Morettini on Management

General Management and Marketing Advice for Software and Tech Companies

Tag: strategy

Why is Intel Buying McAfee?

Intel’s $7.68B announced acquisition of McAfee raised more that a few eyebrows, both in the marketplace and on Wall Street. Does it make sense? It’s hard to say at this point. So much depends upon execution, as well as potential synergies seen by Intel’s management which may not be obvious to outsiders.

 The price is almost 4X McAfee’s most recent annual revenue. That’s very, very pricey in almost everyone’s view. I’ve read a number of columns by others which analyze this deal from various viewpoints.

 Let’s look at several potential rationales for this deal:

 Diversification into software and services

Intel can’t grow in PC semiconductors forever, and is very dependent on the semi business, which can be quite cyclical. Theoretically, attempting to grow by increasing software and services as a percentage of the business makes a lot of sense. But Intel hasn’t been very successful in the past in this very endeavor, which I’ll discuss more below.

 Technology synergies

Intel’s management has provided justification for this deal by talking about embedding security into its chips, as well as valuing highly McAfee’s embryonic security efforts in mobile devices and the cloud. I think these all have strategic merit–but are they worth anywhere near $7.68B?

 Cost synergies

While overlapping functions can lead to cost savings in many acquisitions, there are probably not a lot of costs to be taken out in this one. McAfee is a big company, in a different business than Intel’s core business. Sure, there may be some common functions like HR and finance that can be combined to some extent, but I don’t see cost savings to a material degree here.

 Use of cash flow

Intel generates a LOT of cash. They are one of the most successful tech companies of all times, and their PC processor business is nearly a monopoly, with terrific margins. So the cash is available, and it doesn’t make much sense to have it sitting in the bank earning 1%. THAT will kill your return on assets metric! It needs to be reinvested, or retuned to the shareholders…

 Growth

On the surface, buying a big software company could be a good growth strategy for Intel. Assuming as there is a good return on investment, then why not? It’s going to be hard for Intel to grow much farther in processors. About the only area big enough to make a big difference in their processor business is in mobile. This is a very competitive arena which they’ve failed miserably in to date.

 So that’s some of the reasons you might use to do a deal like this–but is that reality?

 The real reason deals like this happen

CASH: The biggest reason that this type of deal happens is because it can. In this particular case, tech companies like Intel want to be seen as growth companies. It seems to kill tech companies to pay their cash flow out in dividends. But once your company gets to a certain size, it’s hard to be a growth company. A lot of bad acquisitions happen in the process of trying to continue growth status past a reasonable point. But is this the best return on assets, or use of cash flow, for the stockholders?

 Why there is a good chance this acquisition won’t succeed

PRICE: Intel paid dearly for a very established security software player. They paid for the McAfee brand–but will they keep investing in it in the long run? History says that this business will eventually morph into “McAfee by Intel” and they “Intel Security Software”, if the business stays with Intel in the long run. Built into the price was also a large number of retail customers, a dealer and distribution network — but does Intel really want these things? If not, why pay for all of them?

 TECHNOLOGY: Listening to Intel, this seems to be a technology play–but McAfee is universally not considered to have the best technology in the space. They win to a great extent on brand and sheer market presence at this point–like many large companies. Since the price paid was very high–why not buy a smaller player with much better technology to integrate with silicon–for much less?

 CULTURAL FIT: Semiconductors and software are very different businesses. I’ve spent a lot of time in both. I have always said that the “Common Business Sense” that a management team falls back on when stressed, is a real problem when they are making decisions in an unfamiliar business. It doesn’t seem like brain surgery to manage a software business with a semi background, but there are subtle differences that tend to have massive consequences. Intel has bought a number of software businesses in the past–how many of them can you name? There is a reason for this, they tend to disappear in the large semiconductor bureaucracy and eventually wither away.

 Typical M&A ISSUES: Key McAfee personnel will have a tendency to “cash out” and leave after the acquisition. This is a normal issue in M&A, and when the acquirer is in a different space, this can be a particular problem. Possibly the fact that McAfee is already a large public company may reduce this issue. But if the real assets of a software company (the people) walk out the door, there isn’t much left for your $7.68B.

 In summary, I view this as a very questionable move by Intel. Intel has some very smart folks in management. Maybe they have some great strategic and tactical plans in mind, but if so, they’re keeping it all to themselves. For the stated reasons of embedding security in chips, mobile security and the cloud, they could have bought 2-3 innovative security software companies with bleeding edge technology–for a fraction of the price they’ll pay for McAfee. If this acquisition is to pay off, Intel will need to figure out how to leverage the McAfee brand, consumer franchise and distribution channels. I just don’t see this happening in the long run–I hope for Intel shareholders sake I’m wrong. Acquisitions are an area with room for a variety of opinions–what do you think?

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on September 7, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, General Management, Mergers & Acquisitions, enterprise software
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Starting and Growing a Software Company in a Difficult Fundraising Environment

Some would say that it’s ALWAYS a difficult time to raise funds for a startup company. In general, I’d agree. With the exception of a few brief moments, such as pre-Internet Bubble in the late 90’s where money was being thrown around like air, fundraising is hard. There are a few lucky folks that don’t sweat this startup task, like repeat entrepreneurs who hit it big the first time, or those with truly obvious ground-breaking IP. But for most it’s a grueling and soul-sucking necessity.

 Today fundraising for a startup company is tougher than every. The Venture Capital (VC) business is in disarray, with the number of active firms in the process of shrinking. The financial crisis and general economic malaise has made finding capital from nearly every source more difficult, from traditional banks to angel investors. So if you’re planning on starting a company today, it might be time to get creative.

 Most of the ideas presented here are applicable to any type of company. But for those smart about it, a software-based business is one that can be started and grown with minimal, or zero, outside capital. This has always been true in the software business, but a number of developments have made bootstrapping even a more realistic possibility today. You will need to accept upfront that it can be done, and structure everything you do with minimal financial resources in mind.

 Successfully bootstrapping is tough if you’re a first time entrepreneur, especially for those that have been working in large companies, with all the trapping that come with that. But embracing the proper attitude early on is essential if you’re going to have to bootstrap your company, at least in the beginning. Let’s examine some tactics that can increase the odds of startup success:

 Understand early-on the level of capital you’ll have available

This is crucial. Most get going on their business, moving ahead and worrying about funding once they have a business plan, prototype/beta, etc. Only then do they put together an investor pitch and think about how much money to raise. But it can be really helpful to have a realistic view as early as possible how much money will be available to you in the early days. No question this is hard to do and by definition the result will be inaccurate. In reality, a number of things will dictate how much money you’ll have available: Management team reputation and track record, investment contacts, dilution philosophy, local investment resources, business model, IP, etc. The key point here is to do your best to understand how much money you’ll realistically have available at startup and early on….

