Odd Corporate Culture
There is obviously much to be admired about Apple's corporate culture, since it is a very successful company. Yet by many it is considered to be somewhat dysfunctional from a management standpoint. Much of this can be attributed to having a leader with a very strong and quirky style. Cultures tend to develop haphazardly as companies grow, even if its leaders have given some thought to the issue. In a corporation, everyone has a boss and other constraints put on them by the company's social structure. This tends to dampen the effects of dysfunctional behavior by people up and down the organizational chart. The exception to this is the Founder/CEO who is the head of the organization. Much like the old story about the "Emperor who has no Clothes", no one in an official capacity will call out the person at the top of the org chart on their bad behavior, decisions and eccentricities. This is dangerous and can lead to a culture and company policies becoming embedded with inappropriate ideas for no good reason, sometimes based on what lower level people BELIEVE the CEO would want. The takeaway is that leaders (especially strong ones) must take care not to have TOO GREAT an influence on the culture of the company simply because of their personal style.

Corporate Succession
Strong leader such as Jobs often tend to run companies in a dictatorial manner. They also have a tendency to have a "self-centric" view of the world, and don't give sufficient thought to planning for the company's future after their tenure. This may work well while they are in charge, but can lead to a company in disarray when they leave. It's not clear that there is a clear successor, or strong group of potential successors, in place to follow Jobs at Apple. For a company of the size and stature of Apple, most people would think that this isn't a good idea. Founding CEOs and Senior Executives with a similar organizational impact need to force themselves to step back from the present, and plan for a future without themselves. This isn't a comfortable thing for many people, but is critically important for the full potential of their legacy to be fulfilled.

Dangerous Concentration of Responsibility in a Single Person
In a startup, the founders often wear many hats, and make all of the important decisions themselves. No doubt that Jobs and Wozniak personally handled nearly everything when Apple was formed. This is a very proper operating model for a startup. As a company grows, at some point it becomes a VERY INAPPROPRIATE model, and can put the company in great jeopardy. What if that leader has a heart attack or is in some other way unable to fulfill their critical role? Chaos can occur, and the company's decision-making can be paralyzed, especially in the short term. In addition, I believe that the old saying of "two heads are better than one" usually holds true. I'm not one to endorse decisions-by-committee, but many corporate situations are complex and inherently risky, and the decision-making in these circumstances can benefit by having several strong viewpoints. CEOs should ensure that important decisions include at least some level of peer discussion and review, to avoid blind spots and major mistakes.

Micro-Management
Strong leaders, especially those who are able to create a company from the ground up like Steve Jobs, are often "type A" personalities and micro-managers. This may be highly efficient when a company is in startup mode. Later on, however, it can lead to a lack of development of people down in the organization, as well as paralyze the organization's ability to make quick decisions. The most effective leaders are those who are able to "let go" much of the decision-making as the company grows, while keeping their fingers on the pulse of what's truly important. This is a very fine line to walk, no doubt, but it imo being able to successfully pull this off is one of the more important attributes of the very best corporate leaders.

Bench Strength - Can Worthy Managers Survive Under A Strong Leader?
Along the same lines as the Succession discussion above, attracting and retaining talented managers lower in the organization is usually critical to a company's current success. If the leadership of the company tends to be dictatorial, micro-managers who hold on to most of the responsibility, lower-level managers may become demoralized. The management team needs to be developed, and feel like they have real responsibility and some control of their own destiny. When the guy at the top is holding on to all the power, strong leaders further down in the organization have a tendency to move on to other companies, where they feel like they are making an impact and have an opportunity to progress. The best leaders ensure that the conditions are in place attract, nurture, develop and retain the management talent required for a company's continued growth and success.


