Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Tag: software

Why is Intel Buying McAfee?

Intel’s $7.68B announced acquisition of McAfee raised more that a few eyebrows, both in the marketplace and on Wall Street. Does it make sense? It’s hard to say at this point. So much depends upon execution, as well as potential synergies seen by Intel’s management which may not be obvious to outsiders.

 The price is almost 4X McAfee’s most recent annual revenue. That’s very, very pricey in almost everyone’s view. I’ve read a number of columns by others which analyze this deal from various viewpoints.

 Let’s look at several potential rationales for this deal:

 Diversification into software and services

Intel can’t grow in PC semiconductors forever, and is very dependent on the semi business, which can be quite cyclical. Theoretically, attempting to grow by increasing software and services as a percentage of the business makes a lot of sense. But Intel hasn’t been very successful in the past in this very endeavor, which I’ll discuss more below.

 Technology synergies

Intel’s management has provided justification for this deal by talking about embedding security into its chips, as well as valuing highly McAfee’s embryonic security efforts in mobile devices and the cloud. I think these all have strategic merit–but are they worth anywhere near $7.68B?

 Cost synergies

While overlapping functions can lead to cost savings in many acquisitions, there are probably not a lot of costs to be taken out in this one. McAfee is a big company, in a different business than Intel’s core business. Sure, there may be some common functions like HR and finance that can be combined to some extent, but I don’t see cost savings to a material degree here.

 Use of cash flow

Intel generates a LOT of cash. They are one of the most successful tech companies of all times, and their PC processor business is nearly a monopoly, with terrific margins. So the cash is available, and it doesn’t make much sense to have it sitting in the bank earning 1%. THAT will kill your return on assets metric! It needs to be reinvested, or retuned to the shareholders…

 Growth

On the surface, buying a big software company could be a good growth strategy for Intel. Assuming as there is a good return on investment, then why not? It’s going to be hard for Intel to grow much farther in processors. About the only area big enough to make a big difference in their processor business is in mobile. This is a very competitive arena which they’ve failed miserably in to date.

 So that’s some of the reasons you might use to do a deal like this–but is that reality?

 The real reason deals like this happen

CASH: The biggest reason that this type of deal happens is because it can. In this particular case, tech companies like Intel want to be seen as growth companies. It seems to kill tech companies to pay their cash flow out in dividends. But once your company gets to a certain size, it’s hard to be a growth company. A lot of bad acquisitions happen in the process of trying to continue growth status past a reasonable point. But is this the best return on assets, or use of cash flow, for the stockholders?

 Why there is a good chance this acquisition won’t succeed

PRICE: Intel paid dearly for a very established security software player. They paid for the McAfee brand–but will they keep investing in it in the long run? History says that this business will eventually morph into “McAfee by Intel” and they “Intel Security Software”, if the business stays with Intel in the long run. Built into the price was also a large number of retail customers, a dealer and distribution network — but does Intel really want these things? If not, why pay for all of them?

 TECHNOLOGY: Listening to Intel, this seems to be a technology play–but McAfee is universally not considered to have the best technology in the space. They win to a great extent on brand and sheer market presence at this point–like many large companies. Since the price paid was very high–why not buy a smaller player with much better technology to integrate with silicon–for much less?

 CULTURAL FIT: Semiconductors and software are very different businesses. I’ve spent a lot of time in both. I have always said that the “Common Business Sense” that a management team falls back on when stressed, is a real problem when they are making decisions in an unfamiliar business. It doesn’t seem like brain surgery to manage a software business with a semi background, but there are subtle differences that tend to have massive consequences. Intel has bought a number of software businesses in the past–how many of them can you name? There is a reason for this, they tend to disappear in the large semiconductor bureaucracy and eventually wither away.

 Typical M&A ISSUES: Key McAfee personnel will have a tendency to “cash out” and leave after the acquisition. This is a normal issue in M&A, and when the acquirer is in a different space, this can be a particular problem. Possibly the fact that McAfee is already a large public company may reduce this issue. But if the real assets of a software company (the people) walk out the door, there isn’t much left for your $7.68B.

 In summary, I view this as a very questionable move by Intel. Intel has some very smart folks in management. Maybe they have some great strategic and tactical plans in mind, but if so, they’re keeping it all to themselves. For the stated reasons of embedding security in chips, mobile security and the cloud, they could have bought 2-3 innovative security software companies with bleeding edge technology–for a fraction of the price they’ll pay for McAfee. If this acquisition is to pay off, Intel will need to figure out how to leverage the McAfee brand, consumer franchise and distribution channels. I just don’t see this happening in the long run–I hope for Intel shareholders sake I’m wrong. Acquisitions are an area with room for a variety of opinions–what do you think?

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on September 7, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, General Management, Mergers & Acquisitions, enterprise software
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Starting and Growing a Software Company in a Difficult Fundraising Environment

Some would say that it’s ALWAYS a difficult time to raise funds for a startup company. In general, I’d agree. With the exception of a few brief moments, such as pre-Internet Bubble in the late 90’s where money was being thrown around like air, fundraising is hard. There are a few lucky folks that don’t sweat this startup task, like repeat entrepreneurs who hit it big the first time, or those with truly obvious ground-breaking IP. But for most it’s a grueling and soul-sucking necessity.

 Today fundraising for a startup company is tougher than every. The Venture Capital (VC) business is in disarray, with the number of active firms in the process of shrinking. The financial crisis and general economic malaise has made finding capital from nearly every source more difficult, from traditional banks to angel investors. So if you’re planning on starting a company today, it might be time to get creative.

 Most of the ideas presented here are applicable to any type of company. But for those smart about it, a software-based business is one that can be started and grown with minimal, or zero, outside capital. This has always been true in the software business, but a number of developments have made bootstrapping even a more realistic possibility today. You will need to accept upfront that it can be done, and structure everything you do with minimal financial resources in mind.