 Structure your business accordingly

….then design your business model to fit your prospective available funding. In reality, this rarely happens. Most design their business, and then try to raise money to fund it. As a result, for example, I see people start enterprise software companies, with complex products at high price points that demand a team of outside sales reps and field engineers with $150-250K comp plans. Most startups won’t be able to attract the funding to support this sales model. Or adopting a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) approach, without planning for the added operational expenses required with a SaaS model, essentially taking on the role your clients IT department. If you can match your business model to your expected capital resources from the beginning, your chances of success go way up.

 Start while you’re still working

One of the best things a startup entrepreneur can do is to start working on your business while you still have a job. This is especially true of the technically-skilled software company founder. Many software companies have been started by a sole programmer, writing the initial product on his or her laptop while sitting at home in the kitchen. It’s one of the beauties of the software business; you can create a product with very little capital investment. Of course, care needs to be taken that you don’t use any of your employer’s resources or do anything on company time. Make sure that you aren’t violating any of agreements signed with your employer. But once you stop working to start up a new venture there’s no telling when your personal income will start flowing again. So do as much as you can, before cutting the cord with your steady income.

 Do it yourself and don’t be wasteful

Entrepreneurs often find that they can actually do things they never dreamed they could. When dealing with scarce capital, it’s critical to make sure that you actually NEED to pay someone else to accomplish a particular task before parting with your cash. This will lead to personally doing a lot of mundane activities that you don’t really want to do. But it’s important to take those duties on early on to conserve cash. Also try not to waste money on ANYTHING, not just labor. Count those paperclips! The corollary to this is when you really do need outside help, DON’T SKIMP and just do an unacceptable job internally. Bad marketing is an example of this for the technically-oriented founder. This can be truly penny wise and pound foolish, and can cost you much more money in the long run than you save in the short term. Recognize what skills you just don’t have that are absolutely critical to the business, and save money elsewhere so you can afford outside assistance in those crucial areas.

 Don’t reinvent the wheel

I referred earlier to it being easier than ever to build a software company with minimal capital. Development tools have matured to make development quicker than ever. Many target platforms have much less memory constraints, reducing the time needed to produce code that is extremely memory-efficient. There are many pre-built modules for standard functions available for a modest cost. Ten years ago it might have taken a half million dollars to build a quality website that you now can replicate for a few thousand dollars. As a software startup, make sure that you scour all pre-existing resources for things that you can use, before you build them yourself.

 Outsource and off-shore, if appropriate

Another area responsible for much lower costs in starting a software business is the potential for outsourcing/offshoring. This isn’t for every company or every situation, but where it makes sense, it can both reduce your costs significantly and expand the availability of critical development resources. While everyone would prefer the developers under their own roof, in many cases there just isn’t the right talent where the company is located–or the budget to fully staff with full-time, onsite employees.

 Don’t ignore international markets

A big area which most software companies ignore initially for their products is international sales. It’s natural to want to focus on your domestic market first. But doing this exclusively can cost you some excellent growth opportunities, even from the very beginning. This is particularly true for US-based companies. The US is the toughest market in the world. It’s the biggest, and the bulk of the software industry is located there (all looking at the US market first….). As a result, the competition is almost always less in non-US markets. So there is low hanging fruit to be had, plus you can partner in many markets with distribution partners whom have existing market presence, and can take on much of the marketing investment required to gain traction. All of this can mean an excellent return on a modest investment. Once you’ve invested so much to create valuable product IP (which is very “perishable”, by the way), don’t limit your return on that investment by focusing on a narrow geography, if at all possible.

 Don’t give up and enjoy the journey

Don’t ever give up prematurely. The most important thing is to keep grinding until you start to gain traction. Starting up and growing a software company is an exciting–and difficult–endeavor. Above all, I believe you need to be able to enjoy the journey, in addition to having your eye on the end prize–success. There will be difficult times where you need the willpower and stubbornness to push through. Often startup success is found by staying alive long enough for good fortune to find you.

 That’s my advice on starting up a software company and growing it in relatively tough times. Post a comment if you have your own experiences to add.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

2 Comments by admin on August 8, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, General Management, Startup/Early Stage, enterprise software
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Is HP acquiring Palm a good idea?

To answer the question posed in the title, it definitely is if you’re Palm!

A long time player and sometime innovator in the mobile device marketplace, Palm was rapidly losing steam, market share and relevancy in the hyper-competitive Smartphone market. The company had staked its future on its new WebOS software platform and the recently release Pre SmartPhone.

 After a long period of decline due to an aging product line built on an obsolete software platform, the Palm Pre and its WebOS software was introduced to critical acclaim by industry reviewers and pundits. Had these introductions come a few years ago, they might have indeed turned around Palm’s fortunes.

 But competition in the SmartPhone marketplace has heated up to a white-hot level. After a promising early start, sales momentum of the new Pre products stalled, and this “last-stand” product introduction proved to be too little, too late. At nearly the first sign of Pre sales weakness top Palm executives began bailing out, while Telco partners quit promoting the product heavily, and it was also being dropped from the assortment of major retailers such as Radio Shack. The end was clearing in sight for this handheld industry pioneer.

In swoops HP to save what little shareholder equity was left. HP is on a roll, and in conjunction with their upward momentum they seem to be intent on acquiring everything available for sale, as well as competing in nearly every category of the technology business. This particular acquisition appears to me to be particularly high risk/high reward. It raises several key questions:

 Did HP pay too much?

Probably. The price HP is paying for Palm is about $1.2M, while most knowledgeable industry observers had placed the value below $500M. This is hard to understand for the casual observer, but you must remember that a company is worth what the highest bidder is willing to pay. Except for those on the inside of the deal-making, no one knows what the sizes of the competitive bids were. So it’s a bit pointless to speculate whether they paid more than they needed to. The better question is what is the intrinsic VALUE of Palm to a company like HP?

 A case can be made in this situation for bidding at a price that will prevent the transaction from dragging out. Software loses value quickly–especially in a fast-moving market like SmartPhones, and this is largely a software acquisition. Another big key to the valuation question is whether or not HP is able to hold together and retain the Palm team, especially the key developers. In most cases, buying a software business (which is the key asset of Palm) without the team is nearly worthless.

 Can HP compete in the SmartPhone business, and should they?

This is a huge question in my mind. Hewlett Packard is definitely becoming the 10,000 lb gorilla in the tech business. But even the biggest giants reach a limitation on resources, most importantly senior management bandwidth and market segment knowledge. IBM at one time looked much like HP today, competing actively in nearly every important technology market. Eventually IBM lost traction and did a painful restructuring focusing on services. Microsoft is huge and still dominant in software, but they’ve been far from successful everywhere they’ve invested. There are many examples in the tech business of competing in too many competitive markets at once. The often-used analogy (which still rings true) is to Hitler opening up a two front war by invading Russia. The old joke goes that had he been more focused, we might all be speaking German today. I am very skeptical of Hewlett Packard being able to win in all of the major markets they appear to be serious about at the moment.

