Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Tag: high tech

Is HP acquiring Palm a good idea?

To answer the question posed in the title, it definitely is if you’re Palm!

A long time player and sometime innovator in the mobile device marketplace, Palm was rapidly losing steam, market share and relevancy in the hyper-competitive Smartphone market. The company had staked its future on its new WebOS software platform and the recently release Pre SmartPhone.

 After a long period of decline due to an aging product line built on an obsolete software platform, the Palm Pre and its WebOS software was introduced to critical acclaim by industry reviewers and pundits. Had these introductions come a few years ago, they might have indeed turned around Palm’s fortunes.

 But competition in the SmartPhone marketplace has heated up to a white-hot level. After a promising early start, sales momentum of the new Pre products stalled, and this “last-stand” product introduction proved to be too little, too late. At nearly the first sign of Pre sales weakness top Palm executives began bailing out, while Telco partners quit promoting the product heavily, and it was also being dropped from the assortment of major retailers such as Radio Shack. The end was clearing in sight for this handheld industry pioneer.

In swoops HP to save what little shareholder equity was left. HP is on a roll, and in conjunction with their upward momentum they seem to be intent on acquiring everything available for sale, as well as competing in nearly every category of the technology business. This particular acquisition appears to me to be particularly high risk/high reward. It raises several key questions:

 Did HP pay too much?

Probably. The price HP is paying for Palm is about $1.2M, while most knowledgeable industry observers had placed the value below $500M. This is hard to understand for the casual observer, but you must remember that a company is worth what the highest bidder is willing to pay. Except for those on the inside of the deal-making, no one knows what the sizes of the competitive bids were. So it’s a bit pointless to speculate whether they paid more than they needed to. The better question is what is the intrinsic VALUE of Palm to a company like HP?

 A case can be made in this situation for bidding at a price that will prevent the transaction from dragging out. Software loses value quickly–especially in a fast-moving market like SmartPhones, and this is largely a software acquisition. Another big key to the valuation question is whether or not HP is able to hold together and retain the Palm team, especially the key developers. In most cases, buying a software business (which is the key asset of Palm) without the team is nearly worthless.

 Can HP compete in the SmartPhone business, and should they?

This is a huge question in my mind. Hewlett Packard is definitely becoming the 10,000 lb gorilla in the tech business. But even the biggest giants reach a limitation on resources, most importantly senior management bandwidth and market segment knowledge. IBM at one time looked much like HP today, competing actively in nearly every important technology market. Eventually IBM lost traction and did a painful restructuring focusing on services. Microsoft is huge and still dominant in software, but they’ve been far from successful everywhere they’ve invested. There are many examples in the tech business of competing in too many competitive markets at once. The often-used analogy (which still rings true) is to Hitler opening up a two front war by invading Russia. The old joke goes that had he been more focused, we might all be speaking German today. I am very skeptical of Hewlett Packard being able to win in all of the major markets they appear to be serious about at the moment.

 Can putting two losers together ever create a winner?

Not usually. I can’t think of a single high profile successful instance of this, although I’m sure it’s happened before. It usually doesn’t work in such a highly competitive market as SmartPhones, however. Palm was around 5% market share and fading fast.  HP is very successful overall, but its iPaq SmartPhone has less than .1% market share–I’ll bet most of you are shocked to hear that HP was even in the SmartPhone market prior to this deal! When there is a reason that both companies are unsuccessful, it’s very difficult to change the equation simply by combining. Mergers often create more problems then they solve, regardless of how good they look on paper.

 Having said all this, there is some synergy here. There is a belief is that one reason the Pre wasn’t gaining much traction was Palm’s precarious financial position. No one wants to carry around a phone that could soon become an orphan. The HP acquisition should help immensely on that front. Hewlett Packard certainly has the financial might, industry muscle and influence to improve the position of a well regarded platform like the Palm Pre and WebOS platform.

 Will HP be patient and persistent enough to win in SmartPhones?

To me this is the biggest question. If you asked me 10 years ago I would have said no. As a former HP employee, at one time this wouldn’t have been the type of market that I would expect Hewlett Packard to have success. But since them I’ve seen the company persevere for decades as an also ran in the low margin, down and dirty PC business, and finally push Dell out of the top spot. There was a time when Dell (and a few others) used to laugh at HP in the PC market–but that ended a while ago.

 I’m convinced that this ever more powerful version of HP can succeed in SmartPhones if they so choose. But as discussed above, even in a giant company like this, can they win so many tough fights across so many difficult market segments? That is a different question entirely–and something may have to give. They might not be able to win on all fronts.

 Bottom line

The bottom line for me is that HP can probably muscle their way into the SmartPhone market if they want to bad enough. But can they do it while they also compete with Cisco in networking, IBM in services, and Dell in PCs–just to name a few? Even for a successful industry giant like Hewlett Packard is today, I believe in the concept of “biting off more than you can chew”. That is the real risk. One thing I think for sure is that this won’t play out quickly. Only time will tell whether HP ultimately has the market knowledge, patience, tenacity and will to win in this hit-driven and brutally competitive market. What’s your take on this high profile acquisition? Post a comment to rev up a discussion.

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

What is the Best Place to Locate a Tech Company?

There are many great places in the world where software and technology companies thrive.

Outside the US, India has a rich history and deep resources in software development.

Brazil, China and Eastern Europe also are emerging, low cost development centers. All of these areas are better know for outsourced software development services, however, and are only slowing emerging as homes of actual product-based companies. China and the “tigers” of Southeast Asia are known as low cost manufacturing (and in some cases low-cost development) centers.

Canada is promoted by many as the best place in the world to conduct software development, due to aggressive tax credits and other government incentives.

Israel has become an important center of networking and security development.

The point is, I could probably write a book on the many places tech companies thrive. But in the interest of brevity, I’ll use US-based locations as examples in this article, while discussing what regional attributes in general are important to consider when locating a new operation or complete company.