 Successfully bootstrapping is tough if you’re a first time entrepreneur, especially for those that have been working in large companies, with all the trapping that come with that. But embracing the proper attitude early on is essential if you’re going to have to bootstrap your company, at least in the beginning. Let’s examine some tactics that can increase the odds of startup success:

 Understand early-on the level of capital you’ll have available

This is crucial. Most get going on their business, moving ahead and worrying about funding once they have a business plan, prototype/beta, etc. Only then do they put together an investor pitch and think about how much money to raise. But it can be really helpful to have a realistic view as early as possible how much money will be available to you in the early days. No question this is hard to do and by definition the result will be inaccurate. In reality, a number of things will dictate how much money you’ll have available: Management team reputation and track record, investment contacts, dilution philosophy, local investment resources, business model, IP, etc. The key point here is to do your best to understand how much money you’ll realistically have available at startup and early on….

 Structure your business accordingly

….then design your business model to fit your prospective available funding. In reality, this rarely happens. Most design their business, and then try to raise money to fund it. As a result, for example, I see people start enterprise software companies, with complex products at high price points that demand a team of outside sales reps and field engineers with $150-250K comp plans. Most startups won’t be able to attract the funding to support this sales model. Or adopting a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) approach, without planning for the added operational expenses required with a SaaS model, essentially taking on the role your clients IT department. If you can match your business model to your expected capital resources from the beginning, your chances of success go way up.

 Start while you’re still working

One of the best things a startup entrepreneur can do is to start working on your business while you still have a job. This is especially true of the technically-skilled software company founder. Many software companies have been started by a sole programmer, writing the initial product on his or her laptop while sitting at home in the kitchen. It’s one of the beauties of the software business; you can create a product with very little capital investment. Of course, care needs to be taken that you don’t use any of your employer’s resources or do anything on company time. Make sure that you aren’t violating any of agreements signed with your employer. But once you stop working to start up a new venture there’s no telling when your personal income will start flowing again. So do as much as you can, before cutting the cord with your steady income.

 Do it yourself and don’t be wasteful

Entrepreneurs often find that they can actually do things they never dreamed they could. When dealing with scarce capital, it’s critical to make sure that you actually NEED to pay someone else to accomplish a particular task before parting with your cash. This will lead to personally doing a lot of mundane activities that you don’t really want to do. But it’s important to take those duties on early on to conserve cash. Also try not to waste money on ANYTHING, not just labor. Count those paperclips! The corollary to this is when you really do need outside help, DON’T SKIMP and just do an unacceptable job internally. Bad marketing is an example of this for the technically-oriented founder. This can be truly penny wise and pound foolish, and can cost you much more money in the long run than you save in the short term. Recognize what skills you just don’t have that are absolutely critical to the business, and save money elsewhere so you can afford outside assistance in those crucial areas.

 Don’t reinvent the wheel

I referred earlier to it being easier than ever to build a software company with minimal capital. Development tools have matured to make development quicker than ever. Many target platforms have much less memory constraints, reducing the time needed to produce code that is extremely memory-efficient. There are many pre-built modules for standard functions available for a modest cost. Ten years ago it might have taken a half million dollars to build a quality website that you now can replicate for a few thousand dollars. As a software startup, make sure that you scour all pre-existing resources for things that you can use, before you build them yourself.

 Outsource and off-shore, if appropriate

Another area responsible for much lower costs in starting a software business is the potential for outsourcing/offshoring. This isn’t for every company or every situation, but where it makes sense, it can both reduce your costs significantly and expand the availability of critical development resources. While everyone would prefer the developers under their own roof, in many cases there just isn’t the right talent where the company is located–or the budget to fully staff with full-time, onsite employees.

 Don’t ignore international markets

A big area which most software companies ignore initially for their products is international sales. It’s natural to want to focus on your domestic market first. But doing this exclusively can cost you some excellent growth opportunities, even from the very beginning. This is particularly true for US-based companies. The US is the toughest market in the world. It’s the biggest, and the bulk of the software industry is located there (all looking at the US market first….). As a result, the competition is almost always less in non-US markets. So there is low hanging fruit to be had, plus you can partner in many markets with distribution partners whom have existing market presence, and can take on much of the marketing investment required to gain traction. All of this can mean an excellent return on a modest investment. Once you’ve invested so much to create valuable product IP (which is very “perishable”, by the way), don’t limit your return on that investment by focusing on a narrow geography, if at all possible.

 Don’t give up and enjoy the journey

Don’t ever give up prematurely. The most important thing is to keep grinding until you start to gain traction. Starting up and growing a software company is an exciting–and difficult–endeavor. Above all, I believe you need to be able to enjoy the journey, in addition to having your eye on the end prize–success. There will be difficult times where you need the willpower and stubbornness to push through. Often startup success is found by staying alive long enough for good fortune to find you.

 That’s my advice on starting up a software company and growing it in relatively tough times. Post a comment if you have your own experiences to add.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

2 Comments by admin on August 8, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, General Management, Startup/Early Stage, enterprise software
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Selling SaaS through the VAR Channel

The move toward Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is the strongest trend in the software business in recent memory. It changes the software business model in a number of fundamental ways. For the purposes of this article, I’m assuming the reader has a basic understanding of the SaaS business model. I’m also going to assume a basic understand of what a Value Added Reseller (VAR) is and does. I’ll focus on the fit between SaaS and the VAR distribution channel.

 The VAR channel has been a major factor in the B2B software business for a long time. There are tens of thousands of VARs, most of them now focused on specific vertical markets. While it is still possible to find a horizontal VAR, in a market of any size you’ll likely find a nice number of VARs specializing on that segment of customers. As a result, anyone who is selling software (whether via traditional licensing or SaaS) would love to have this stable of key market influencers representing their product. Let’s take a look at the situation:

 Major SaaS strengths

  •  Simplicity of startup for the customer – For many SaaS apps, getting started is as simple as signing up, obtaining a user name and password. Contrast this with the lengthy, complex and sometimes extensive setup and configuration period for some B2B apps. (This strength is a potential problem for VARs).
  • Available from any web browser - This is one of the great capabilities driving the SaaS revolution. Of course, traditional apps can have a web-based interface as well, but SaaS apps by definition are web-centric. Browser-based apps can limit functionality in some cases, but is becoming less of an issue all the time.
  •  Simplicity of maintenance for the vendor - This is a big one. With traditional on-premises apps, the vendor has to deal with “pushing” updates to the client, often into wildly varying hardware and software environments. With SaaS, the vendor presses a button and the new version is universally available to everyone. This is a huge advantage leading to reduced rollout costs for the vendor, and less pain for the client. (Also a potential problem for VARs) 
  • Less IT infrastructure required by clients - Theoretically a company could nearly eliminate their IT department by adopting all SaaS apps. As a practical matter, this isn’t happening in companies of any size, and likely won’t. But any reduction in reliance on perennially overworked IT departments is usually seen as a good thing. (Potential problem for VARs, but also an opportunity)