 Can putting two losers together ever create a winner?

Not usually. I can’t think of a single high profile successful instance of this, although I’m sure it’s happened before. It usually doesn’t work in such a highly competitive market as SmartPhones, however. Palm was around 5% market share and fading fast.  HP is very successful overall, but its iPaq SmartPhone has less than .1% market share–I’ll bet most of you are shocked to hear that HP was even in the SmartPhone market prior to this deal! When there is a reason that both companies are unsuccessful, it’s very difficult to change the equation simply by combining. Mergers often create more problems then they solve, regardless of how good they look on paper.

 Having said all this, there is some synergy here. There is a belief is that one reason the Pre wasn’t gaining much traction was Palm’s precarious financial position. No one wants to carry around a phone that could soon become an orphan. The HP acquisition should help immensely on that front. Hewlett Packard certainly has the financial might, industry muscle and influence to improve the position of a well regarded platform like the Palm Pre and WebOS platform.

 Will HP be patient and persistent enough to win in SmartPhones?

To me this is the biggest question. If you asked me 10 years ago I would have said no. As a former HP employee, at one time this wouldn’t have been the type of market that I would expect Hewlett Packard to have success. But since them I’ve seen the company persevere for decades as an also ran in the low margin, down and dirty PC business, and finally push Dell out of the top spot. There was a time when Dell (and a few others) used to laugh at HP in the PC market–but that ended a while ago.

 I’m convinced that this ever more powerful version of HP can succeed in SmartPhones if they so choose. But as discussed above, even in a giant company like this, can they win so many tough fights across so many difficult market segments? That is a different question entirely–and something may have to give. They might not be able to win on all fronts.

 Bottom line

The bottom line for me is that HP can probably muscle their way into the SmartPhone market if they want to bad enough. But can they do it while they also compete with Cisco in networking, IBM in services, and Dell in PCs–just to name a few? Even for a successful industry giant like Hewlett Packard is today, I believe in the concept of “biting off more than you can chew”. That is the real risk. One thing I think for sure is that this won’t play out quickly. Only time will tell whether HP ultimately has the market knowledge, patience, tenacity and will to win in this hit-driven and brutally competitive market. What’s your take on this high profile acquisition? Post a comment to rev up a discussion.

 Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

3 Comments by admin on May 14, 2010
filed in Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Mergers & Acquisitions, Retail, hardware
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What is the Best Place to Locate a Tech Company?

There are many great places in the world where software and technology companies thrive.

Outside the US, India has a rich history and deep resources in software development.

Brazil, China and Eastern Europe also are emerging, low cost development centers. All of these areas are better know for outsourced software development services, however, and are only slowing emerging as homes of actual product-based companies. China and the “tigers” of Southeast Asia are known as low cost manufacturing (and in some cases low-cost development) centers.

Canada is promoted by many as the best place in the world to conduct software development, due to aggressive tax credits and other government incentives.

Israel has become an important center of networking and security development.

The point is, I could probably write a book on the many places tech companies thrive. But in the interest of brevity, I’ll use US-based locations as examples in this article, while discussing what regional attributes in general are important to consider when locating a new operation or complete company.

Labor cost considerations
This is obviously, very, important. But I contend that it’s not everything, especially in the tech business. You still need access to all of the key components that make a software or technology company successful–regardless of cost. Having said this, where in the country you locate can have a pretty major effect on your cost structure, and therefore your competitiveness over time. If for example you decide to locate in the Bay Area, you will be paying the highest salaries, rent, etc when compared to just about everywhere else. You may believe it is worth it, and of course there are strategies such as outsourcing that can be used to reduce some of that cost disadvantage. But it is important to understand what effect location will have on your cost structure, and plan for that effect.

Product development resources
Generally the most important consideration with respect to product development resources is to locate in an area where there is access to the talent flowing out of engineering colleges. This might be a major metro area, but it also could be a smaller city (with the advantage of lower overall costs) which is the home of a major university. For example, most of the Big Ten Universities have small tech clusters located in their regions, even though they are mostly located in smaller cities. It also helps to be located in an area where developers WANT to live–warm weather and recreational opportunities tend to dominate this aspect of discussion. Another factor is what type of developer you’re looking for. For example, if you’re involved in the wireless business, you will be hard-pressed to find a stronger preponderance of development talent than you will in San Diego. If you decide to locate in any area where your access to developers is limited, outsourcing is no longer an option but a necessity, and will play an important role in your success or failure.

Management resources
Access to management resources is strongly correlated with whether or not a region has a critical mass of tech companies. As a result, the Bay Area is superior to anywhere else with respect to the overall depth of management talent. But I think this is often overplayed (especially by those residing in the Bay Area!). There is arrogance by some in the technology business that says if you don’t live in one of the major tech centers, you couldn’t possibly be a top-notch tech executive. The reality is that not every talented person wants to live in the Bay Area or Boston, so they executive talent be found everywhere. If you’re putting together a startup, only a small cadre of senior executives is needed to launch successfully.

Lifestyle preferences
This is an important consideration, and a highly variable and very personal factor. I contend that it’s important to be happy if you’re going to be successful in business, at least in the long run. If you’re a skier, it might be great for you to locate operations in Boulder, CO. If you love the beach or are a tri-athlete, San Diego is a great choice. If you love cultural activities New York or San Francisco might be ideal. If you’re all business all the time, you can’t beat Silicon Valley. Know who you are and what you like, and set yourself up somewhere you won’t regret in the long run.

Outsourcing
Outsourcing today is a factor that can be the great equalizer with respect to locating your company. For example, you strongly desire to locate in the Bay Area because of the overall tech business climate, access to capital and senior management talent, but are worried about development or manufacturing costs. Done correctly, strategic outsourcing can overcome those issues.

Where do the traditional high tech centers of the country rank for you?

Here’s my ranking:

Tech Center Costs Developers Management Lifestyle
Bay Area Worst Highest Highest Good
Boston Worst Plentiful Plentiful Good
Southern California High Good Good Great
Austin Moderate Good OK Good
North Carolina Moderate Good OK Good
Smaller-metro areas Lowest Scarce Scarce OK

Before anyone screams that I’m short-changing their area, this is obviously VERY subjective. This is my take, and what is important is that you create your own grading system before deciding where to locate your operations. Some may consider a smaller area which isn’t a traditional tech center to be an IDEAL location. Others might feel that Bay Area is a great place to live. A lot of this is simply personal taste.