SUMMARY
Apple is a great tech company, and Steve Jobs is one of our industry's legendary entrepreneurs and managers. Yet every company, even highly successful ones like Apple, has holes in its game. There are many strong leaders much like Jobs at the head of software and tech companies. Too often their strength is manifested with a very short term view of the organization. Although difficult to do, the strongest leaders operate with a view on not just optimizing the immediate issues facing them, but also plan ahead so that the company can function well even without their personal involvement. Often this means suppressing some of their own natural tendencies so that the overall organization can more fully develop. The resulting decentralization of power reduces a number of risks that are inherent when too much depends on a single individual. That's my own view--post a comment if you have additional views to add to this discussion.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Integrating Sales and Marketing at Software and Technology Companies

In some, but not all tech companies, the Sales and Marketing functions are managed separately. They are separate, but closely related functions that some people (especially technical folks) have a tendency to confuse. Normally, there is a VP or Director heading up the Marketing department, and another VP or Director leading the Sales staff. But it is also not unusual to see a VP or Director of Sales & Marketing who leads both functions at once.

This all seems benign enough, so what's the issue? The issue comes when actual revenue fails to meet the forecast--that's when the finger-pointing usually begins. Unfortunately, not meeting forecasts is a common event in technology businesses, where forecasting of new software and tech products can be particularly challenging. When that finger-pointing starts, it often breaks out first between the Marketing and Sales departments--here's how the ensuing "discussion" might go:

SALES: "You haven't planned products that our customers want to by. You've priced them too high. And those leads that you've spent SO MUCH money on that you are giving us aren't qualified, and are essentially worthless to us."

MARKETING: "You're not selling the right products as we directed, or presenting the positioning of our product line properly. All you do is try to sell on price, constantly discounting and hurting our margins. If you'd follow up on all the leads we gave you, get off of the golf course and work more than 4 hours a day, you'd be well over quota and the company would be doing fine."

Sales folks and Marketers are different types of people, and tend to view the world differently and from their own selfish perspectives. This often nasty "discussion" as simulated above is far from uncommon, and can get pretty ugly--which can really hurt a company in trying to reach its goals. So what's the right way to get the Sales and Marketing departments to work together as a team, avoiding all of this counter-productive ugliness?

SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE POTENTIAL CONFLICT


The VP of Sales & Marketing
One way to greatly reduce this conflict is to have a common leadership for the Sales and Marketing functions. This usually means having a VP-Sales & Marketing in your organization. If you can find the right person to fill this role, this can actually be a very good solution. Having a single leader can go a long way toward eliminating or at least greatly reducing this conflict, assuming he has a balanced background and perspective, and is fair, not favoring one department over the other. Good people to fill this role are out there--but are very rare, in my opinion. There are far more managers who have been put in the position of VP-Sales & Marketing than there are those who were suited for the role. Most of the time you end up with a manager that understands one function well, and gives short shrift to or completely screws up the other function. . You will often find this combined VP position in companies that are not "marketing-intensive", where the sales function is the dominant aspect of the job. If the Marketing function is truly less important, a company can get by with this structure, although it usually isn't ideal. You can read more about the issues with a VP-Sales & Marketing role in a previous article that I've written entitled "Big S, little m".

CEO Demands Communication and Cooperation
If care isn't taken, the very different personality types in sales and marketing can lead to some pretty intense conflicts. I've been a soldier, captain and general in this war--and let me tell you, it isn't pretty. I've also (effectively) filled the role of VP-Sales & Marketing, which is a story for another day. Much like the battles between Marketing and Engineering that I've previously written about, I have seen this battle play out regularly in the companies that I have worked for as an employee, as well as at many of my clients in eight years as a consultant at PJM Consulting. Things can get out of hand very quickly, and paralyze a company. In many cases, the key is how the CEO handles the situation. He must go well out of his way to be a fair arbitrator in these discussions. Even the most benign comment can appear to show favor to one side, in the eyes of the other. Don't ignore or deny the problem, or assume it will be handled at the VP level. It is the CEO's responsibility to prevent, recognize and fix this problem. Be careful that you don't inadvertently make decisions or set up policies that reward or tolerate company politics.

Departmental Social Integration
I recommend planning activities which allow sales and marketing counterparts to get to know each other as "people" outside of their project activities. In many ways a successful outcome is all about relationships, so closely monitor the personal relationship between VP-Marketing and VP-Sales. Also, make sure that the VPs are monitoring the relationships below them. Ensure both VPs are open and honest with about the relationship between departments. Also watch for arrogance (especially from "experienced veterans") when screening potential new hires for either department that will interface with the other --arrogance often usually the trigger which starts the battle rolling

Integration of Departmental Functions
Encourage the sales department to get marketers in front of their customers. Hire marketing people that have had some sales or business development experience, who understand dealing directly with customers--and know what's it like when your living depends upon making your quota. Insist that the marketing department include the sales folks in determining what a "qualified lead" looks like. If you can get agreement on this up front on this important issue, much of the finger pointing goes away when things don't go as planned.