 Major VAR motivations

 Sell Services (not products) – Contrary to the expectations of channel neophytes, VARs are generally seriously interested in products to the extent that they have the ability to generate service revenue for the VAR. (Early SaaS models eliminate many traditional service revenue streams)

 Secure ongoing revenue – VARs don’t own intellectual property(products) to stabilize long-term revenues as a rule, so they’re always interested in ways of “smoothing out” their business with predictable, ongoing revenue streams. (SaaS eliminates much traditional service revenue, but subscriptions open up new possibilities)

 Maintain client control – VARs are very sensitive about retaining control of the relationship with their clients. They view these relationships as hard-won, and without owning the intellectual property, they are probably the most strategic aspect of their business. (VARs shy away from vendors who try to wrest account control from them, and many new SaaS vendors have this “direct-first” mentality).

 The Gap

 The problem as discussed in the above paragraphs is that the ways VARs traditionally make money (installation, training, integration, customization, support, client control) have been eliminated or severely reduced as opportunities by first generation SaaS vendors. Frankly, it’s never been easy for any software vendor to recruit VARs who are “active” with their products. The current situation sets up the typical first generation SaaS vendor as an arch- enemy to VARs. The SaaS vendors aren’t attractive partners due to the lack of potential service revenue (and often aren’t looking to partner), but are targeting the VAR’s customer base. To some, it looks like the end of the VAR channel for anyone running a SaaS-based company. Sound like a caution sign to SaaS vendors, one which makes the vendor focus strictly on direct selling? Maybe–but let’s explore a few ideas for changing the equation.

 Ideas on how to bridge the gap and attract VARs to your SaaS offering

 There are some forward-thinking SaaS who have been able to leverage the VAR channel for their companies. But at this point, they are few and far between. For many of the reasons stated in the above paragraphs, there is no established, tried and true model for attracting VARs to a SaaS offering today.

The biggest thing I’d like you to consider with respect to the sentence underlined above, is that when things are least established, there is the MOST opportunity for newcomers. Since there is no established perfect SaaS/VAR cooperative business model yet, no SaaS player is dominating in this still very influential channel. For a newcomer, this creates great opportunity and potential payback for creative approaches. Let’s take a look at a few such ideas to attract VARs:

 Design your SaaS offering from the ground up for easy customization and integration

Unfortunately I don’t see many SaaS vendors considering channel strategy when designing their first product. In the early days of SaaS, enabling customization and integration with other products was tough to do. Now the tools are there to make it very possible, but it’s a lot harder if you try to do it “after the fact”, once your architecture has been set and the first commercial release is done. This one step can be a huge asset when you are later trying to design programs attractive to VARs, and it can of course be a huge advantage with certain end users as well.

 Offer solid upfront margins, but focus on downstream revenue streams for your VARs

I recommend offering competitive upfront-sale margins, but going overboard here can be a waste of resources. Remember that VARs don’t build their business on upfront product sales revenue. Focus on finding ways VARs can make money dealing with you after the initial sale is complete. As an example, how about sharing downstream subscription revenue–but only if the VAR creates X amount of new sales revenue for the year? This is an example of a win/win which could lead to great loyalty to your offerings, tying the VAR’s interest to your business in the long run.

 Instead of building a large in-house consulting team, use VARs to help fill IT gaps for your customers

VARs have a lot of capability to offer services that your end users might require and demand. Rather than competing with VARs (and using scarce capital that could be deployed elsewhere), take a look at creating programs to utilize the best of your channel partners as your outsourced consulting team.

 Create a program to enable the outsourcing of upfront product training to your VARs

Initial product training is a great example of a “consulting service” to outsource to your channel. Most product groups see training as a necessary evil and an afterthought, often giving it away for free–while providing it with insufficient attention from the end user’s perspective. With the right tools, a VAR could turn this into a profit center for their business, reducing your utilization of key resources on a non-core activity, while tying the VAR tightly to your products.

 Be careful to allow your VARs to continue to lead in account management activities

In everything you do, keep in mind that the VAR is paranoid about account control (with good reason, unfortunately). Remember, you are in a business partnership with the VAR, and you need to trust them to do the right things for your joint business interests in the account. If you don’t feel like you can trust a particular VAR in this regard, don’t change your program to wrest account control from your channel. Stop doing business with that VAR.

I’m optimistic that adopting a few of these ideas can give you a leg up over the competition in building a productive channel business. I hope that you’ll find this article provocative, if not accurate in your view! This is an emerging, rapidly changing environment. Please post a comment with your own thoughts to expand the discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on July 18, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, Product Marketing/Management, SaaS, VARs, enterprise software
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Growing from a Startup to a Mid-Market Software or Hardware Company

Every stage of a company’s growth holds unique challenges. In my opinion, startup to about $2M in revenue for a software company, and startup to $10M for a hardware company is the hardest phase of all. But growing a business is almost always hard, and there are several natural revenue levels where companies tend to “get stuck”.

 As in the hardware/software contrast above, revenue levels for different business models can be quite different. So it’s hard to generalize strictly upon gross revenue levels. But undoubtedly there are stages that every company goes through (startup to profitability, profitability to stable small company, stable small company to midsized company, etc.) which represent points of inflection in terms of the way a company operates. For example, you need quite a bit more formal process to operate a large company than a very small one. The methods of capitalizing a large company are very different from a bootstrapped or VC-backed startup. There are many more possible examples; I’m sure you get the picture. For this article we’ll focus on growth into the Mid Market stage.