What’s the most important location attribute?
The one most important consideration is the preferences of you or your team! What’s key to keep in mind as you make this decision is to think globally and long term about what’s important. The beginning of a new company business unit is an opportunity to start with a clean sheet about what’s important for the business, as well as the founders personally. Don’t just start up you new business in a location because “you’re already there”, maybe because the parent company is there, or you just lost or quit an employee position. This decision will have many implications down the road, and once you make it, your flexibility to overturn it will be much more limited in the future. The bottom line is that while geography should play a role in your decision, no place is perfect; you can start up and successfully run a tech company just about anywhere is you plan up front.

What’s your view on where’s the best place or most important attributes to starting a new software or tech business? Leave a comment and clue us in.

Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter. Contact Phil directly at info@pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on March 29, 2010
filed in Corporate Strategy, Distribution Channels, General Management, Startup/Early Stage
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VAR vs. Retail Distribution in Software and Technology Markets

There is much talk in the software and technology industry about distribution through the “Channel”. Generically that means selling through some type of a third party company, rather than selling directly to the end customer. But in reality the “Channel” includes a wide variety of disparate types of third party resellers. Today we’ll take a look at when to consider partnering with two of the main channel reseller types, VARs and Retailer–which also happen to be two of the most different.

What’s the difference between a VAR and a Retailer?

Let’s start with the retailer, as that’s a bit more obvious. With respect to software and hardware products, we’re talking about computer, specialty electronics and mass market stores, independents as well as regional and national chains. Retail is both a B2C channel and a B2B channel, especially when talking about serving the small and medium size business (SBM) market. While retailers may offer some “value-added” services such as extended warranties, delivery, installation, etc., the main purpose of a retail store is quite simple. The retailer serves primarily as a point-of-sale location, holding inventory and enabling end customers to have immediate access to products at favorable prices.

VARs (Value-Added-Resellers) are in many respects the polar opposite to retailers. The VAR channel is strictly B2B, and sells to both large enterprises and the SMB market. Usually there isn’t a retail storefront–if there is, it’s not a big part of the business. Expensive retail space is avoided to minimize their real estate costs, because walk-in traffic isn’t part of the business model. Unlike retailers, VARs are focused on selling their services, such as installation, configuration, integration, customization, etc, rather than turning over large quantities of products. VARs aren’t interested in having a large “assortment” of products like retailers. This is a key point that channel newbie are prone to miss–at great cost to their company. While VARs do sell products, they are motivated to do so in only two instances:

1) Core products which are strategic because the VAR’s services are built around them
2) Easy to sell, demand-driven commodity products requested by their customer base

If you take just one thing away from this article, let it be this: VARs aren’t dying to sell most products. If your product doesn’t fit into one of the two categories above, you will be pushing on a rope trying to make progress in the VAR channel.

Is one of these channel types “better” than another?

One is not superior to the other. Each reseller type is better for different product types and circumstances. They both can be used quite profitably, but they serve different purposes. It’s important when designing a channel strategy to start with the end customer and work backwards. Where would the end customer like to buy? How important is price vs. services and support? What reseller type best meets the desires and needs of your target customer type(s)?

When you should use the VAR channel

While VARs aren’t product-oriented businesses, in aggregate they are still a very important channel for many product types. If you have a product which requires a high level of support, or “value-added” services such as expert installation, integration with other products, customization or 24/7 support, VARs can play a key role in your distribution strategy. If you have a popular commodity product, they can be useful (in aggregate) to greatly expand your distribution points. The VAR channel is highly segmented by vertical market, so if your product has a vertical orientation (networking, medical, insurance, etc.) this often creates an opportunity for VARs to be an important channel partner.

When you should use the Retail channel

Retailers are usually best for horizontal, commodity or mature products. They are effective at providing broad, immediate access to your products across a wide geographic area. Retailers typically are “inventory turn” oriented in their business models, and tend to work on thin margins. So if keeping your price point low is important while still using a third party channel, they are an excellent choice. Of course the fact that they provide instant access to your products during business hours can be a very important asset.

Can you use both VARs and Retailers for the same product?

Yes, but you must know what you are doing, or you may end up very sorry that you did. Since VARs and retailers bring very different things to your distribution, there is a strong chance of serious channel conflict if you use both reseller types for the same product. The biggest potential issue is degradation of your product street price, because while VARs typically work off high product margins and low turnover, retailers are the opposite. Retailers optimize their businesses for high inventory turnover, while accepting low product margins. The low margin strategy causes the street price of your product to fall for all channels distributing your product. If the street prices drop too low, the margins may drop too far to be interesting to VARs (even though they are focused primarily on their service offerings). Companies new to multi-channel distribution sometime make this problem even more acute by offering price discounts based on volume, which makes the situation even worse. A volume-based pricing strategy favors the higher volume retail channel, and also incentivizes even deeper street price drops, to create higher volumes and resulting better wholesale prices. Multi-channel pricing is a complex area fraught with danger for the uninitiated–new players should solicit outside advice, and tread carefully.

VARs and retailers can be important, high volume distribution channels for many software and tech companies. They can each be primary distribution channels, or combined with direct a sales approach and other channels to form highly efficient multi-channel distribution networks. More distribution is not always better, however. Companies need to know what they are doing when proceeding with a multi-channel strategy, or risk doing great damage to their sales and marketing efforts.

That’s how I view using VARs and retail in your distribution strategy. How do you see it? Post a comment to get a discussion going. Follow Phil Morettini and Morettini on Management via Twitter, Facebook, RSS, or the PJM Consulting Quarterly Newsletter.

No Comments by admin on November 8, 2009
filed in Business Development, Distribution Channels, Retail, VARs
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Will Microsoft’s BING Finally Bring Success in the Search Engine Market?

Microsoft’s new search service is called BING, and takes a contrarian approach to the simple Google Interface. The BING interface is kind of a cross between Google and the Yahoo Directory, with a bit of Expedia, MapQuest, Shopping.com, UTube and Flicker thrown in for good measure. Never accuse Microsoft of being modest in their ambitions–this site takes on directly just about every major category in the online world.

I’ve given BING a quick look. It’s polished and appears pretty comprehensive. The search results don’t seem to be that much different from previous Microsoft efforts, although the interface’s major categories may allow the finding of information more quickly than an elegantly simple one like Google’s–if you know upfront the category of information that you’re looking for.

HOW LIKELY IS SUCCESS?

Will they succeed? They have many times before in similar situations. They’ve been laughed at and written off in quite a number of markets over the years. MS has a bad corporate habit of releasing poor products in their first one, two, and even three incarnations. Any other company would give up after so many failures in a particular segment-but not Microsoft. Don’t forget that as a software company, Microsoft has always seemed to believe that it is their god-given right to sell every line of software code written in the world.