Labor cost considerations
This is obviously, very, important. But I contend that it’s not everything, especially in the tech business. You still need access to all of the key components that make a software or technology company successful–regardless of cost. Having said this, where in the country you locate can have a pretty major effect on your cost structure, and therefore your competitiveness over time. If for example you decide to locate in the Bay Area, you will be paying the highest salaries, rent, etc when compared to just about everywhere else. You may believe it is worth it, and of course there are strategies such as outsourcing that can be used to reduce some of that cost disadvantage. But it is important to understand what effect location will have on your cost structure, and plan for that effect.

Product development resources
Generally the most important consideration with respect to product development resources is to locate in an area where there is access to the talent flowing out of engineering colleges. This might be a major metro area, but it also could be a smaller city (with the advantage of lower overall costs) which is the home of a major university. For example, most of the Big Ten Universities have small tech clusters located in their regions, even though they are mostly located in smaller cities. It also helps to be located in an area where developers WANT to live–warm weather and recreational opportunities tend to dominate this aspect of discussion. Another factor is what type of developer you’re looking for. For example, if you’re involved in the wireless business, you will be hard-pressed to find a stronger preponderance of development talent than you will in San Diego. If you decide to locate in any area where your access to developers is limited, outsourcing is no longer an option but a necessity, and will play an important role in your success or failure.

Management resources
Access to management resources is strongly correlated with whether or not a region has a critical mass of tech companies. As a result, the Bay Area is superior to anywhere else with respect to the overall depth of management talent. But I think this is often overplayed (especially by those residing in the Bay Area!). There is arrogance by some in the technology business that says if you don’t live in one of the major tech centers, you couldn’t possibly be a top-notch tech executive. The reality is that not every talented person wants to live in the Bay Area or Boston, so they executive talent be found everywhere. If you’re putting together a startup, only a small cadre of senior executives is needed to launch successfully.

Lifestyle preferences
This is an important consideration, and a highly variable and very personal factor. I contend that it’s important to be happy if you’re going to be successful in business, at least in the long run. If you’re a skier, it might be great for you to locate operations in Boulder, CO. If you love the beach or are a tri-athlete, San Diego is a great choice. If you love cultural activities New York or San Francisco might be ideal. If you’re all business all the time, you can’t beat Silicon Valley. Know who you are and what you like, and set yourself up somewhere you won’t regret in the long run.

Outsourcing
Outsourcing today is a factor that can be the great equalizer with respect to locating your company. For example, you strongly desire to locate in the Bay Area because of the overall tech business climate, access to capital and senior management talent, but are worried about development or manufacturing costs. Done correctly, strategic outsourcing can overcome those issues.

Where do the traditional high tech centers of the country rank for you?

Here’s my ranking:

Tech Center Costs Developers Management Lifestyle
Bay Area Worst Highest Highest Good
Boston Worst Plentiful Plentiful Good
Southern California High Good Good Great
Austin Moderate Good OK Good
North Carolina Moderate Good OK Good
Smaller-metro areas Lowest Scarce Scarce OK

Before anyone screams that I’m short-changing their area, this is obviously VERY subjective. This is my take, and what is important is that you create your own grading system before deciding where to locate your operations. Some may consider a smaller area which isn’t a traditional tech center to be an IDEAL location. Others might feel that Bay Area is a great place to live. A lot of this is simply personal taste.

What’s the most important location attribute?
The one most important consideration is the preferences of you or your team! What’s key to keep in mind as you make this decision is to think globally and long term about what’s important. The beginning of a new company business unit is an opportunity to start with a clean sheet about what’s important for the business, as well as the founders personally. Don’t just start up you new business in a location because “you’re already there”, maybe because the parent company is there, or you just lost or quit an employee position. This decision will have many implications down the road, and once you make it, your flexibility to overturn it will be much more limited in the future. The bottom line is that while geography should play a role in your decision, no place is perfect; you can start up and successfully run a tech company just about anywhere is you plan up front.

What’s your view on where’s the best place or most important attributes to starting a new software or tech business? Leave a comment and clue us in.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

Promoting Software and Hardware Products through the VAR Channel

With the exception of some software and hardware vendors who sell super-expensive products to the largest enterprises, a large percentage tech companies uses the Value Added Reseller (VAR) channel, to one extent or another. So how do you best go about doing this successfully? Create a great product, throw it to the channel, and sit back and collect the money?

If only it were so. Unfortunately, many tech companies new to the channel find out the hard way that you will fail by taking the word “seller” in the VAR label too seriously. For those of use with experience in the VAR channel, you know that it is still incumbent upon the vendor to create end user demand for their product. Yes, you need to market to VARs as well. And you will take whatever “push” you can get from the channel. But you must have an active promotional program aimed at end users for a realistic chance at channel success.

So what are the best marketing approaches to support channel sales activities? If depends, of course, on the specifics of your product, market, price point, etc. But let’s take a quick look at some popular promotion methods used in conjunction with channel sales. I’ll break it down into three basic categories:

End user demand creation

This is first and foremost the most critical activity. It’s an unfortunate fact that most new players in the channel don’t understand this initially. Many have to learn it through a painful hands-on lesson, which sometimes leads to rejecting use of the channel outright, due to spectacular failure. It may be counter-intuitive, but it doesn’t even matter whether you establish end user demand for your products by selling direct or via the channel. The important thing is that with few exceptions there needs to be serious interest in your products at the end user level if you’re to successfully sell through VARs. In fact, it’s almost always necessary to be successful selling directly to end users, before you can hope to have a successful VAR channel for your products. Almost any end user marketing method that fits with your product type and budget can be used to create this demand, but here are some commonly used promotional types:

• SEO (Search engine optimization)
• PPC (Pay per click) advertising
• Press relations
• White paper marketing
• Targeted online banner advertising
• Direct mail, but traditional and email
• Social media marketing (Blogs, Twitter, Linkedin, Facebook, etc.)
• Trade shows

VAR recruitment

In addition to creating end user demand, you’ll also want to market directly to VARs, to get them interested in actively working with you and your products. An important point to remember is that the VAR channel is very large, and generally segmented into many vertical categories. So however you approach them, don’t waste time (yours or theirs!) by contacting VARs who aren’t doing business in your target end user segments. Here’s some common recruitment approaches:

• Direct email through available VAR lists
• Phone campaign using available lists
• Internet research with direct email or phone approach
• Trade Shows (VARs frequent them, and it’s a great opportunity for personal contact)
• Have a highly successful product with strong end user pull (VARs will find you!)