 First of all, there is no perfect definition of a “Mid-Market” company. People have defined it many different ways: by number of employees, revenue level and many other factors. For the purposes of this discussion, we’ll define a Mid Market company as one having between 100 and 999 employees. . Let’s take a look at some of the major changes required to successfully grow from a startup to a mid-market sized company:

Hiring

As a startup or smaller company, you’re often restricted by resource realities with respect to who you can hire. Startups are often forced to hire people with less direct experience than they’d like, and pay them less than the going rate in cash compensation. You often can’t fill every hole, even all the ones that you think are critical. People have to wear two or more hats, and the type of people you can attract might be those that really prefer the small company environment, or are dreaming big dreams based upon the stock options. In short, it’s continuous compromise. As you grow into the mid market you have more resources to pay market rates, and are generally more attractive to a larger pool of employee prospects.

 But please, be careful–just because you can hire differently, doesn’t mean you should. I’ve seen folks get drunk on hiring at this phase, and get loaded down with overhead that makes running the business to optimal profitability much harder. There is also a tendency to go after people with big, blue chip company resumes, which can be very dangerous. If these candidates don’t also have experience in smaller companies, you’re setting yourself up for a very premature and inappropriate culture change. It’s important to guard against building a big company bureaucracy in a middle market company.

 Business processes

Much like in hiring, there is often a tendency to want to add too much process, too soon. In fact, I believe this is the absolute biggest danger executive management needs to guard against during this transition. The CEO and senior team are usually very aware that the business is outgrowing its current level of checks, balances and controls. Inevitably there is a need for additional and more formal processes. The typical mistake I see is that instead of adding carefully and gradually, folks want to radically change the business overnight. The result is often a still-modest-sized business operating like one with 20,000 employees: Meaning operating VERYSLOWLY. Guard against this! Mid Market companies still need to rely on speed and agility to compete with the corporate giants, who have many more competitive advantages that you can’t yet replicate.

 Scope of target market

Around the mid market stage, a single-product or single market segment company may be running out of room to grow at the rates it has historically enjoyed. This is a day of reckoning and a danger point that stops many promising companies in their tracks. If you need to expand into new products or markets, make sure that you do so rationally. Don’t go out and acquire a company in a complete different business, because your investment banker thinks it’s undervalued and a great buy. Do “diversify” into “adjacent” markets, taking one of your existing technologies into a different market, or introducing a new technology or product category to your existing market segment.

 Capitalization

This is the stage where you absolutely need to hire a serious CFO with financial market savvy and connections. Many startups have someone with a CFO title whose background is really accounting and financial controls. Or possibly and outsourced, part-time CFO. This usually is fine up to this stage. But once you are talking about opening new offices, funding a new market focus or new line of product technology, the game has changed. The skill set of controlling the company’s simple expenses, dealing with angel and VC investors now becomes inadequate. The company needs someone that understands raising money in institutional financial markets, along with the contacts that go with that knowledge. Budgeting and controls will also start to become more decentralized, requiring a different financial management style, as the company continues to grow into the upper end of the mid market phase.

 Distribution and regional offices

As your business grows into new markets and product categories, your distribution system must often change and grow with it. This might be the time that you begin to open offices in all the key geographic markets of the world. But don’t do this “just because it’s time”. It should be done only for good business reasons, such as increasing marketing in countries where a distributor won’t or can’t do what’s necessary. It might also be the time that a single distribution channel business needs to become multi-channel. For example, a direct-only company adds retail or VAR channels. Again, avoid the temptation to do these types of things because your business has grown to a certain stage. It adds complexity and overhead to your business, so make sure there are sound business reasons for the change.

 Product Development

Moving to a different customer set or new base technology can have a profound effect on the product planning and development process. It is often at this stage that you must stop relying on a single set of market veterans or insiders, who have been successful in bringing out products due to deep, long-term domain knowledge in your original market/product focus. Now is often the time where there needs to be a bit more standardized product planning and development process, as you broaden both the number and scope of development projects.

 The bottom line is that as you grow out of the startup phase, the way your business operates necessarily will need to adjust to continue strong growth. The biggest danger here is trying to “get big” before your time. While the big blue chip companies are often envied, trying to duplicate their current mode of operation while you’re just entering the mid-market stage is probably the best way to ensure that your company will never reach that blue chip status. “Get big” in the way you operate cautiously–because once you’ve bureaucratized your business, it’s very difficult going back.

 That’s my take on going from a startup to mid-market. Share your own growth stories with us to start a discussion.

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on June 8, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, General Management, Operations, Startup/Early Stage
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Is HP acquiring Palm a good idea?

To answer the question posed in the title, it definitely is if you’re Palm!

A long time player and sometime innovator in the mobile device marketplace, Palm was rapidly losing steam, market share and relevancy in the hyper-competitive Smartphone market. The company had staked its future on its new WebOS software platform and the recently release Pre SmartPhone.

 After a long period of decline due to an aging product line built on an obsolete software platform, the Palm Pre and its WebOS software was introduced to critical acclaim by industry reviewers and pundits. Had these introductions come a few years ago, they might have indeed turned around Palm’s fortunes.

 But competition in the SmartPhone marketplace has heated up to a white-hot level. After a promising early start, sales momentum of the new Pre products stalled, and this “last-stand” product introduction proved to be too little, too late. At nearly the first sign of Pre sales weakness top Palm executives began bailing out, while Telco partners quit promoting the product heavily, and it was also being dropped from the assortment of major retailers such as Radio Shack. The end was clearing in sight for this handheld industry pioneer.

In swoops HP to save what little shareholder equity was left. HP is on a roll, and in conjunction with their upward momentum they seem to be intent on acquiring everything available for sale, as well as competing in nearly every category of the technology business. This particular acquisition appears to me to be particularly high risk/high reward. It raises several key questions:

 Did HP pay too much?

Probably. The price HP is paying for Palm is about $1.2M, while most knowledgeable industry observers had placed the value below $500M. This is hard to understand for the casual observer, but you must remember that a company is worth what the highest bidder is willing to pay. Except for those on the inside of the deal-making, no one knows what the sizes of the competitive bids were. So it’s a bit pointless to speculate whether they paid more than they needed to. The better question is what is the intrinsic VALUE of Palm to a company like HP?

 A case can be made in this situation for bidding at a price that will prevent the transaction from dragging out. Software loses value quickly–especially in a fast-moving market like SmartPhones, and this is largely a software acquisition. Another big key to the valuation question is whether or not HP is able to hold together and retain the Palm team, especially the key developers. In most cases, buying a software business (which is the key asset of Palm) without the team is nearly worthless.