There are many examples of Microsoft rising from the dead in software market segments. In spreadsheets, Excel was at one point in time a speck on the wall compared to Lotus 123. WordPerfect had a commanding lead over MS Word in word processing back in the DOS days. And a large number of MS Network Operating System Server software offerings (beginning with LAN Manager) were considered a joke relative to Novell Netware, for the longest time back in the 90s.

In all of these situations, Microsoft had the last laugh, soundly beating their seemingly entrenched and unbeatable rivals in large market segments. As a result of this corporate history, they believe that can beat anyone and rarely give up. Occasionally, I have seen them back off, notably after several tries competing with Intuit in personal financial software. But if it’s considered a strategic, core segment by MS, they will throw a huge amount of resources at the segment, take large losses, and not give up until they’ve broken through.

I call them the Terminator of High Tech.

TERRIBLE TRACK RECORD IN ONLINE SERVICES

Of course, this isn’t a pure software market, its online services. The problem for Microsoft with Bing and the search engine market in general is that they’ve been floundering almost completely, for a long period of time, in online services. In fact, they’ve not had much success in their history online at all. This is especially noteworthy in contrast to their domination of the desktop software business, and the competitive advantage their desktop monopoly should provide them in online services. Yet they’ve done poorly in almost everything online, and are a distant third in search engine marketing–not even all that close to a fading Yahoo.

So as most pundits will confirm, Microsoft has been terrible in the online world. This does not bode well for the possible success of Bing. But as I alluded to earlier, there is another side to this equation.

MICROSOFT CONSIDERS ONLINE SERVICES IN GENERAL AND SEARCH ENGINE MARKETING SPECIFICALLY, TO BE ABSOLUTELY AT THE CORE OF THEIR FUTURE SUCCESS–AND EVEN THEIR SURVIVAL.

Yes, this hugely successful company has always been a bit paranoid–which may be a bit on the humorous side given their overall success. But it has worked well for them over the years. It has given the company a sense of urgency which is very hard to generate in corporations of their size and stature. So anyone with a sense of history would be foolish to rule them out.

HOW CAN MS OUTFLANK GOOGLE?

But how are they going to defeat their competitors, mostly notably Google, this time in the online world? In my quick evaluation, I didn’t see anything technically revolutionary, such as demonstrably more-relevant search results. Some people may prefer the Bing category-oriented interface better than Google’s, but it will be a matter of taste–I can’t see an overwhelming advantage here. In past cases MS may have overwhelmed a segment with marketing, or simply given away a product, to ensure defeat of a rival they feared could grow into a broad line Software competitor (Novell, Netscape, etc.). It’s unclear to me what strategy they will be able to take to defeat Google, which is a dominant, embedded brand with wild profitability in Search Engine Advertising. But I believe they fear the Google franchise and know they need to crack to code to online success if they are going to retain their position in the long run. So don’t expect any throwing in the towel any time soon.

Maybe Microsoft will hit upon some innovative strategy that will enable them to win the day in this crucial market. But the one thing I can think of right now, that may work in their favor, is deep pockets, longevity and sheer persistence. Google has also been unable to achieve success outside of their domination in their core Search Engine Marketing segment. This is very analogous to Microsoft’s struggles outside of desktop software. The Search Engine advertising segment will eventually mature, and there are already some early signs of slowing. Plus Google risks killing the goose that laid their golden egg by raising their “Auction” bid rates to levels that will make it hard for their customers to make money–don’t get me started on that. Advertisers may eventually take their advertising budgets elsewhere. So for MS in this crucial platform it may be a matter of hanging around, making incremental improvement to their Search Engine offerings, until Google shoots itself in the foot.

Doesn’t sound like much of a strategy, I know. But stranger things have happened. Let me know what you thing of Microsoft’s launch of Bing. Post a message or drop me an email.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

No Comments by admin on June 5, 2009
filed in Corporate Strategy, General Management, Online Marketing, Uncategorized
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Inside TeleSales versus Outside Sales in Software and High Tech Companies

There are many ways to deliver your software and technology products to the market. For example, one and two step distribution through third party channels, direct marketing/sales over the Internet, OEM relationships and many variations of these, as well as other methods.

One classic method of delivering products to the marketplace is by using a direct sales force. Within the direct sales methodology, two of the most popular variations are an outside sales force and an inside telesales group.

Inside sales forces utilizing telesales are cheaper per rep, so your cost of sales is reduced, and you can potentially afford more reps. Outside sales forces can provide additional credibility and stronger relationship with the account. How do you choose between the two methods? Does it sometimes make sense to use both? Let’s take a look at some of the key aspects to consider when making this decision:

PRODUCT COMPLEXITY AND LENGTH OF SALES CYCLE
Probably the most important consideration in this discussion is the complexity of your product offerings, and the corresponding typical length of your sales cycle. Simple products with shorter sales cycles obviously lend themselves to the less expensive telesales approach. If you have a complex product that requires more in the way of hands-on demos, application engineering and other high-touch sales support, an outside sales force may be warranted.

BRAND STRENGTH AND STAGE OF COMPANY LIFECYCLE
Another important factor is the position of your company in the marketplace. Take an example of two companies selling the same product, to the same market. The newer company with less market presence and a weaker brand may require an outside sales force to maximize its market penetration. The more established brand and company might be able to get by with a lower cost inside telesales approach in similar circumstances.

PRODUCT PRICING
Product price is another important element in this discussion. All things being equal, higher priced products are more likely to require outside sales, while more modestly priced ones may be able to be sold effectively with only an inside sales force. Low price products, unless sold in high volumes, may just not profitably support the use of an outside sales organization.

TARGET CUSTOMER PROFILE
Is the target company large or small, is the prospect themselves young or old, progressive or traditional? It’s important to understand your customer profile and buying style in deciding how best it will be to sell to them. This is of course often decided on a case-by-case basis for individual customers. But in making this decision on how to structure your direct sales force, it’s important to characterize your target market in aggregate. For example, if the bulk of your target market is older, traditional companies and you are trying to sell to their IT departments, you’d better strongly consider building an outside sales force. Many of these customers come from the old “Glass House” era that was dominated by IBM, and are used to having sales people physically call on them. On the other hand, your prime prospects may be in a newer, SMB market segment that has prospects who are more comfortable with remote communications methods. These folks also have less staff, and less corresponding time to meet with outside reps. These targets may be well-served by a competent inside sales force.

HYBRID SALES STRUCTURE
In some cases a mix of inside telesales and outside reps works best. Here are two examples of when this might be optimal: 1) Outside reps for Major Accounts, Inside reps for the rest of the territory and 2) a product with a low sales price that lends itself to an inside sales force, but the product is something that major accounts can use in great quantities, justifying an outside sales force to call specifically on these accounts.