Joint Goals and Compensation Structure
It currently isn't common to design department or individual goals which cross marketing and sales functions, but if you can find a way to do this, you are structurally setting up the desire and need for close cooperation. Design goals and MBOs to reward the two departments for working together. Also, don't ever allow one department to "get ahead" by blaming the other--tie them together as much as possible in your goal setting.


SUMMARY

To limit issues between sales and marketing functions and ensure that they "sing from the same sheet', make sure to pay close attention to the individual departmental activities, which can nevertheless greatly effect the perceived performance of the other department. Optimizing the cooperation between sales and marketing demands an up front look at things such as the corporate structure at the highest levels, the social fabric of the company, compensation structure and use of MBOs, and formal cross-departmental reviews so each department can influence the other department's approaches. All too often in my practice at PJM Consulting, these things aren't taken into consideration until after the fact--when things have already blown up and there is a mess to clean up.

That's my view on this all too common conflict. What has been your experience in this area? Post a comment and begin a discussion.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Structuring a High Tech Sales Force

There are many ways to organize a sales force. In my opinion, there is no one "right" way. There is only the BEST way for unique circumstances of your current company.

Like most aspects of developing a software or technology company, there are guidelines, but no exact roadmap to building a successful sales force. In my practice at PJM Consulting, I often suggest that a management exercise like structuring a sales force should begin with a series of questions:

What stage of development is your company in?
This important, because an early stage company may not have the resources to fully fund the outside sales force that may be ideal for its situation. Or the company may want to sell primarily via an inside sales force, but hasn't had enough early success or nailed down the sales process sufficiently, to sell effectively through this less "high touch" method. Stage of development can be as important as what the ideal "steady state" organization would look like--don't over shoot your development stage in designing your sales organization.

What are you asking your sales force to do?
Are you using your sales force primarily as closers, supported by strong marketing, etc -- or will your sales force be doing a lot of cold calling, handling the customer "cradle to grave"? In general the more you are asking your sales force to do, the more "high touch" the structure needs to be.

What markets are you targeting?
In some markets (such as many enterprise IT market segments) an outside rep knocking on the customer's door is absolutely expected, and essential. In other markets (like many SMB markets), this type of attention would be considered a nuisance, not a service. It's important to understand what the target customers want and are expecting in a sales interface.

What are your product price points?
The implications of this question are usually well understood. High priced products can support a more expensive outside sales force, and may require one to make the sale. Lower priced products can't usually be sold profitably this way, and an inbound or outbound telesales operation is often the optimal structure.

Is your product more of a commodity sale, or is there a longer, more complex sales cycle?
Commodities lend themselves to lower cost inside sales, as well as a higher mix of channels. The more complex your sales cycle, the more likely your company will need a captive, outside direct sales force.


This is just a sample of key questions to ask yourself as you design your sales function. There are many more relevant questions that should be asked, depending upon the specific situation. I won't attempt to cover them all, or this article will become a book. Once you've done a good job of asking and answering the relevant questions, it's time to actually start designing your organization. Below are some of the personnel types and organizational structure that a software or tech company would typically consider as part of its sales organization:

SALES REP TYPES

Outside Reps
This is the classic sales rep style that has been around since the beginning of time. In the "old days" even consumer products were often sold this way (those of a certain age can remember the "door to door" Fuller Brush Salesmen). But this is the most expensive form of sales person, and depending upon the market, products and other factors, is not always the most efficient or even effective. There are still a lot of companies that sell almost exclusively through outside direct sales forces. But in companies where they direct outside sales reps do exist, they are often used more sparingly, in combination with other types of reps and channels.

Inside Reps
This is a favorite form of rep for commodity products, companies that sell heavily through third party channels, and inexpensive, higher volume products. Inside reps can also be used effectively in a "teamed" approach with outside reps, helping to optimize a territory. They may source or qualify leads for the outside reps, handle smaller accounts in the territory or generally act as a "junior sales rep" to the more senior outside reps.