 Can HP compete in the SmartPhone business, and should they?

This is a huge question in my mind. Hewlett Packard is definitely becoming the 10,000 lb gorilla in the tech business. But even the biggest giants reach a limitation on resources, most importantly senior management bandwidth and market segment knowledge. IBM at one time looked much like HP today, competing actively in nearly every important technology market. Eventually IBM lost traction and did a painful restructuring focusing on services. Microsoft is huge and still dominant in software, but they’ve been far from successful everywhere they’ve invested. There are many examples in the tech business of competing in too many competitive markets at once. The often-used analogy (which still rings true) is to Hitler opening up a two front war by invading Russia. The old joke goes that had he been more focused, we might all be speaking German today. I am very skeptical of Hewlett Packard being able to win in all of the major markets they appear to be serious about at the moment.

 Can putting two losers together ever create a winner?

Not usually. I can’t think of a single high profile successful instance of this, although I’m sure it’s happened before. It usually doesn’t work in such a highly competitive market as SmartPhones, however. Palm was around 5% market share and fading fast.  HP is very successful overall, but its iPaq SmartPhone has less than .1% market share–I’ll bet most of you are shocked to hear that HP was even in the SmartPhone market prior to this deal! When there is a reason that both companies are unsuccessful, it’s very difficult to change the equation simply by combining. Mergers often create more problems then they solve, regardless of how good they look on paper.

 Having said all this, there is some synergy here. There is a belief is that one reason the Pre wasn’t gaining much traction was Palm’s precarious financial position. No one wants to carry around a phone that could soon become an orphan. The HP acquisition should help immensely on that front. Hewlett Packard certainly has the financial might, industry muscle and influence to improve the position of a well regarded platform like the Palm Pre and WebOS platform.

 Will HP be patient and persistent enough to win in SmartPhones?

To me this is the biggest question. If you asked me 10 years ago I would have said no. As a former HP employee, at one time this wouldn’t have been the type of market that I would expect Hewlett Packard to have success. But since them I’ve seen the company persevere for decades as an also ran in the low margin, down and dirty PC business, and finally push Dell out of the top spot. There was a time when Dell (and a few others) used to laugh at HP in the PC market–but that ended a while ago.

 I’m convinced that this ever more powerful version of HP can succeed in SmartPhones if they so choose. But as discussed above, even in a giant company like this, can they win so many tough fights across so many difficult market segments? That is a different question entirely–and something may have to give. They might not be able to win on all fronts.

 Bottom line

The bottom line for me is that HP can probably muscle their way into the SmartPhone market if they want to bad enough. But can they do it while they also compete with Cisco in networking, IBM in services, and Dell in PCs–just to name a few? Even for a successful industry giant like Hewlett Packard is today, I believe in the concept of “biting off more than you can chew”. That is the real risk. One thing I think for sure is that this won’t play out quickly. Only time will tell whether HP ultimately has the market knowledge, patience, tenacity and will to win in this hit-driven and brutally competitive market. What’s your take on this high profile acquisition? Post a comment to rev up a discussion.

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

3 Comments by admin on May 14, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Mergers & Acquisitions, Retail, hardware
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Is The Tech Recovery Upon Us?

Let’s face it, things still aren’t great economically: unemployment is over 10% nationally in the US, credit is tight for small businesses as well as reduced access to investment capital, and consumer’s moods, while improving are still not positive.

However, while I don’t want to overstate the case, but I do believe we are on the way to recovery. This has strategic implications for software and tech companies.

A look at the positives:

Stock markets on the rise–The Dow Jones Industrial average is up nearly 65% in the last nine months. Tech stocks in particular have been strong: the benchmark NYSE Arca Computer Technology Index is up nearly 95% in the same period. This is from a very deep bottom, of course. But it adds considerable wealth increases optimism, which usually leads to positive momentum.

Search firms are adding their own staff– ExecuNet’s benchmark Search Firm Hiring Index has increased the last two quarters, after many quarters of decrease. This is a nice indicator of expected increased hiring by businesses overall.

Worldwide employment on the rise — Manpower, Inc.’s Global Employment Outlook Survey for Q1 2010 states that the employment outlook is mostly positive in the Americas and Asia-Pacific, while still somewhat mixed in EMEA. Labor market strength in Asia-Pacific, which is becoming increasingly important as a consumer market, is expected to return to levels similar to before the global downturn.

VCs still have lots of money to invest — After sitting on the sidelines in fear (like everyone else with money in their pockets) during this great recession, Venture Capitalists are starting to poke their heads out among the economic green shoots. They were sitting on huge amounts of capital that was raised in the pre-recession bubble environment, much of which is still not invested-but still accruing management fees. I have heard that there are now many limited partners filing lawsuits as a result of their funds lying fallow, which may stimulate an acceleration of VC investments in the coming year.

IT spending is forecast to rise — After several down years and a very bad 2009, Garner is projecting an increase in excess of a 3% in IT spending worldwide in 2010. This is very important, and a bullish signal for the tech sector heading into the New Year.

The IPO market window appears to be opening — Security software company Fortinet had a very successful offering in November. Meru Networks, a supplier of wireless LAN solutions, announced today it planned to raise $86M in an initial public offering. IPOs tend to drive increased capital access up and down the food chain, and that window has been closed for some time. If it opens significantly, that bodes well for growth in the software and tech sector.

No more bubbles – at least anytime soon

We’re not heading toward another bubble anytime soon. It appears we’re headed for moderate, but hopefully sustainable growth as a result of our two catastrophic burst bubble in the last decade. Government debt, commercial real estate and inflation potential are concerns in the long run, but appear to be manageable in the near term.

What should tech companies do?

First of all, don’t be stupid and increase spending if your situation doesn’t support it — credit is still very tight, and access to investment capital still remains below typical levels of the last decade. So make sure your plans are supported by cash flow, or in the case of early stage companies, at least access to reasonable levels of debt financing or investment capital.

If you are able to spend, it’s a great time to grow fast or take share from competitors — when the economy is just starting to take off and buying is accelerating, act before your cautious competitors have come out of their shells.