Cooperative marketing with the channel

Lastly, once you’ve created end user demand and recruited enough VARs to have a “program”, you need to establish standard methods of working with your new partners to create and fulfill demand. VAR programs come in all shapes and sizes depending upon the market, and I’ve seen a wide variety of promotional opportunities included in these programs. One of my personal favorite “getting started” methods is to offer to pay for and execute a direct mail campaign (blind to the vendor, if necessary) introducing you and your product family as a new partner of the VAR. Below are some promotional activities that are very commonly included in VAR programs:

• Co-op advertising/promotion with the vendor provides funding for approved VAR-executed promotional programs up to a set percentage (3-6%) of sales of your products
• Free or discounted demo units
• Special pricing for large opportunities
• Co-selling with your in-house sales force
• Deal registration
• Additional discounts for completing product training, certifications or maintaining premium support levels
• Co-branded product literature and other use of the vendor’s logo
• Website and catalog listings of authorized or “preferred” VARs
• Rebates for volume sales (not recommended; fraught with danger)
• Vendor-funded introductory direct mail campaign

That’s my quick primer on successfully promoting your products for sale through the VAR channel. Many of you have your own experience in this area; post a comment or a question to activate our discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

VAR vs. Retail Distribution in Software and Technology Markets

There is much talk in the software and technology industry about distribution through the “Channel”. Generically that means selling through some type of a third party company, rather than selling directly to the end customer. But in reality the “Channel” includes a wide variety of disparate types of third party resellers. Today we’ll take a look at when to consider partnering with two of the main channel reseller types, VARs and Retailer–which also happen to be two of the most different.

What’s the difference between a VAR and a Retailer?

Let’s start with the retailer, as that’s a bit more obvious. With respect to software and hardware products, we’re talking about computer, specialty electronics and mass market stores, independents as well as regional and national chains. Retail is both a B2C channel and a B2B channel, especially when talking about serving the small and medium size business (SBM) market. While retailers may offer some “value-added” services such as extended warranties, delivery, installation, etc., the main purpose of a retail store is quite simple. The retailer serves primarily as a point-of-sale location, holding inventory and enabling end customers to have immediate access to products at favorable prices.

VARs (Value-Added-Resellers) are in many respects the polar opposite to retailers. The VAR channel is strictly B2B, and sells to both large enterprises and the SMB market. Usually there isn’t a retail storefront–if there is, it’s not a big part of the business. Expensive retail space is avoided to minimize their real estate costs, because walk-in traffic isn’t part of the business model. Unlike retailers, VARs are focused on selling their services, such as installation, configuration, integration, customization, etc, rather than turning over large quantities of products. VARs aren’t interested in having a large “assortment” of products like retailers. This is a key point that channel newbie are prone to miss–at great cost to their company. While VARs do sell products, they are motivated to do so in only two instances:

1) Core products which are strategic because the VAR’s services are built around them
2) Easy to sell, demand-driven commodity products requested by their customer base

If you take just one thing away from this article, let it be this: VARs aren’t dying to sell most products. If your product doesn’t fit into one of the two categories above, you will be pushing on a rope trying to make progress in the VAR channel.

Is one of these channel types “better” than another?

One is not superior to the other. Each reseller type is better for different product types and circumstances. They both can be used quite profitably, but they serve different purposes. It’s important when designing a channel strategy to start with the end customer and work backwards. Where would the end customer like to buy? How important is price vs. services and support? What reseller type best meets the desires and needs of your target customer type(s)?

When you should use the VAR channel

While VARs aren’t product-oriented businesses, in aggregate they are still a very important channel for many product types. If you have a product which requires a high level of support, or “value-added” services such as expert installation, integration with other products, customization or 24/7 support, VARs can play a key role in your distribution strategy. If you have a popular commodity product, they can be useful (in aggregate) to greatly expand your distribution points. The VAR channel is highly segmented by vertical market, so if your product has a vertical orientation (networking, medical, insurance, etc.) this often creates an opportunity for VARs to be an important channel partner.

When you should use the Retail channel

Retailers are usually best for horizontal, commodity or mature products. They are effective at providing broad, immediate access to your products across a wide geographic area. Retailers typically are “inventory turn” oriented in their business models, and tend to work on thin margins. So if keeping your price point low is important while still using a third party channel, they are an excellent choice. Of course the fact that they provide instant access to your products during business hours can be a very important asset.

Can you use both VARs and Retailers for the same product?

Yes, but you must know what you are doing, or you may end up very sorry that you did. Since VARs and retailers bring very different things to your distribution, there is a strong chance of serious channel conflict if you use both reseller types for the same product. The biggest potential issue is degradation of your product street price, because while VARs typically work off high product margins and low turnover, retailers are the opposite. Retailers optimize their businesses for high inventory turnover, while accepting low product margins. The low margin strategy causes the street price of your product to fall for all channels distributing your product. If the street prices drop too low, the margins may drop too far to be interesting to VARs (even though they are focused primarily on their service offerings). Companies new to multi-channel distribution sometime make this problem even more acute by offering price discounts based on volume, which makes the situation even worse. A volume-based pricing strategy favors the higher volume retail channel, and also incentivizes even deeper street price drops, to create higher volumes and resulting better wholesale prices. Multi-channel pricing is a complex area fraught with danger for the uninitiated–new players should solicit outside advice, and tread carefully.

VARs and retailers can be important, high volume distribution channels for many software and tech companies. They can each be primary distribution channels, or combined with direct a sales approach and other channels to form highly efficient multi-channel distribution networks. More distribution is not always better, however. Companies need to know what they are doing when proceeding with a multi-channel strategy, or risk doing great damage to their sales and marketing efforts.