Hybrid Reps
This rep type is own invention (the term is at least). This rep is part outside rep, part inside rep. A rep of this type would be appropriate for those "tweener" products and markets, which don't fit neatly into a pure inside or outside model. For example, software products with an average sales price of $5-10,000--too low cost to be sold strictly through an outside sales force, but maybe too complex or expensive for a pure phone sale. Hybrid reps spend most of their time in the office on the phone, but also travel modestly, approximately one trip/month. Example trips might be to staff trade shows, visit channel partners and call on major accounts. This type of rep may be very appropriate for early stage companies that can't yet afford to build out full inside and outside sales organizations.

Sales Managers
This is pretty self-explanatory, but not every tech company can afford a classical, full-time sales manager. Often you will see individual reps reporting to a manager of another function in startups, and occasionally you will see the concept of a "producing manager", who has line sales responsibilities in addition to management. This personnel type is very important to setting the tone for your sales organization, and is applicable to managing all rep types within any organizational structure.

Sales Administrator
A specialist that you tend to see in larger sales organizations, or at least those that have a lot of complexity (a lot of return activity, inventory management, repairs, rep splits, etc.)

SALE ORGANIZATION TYPES

All of the organizational types listed below can be commonly found as the dominant sales organizational type in many companies, as well as in combination with each other in larger, more complex companies:

Region-specific organizations
This is probably the most common organizational structure, which may include any of the sales reps types, who are assigned to specific territories. In many cases I favor this arrangement, as it tends to be the most unambiguous to measure and manage. The downside is that certain regions can prove to be much more naturally fertile than others, which can make the management process more difficult to do fairly. You also may lose the advantages that certain reps may have in terms of contacts or vertical market knowledge which lies outside of their geographic region.

Channel-Specific organizations
This is the second most common sale organizational type, which of course tends to be found in companies which make strong use of third-party sales channels. There may be a direct sales force, a VAR or retail sales force, an OEM sales force, and so on. Sometime there is an "intermixing of these organizations, for example, an "overlay" VAR channel rep as part of a direct sales force.

Industry-specific organizations
Likely the least common of organization types, but one which is very appropriate in certain circumstances. For example, a tech company which has very different value propositions in a number of vertical industries, where "insider status" in important to selling into a particular vertical market, or the product offerings are arranged by vertical market.


SUMMARY
There are many possible sales organization types and styles for software and tech companies. Many different ways of organizing can work--and the people you have are always more important than organizational structure to your ultimate success. But by carefully considering your company's specific situation, and matching your organizational structure to your market, products and available resources, your company will have the best chance of achieving sales optimal results.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Google Chrome--a Strategic Platform or just another Browser?

Google's new Chrome Browser came out a few weeks ago to quite a bit of attention. It's big news 1) because it's from Google and 2) it brings back memories of the "browser wars", and seems like it could potentially signal the next big battleground in the intense rivalry between Google and Microsoft.

I've downloaded Chrome and played with it a bit, but this isn't intended to be a technical review of Chrome's merits. It seems reasonably snappy, and has Google's typical minimalist design philosophy, including a single box for multiple functions (search, address bar, etc.). Your personal preferences will decide whether you like that or not. It has some nice features such as tabbed browsing, which theoretically should prevent one bad browser window from crashing all open browser windows--much like when Windows became multi-threaded. Nice stuff, but doesn't really fundamentally change the browser game. But technically it's still a beta anyway (of course just about everything is with Google), and it will evolve over time--so it's not really time to judge it from a technical perspective anyway.

What I want to do is to examine Chrome as a strategic move by Google with respect to the software and online worlds--what does it really mean, where will it take the market, and what are its chances for success?

Let's take a look at some of the potential ways that Chrome could affect the marketplace:

A Better Browser
Of course, PR propaganda always will say that this is the "real" reason for bringing out a new product such as this. When I was at HP we used to call this "making a contribution to the market". Google in particular often gets sanctimonious about this type of thing, with all their "do no evil" and saving the world stuff. Does the world really need another, better browser? Not sure. Firefox and Safari, to name two, are already probably technically superior to IE, and while they've made some inroads in the marketplace, they still trail Microsoft by a wide margin. But history tells us that competition is a good thing, and a step forward on major platform like a browser can certainly be thought of as a gateway to allow software innovation to develop faster. Having a company like Google enter the fray should increase rate of innovation that's possible in the online market.