In general, companies tend to be too conservative in their investment and hiring plans — Take note that hiring tends to peak at the apex of an economic cycle, just before growth slows or turns negative. In fact, many experts consider strong hiring a leading indicator of an economy that’s lost its momentum. I’ve never been a fan of hiring just because you have the money and growth rate to support it. This is a leading cause of bloated cost structures and bureaucratic, slow moving organizations. But most companies are pretty lean in staff after several years of recession. So if you really do need people, it’s more productive to hire them now as we begin an up cycle, instead of waiting until the very end of it as so often happens.

That’s my forecast and advice for the software and technology business sector as we enter 2010. What’s your forecast? I’d love to hear it. Post a comment or shoot me an email to add your own spin to this discussion.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil via email at info@pjmconsult.com.

No Comments by admin on December 21, 2009
filed in Corporate Strategy, General Management
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Will SaaS Lead to the Death of Software Product Management?

There is a lot of talk in the software business these days about changing business models, particularly the trend toward SaaS (Software as a Service).

Will SaaS business models dominate the software business?

Many consultants, pundits and other industry figures are proclaiming that SaaS will very soon take over the world; saying if you’re not on the bus soon, you’re going to be out of business. I believe this is a bit overstated, but the strong trend toward the SaaS business model can’t be denied.

My opinion on SaaS adoption: When bandwidth is unlimited and close to free, all IT systems are totally secure, the Internet is as reliable as old AT&T; and every customer in the world decides they want to rent everything and own nothing–then I’ll agree that SaaS is heading toward 100% market share. As I said above there’s a strong trend in this direction, but we’re a long way from there.

Is software product management dead?

I’ve written about SaaS a number of times before, and since it has become very important in the software business I’ll continue to do so frequently. What I want to address today is another opinion some “experts” are also espousing: that the trend toward SaaS means the end of the Product Management function in the software business.

I find this statement to be downright silly.

When following this debate, it’s important to take notice that many of the folks proselytizing these opinions have businesses whose success is based upon these predictions actually coming true. It’s always important to consider conflicts of interest among the debaters.

In one recent webinar they trotted out a SaaS software company that was growing briskly every year with no product managers in the company. What wasn’t said is that it was always possible to find software companies (of the traditional sort) who didn’t have a product management function. Software companies are often founded by programmers, and they haven’t always seen the need for Product Management. There are very successful companies where the developers talk directly to the customers, with no product managers at all. However, the facts are that a very small percentage of companies that do business this way are successful, and its usually based upon special circumstances: the rare developer who understands markets and customers as well as he does coding, markets where the developers themselves are perfect customer proxies, etc.

So while software companies without Product Managers have always been out there, it just hasn’t been a broad formula for success. Trotting out one SaaS company successfully doing business this way (incidentally, I saw some big holes in their model long-term) doesn’t impress me much.

I’m not defending the status quo–I’ll say it once again, there is a huge move to SaaS in the software biz. Many (and maybe most) will be doing business this way in the near future. However, like most over-hyped trends, this are some pretty big overstatements being thrown around.

SKILLED product management will always be important

The argument being made is that many of the functions Product Managers currently perform are obsolete under the SaaS model. With continuous development more practical using SaaS, there may be fewer (or no) new version introductions. So the old waterfall chart with MRDs being created for the new version may go away along with new product introductions. I’m sure you get the picture. SaaS is a pretty fundamental change to the software business model, so you wouldn’t expect a product manager’s job to be stagnant under such change.

But those predicting the death of product management are focusing on the more mundane aspects of Product Management. The essence of this critical function is the ability to understand markets and match widespread, aggregate customer needs to the technical skills and IP of your company–creating a PRODUCT which can be sold to these many people. It doesn’t matter whether you deliver this PRODUCT over the Internet in a hosted manner using monthly subscriptions, or in the more traditional on-customer premises, licensed model. Product Management is about creating a profitable PRODUCT well-matched for a market segment. It matters not whether you are engaged in customer facing marketing/promotional activities, or upfront product planning–the product manager’s understanding of market needs and how your company can fulfill those needs is crucial in a product business. Otherwise, you’re just selling custom software–one-off’s for every customer. That’s a different business–not a bad one–and one you which doesn’t require product managers.

Can Social Media replace Product Management?

Another thing being bandied about by my favorite pundits is the impact of communities and other social media for its potential impact on product development. The thinking goes that there will be much more direct interaction with the end customer, leading to tremendous amounts of data available to ISVs. While SaaS is very well suited to communities (although not exclusive–they can be well utilized by traditional licensed software vendors), the ability to more easily obtain direct customer comments, and maybe take votes on potential new features doesn’t eliminate the need for product management. To the contrary. While communities and other forms of social media are very powerful tools, don’t mistake more data and customer access with actionable market intelligence. Data needs to be interpreted, and skilled marketers are best positioned to discern who’s telling you what and why–the underlying motivations behind any customer feedback. So all of this added customer access and resulting data will only put a premium on good product management, to use these powerful new tools and data for quicker action and to allow better product planning decisions. Remember, SaaS competitor down the road will have access to the same tools and data that you do.

It is rare to find a developer who has truly exceptional product management skills. That’s not a knock on developers; as a whole they are an extremely sharp bunch. But specialization in life happens for a reason–very seldom is someone the best at everything. Developers are trained to write code and build applications, not understand markets or extract the “truth” from customers. Different types of people’s brain’s work differently, and a good developer and good product manager are an example of this.

I find that it’s when a talented, open-minded development manager teams with a market-savvy product manager, that most great software applications are made. So no, I don’t believe that the Product Management function is going away anytime soon in the software business. There are many important changes going on in the business, the SaaS business model not the least of these. With any change in business model, functional roles will evolve and change. But I believe strongly that Product Management is a fundamental, important role that will remain critical in software businesses far into the future.

That’s what I think about SaaS and product management–what do you think? Post a comment to start the discussion! Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

3 Comments by admin on October 12, 2009
filed in Corporate Strategy, Product Marketing/Management, SaaS, Social media, Software/Product Development
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Startup Mistakes by Software and Tech Companies

Starting a company, any kind of company is the hardest thing to do in business. Sez me.

It’s also one of the most rewarding and fun, if you’re built for the startup experience–though not everyone is. Technology startups have their own unique challenges. There are many different ways to drive off the road, some of which I list below. Keep in mind that no startup is perfect, and mistakes will be made. The future can not be forecast, and in a software or tech startup you’re often flying nearly blind without a map, because you are trying to do something new and different.