That’s how I view using VARs and retail in your distribution strategy. How do you see it? Post a comment to get a discussion going. Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

Startup Mistakes by Software and Tech Companies

Starting a company, any kind of company is the hardest thing to do in business. Sez me.

It’s also one of the most rewarding and fun, if you’re built for the startup experience–though not everyone is. Technology startups have their own unique challenges. There are many different ways to drive off the road, some of which I list below. Keep in mind that no startup is perfect, and mistakes will be made. The future can not be forecast, and in a software or tech startup you’re often flying nearly blind without a map, because you are trying to do something new and different.

In the end, if you are able to make it through, overcoming your mistakes may be the most satisfying part of the whole startup experience. So keep in mind that it’s almost impossible to play a perfect game. On the other hand, it’s crucial to steer clear of the mistakes which are often avoidable–because you only get some many chances to recover from errors.

Here are some of the common, often avoidable missteps to be aware of:

Too little capital
Sometimes this is unavoidable–but if you really don’t have enough capital maybe you shouldn’t start up in the first place. Activities such as software product development are notorious for going way past schedule and over budget. Most products don’t move like a knife through butter with the first modest promotional campaign. So build a decent amount of backup money into your plan, because things rarely go as planned. If they do, great, you can use the money to accelerate growth. But when things don’t go well, you’ll at least give yourself a fighting chance, if you’ve set aside a bit of money for a rainy day.

Don’t try to be a “Big Company” right off the bat
Many startup management teams are jealous of the resources available to their established competitors. These folks can become “Big Company Wannabes”, a classic formula for going out of business early. Don’t spend your precious time and resources on activities that don’t efficiently bring the product out, or market it. Period. Lavish trade show booths, company parties, expensive or large offices, administrative assistants for all the execs, etc., etc. Don’t hire a lot of big company people who don’t have early stage experience–they are prone to the types of costly waste listed above.

No backup plan
It is a startup and you have to expect little margin for error in reaching success. But that’s no excuse for a lack of strategic planning–within the constraints of your resources. A backup plan might be something simple: software companies going to open source if your high-priced commercial strategy meets resistance, a service-oriented revenue strategy with a cheap or free product, using a channel rather than building a full sales force, licensing your technology instead of marketing a full product to end users. It depends on your circumstances, but do try to have some type of a contingency plan going in.

The “Techies know everything” syndrome
This is a common malady in tech startups, because many new software and tech companies are led by management heavy in experience from the engineering or software development side of the business. Usually these folks are very smart, but in some cases also a bit full of themselves, unable to know their own blind spots. Those blind spots often appear in marketing and sales (which every engineer and software developer knows are easy, non-complex activities). The really smart guys quickly figure out those other parts of the business besides the tech stuff is hard as well, and make adjustments through education and bringing in outside expertise.

The “Technology is everything” syndrome
This is a corollary to the bullet point above. The technology and product is crucial in a tech startup, since it is usually the basis for your competitive advantage. But it’s not everything, and many a startup has failed despite great technology and an exciting new product.

No marketing budget or in-house expertise
Believe it or not, I see a lot of companies with little or no promotional budget. Its insanity, but they only have enough money to get the product built, apparently thinking “if you build it they will come”. This is nearly always a failure mode. If there is someone with marketing expertise among the founders, they usually won’t allow this to happen. So secure a marketer on your founding management team, or at least find a close advisor you will listen to, early on.

Under-estimating time to market
This is a very common mistake. By definition, you are trying to do something new, which isn’t forecast-able. So don’t believe your own pretty Gantt charts–garbage-in equals garbage-out when it comes to schedules. Don’t count on making it to the big trade show, commit to costly promotional activities with no recourse, or let the developers all plan to leave for that well-deserved month in Hawaii. Get the product done first. I tell you this with many painful experiences as a teacher, both personally in software and tech companies and through my clients.

Under-estimating time-to-success
Even if you are able to get the product out on time, that doesn’t mean version one will hit the ground running. They often crawl, stumble and fall at first. After all, this is your first opportunity at really accurate market research. Even if the product is right on target, finding the marketing mix that works is generally trial and error. Many products don’t find success until their second version is released, so have some money in the bank, and some emotional bandwidth available for this possibility.

Introducing a “buggy” product
This is one of my biggest pet peeves, especially for software products. Most products aren’t fully stable when the developers think it is ready. They work on it so long and hard, that human nature wants it to be finished near the end–and dangerous shortcuts can be the result. Dedicate as many resources as you can spell to ensure a credible, third party view that the product is as stable as it can be, before the market gets the opportunity to “debug it” for you. You only get one chance to make a first impression. If the situation is bad enough, it can cost you your business.

There are my thoughts on what critical mistakes to avoid in a technology startup. I’m sure many of you have your own lessons and ideas to share. Post a comment to start the discussion! Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

Compensating the High Tech Sales Force

A very controversial topic within many software and other tech companies is how to best compensate the sales force. How much is required? How much is too much? What’s the best mix of salary and incentive comp?

If you’ve read anything I’ve written before, you’ll find my next comment familiar:

It all depends on your particular situation.

There is no across-the-board best practice for optimizing your sales force’s performance via compensation strategy. Every company, market and competitive landscape is different at any given point in time.

Let’s take a look at some of the more common variables and how they might affect your compensation strategy:

Established brand vs. startup
If you’re a startup, plan on paying your sales reps more. It will be harder to attract great reps as a startup, unless you are in a special situation with an incredibly hot new product (of course, every startup CEO thinks this way about their product!). You may need to pay reps a higher base, and certainly richer commissions than your established competitors. Some of this can be mitigated if you are offering an equity opportunity, as discussed later. But for sure, prospective reps need to believe that there is a good chance they can make more money at your startup, or you won’t be able to compete with established companies for the same level of folks. That’s just a fact of life.

Price Point
If your price points are higher, you may need to pay a higher base salary, if the total number of sales made will be low. Lower price points lend themselves to higher commissions and lower bases, because the rep will be able to start making money sooner, and more regularly.