An Application Development Platform
This is the position that many pundits suspect may be the major impact of Google's move. In their introduction, Google talked quite a bit about "remaking" the browser for Web 3.0, if you will. And a fresh approach does make sense, given that Internet Explorer was conceived long before serious online applications were envisioned for the Web. With SaaS and Web 2-3-4.0 currently all the rage, having a browser platform designed from the bottom up to accommodate online software applications should be a good thing. If it's all it's cracked up to be, this could conceivably be a game-changer and a real threat to Microsoft. The key here is how much of the talk about re-architecting the Browser is real, and how much is hype. This will become more apparent over time as Chrome is further developed, and application developers take a look to see if there truly are features they can take advantage of to build better online apps for users.

An Additional Way To Track User Behavior
This is one of the more cynical viewpoints as to the major motivation behind Google's introduction of Chrome. The thinking is that this is one more insidious move by Google to "big brother" your online activity. It's no secret that Google uses web activity data they collect by various means (such as Google Analytics) to fine-tune their advertising business. Certainly owning browser could be seen as the "holy grail" towards creating a complete characterization of online activity. What else might they use this data for, in addition to fine tuning their advertising platform? That's the question and concern.

A Way To Drive More Search Traffic And Adwords Revenue
Along the same lines as the bullet point directly above, owning the browser could be seen as the ultimate in terms of driving web traffic toward Google's Adwords online advertising. The first thing you see upon downloading Chrome is the opportunity to switch to Google as your default search engine. How much will they do in this regard, either subtly or in a straightforward manner? As stated above, at a minimum, it gives them the opportunity to make Google the default search engine, which is critical to their base business. Only time will tell how much of a factor this is in Google's Chrome strategy.


A "Real" Competitor Aimed At Microsoft IE To Make Them Defend Their Turf
Of all the bullet points I'm raising, this is the one I'm most sure of. Google and Microsoft are locked in one of those classic death matches for online software supremacy, and don't miss an opportunity to tweak their arch-rival and make them sweat a bit. Going back to the application development argument above, there is a feeling that Chrome could serve as the basis for a suite of online Google apps to threaten obsolescence for Microsoft's desktop software business. I don't doubt that Google may try to do this. But even if from a technical and marketing perspective Chrome is only a modest success, it almost certainly will get Microsoft's attention and cause them to expend resources and management attention on browser technology, to an extent they may not have preferred.


SUMMARY
Chrome is intriguing, but it's too early to tell for sure what the major reason is for this Google initiative. They may not even know for sure themselves at this point. But the product, and more importantly the move itself, will likely make Microsoft react. The ensuing competition should be all good for the user and developer communities, as long as it doesn't take us toward another tiresome and market-paralyzing "platform API" war. I'll be following the future development of Chrome closely to see where it takes us--how about you?

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

Structuring Channel Discounts for Software and Technology Companies

Selling through sales and distribution channels of various types is very important to many software and tech companies. Yet channel programs, and specifically discount structures, are often thrown together quickly and haphazardly, without looking at any real hard data. Let's examine some of the key items it's advisable to consider, when structuring a channel discount program:

Market Norms
The absolute first place to start when considering channel discounts is to survey the SPECIFIC market that you are entering. By this I mean look at similar products through the EXACT profile of channel partners you are considering selling through. For example for consumer software, retail margins of 15-18% are common, whereas for a specific VAR segments the discount norms may be in the 25-40% range. If your discounts fall too far below the market norm, your program will likely fail. If discounts are set much higher than the market norm (without good reason), your company will be leaving considerable profits on the table. It is very important to do upfront research on actual conditions in your segment--don't just "assume"! Preferably, you want to find out what your direct competitors are offering in terms of a channel program. This may seem obvious. But in my consulting practice at PJM Consulting, instead of using objective data, I see significant numbers of companies use their own theories about what the right discount structure SHOULD be from their perspective. This often ends up being the main reason for a painful "restart" of their channel program at a later date.