COMPANY CAPITALIZATION
How much money does the company have? Sometimes, there just isn’t enough capital to initially invest in an outside sales force, even if the situation ideally calls for it. In these cases, it makes sense to start with an inside sales force, and do the best you can. There are many ways to compensate in this situation, even if it’s not ideal. We’ll cover the details of this scenario in another article. Suffice it to say that it’s preferable to get by with a sales structure that may not be optimal, rather than bankrupt the company with an outside sales force that it can’t yet afford. I’ve seen this occur more than once in my practice at PJM Consulting.

SUMMARY
Like any other key structural decision that senior management faces in developing a software or technology company, it’s important to carefully consider the details of your particular circumstances. Many times managers will quickly settle on replicating what they know, and are comfortable with from their past experience, or simply attempt to copy what the market leader does. Both of these approaches leave you vulnerable to a potential critical strategic mistake. Be thoughtful upfront in your approach to how to structure your direct sales force, and you are likely to be rewarded with optimal push in your chosen market segment.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

No Comments by admin on February 5, 2009
filed in Corporate Strategy, Startup/Early Stage, sales
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Google Chrome–a Strategic Platform or just another Browser?

Google’s new Chrome Browser came out a few weeks ago to quite a bit of attention. It’s big news 1) because it’s from Google and 2) it brings back memories of the “browser wars”, and seems like it could potentially signal the next big battleground in the intense rivalry between Google and Microsoft.

I’ve downloaded Chrome and played with it a bit, but this isn’t intended to be a technical review of Chrome’s merits. It seems reasonably snappy, and has Google’s typical minimalist design philosophy, including a single box for multiple functions (search, address bar, etc.). Your personal preferences will decide whether you like that or not. It has some nice features such as tabbed browsing, which theoretically should prevent one bad browser window from crashing all open browser windows–much like when Windows became multi-threaded. Nice stuff, but doesn’t really fundamentally change the browser game. But technically it’s still a beta anyway (of course just about everything is with Google), and it will evolve over time–so it’s not really time to judge it from a technical perspective anyway.

What I want to do is to examine Chrome as a strategic move by Google with respect to the software and online worlds–what does it really mean, where will it take the market, and what are its chances for success?

Let’s take a look at some of the potential ways that Chrome could affect the marketplace:

A Better Browser
Of course, PR propaganda always will say that this is the “real” reason for bringing out a new product such as this. When I was at HP we used to call this “making a contribution to the market”. Google in particular often gets sanctimonious about this type of thing, with all their “do no evil” and saving the world stuff. Does the world really need another, better browser? Not sure. Firefox and Safari, to name two, are already probably technically superior to IE, and while they’ve made some inroads in the marketplace, they still trail Microsoft by a wide margin. But history tells us that competition is a good thing, and a step forward on major platform like a browser can certainly be thought of as a gateway to allow software innovation to develop faster. Having a company like Google enter the fray should increase rate of innovation that’s possible in the online market.

An Application Development Platform
This is the position that many pundits suspect may be the major impact of Google’s move. In their introduction, Google talked quite a bit about “remaking” the browser for Web 3.0, if you will. And a fresh approach does make sense, given that Internet Explorer was conceived long before serious online applications were envisioned for the Web. With SaaS and Web 2-3-4.0 currently all the rage, having a browser platform designed from the bottom up to accommodate online software applications should be a good thing. If it’s all it’s cracked up to be, this could conceivably be a game-changer and a real threat to Microsoft. The key here is how much of the talk about re-architecting the Browser is real, and how much is hype. This will become more apparent over time as Chrome is further developed, and application developers take a look to see if there truly are features they can take advantage of to build better online apps for users.

An Additional Way To Track User Behavior
This is one of the more cynical viewpoints as to the major motivation behind Google’s introduction of Chrome. The thinking is that this is one more insidious move by Google to “big brother” your online activity. It’s no secret that Google uses web activity data they collect by various means (such as Google Analytics) to fine-tune their advertising business. Certainly owning browser could be seen as the “holy grail” towards creating a complete characterization of online activity. What else might they use this data for, in addition to fine tuning their advertising platform? That’s the question and concern.

A Way To Drive More Search Traffic And Adwords Revenue
Along the same lines as the bullet point directly above, owning the browser could be seen as the ultimate in terms of driving web traffic toward Google’s Adwords online advertising. The first thing you see upon downloading Chrome is the opportunity to switch to Google as your default search engine. How much will they do in this regard, either subtly or in a straightforward manner? As stated above, at a minimum, it gives them the opportunity to make Google the default search engine, which is critical to their base business. Only time will tell how much of a factor this is in Google’s Chrome strategy.

A “Real” Competitor Aimed At Microsoft IE To Make Them Defend Their Turf
Of all the bullet points I’m raising, this is the one I’m most sure of. Google and Microsoft are locked in one of those classic death matches for online software supremacy, and don’t miss an opportunity to tweak their arch-rival and make them sweat a bit. Going back to the application development argument above, there is a feeling that Chrome could serve as the basis for a suite of online Google apps to threaten obsolescence for Microsoft’s desktop software business. I don’t doubt that Google may try to do this. But even if from a technical and marketing perspective Chrome is only a modest success, it almost certainly will get Microsoft’s attention and cause them to expend resources and management attention on browser technology, to an extent they may not have preferred.

SUMMARY
Chrome is intriguing, but it’s too early to tell for sure what the major reason is for this Google initiative. They may not even know for sure themselves at this point. But the product, and more importantly the move itself, will likely make Microsoft react. The ensuing competition should be all good for the user and developer communities, as long as it doesn’t take us toward another tiresome and market-paralyzing “platform API” war. I’ll be following the future development of Chrome closely to see where it takes us–how about you?

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

No Comments by admin on October 9, 2008
filed in Corporate Strategy, Product Marketing/Management, SaaS, Software/Product Development
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Steve Jobs, the iPhone and Apple Strategy – have we seen this story before?

Apple computer and its red-hot iPhone have dominated the business news recently. By all accounts, with good reason. I haven’t had the opportunity to play around with an iPhone yet, but the early reviews have been very positive. Initial interest demand has been high, especially given the usual amount of mystery and intrigue woven by Mr. Jobs and the folks at Apple.

For a first-time entry in to a large, competitive business such as cell phones–you’ve got to be impressed. Yet I’ve got this vague feeling of familiarity when it comes to this story–I somehow feel that I’ve seen it and heard it all before….

THE RETURN OF JOBS

Apple Computer since the return of Steve Jobs from the hinterlands has felt a lot like the Apple from Jobs initial run at Apple. He’s restored the company’s attitude, and dominates publicity, product direction and what feels like nearly every little detail about the company. Not bad for what is roughly a $20B company. It speaks to how strong and impressive Mr. Jobs’ personality and skill set really is. He has done a tremendous job bringing Apple back from the brink, and it appears that they may be headed to heights that weren’t even approach in his first tenure at the company.