Length of sales cycle
The sales cycle aspect is pretty straightforward, and tied closely to the price point discussion above. Price points and sales cycles almost always have a direct relationship. High price points lead to longer sales cycles, and low price points to shorter cycles. It’s harder to compensate heavily on commission if there is a long sales cycle, because sales reps need to eat regularly, too. If you have a product that takes a long time to sell, make sure that you have a decent base salary for your reps, if you want to keep the good ones.

Growth vs. harvest
Companies generally highly value reps that can sell new products and into new accounts–they want to pay for growth. So the more you are asking your reps to do what is considered to be the hardest thing in sales — sell “new”– the higher the commission structure should be. Selling “new” is the highest form of risk in sales, and it should be compensated by the highest reward. Selling established products and selling into established accounts (harvesting) is not as risky, and as a result can often carry lower commission structures.

Initial sale vs. ongoing revenue
Similar to the growth vs. harvest discussion, sometime you are selling a product that has upfront revenue as well as ongoing revenue, typically from updates, replacements or services. You generally want to pay higher commissions for the upfront portion than you do the ongoing revenue. A good example of this is a traditional software license with an annual maintenance fee. If you pay commissions on the maintenance portion at all, in most circumstances the payout should be lower than the incentive on the upfront license fee.

Commodity vs. missionary sales
Commodity sales lend themselves to high commissions and low (sometimes even zero) base salaries. This is because sales cycles are usually short for commodities, and since they are by definition in big markets it’s easier to make a base level of sales and resulting commissions, even for a new rep. By the very nature of commodities the rep’s service is often a major differentiating success factor, so a comp mix toward commissions rewards the exceptional rep to really work hard. Missionary sales, on the other hand, require a great deal of patience by the rep, as well as a lot of hand-holding and relationship building. To keep good sales reps in such a situation, it’s important to have base salaries which are adequate to enable the best sales reps to exhibit patience with the long sales process. Missionary sales are an area that really demands both high bases and strong commission structures, as they are one of the most demanding forms of selling.

Hunters vs. Farmers
Hunters obtain new accounts while Farmers maintain and maximize the sales into existing accounts. These two situations require two different sales personalities, and the compensation packages should be different as well. The hard-charging hunter will require a decent base salary, but really needs the high commission structure to keep him motivated. The Farmer is likely to be a more stability-oriented, relationship-building style of rep. A relatively higher base and lower commission structure is usually more comfortable for reps in situation.

Equity
In most cases, the playing field is slanted toward established companies when it comes to compensating and attracting sales reps. Equity participation can be the great equalizer for startups in compensation. Every company has a different view of how broadly to offer equity. But a startup that offers equity participation to its sales force can often give up less in cash compensation. For risk-taking reps, equity can even be the deciding factor in recruiting, in some cases. The lure of equity that might grow into a significant stake at a successful startup can help pull a rep from a more established job.

So what specifically should you be paying your reps? Laying out actual numbers is beyond the scope of this discussion, because there are too many factors and potential situations to generalize. All the factors above come into play in structuring a sales compensation package, as well as factors such as inside vs. outside sales. Every situation is different, and competitive factors also come into play, if you’re competing directly with your rivals for reps. Local market circumstances, as well as the overall economy, can also play a strong role in setting the final package.

Above all, if you want to optimize the performance of your sales force using compensation as a tool, you must do your homework. Don’t just quickly come up with something that “sounds good” or is “how you’ve done if before”. Analyze the situation of your unique company at this particular point in time, and at certainly consider at a minimum the factors mentioned above.

That’s my thinking on how to compensate your sales force–what’s yours? Post a comment below or shoot me an email if there is a particular situation you’d like to discuss.

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White Papers in the High Tech and Software Marketing Mix

There are many marketing methods in Software and IT marketing that can be appropriate in some, but not all situations. I’d put White Papers in that category. The term “white paper” is a broadly used term, and can mean different things to different people. I define a white paper as a document written to provide insight or expertise specific to a market, process or product category.

PRODUCT & MARKET APPLICABILITY

White Papers are used far more often in B2B marketing than in B2C marketing. I have seen them used in a B2C environment, but only infrequently. A White Paper is most often useful when there is complex technology or work processes involved. In a B2C environment, they would usually only be used in an “early adopter” market where a product concept is new, and prices and sales cycles are still long.

MARKETING RATIONALE FOR WHITE PAPERS

Why use a White Paper at all? The best reason is to build credibility for your company or product. White papers are most frequently accessed by prospects early in the sales cycle, when a prospect is just beginning research on a product category. These documents allow company personnel to show off domain or technology expertise, which should reflect well on the product you eventually want to sell the prospect. The white paper shows off your company as thought leader in your category. It also allows you to subtly and gently position your company and product in the prospects mind, very early in the sales process. It is often helpful to designate one (or a few) people in the company as the author of the white paper and as an expert in the field.

THE “RIGHT WAY” TO DO WHITE PAPERS

So what are the key factors to creating a successful white paper? Here’s a few:

* Written by a domain or technical expert
* Succinct-no fluff or overt marketing, to the point
* Aimed directly at your target prospects
* Provides valuable information to your target
* Mostly solution-agnostic, any product or company promotion must be subtle

WHAT NOT TO DO IN A WHITE PAPER

And what are the things to avoid a wasted effort? Keep these points in mind:

* Can’t be a product brochure -no relentless promotion
* Don’t make it the length of a book
* Never stretch the truth
* If it’s too general, so that no one will invest time to read it

BEST USES FOR WHITE PAPER

What can you do with your white paper, once you’ve put in the time, money and effort to create one? There are many good uses–here’s a few to consider:

* It will contribute positively to Search Engine Optimization on your website
* An excellent item to use in a PPC campaign offer
* A great email marketing campaign offer
*An important intermediate step in the sales process; often useful just after a website visit, but prior to a webinar or product trial
* Versatile as “lead bait”; regardless of the medium or campaign, you should require contact info from the prospect prior to a white paper download
*Assists in moving a prospect along without “high touch” interactions–helping automate the sales process and shorten the sales cycle

SUMMARY

White papers can be very valuable tools in a number of market segments. These documents should be used to differentiate your company as a progressive thought-leader in your market category. The optimal goal for a successful white paper is to position your company as a preferred vendor or serious alternative for prospects in your market segment. This is accomplished by demonstrating expertise and providing credible, valuable and unbiased information which is valued by the target prospect. It is NOT accomplished by “tooting your own horn”, playing fast and loose with facts, or duplicating your company brochure. If you want to be a successful white paper marketer, it’s important to restrain yourself from tactics in the latter category. That’s what I think about making white papers an important part of your marketing mix. Please post a comment and add your experience and thoughts on this topic.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

The Future of Venture Capital Funding in High Tech

Like almost every aspect of the current economy, Venture Capital Fundings of High Tech and Software startups are way down.