Product and Pricing Strategy (Street Price)
Channel discount structures cannot be constructed in a vacuum. They are but one component of your overall product and distribution strategy. As such, they must be consistent with the overall goals you establish for the product. If you are seeking to penetrate a new market or a new channel, it may be wise to be more aggressive than the market norms to gain market share and shelf space. If your market is more mature and you are in a harvest mode on a particular product line, it may be wise to minimize channel discounts to maximize profitability. In any event, consider channel discounts early in the product planning phase as part of your overall product pricing strategy.

Type of Channel
There are many different types of partners for software and tech companies that fall into the category of "channel resellers". Computer retail, mass market retail, Value-Added resellers (VARs), Systems Integrators (SI), Domestic Distributors, International Distributors, Manufacturers Reps--and many more. Each of these reseller types are quite different from the others, and each add different types and levels of value to your distribution systems. Yet every one that you distribute through will be competing with the others (as well as your direct sales model), at least indirectly.


Multi-Channel Pricing Equity
It's important if you are selling through more than one channel (including direct sales) to attempt to equalize, as much as possible, the street prices charged by the various channel types. The best way to do this is to consider the costs incurred by the various types of resellers in delivering your products to the target customer. For example, a VAR that provides support, pre-sales consulting and other services may need a higher level of discount to achieve an adequate profit margin than a retailer that simply is providing shelf space might. In reality, the retailer is likely to have a lower street price, but it is important to try to minimize this gap. Otherwise the VAR who may be providing important services to a segment of your customers may be driven out of the market, and refuse to sell your product--which is not in your company's interests. The most common practice which causes inequities in channel pricing is a volume-driven discount model. New entrants to the channel often use this approach--why wouldn't you want to incentivize volume sales by giving the biggest discounts to the largest volume sellers? Although this may work fine if you have a monolithic reseller channel, where all the players have the same business model and offer the same value add, it otherwise will quickly cause the problems discussed here. The resellers possessing the lowest cost structure and providing the lowest value-add will quickly dominate the market, driving the high-cost/high value-add resellers away. This may be ok with you; just make sure you explicitly consider this possibility before embarking on a volume-driven channel discount strategy.

Value Added
One of the things that I recommend considering explicitly up front is: what is the key value-add that you are seeking from the channel? Is it pre-sales consulting, installation services, post-sale support, shelf space and inventory for immediate customer access, or one of many other factors? Make sure you understand what channel value-add is most important to you, and build protections into your discount structure for the reseller type who best provides this value.

Components of Discounts
It's not always necessary (or wise) to offer a single, monolithic discount level for resellers. How you structure your discounts components should be closely tied to your product and pricing strategy--what you are trying to accomplish with your overall channel strategy. For example, if you are trying to manage your street price at a certain level, it can be dangerous to offer a large discount to certain types of resellers who may pass that discount on as a lower street price. Yet this segment of resellers (for example, retailers) may be an important, high volume channel for your product type. In this case, it may be wise to offer additional, conditional discount for activities that you value. Again as an example, to keep your street price up but incentivize a high level of activities through retail, you could offer a high level of added discount for approved co-op marketing activities. A segmented discount structure driven by costs and value-add, rather than volume, is often the most effective structure to maximize multi-channel sales. This will also limit discount-driven reductions in street price, which ultimately can severely reduce profit levels and incentives to sell for both the vendor and all channel partners--if not properly controlled.


SUMMARY
Creating a Channel Discount Strategy and structure is NOT a theoretical exercise. It should be primarily a tactical exercise based on a realistic view of market conditions, and include collection and analysis of objective market data. While what you hope to accomplish with your discount strategy is important, the overwhelmingly most important factors in creating your discount strategy should be what is happening in your segment of the channel--and what will work best for your company. Try not to create a structure based on what you'd like to see with respect to the channel. Focus on creating a pragmatic, workable strategy upfront, to avoid an unsuccessful channel entry and painful restructuring that results. If you are new to the channel game, seeking outside assistance may help you avoid experiencing one of these painful false starts that happen frequently in the channel.

That's my view of how best to create a channel discount structure. I welcome you to post a comment with your own thoughts on this important technology management decision.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com