In the end, if you are able to make it through, overcoming your mistakes may be the most satisfying part of the whole startup experience. So keep in mind that it’s almost impossible to play a perfect game. On the other hand, it’s crucial to steer clear of the mistakes which are often avoidable–because you only get some many chances to recover from errors.

Here are some of the common, often avoidable missteps to be aware of:

Too little capital
Sometimes this is unavoidable–but if you really don’t have enough capital maybe you shouldn’t start up in the first place. Activities such as software product development are notorious for going way past schedule and over budget. Most products don’t move like a knife through butter with the first modest promotional campaign. So build a decent amount of backup money into your plan, because things rarely go as planned. If they do, great, you can use the money to accelerate growth. But when things don’t go well, you’ll at least give yourself a fighting chance, if you’ve set aside a bit of money for a rainy day.

Don’t try to be a “Big Company” right off the bat
Many startup management teams are jealous of the resources available to their established competitors. These folks can become “Big Company Wannabes”, a classic formula for going out of business early. Don’t spend your precious time and resources on activities that don’t efficiently bring the product out, or market it. Period. Lavish trade show booths, company parties, expensive or large offices, administrative assistants for all the execs, etc., etc. Don’t hire a lot of big company people who don’t have early stage experience–they are prone to the types of costly waste listed above.

No backup plan
It is a startup and you have to expect little margin for error in reaching success. But that’s no excuse for a lack of strategic planning–within the constraints of your resources. A backup plan might be something simple: software companies going to open source if your high-priced commercial strategy meets resistance, a service-oriented revenue strategy with a cheap or free product, using a channel rather than building a full sales force, licensing your technology instead of marketing a full product to end users. It depends on your circumstances, but do try to have some type of a contingency plan going in.

The “Techies know everything” syndrome
This is a common malady in tech startups, because many new software and tech companies are led by management heavy in experience from the engineering or software development side of the business. Usually these folks are very smart, but in some cases also a bit full of themselves, unable to know their own blind spots. Those blind spots often appear in marketing and sales (which every engineer and software developer knows are easy, non-complex activities). The really smart guys quickly figure out those other parts of the business besides the tech stuff is hard as well, and make adjustments through education and bringing in outside expertise.

The “Technology is everything” syndrome
This is a corollary to the bullet point above. The technology and product is crucial in a tech startup, since it is usually the basis for your competitive advantage. But it’s not everything, and many a startup has failed despite great technology and an exciting new product.

No marketing budget or in-house expertise
Believe it or not, I see a lot of companies with little or no promotional budget. Its insanity, but they only have enough money to get the product built, apparently thinking “if you build it they will come”. This is nearly always a failure mode. If there is someone with marketing expertise among the founders, they usually won’t allow this to happen. So secure a marketer on your founding management team, or at least find a close advisor you will listen to, early on.

Under-estimating time to market
This is a very common mistake. By definition, you are trying to do something new, which isn’t forecast-able. So don’t believe your own pretty Gantt charts–garbage-in equals garbage-out when it comes to schedules. Don’t count on making it to the big trade show, commit to costly promotional activities with no recourse, or let the developers all plan to leave for that well-deserved month in Hawaii. Get the product done first. I tell you this with many painful experiences as a teacher, both personally in software and tech companies and through my clients.

Under-estimating time-to-success
Even if you are able to get the product out on time, that doesn’t mean version one will hit the ground running. They often crawl, stumble and fall at first. After all, this is your first opportunity at really accurate market research. Even if the product is right on target, finding the marketing mix that works is generally trial and error. Many products don’t find success until their second version is released, so have some money in the bank, and some emotional bandwidth available for this possibility.

Introducing a “buggy” product
This is one of my biggest pet peeves, especially for software products. Most products aren’t fully stable when the developers think it is ready. They work on it so long and hard, that human nature wants it to be finished near the end–and dangerous shortcuts can be the result. Dedicate as many resources as you can spell to ensure a credible, third party view that the product is as stable as it can be, before the market gets the opportunity to “debug it” for you. You only get one chance to make a first impression. If the situation is bad enough, it can cost you your business.

There are my thoughts on what critical mistakes to avoid in a technology startup. I’m sure many of you have your own lessons and ideas to share. Post a comment to start the discussion! Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

1 Comment by admin on September 14, 2009
filed in Corporate Strategy, General Management, Software/Product Development, Startup/Early Stage
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Compensating the High Tech Sales Force

A very controversial topic within many software and other tech companies is how to best compensate the sales force. How much is required? How much is too much? What’s the best mix of salary and incentive comp?

If you’ve read anything I’ve written before, you’ll find my next comment familiar:

It all depends on your particular situation.

There is no across-the-board best practice for optimizing your sales force’s performance via compensation strategy. Every company, market and competitive landscape is different at any given point in time.

Let’s take a look at some of the more common variables and how they might affect your compensation strategy:

Established brand vs. startup
If you’re a startup, plan on paying your sales reps more. It will be harder to attract great reps as a startup, unless you are in a special situation with an incredibly hot new product (of course, every startup CEO thinks this way about their product!). You may need to pay reps a higher base, and certainly richer commissions than your established competitors. Some of this can be mitigated if you are offering an equity opportunity, as discussed later. But for sure, prospective reps need to believe that there is a good chance they can make more money at your startup, or you won’t be able to compete with established companies for the same level of folks. That’s just a fact of life.

Price Point
If your price points are higher, you may need to pay a higher base salary, if the total number of sales made will be low. Lower price points lend themselves to higher commissions and lower bases, because the rep will be able to start making money sooner, and more regularly.

Length of sales cycle
The sales cycle aspect is pretty straightforward, and tied closely to the price point discussion above. Price points and sales cycles almost always have a direct relationship. High price points lead to longer sales cycles, and low price points to shorter cycles. It’s harder to compensate heavily on commission if there is a long sales cycle, because sales reps need to eat regularly, too. If you have a product that takes a long time to sell, make sure that you have a decent base salary for your reps, if you want to keep the good ones.