There is pressure on virtually every segment of our economy, and the worldwide financial system is in by far the greatest disarray of our lifetime. The preferred exit strategy for Venture Capitalists, the IPO, pretty much shut down quite a while back. Financial returns at Venture funds have taken a hit like everything else financial, and VCs are definitely not in good position to attract new capital in the near term–given the current frantic flight to quality by investors. Things look dire in the VC business. There are even suggestions by many people, including some prominent VCs, that the long running and revered Venture Capital business model is “broken”, and that it will cease to exist as we now know it.

So what really is going to happen? Is the end of the world near? (well…maybe, based on the news headlines every day). Will a software or technology entrepreneur be able to fund their company via the VC route in the future? Let’s take a look at some of the things I expect to see happen.

SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS
First of all, I don’t believe the end of the world is near. Nor do I think that the Venture Capital business is going away. There is a fair bit of pain left to go in this very down economic cycle, and the VC business will be no exception. So in the short term, new VC funds will have a difficult time raising money, startup capital will remain very tight, valuations will be lower and the whole experience of raising money will be even more painful than normal (and it’s always painful). Many VC-backed startups which haven’t gotten sufficient traction have been told if they don’t have 12-18 months of cash in the bank, additional funds won’t be forthcoming. But make no mistake, there are software and tech companies closing funding rounds every day. VCs still have not deployed a very large amount funds they raised in better times–that money needs to be put to work. There is still money out there in the short term for deserving business plans. And in the long run, the economy will rebound and things will go back to “normal”. I do believe that the Venture Capital business needs to make some adjustments, however–so it will probably be a “new normal”.

HOME RUNS VS. SOLID SINGLES AND DOUBLES
One of the staples of the VC business model has been finding “home runs”, meaning those companies that can grow large enough for an IPO. These are few and far between. VCs have always said they would gladly invest in 5 to 10 failures to find that one big hit. The IPO market has essentially gone away for the time being, which puts a lot of pressure on the basic premise of how to make money as a VC. I’ve always thought the “big hit” model was lunacy, and akin to throwing darts at a board–it’s so hard trying to pick out who the huge winners are going to be a startup stage. There’s a lot of luck involved in a company getting to an IPO, and even more luck involved in picking them out at birth. This strategy seemed to work fine when the markets were consistently heading up and to the right, and quite a few companies could do an IPO and get a billion dollar market cap. But I’ve always thought the very basis of investing and company building is in finding those companies that can give you a return on your money, skillfully balancing risk and reward. Considering those companies that have truly developed a strategic advantage and a sound business plan, some of them may get very big, others not so much–depending upon the specifics of their target market and business. But VCs for years have been basing investment decisions almost solely upon huge markets and the potential for the big hit. I think it was lazy investing, and that part of the VC business model may need some adjustment.

VC COMPENSATION MODELS
As VC fund size and limited partner returns increased during this golden era of VC funds, so too did the compensation to the General Partners of the fund. When funds and returns were outsized, limited partners swallowed hard or looked the other way. It’s analgous to a mutual fund with a hefty management fee–when the returns are great, it’s no problem. But in times like today, the small fees associated with an index fund look pretty good compared to that underperform mutual fund with active, expensive management. VC fund Annual Management Fees which have typically been in the 2-3% range will likely be reduced, or maybe even go away entirely. The 20% carry standard will probably hold, and may even go up and bit if there is heavy pressure to reduce the management fees. LPs won’t mind the carry if they are realizing good returns. What does this mean for the software/tech entrepreneur? It may not mean much, on the surface. But I do think it will require VCs to do more homework on their potential investments, which possibly gives an edge to those entrepreneurs will less dramatic, smaller business plans, but better risk profiles.

THE OXYMORON OF “LATE STAGE VENTURE CAPITAL”
I’ve always thought that the idea of “late stage” venture capital was kind of a joke. However, the Venture Capital business has been moving this direction for quite a while. Part of the reason is that VC funds have gotten so big that it’s hard to deploy all of the money with “real” startup investing. And also it’s a less risky way to get to that big IPO payoff. But really, these late stage funds have gotten pretty similar to Private Equity firms, except their time horizon may be shorter. So maybe these investors should really just be re-classified–in many ways they don’t look anything like their early stage brethren. At this stage, there are usually many other potential sources of capital. I believe that this late stage segment of the venture capital business is one that is due to shrink the most in the near term.

CAPITAL-EFFICIENT BUSINESSES VS. KISSING FROGS TO FIND THE “BIG ONE”
I think that the Venture business will trend back to true startup investing, and will reduce it’s reliance on the long home run as its basic method of making money. This is where they really add value to the “business-creation value chain”. What I expect to see is a renewed search for businesses which are “capital efficient”. What I mean by this are companies that will turn an invested dollar into a high multiple of that investment, in terms of revenue, profits and valuation. You might say this has always been true. But the key difference, I believe, is that that venture funds will be smaller, and as a result will feel less pressure to fund high risk, high ceiling businesses where a lot of capital needs to be deployed. As I stated earlier, VCs with large funds have previously felt that the economics of their business demanded this approach. With smaller funds, I believe that capital efficient businesses in smaller markets will no longer be ignored. Solid singles and doubles may come back in vogue (for those of you that understand baseball analogies!).