There are many reasons that Apple and Steve Jobs, over a long period of time, have proved to be an interesting story. There are the breakthrough products, invention of new categories, tremendous highs and lows in financial results, strong, eccentric personalities, and boardroom intrigue–all multiplied when Jobs is factored in.

But the thing that I’ve always found most interesting about Apple has been its corporate strategy.

APPLE CORPORATE STRATEGY

Lets first give Steve Jobs and his strategies their due; he’s done a whole bunch of things right. It’s hard to imagine where this company would be if they hadn’t brought him back for his second tour. But like most strong personalities, along with his myriad strengths–he’s got a few quirks as well. Some might argue these quirks are actually weaknesses. I’ve always thought that his biggest weakness was being a “control freak”. Some might argue that this is actually reflective of strength, indicative of a strong leader who is forcing a change in the status quo to his vision. At times it appears so.

For example, the original Mac was a great triumph at first. It set a new standard for PC usability and industrial design, and was a huge seller in the beginning. But in creating the Mac, Apple also:

1) Didn’t use standard (Intel) chips, but more expensive ones from weaker competitors
2) Was a relatively “closed” system
3) Couldn’t be upgraded much at all
4) Kept Prices and margins high, unsustainably so with hindsight

A SUSPECT BUSINESS MODEL?

Maybe most interesting of all from a strategic perspective, is Apple’s choice of a business model. Apple has always been an innovator in software, with most of its differentiation coming in this area. (At least this is true since the Mac was introduced–the original Apple hit product, the Apple II, was pure hardward innovation.) Yet the company has always tried to make its margin selling hardware devices, bundling in its software with its hardware, mostly for free. I believe that this closed, single vendor, hardware/software bundled system approach can be the right strategy in creating a new market. It allows a pioneer to control the user experience, while realizing larger margins and profits in the short run to support innovation. But as markets grow big, that approach which works so well in the beginning often becomes an albatross as other players enter a larger market, and figure out how to take cost out of the system. These strategic choices (flaws?) were some of reasons that ultimately led the Mac platform to be a distant also-ran in the PC races (although one with a rabid core following), even though it had a large advantage in technology and a healthy market share initially.

iTUNES AND THE iPOD

Interestingly, Jobs followed a similar basic strategy with iTunes and the iPod. He innovated with cool, hip industrial design, a classically simple but elegant user interface, and (maybe most importantly) broke the logjam with the Record labels on downloadable songs–for the first time creating a site with a truly wide selection of mainstream songs, downloadable without hassle. He once again has kept this a pretty closed system, not allowing other devices to download to iTunes, or other music sites to feed the iPod–although he has shown signs of opening this up recently. Once again, pricing is pretty high, relative to competitive “systems”. Apple has so far been able to keep a comfortable lead in the online music space–but using a timeline which is required to measure markets of this scope–one must remember, it is still very early in the game.

My feeling about this “closed system approach” that Jobs favors, is that in consumer electronics and computing, it often works very well for a while–but then backfires as the market grows and matures. Technology commoditizes, and markets eventually lean toward openness–which provides greater choice and lower costs to users. Jobs waited way too long with the Mac, and retreated on the strategy when Apple belately tried to open up the platform, just as he returned for his second run with the company. Apple may be headed toward open PC computing again with the new MacTel platform, but in my opinion, that ship has likely sailed long ago. It would be a long hard pull for the Mac to once again compete as a mainstream PC platform. Of course Steve Jobs is nothing if not audacious, so I wouldn’t put it past him to try.

iPHONE STRATEGY – GOOD & BAD

This brings us to the iPhone. Apple has been up and down during it’s corporate life, more often than a cat with nine lives. Right now, Apple is definitely riding on a high. When you take a look at this iPhone recent introduction, there is a whole bunch of familiar Apple/Jobs strategy going on. You see the innovation pointed at a major market that is populated by major players, but a relatively poor user experience. In this case it’s the poor user experience of the cell phone industry, just like PCs and downloadable music, which were frustrating to consumers when Apple innovated in those markets. The innovation is out of the old Apple playbook: led by cool industrial design, and a breakthrough, simple but elegant user interface. All of this, along with typically brilliant Apple PR, has led to the iPhone “mania” that is reminiscent of past Apple introductions. The iPhone sure looks like a big hit at this point, and no doubt will be in the short run.

But will Apple and Jobs be able to sustain the iPhone momentum, like they have with the iPod/iTunes to date, or will the initial success fade like it did with the Mac? While Jobs is now a more seasoned, and even more successful electronics industry icon, I would argue that there still may be a few of the old flaws in his game. The price point Apple introduced the iPhone at is very high, relative to most cell phones with a similar level of capabilities. The phone was introduced with a battery that can’t be upgraded by the user, something that has been standard in the cell phone market (and most portable consumer electronics) for many years. iPhone owners will have to send the product away to get the battery changed–who can go days without their phone? This is an incomprehensible mistake in strategy, in my opinion.

And finally, and most importantly, Apple chose the most “closed system” approach of all–the iPhone with only be available on one Cell Phone network, AT&T;, for at least 5 years. I find this part of the strategy astounding. First of all, it seems to me to be completely unnecessary and yielding few benefits to the company. It appears that Apple did this to have leverage in their cell phone partner negotiations, all
owing them to retain control on some items, and keeping their prices high. I think Apple is being penny-wise and pound foolish here. The have a hot product; now is the time to establish the Apple brand as the preferred high end supplier of smart phones. But they can now accomplish this in only a segment of the huge cellular audience, for completely artificial reasons. Shutting out the bulk of the market in this fleeting time of major advantage, for bit higher margins and control on a few areas that most cell phone manufacturers do without? It’s hardly worth in my opinion.

Also, the Cellular Network Operator partner they have chosen is very suspect. While AT&T; is the biggest wireless operator in the US market and a fine company, they are behind in the game technologically in the wireless Internet part of the cellular market–the very aspect in which the iPhone shines as a mobile device. So the wonderful new features brought to wireless web access by the iPhone will slow to a crawl on the inferior AT&T; data network. It may be like running a great graphical user interface over a dial up modem–frustrating. If all you do is sit and wait for the network, it won’t matter much how slick or intuitive the device UI is.

FLAWS IN APPLE’S iPHONE GAMEPLAN?

My feeling is that there may again be some major flaws in this most recent Apple strategy. This may again cause the company to give up an early lead, in a market in which they’ve contributed true innovation. I’m not privy to all of the information that Apple management is, of course. And it’s always easy to second-guess from a distance, after the fact. So it’s quite possible that I’m just missing something, and dead wrong in my take. Plus, the whole picture of Apple’s market entry hasn’t been revealed yet. For example, I haven’t seen or heard anything about Apple’s partnering strategy with Cellular operators outside the US, but I am very interested to see how this compares to the US strategy. Will the strategy be similar or very different internationally?