Growth vs. harvest
Companies generally highly value reps that can sell new products and into new accounts–they want to pay for growth. So the more you are asking your reps to do what is considered to be the hardest thing in sales — sell “new”– the higher the commission structure should be. Selling “new” is the highest form of risk in sales, and it should be compensated by the highest reward. Selling established products and selling into established accounts (harvesting) is not as risky, and as a result can often carry lower commission structures.

Initial sale vs. ongoing revenue
Similar to the growth vs. harvest discussion, sometime you are selling a product that has upfront revenue as well as ongoing revenue, typically from updates, replacements or services. You generally want to pay higher commissions for the upfront portion than you do the ongoing revenue. A good example of this is a traditional software license with an annual maintenance fee. If you pay commissions on the maintenance portion at all, in most circumstances the payout should be lower than the incentive on the upfront license fee.

Commodity vs. missionary sales
Commodity sales lend themselves to high commissions and low (sometimes even zero) base salaries. This is because sales cycles are usually short for commodities, and since they are by definition in big markets it’s easier to make a base level of sales and resulting commissions, even for a new rep. By the very nature of commodities the rep’s service is often a major differentiating success factor, so a comp mix toward commissions rewards the exceptional rep to really work hard. Missionary sales, on the other hand, require a great deal of patience by the rep, as well as a lot of hand-holding and relationship building. To keep good sales reps in such a situation, it’s important to have base salaries which are adequate to enable the best sales reps to exhibit patience with the long sales process. Missionary sales are an area that really demands both high bases and strong commission structures, as they are one of the most demanding forms of selling.

Hunters vs. Farmers
Hunters obtain new accounts while Farmers maintain and maximize the sales into existing accounts. These two situations require two different sales personalities, and the compensation packages should be different as well. The hard-charging hunter will require a decent base salary, but really needs the high commission structure to keep him motivated. The Farmer is likely to be a more stability-oriented, relationship-building style of rep. A relatively higher base and lower commission structure is usually more comfortable for reps in situation.

Equity
In most cases, the playing field is slanted toward established companies when it comes to compensating and attracting sales reps. Equity participation can be the great equalizer for startups in compensation. Every company has a different view of how broadly to offer equity. But a startup that offers equity participation to its sales force can often give up less in cash compensation. For risk-taking reps, equity can even be the deciding factor in recruiting, in some cases. The lure of equity that might grow into a significant stake at a successful startup can help pull a rep from a more established job.

So what specifically should you be paying your reps? Laying out actual numbers is beyond the scope of this discussion, because there are too many factors and potential situations to generalize. All the factors above come into play in structuring a sales compensation package, as well as factors such as inside vs. outside sales. Every situation is different, and competitive factors also come into play, if you’re competing directly with your rivals for reps. Local market circumstances, as well as the overall economy, can also play a strong role in setting the final package.

Above all, if you want to optimize the performance of your sales force using compensation as a tool, you must do your homework. Don’t just quickly come up with something that “sounds good” or is “how you’ve done if before”. Analyze the situation of your unique company at this particular point in time, and at certainly consider at a minimum the factors mentioned above.

That’s my thinking on how to compensate your sales force–what’s yours? Post a comment below or shoot me an email if there is a particular situation you’d like to discuss.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

2 Comments by admin on August 17, 2009
filed in Distribution Channels, Startup/Early Stage, sales
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Cloud Computing, SaaS and Such–Have We Read This Story Before?

I have this incredible feeling of déjà vu.

Cloud computing and Software as a Service is all the rage. In my practice at PJM Consulting, I am very involved in software startup activity. Nearly every new software company that I see today is being built on the Software as a Service business model. It’s all the rage–so much so that it appears that any self-respecting software entrepreneur would be embarrassed to start a company using the traditional software licensing model. Even if an entrepreneur was so inclined, good luck finding a VC who would even consider funding such a company. No one wants to look like a dinosaur.

It’s all well and good–there is definitely a real trend toward SaaS and Cloud Computing, with many good reasons for it. But most high technology trends are initially a bit over-hyped, and tend to get ahead of themselves. In addition, this particular story seems ever so familiar to a tech veteran that’s been around for a few of these cycles.

The first bit of history this reminds me of is the old terminal/mainframe model from the early years of computing. There were some real advantages to this model, but also some big disadvantages as well–which opened the door for the golden age of PCs and networking.

The second era that the current SaaS wave reminds me of is “Web 1.0″, when Web-based hosted software (then called ASP rather than the modern SaaS terminology), was first going to take over the world. The current trend seems so very similar because it was around the Web 1.0 years of the late 90s/early 2000 when the traditional software license business model was first proclaimed dead. At that time nearly every new business plan was based upon an ASP model.

So some of this fast-moving Cloud Computing or SaaS trend is new–but much of it could be viewed as recycled from past trends. Let’s look at the Pros and Cons of this computing model:

ADVANTAGES

* Enables “Utility-Style” computing – variable expense instead of. capital investment
* Allows an end run around overwhelmed IT departments (like PC networking did)
* Supposedly “On-demand”–use only what you need, when you need it
* More efficient use of compute resources by time-slicing large farms of cost-efficient computing resources
* Web-based allows anywhere, anytime availability
* Off-site storage of data assists disaster recovery preparedness

DISADVANTAGES

* Immature and inherently more difficult Security
* More difficult integration with other applications
* Internet latency
* Internet reliability
* Data resides outside the company firewall
* Costs over time aren’t necessarily lower for customers
* Lower margins for software vendors–aren’t always accounted for in current pricing

SUMMARY

I believe that the trend toward computing in the cloud will continue, but there will be some stumbles and pullbacks along the way. Cloud Computing and SaaS has some inherent strengths–but also some under-publicized weaknesses. Many software vendors are overlooking the weaknesses at this time, as is typical of any new and hyped technology. Traditional licensed software hosted by the user still has its strengths and a definite place in the market. Like many mature technologies and business models, the death of traditional software licensing has been greatly exaggerated. Once the early hype passes, decisions on whether to computer within the firewall or in the cloud will once again be made on the individual merits, costs and user needs for a particular application within a particular company. That’s how I see it–post a comment with your opinion so we can look at all viewpoints.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

5 Comments by admin on May 4, 2009
filed in Corporate Strategy, General Management, Operations, SaaS, Software/Product Development, enterprise software
tagged , , , , , , , , , , , ,
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