IS MONEY REALLY “SMART’? OPERATIONAL EXPERTISE VS. FINANCIAL GUYS
I’ve always felt that the idea of “smart money” has always been a fallacy, or least one that was greatly overblown in the Venture Capital business. I know that there are A LOT of people that will disagree with me on this point. A lot of startup advisors will tell you that it’s imperative to raise money from investors who will provide much more than cash. I think it’s a bunch of malarkey. No doubt that there are some experienced, skilled and very well-connected VCs that can provide a strategic advantage to entrepreneurs, who are fortunate enough to attract them as investors. But with money being a commodity, this is mostly about a VC firm trying to differentiate and provide a value-add. Fundamentally, the need for capital and the need for advice and other business assistance aren’t tied at the hip. Both are o
ften needed, but they don’t need to come from the same place–they are important, but separate ingredients to the successful startup recipe. If you can get both in one package, that’s great. But too many VCs present themselves as experts in areas where they’ve really just been investors. This is especially true for those many VCs that come from a financial background, rather than from a high tech startup management background. Frankly, entrepreneurs need to be careful of utilizing faulty advice, regardless of whether it comes from someone who has put money in their company or not. Having money in a pocket should not be confused with operational knowledge or expertise. I’m not sure whether it will happen or not, but I’d like to see the Venture Capital business present a more realistic view of the value that they are adding–it’s not the same in all cases.

SUMMARY: WILL VC FUNDING GO AWAY?
The short answer is “definitely not”. I do think that the bubble excesses have highlighted some weaknesses in the Venture Capital model. There will be adjustments to it–just like there will be adjustments in many other businesses, as a result of our economic duress. I’ve offered some ideas to get everyone thinking–please feel free to disagree, or otherwise add to the discussion. I’d welcome everyone to post a comment, if you have an additional take on this always interesting topic.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

Inside TeleSales versus Outside Sales in Software and High Tech Companies

There are many ways to deliver your software and technology products to the market. For example, one and two step distribution through third party channels, direct marketing/sales over the Internet, OEM relationships and many variations of these, as well as other methods.

One classic method of delivering products to the marketplace is by using a direct sales force. Within the direct sales methodology, two of the most popular variations are an outside sales force and an inside telesales group.

Inside sales forces utilizing telesales are cheaper per rep, so your cost of sales is reduced, and you can potentially afford more reps. Outside sales forces can provide additional credibility and stronger relationship with the account. How do you choose between the two methods? Does it sometimes make sense to use both? Let’s take a look at some of the key aspects to consider when making this decision:

PRODUCT COMPLEXITY AND LENGTH OF SALES CYCLE
Probably the most important consideration in this discussion is the complexity of your product offerings, and the corresponding typical length of your sales cycle. Simple products with shorter sales cycles obviously lend themselves to the less expensive telesales approach. If you have a complex product that requires more in the way of hands-on demos, application engineering and other high-touch sales support, an outside sales force may be warranted.

BRAND STRENGTH AND STAGE OF COMPANY LIFECYCLE
Another important factor is the position of your company in the marketplace. Take an example of two companies selling the same product, to the same market. The newer company with less market presence and a weaker brand may require an outside sales force to maximize its market penetration. The more established brand and company might be able to get by with a lower cost inside telesales approach in similar circumstances.

PRODUCT PRICING
Product price is another important element in this discussion. All things being equal, higher priced products are more likely to require outside sales, while more modestly priced ones may be able to be sold effectively with only an inside sales force. Low price products, unless sold in high volumes, may just not profitably support the use of an outside sales organization.

TARGET CUSTOMER PROFILE
Is the target company large or small, is the prospect themselves young or old, progressive or traditional? It’s important to understand your customer profile and buying style in deciding how best it will be to sell to them. This is of course often decided on a case-by-case basis for individual customers. But in making this decision on how to structure your direct sales force, it’s important to characterize your target market in aggregate. For example, if the bulk of your target market is older, traditional companies and you are trying to sell to their IT departments, you’d better strongly consider building an outside sales force. Many of these customers come from the old “Glass House” era that was dominated by IBM, and are used to having sales people physically call on them. On the other hand, your prime prospects may be in a newer, SMB market segment that has prospects who are more comfortable with remote communications methods. These folks also have less staff, and less corresponding time to meet with outside reps. These targets may be well-served by a competent inside sales force.

HYBRID SALES STRUCTURE
In some cases a mix of inside telesales and outside reps works best. Here are two examples of when this might be optimal: 1) Outside reps for Major Accounts, Inside reps for the rest of the territory and 2) a product with a low sales price that lends itself to an inside sales force, but the product is something that major accounts can use in great quantities, justifying an outside sales force to call specifically on these accounts.

COMPANY CAPITALIZATION
How much money does the company have? Sometimes, there just isn’t enough capital to initially invest in an outside sales force, even if the situation ideally calls for it. In these cases, it makes sense to start with an inside sales force, and do the best you can. There are many ways to compensate in this situation, even if it’s not ideal. We’ll cover the details of this scenario in another article. Suffice it to say that it’s preferable to get by with a sales structure that may not be optimal, rather than bankrupt the company with an outside sales force that it can’t yet afford. I’ve seen this occur more than once in my practice at PJM Consulting.

SUMMARY
Like any other key structural decision that senior management faces in developing a software or technology company, it’s important to carefully consider the details of your particular circumstances. Many times managers will quickly settle on replicating what they know, and are comfortable with from their past experience, or simply attempt to copy what the market leader does. Both of these approaches leave you vulnerable to a potential critical strategic mistake. Be thoughtful upfront in your approach to how to structure your direct sales force, and you are likely to be rewarded with optimal push in your chosen market segment.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

What Happens to Apple after Steve Jobs?

I’ve written several times on Steve Jobs and Apple, one of the most fascinating companies and executives that we’ve seen in the history of high technology.

I don’t mean to make this a morbid article; the current speculation on Steve Job’s health has been well-documented. I hope that Mr. Jobs is fine, and that he has many more years of good health, with a continued long reign at Apple.