Steve Jobs has contributed greatly to the development of the worldwide computer and electronics business. He has had many great successes, and also fallen a few times. He is an iconic figure who isn’t afraid to take a stand. Apple has ridden Job’s strategies to great heights several times; and also to great depths a time or two as well. Along the way Steve Jobs has provided a wealth of controversial material for columnists, writers, commentators and anyone else with an opinion. I am fascinated to watch as his strategy for this latest chapter, the iPhone, plays out in the marketplace.

So there you have it–that’s my take. Post a comment and let me know what your own thoughts are on Mr. Jobs, Apple and the iPhone.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
www.pjmconsult.com

2 Comments by admin on July 23, 2007
filed in B2C, Business Models, Corporate Strategy, General Management, Software/Product Development, hardware
tagged , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Strategic Acquisitions for Software and Technology Companies

Acquiring new products or whole companies is a popular activity for many growth and market-share oriented companies. Is it a good idea?

Well, as I often say–it depends. I get involved in company or product acquisitions quite often in my consulting practice. There is nothing inherently good or bad about acquisitions in the technology business. However, there is nothing inherently bad about opening a restaurant, either. Nonetheless, a very high percentage of restaurants (I’ve seen figures as high as 90%) fail within 5 years. The failure rate for acquisitions may not be quite as high as for restaurant startups, but technology acquisitions are also judged to be failures at shockingly high rates. Caution should rule when approaching either of these very popular activities. As I’m fond of saying about success or failure in any complex business activity–the devil’s in the details.

Common Motivations for Acquisition Activity

Let’s examine the common reasons that acquisitions are considered in the first place:

1) It’s exhilarating and “sexy” to buy another company
2) Growth for growth’s sake (often pushed by investors)
3) The belief that buying a competitor is the ultimate “victory”
4) A consolidating market (often commoditizing) where there is only room for a few large players
5) Diversification
6) A great strategic fit where 1+1 truly equals 3

As you might have guessed, reasons 1-3 above aren’t great justifications for such a risky activity. Number 4 can be a good justification, but often this is given as the rationale, when the actual market case doesn’t truly support it. Number 5 can be a good or bad rationale, depending upon whether the business case really calls for diversification–or if focus would make more sense. Number 6 is by far the best reason to acquire a company, particularly if you aren’t an industry giant, pitted in a death match with another titan of your marketplace.

So let’s say you’ve actually thought it through, and have used sound analysis and judgment in deciding to pursue an acquisition. Congratulations for passing the first test–but there are still myriad things that can trip you up, on the way to acquisition success:

Great Ways to Fail

First acquisition done “on your own”–I strongly urge all first time acquirers, whether of the product or company variety, to seek assistance. Acquiring a company and even a product is very complex, with a lot of places to trip up. Retaining an experienced hand that has seen and gone through the mistakes before, can prevent you from the most expensive education of your life.
Bad cultural fit–In the excitement of an acquisition or a merger, people have a tendency to not look past the surface. It’s much like dating an attractive potential mate, and proposing based upon infatuation, without establishing whether there is common ground in the way you live your lives. This is the business equivalent of marriage, folks. Compatibility in business philosophies and practices is crucial–and often overlooked, until after the fact, when everything is unraveling.
Poor organizational integration– Even with an excellent evaluation of potential partners, a great many mergers fail based on the execution of integrating the organizations. That’s because it is HARD. You are generally merging two organizations with disparate operating styles, as well as overlapping functions and people. Fear, uncertainty and doubt of the individuals involved can by ITSELF scuttle a potentially great fit. This area is often quoted as the reason most acquisitions fail.
Poor product integration–This is the reason a lot of acquisitions in software and high tech should be called off early in the process. It is often very difficult to rationalize how you are going to support two different code bases or technologies, aimed at the same market. The plan usually call for integrating them over time, but that often proves to be very difficult from a technical perspective. This is a real red flag when buying a direct competitor. Yet the price of the merger in high tech often assumes that the products can be integrated acceptably, without losing customers from either of the existing products. Unfortunately this is usually a very tall order
Paying too much–Price plays a big role in software and technology acquisitions. Due to high growth rates and the perceived need to move quickly in fast-growing, competitive technology markets, acquisitions are often priced in multiples of revenue. This is in contrast to the more conservative multiples of EBITDA in other less dynamic industries. Often the target isn’t even profitable yet, but still commands a high price-to-revenue multiple, due to the “hot” nature of the market space, and perceived value of the acquired technology. This high price puts a severe strain on downstream execution of the merger to be “perfect”, as discussed above.

So with all of the landmines out there in the acquisition arena, along with the high failure rate, is it simply nuts to consider acquisitions? Doesn’t it make sense to just stay away from them? NOT NECESSARILY.

Sound Approaches to Pursuing Mergers

Buying innovation–This often happens when companies reach a certain size; they simply lose their ability to innovate. Rather than innovate internally, they do so by acquiring small companies with market-changing technologies, which may not have the resources to fully exploit in the marketplace on their own. Even though multiples here tend to be high, risk is somewhat mitigated relative to internal Research and Development that might not “pan out”, and the size of the acquisition is often very modest, relative to the resources of the acquirer. This is an example of a true 1+1=3 strategic fit. This strategy has been used with great success by Cisco, Microsoft, and many other large companies with successful acquisition programs.
Buying companies or products that truly fill a hole in your offering–While some companies tend to overuse this as justification, acquisition of a reasonably priced company or product at just the right time, can mean the difference between continued growth or inevitable stagnation.
Buying undervalued assets–This is harder to do in high tech than in other industries; high tech companies have a habit of overvaluing their businesses and technologies. But an executive team with a key eye for a bargain can often pick up a diamond in the rough, for example a division that has suffered because it isn’t a good fit with the parent company’s core business
Truly appropriate diversification–Sometime you run out of steam in your current market, and the amount of cash flow generated by your current business dictates that an investment in another growth area may be prudent. The key here is to pick a market segment adjacent to the existing business, or at least a business that the management team can easily adjust too. However, management teams often are over-confident and deceive themselves, and end up investing in an area where they really don’t belong.

I could go on and talk more about acquisitions for a very long time. But instead of putting you all to sleep, let’s begin a dialogue on this topic. Inform us of your own Merger and Acquisition stories, best practices, and cautionary tales.

Phil Morettini
PJM Consulting
http://www.pjmconsult.com/

No Comments by admin on April 30, 2007
filed in Business Development, Business Models, Corporate Strategy, Mergers & Acquisitions, Uncategorized
tagged , , , , , , ,
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