But it does raise a slightly different question that is interesting to ponder. There has always be a “cult of personality” surrounding Apple and Steve Jobs. In fact, when Jobs recently announced that his recent weight loss was do to a minor hormone imbalance rather than a reoccurrence of cancer, the stock was up 4% that day. Mr. Jobs is joined at the hip with Apple in the investment community and public’s eyes. Jobs will leave Apple at some point, hopefully to go into a happy retirement, as I stated above. Regardless of the circumstances of his leaving, what will become of the company once he is gone?

I can think of no tech company more closely associated with a founder/CEO than Apple and Jobs. Gates and Microsoft certainly are in that league, and I’m sure that you can think of others. But I doubt if you can think of any combination that is clearly more high profile and closely-linked.

Jobs has obviously been a major driver of Apple’s current success, and has enriched its many shareholders and other stakeholders. While it may be blasphemy to the Apple faithful, especially in recent times, in my opinion he has also been responsible for some of the company’s periodic downturns. Whether viewed strictly as the company’s savoir, or also an unstable dictator that has wrought big swings in the company’s performance over a long period of time–it’s undeniable that an unusual amount of responsibility has laid in Job’s hands–especially for a company of Apple’s enormous size. He is known to be detailed-oriented and involved (from a positive perspective), and a micro-manager and poor delegator assuming a more negative viewpoint. The basic premise of this article is that once he leaves Apple, there will be a leadership vacuum. This isn’t necessarily a prescription for catastrophe–but it is rarely a good thing for a company, at least in the short term. So what are the broader lessons we can glean from this fascinating situation with respect to managing high tech businesses? Apple really isn’t a rare case–tech companies cultures are built around their founder/CEO quite often, as I see often in my practice at PJM Consulting. This is a case study that can be instructive for many managers. Let’s take a look at a few potential lessons:

Difficult or Odd Corporate Culture
There is obviously much to be admired about Apple’s corporate culture, since it is a very successful company. Yet by many it is considered to be somewhat dysfunctional from a management standpoint. Much of this can be attributed to having a leader with a very strong and quirky style. Cultures tend to develop haphazardly as companies grow, even if its leaders have given some thought to the issue. In a corporation, everyone has a boss and other constraints put on them by the company’s social structure. This tends to dampen the effects of dysfunctional behavior by people up and down the organizational chart. The exception to this is the Founder/CEO who is the head of the organization. Much like the old story about the “Emperor who has no Clothes”, no one in an official capacity will call out the person at the top of the org chart on their bad behavior, decisions and eccentricities. This is dangerous and can lead to a culture and company policies becoming embedded with inappropriate ideas for no good reason, sometimes based on what lower level people BELIEVE the CEO would want. The takeaway is that leaders (especially strong ones) must take care not to have TOO GREAT an influence on the culture of the company simply because of their personal style.

Corporate Succession
Strong leader such as Jobs often tend to run companies in a dictatorial manner. They also have a tendency to have a “self-centric” view of the world, and don’t give sufficient thought to planning for the company’s future after their tenure. This may work well while they are in charge, but can lead to a company in disarray when they leave. It’s not clear that there is a clear successor, or strong group of potential successors, in place to follow Jobs at Apple. For a company of the size and stature of Apple, most people would think that this isn’t a good idea. Founding CEOs and Senior Executives with a similar organizational impact need to force themselves to step back from the present, and plan for a future without themselves. This isn’t a comfortable thing for many people, but is critically important for the full potential of their legacy to be fulfilled.

Dangerous Concentration of Responsibility in a Single Person
In a startup, the founders often wear many hats, and make all of the important decisions themselves. No doubt that Jobs and Wozniak personally handled nearly everything when Apple was formed. This is a very proper operating model for a startup. As a company grows, at some point it becomes a VERY INAPPROPRIATE model, and can put the company in great jeopardy. What if that leader has a heart attack or is in some other way unable to fulfill their critical role? Chaos can occur, and the company’s decision-making can be paralyzed, especially in the short term. In addition, I believe that the old saying of “two heads are better than one” usually holds true. I’m not one to endorse decisions-by-committee, but many corporate situations are complex and inherently risky, and the decision-making in these circumstances can benefit by having several strong viewpoints. CEOs should ensure that important decisions include at least some level of peer discussion and review, to avoid blind spots and major mistakes.

Micro-Management
Strong leaders, especially those who are able to create a company from the ground up like Steve Jobs, are often “type A” personalities and micro-managers. This may be highly efficient when a company is in startup mode. Later on, however, it can lead to a lack of development of people down in the organization, as well as paralyze the organization’s ability to make quick decisions. The most effective leaders are those who are able to “let go” much of the decision-making as the company grows, while keeping their fingers on the pulse of what’s truly important. This is a very fine line to walk, no doubt, but it imo being able to successfully pull this off is one of the more important attributes of the very best corporate leaders.

Bench Strength – Can Worthy Managers Survive Under A Strong Leader?
Along the same lines as the Succession discussion above, attracting and retaining talented managers lower in the organization is usually critical to a company’s current success. If the leadership of the company tends to be dictatorial, micro-managers who hold on to most of the responsibility, lower-level managers may become demoralized. The management team needs to be developed, and feel like they have real responsibility and some control of their own destiny. When the guy at the top is holding on to all the power, strong leaders further down in the organization have a tendency to move on to other companies, where they feel like they are making an impact and have an opportunity to progress. The best leaders ensure that the conditions are in place attract, nurture, develop and retain the management talent required for a company’s continued growth and success.

SUMMARY
Apple is a great tech company, and Steve Jobs is one of our industry’s legendary entrepreneurs and managers. Yet every company, even highly successful ones like Apple, has holes in its game. There are many strong leaders much like Jobs at the head of software a
nd tech companies. Too often their strength is manifested with a very short term view of the organization. Although difficult to do, the strongest leaders operate with a view on not just optimizing the immediate issues facing them, but also plan ahead so that the company can function well even without their personal involvement. Often this means suppressing some of their own natural tendencies so that the overall organization can more fully develop. The resulting decentralization of power reduces a number of risks that are inherent when too much depends on a single individual. That’s my own view–post a comment if you have additional views to add to this discussion.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com